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SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME I.

THEISM AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE
HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL

BY

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PREFACE.

As professor of systematic theology in the Divinity School of Harvard University, Dr. Everett gave regularly, each year, three courses of lectures which constituted together a unified body of theological instruction. In the first of these courses, he dealt with the psychological roots of religion which he found in the feelings appropriate to the three ideas of the reason,—truth, goodness and beauty. In the second course, on historical religions, his purpose was to present various systems as typical manifestations, first, of the religion of the understanding, Confucianism, and second, of religions in which one or another of the three ideas was particularly emphasized: truth, in the religions of India, especially in the Vedanta and Sankhya systems of philosophy; goodness, in Mazdeism; beauty in the religion of Greece. In the third course Dr. Everett first unfolded the philosophical implications of the three ideas in a doctrine of God as Absolute Spirit, in whom they have full realization, and then considered in the light of them the fundamental problems of theology, and presented Christianity as the Absolute Religion because comprehending in harmonious perfection all three ideas of the reason. Of these courses, the first has already been published (*The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, edited by Edward Hale, Macmillan Co. 1902), and was so well received that the Committee of the Divinity Faculty having its publication in charge felt warranted in proceeding to issue the third course, especially as the Rev. Edward Hale, who had edited so admirably the previous volume, was willing to undertake the much severer task of preparing this course also for publication. The difficulties of the work were enormous: Dr. Everett left no manuscripts of his lectures, and the editor's sole reliance had to be upon students'

notes taken in the class-room. Moreover, these lectures dealt with profound and intricate problems, in the discussion of which much depends upon a precision of statement rarely found in class-room notes. In addition, the treatment varied from year to year, far more than was the case with lectures in the first course, according to the changing demands of theological interest and the corresponding shiftings of emphasis on the part of the lecturer. The magnitude and delicacy of the task are mainly responsible for the delay in the preparation and publication of the present volume, but it is believed that the former students and many friends of Dr. Everett, as well as all who are interested in the subjects here discussed, will welcome this literary memorial of a subtle and luminous thinker who, as his mural tablet in the chapel of the School he loved and served justly says, "showed by life and doctrine the unity of the Spirit in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty."

W. W. FENN,

For the Faculty of Divinity.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
June, 1909.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE thirty-five chapters into which this book is divided represent some ninety lectures, the number in the course varying a little from year to year. In preparing them for publication I have been indebted to the Rev. F. M. Bennett, the Rev. J. B. W. Day, the Rev. W. F. Furman, Professor H. H. Horne, the Rev. W. R. Hunt, and Professor H. H. Williams for the use of their notes, and to the Harvard Divinity Library for the use of notes taken by the late Rev. Samuel Foster McCleary. All of these notes have been helpful, but I am under especial obligation to Mr. Furman whose careful transcription of his shorthand notes has enabled me to reproduce many passages with a fulness which otherwise would hardly have been possible.

EDWARD HALE.

CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS.
June, 1909.

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SYLLABUS.

THIS syllabus, furnished to students in later years, covered the first and third courses in Dr. Everett's theological instruction. The part numbered from 1 to 23 corresponds to the first course, the substance of which was published in 1902 under the title, *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*. It has been thought best to print the syllabus here entire, with page references to the two volumes.

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THEISM AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

CHAPTER I.

AGNOSTICISM.—THE UNKNOWABLE OF HERBERT SPENCER.

IN the examination of the psychological elements of religious faith which has already been made¹ religion was first defined as essentially *feeling*. To this was added in a second definition that it is *feeling toward the supernatural*. Both of these definitions were inclusive, covering all forms of religion. A third definition, however, was then reached, no longer absolutely inclusive but typical, that **RELIGION IS A FEELING TOWARD A SUPERNATURAL PRESENCE MANIFESTING ITSELF IN TRUTH, GOODNESS AND BEAUTY.** Although the term “supernatural” is in itself negative,² it was found that a positive content could be given to it in the three ideas of the reason. The recognition of this content, the perception that there is a presence which manifests itself in truth and goodness and beauty, makes possible a religion in which there is place for both obedience and worship. This third definition, therefore, offers the basis for a religion of a high order and one in which certain natures can rest satisfied. There are other natures, however, which require something further. They ask for a more intimate relation with the object of worship and trust. Is it possible

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1902), the substance of a course of lectures by Dr. Everett introductory to the lectures on Theism.

² *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 93.

to meet their demand and to substitute for the word "supernatural" in this definition the word "spiritual"?

It is evident that if we attempt to take this further step we must face at once the position popularly known as agnosticism. We meet it in two forms. Of these one is based on *a posteriori*, the other on *a priori* considerations, or, from another point of view, there is on the one hand the agnosticism resulting from the inadequacy of our means of knowledge, and on the other hand that which results from the nature of the object as in itself unknowable. For example, we do not know whether the planet Mars is inhabited because as yet we lack the proper instruments to enable us to find out. Or again, the number of the grains of sand on the seashore is unknowable because the process of counting is too delicate and intricate to be carried through. In neither of these two cases is the object unknowable in itself, but only because the means at our command for attaining to knowledge are insufficient. On the other hand the length of eternity, or the extent of space, cannot be known, because of the very nature of the thing itself. Agnosticism of this kind, it should be observed, is a sign not of weakness or limitation in human reason but of strength. To know that no one can tell what are the limits of eternity or space because such limits do not exist, is not ignorance but knowledge. Agnosticism in regard to the Absolute is of this latter kind. It is based upon *a priori* considerations. The Absolute, being what it is, cannot be known. But here is the very contradiction which has just been suggested. To affirm that the Absolute is unknowable is to show that strictly speaking it is not unknowable; we know enough about it to know that it is unknowable. The term "unknowable" may be true in a rhetorical sense, but it cannot be used scientifically. The words "agnostic" and "agnosticism," as used by Huxley, express simply the attitude of one who lacks the evidence which would enable him either to affirm or to deny.¹ The *Unknowable* of Herbert Spencer expresses the *a priori* impossibility of attaining to knowl-

¹ Thomas H. Huxley, *Collected Essays*, Vol. V, p. 192. Also *Life and Letters*, Vol. I, p. 233, Vol. II, p. 235.

edge of the Absolute. The use which Huxley makes of his terms is scientific. Spencer's term can be used properly only in a rhetorical sense. When we say that the Absolute is unknowable, what we really mean, speaking accurately, is that in many of its aspects it is unknowable.

Although Spencer assumes that the Absolute is unknowable, he maintains, nevertheless, that we must believe in it.¹ We cannot, he says, "get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances." But what is meant by the consciousness of a thing? I am conscious only of that of which I have had some experience. I can believe only to the extent to which I am able to conceive. Suppose, for instance, that I hear a noise in the next room. It excites in me a belief that something, perhaps somebody, is moving there,—what or who, I cannot say. At first thought it might seem that in such a case my belief went beyond my knowledge. But what is it that I believe? That there is something there. What is my concept? That it is situated thus or so. The concept is very vague, but so is the belief. The belief does not go beyond the concept. Or take an example of a different kind. Suppose you had never heard the word "boomerang," and some one uses it. It is the name of something. Do you know anything about it? If not, what reason have you for believing in it? You answer that you do not know about it yourself, but So-and-so does. Then you believe only this in regard to it, that it enters into the knowledge of So-and-so. But perhaps you say that it is a man who has travelled in Australia who knows about it. Then you conceive of it as in Australia. You are told further that it is a weapon, and your concept becomes clearer. Then you are told that it changes its course and that it is shaped so that it shall change its course. Here your concept will probably rest. Has your belief at any point gone beyond your concept? Belief does not precede knowledge, because it does not extend beyond knowledge; our belief can go no further than our understanding.

In saying this, however, we have to guard against the confusion that arises if we take the term "understanding" as implying *full*

¹ *First Principles*, 4th ed., 1880, Chap. IV, § 26.

understanding. Our proposition is not what a man means when he says, "I will believe nothing that I cannot understand." He means that he will believe nothing which he cannot understand completely. But this would imply no belief at all, for there is nothing which you can completely understand. We have to distinguish here between a vague thought and an incomplete or abstract thought. All our concepts are more or less incomplete, but to the extent to which they are complete they are clear and real. When I look at a distant wood I see in one sense nothing but the leaves. In another sense I do not see the leaves at all. Yet my vision, in so far as it is vision, is real and clear.

As knowledge increases, however, the sense of mystery deepens. All that we know of any object at a given moment is the introduction of that object to a new set of relations not before associated with it. Darkness comes with the glimmering of light. So with knowledge comes the sense of ignorance. The two are bound together inseparably so far as any object is concerned which presents itself to us. If we let a represent what is known and x what is unknown, then all objects are presented to us in terms of ax . No a can exist by itself, but every a can be seen only as ax . If we knew everything, x would disappear; but as we move from knowledge to knowledge, the x increases more rapidly than the a , not necessarily in the form of absolute ignorance, but in our sense of ignorance, our recognition of what is still unknown. We need not feel mortification because our sense of mystery grows in this way as our knowledge increases. When, as appears to happen in the case of many persons, knowledge takes away the sense of mystery, we find usually that the knowledge in such cases has been only superficially grasped. Whenever we think deeply and exhaustively, we come upon the field of the mysterious, and as we try to communicate what we know, it is as though our knowledge were some little island in the vast sea of the unknown. (Science is born of wonder, says Aristotle, and Hegel replies that wonder is born of science.) Yet while it is true that there is no a without an x , we must also recognize as distinctly that there is no x without an a , no sense of mystery

without some knowledge. Mystery is simply the other side of knowledge.

What is it, however, more precisely, that Spencer means by the Unknowable, and what is the process by which he reaches his thought of it? / Spencer's *Unknowable* is Absolute Being, the *Substance* of Spinoza, the *Being* of Hegel. / He reaches the thought of it through a process of repeated abstractions. Beginning with that which is concrete, and then withdrawing the limits and conditions from concept after concept, he arrives finally at "a consciousness of something unconditioned," "not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, ideas or conceptions," but "the abstract of *all* thoughts, ideas or conceptions," "that which is common to them all."¹ Since any concept implies limitation, it follows that the Absolute, if thus unconditioned, cannot be conceived but is unknowable.

It is true, as Spencer assumes, that there is no thought without limitation. But is he right when he says of the Absolute that it is without limitation? Is it, as he says, unclassified, unrelated, and unconditioned? It is unclassified, Spencer says, because it stands alone. We might reply that one may constitute a class, but this would be superficial and would not cover the case. Every thought contains two elements, a positive and a negative, that which is more specific or individual and that which is more general or universal. Our knowledge of any object is obtained as we contrast it with something else, or as we bring it into some class larger than itself. Therefore if the Absolute cannot be thus contrasted or differentiated, it is unknowable.

The Absolute, however, is absolute *being*. Spencer, to be sure, speaks of it as "existence," but in so doing he uses the term carelessly. For *existence* implies that that of which it is used stands out from something else. It is the finite which exists; the Absolute *is*. Now absolute being is differentiated in two directions. In the first place, *being* is a common term in absolute being and finite being, and we have at once a classification which includes both. Secondly, when I affirm *being* I exclude *non-being*, and

¹ *First Principles*, p. 98.

both *non-being* and *being*, whether absolute being or finite being, are thus differentiated, and the ultimate term must be, not absolute being, as Spencer with Hamilton assumes, but a term which shall include both what is and what is not, both *being* and *non-being*. This highest universal has no name, and since it cannot be carried up into a higher generalization it is beyond conception. What Spencer has assumed in regard to absolute being is true, not of absolute being, but of this highest universal. In the process of abstraction Spencer and Hamilton simply reached the conclusion, the ultimate term in the series, too soon. Absolute being is not the final term, but can be taken up into a higher class. Therefore the Absolute is not unclassified, and in so far is not unknowable. It is indeed the most abstract term which we use, but because it is abstract it is not therefore vague. Our thought of absolute being is no more vague than any other thought, but only more abstract.

Is the Absolute unrelated? In discussing this question Spencer falls into a verbal difficulty. He speaks of the relative and the non-relative as terms of a correlation.¹ But if the non-relative is a term in a correlation, how can it be called a non-relative? Spencer speaks of the Absolute as manifesting itself in the universe and conversely of the universe as a manifestation of the Absolute. But the universe cannot be a manifestation of the Absolute except as its forms are related to the Absolute, and if they are related to it, then in turn it must be related to them. If there is a relation of the finite to the infinite, there must be as well a relation of the infinite to the finite. There cannot be relation without correlation. Thus in point of fact the Absolute is related to everything that is. Instead of being unrelated, nothing can be more related.

Finally, is Spencer's Absolute unconditioned, and for that reason unknowable? Anything may be conditioned or unconditioned either externally or internally. It is unconditioned externally when there is no restraint or limitation from without. In this sense the Absolute is unconditioned, for it is not dependent upon anything outside itself. Internally, however, the absolutely

¹ *First Principles*, p. 91.

unconditioned is by the very nature of things impossible, for every form of being is conditioned by what it is; it is what it is and nothing else. The Absolute is thus conditioned internally, if only as being. But, furthermore, nothing can *be* without being something. A thing *is* only in and through its qualities and relations. If you take these away there is nothing left; the *Ding-an-sich* is an unreality. Here, for instance, is the substance which we know under various forms as water or ice or vapor. We may call it the *absolute* of water and ice and vapor; it is not any one of them, although it manifests itself in one or another of them indifferently according to varying conditions. Are we to say that we cannot know it? On the contrary, we do know it as that substance whose nature it is thus to manifest itself. In the same way the Absolute of Spencer is that which manifests itself in the universe. Although it is neither matter nor spirit, it manifests itself in both. The whole universe is its manifestation. Separate it from the universe and it would cease to be. Spencer himself allows it no freedom in this respect. In proportion, therefore, as we know the universe we know the Absolute, and, since the Absolute exhausts itself in the universe, if we could arrive at complete knowledge of the universe we should also have complete knowledge of the Absolute. Spencer's Absolute is thus in itself most knowable. If we fail to know it, the difficulty arises from the limitation of our own powers and not from anything in the nature of the Absolute itself.

In criticising Spencer's position we must not forget the great service which he has rendered in popularizing the recognition of the unknown in matter and force, and in showing that they are not to be fully comprehended, as is so commonly assumed by superficial thinkers. Spencer's difficulty lies in his failure to see that, while it is true that no knowledge is complete, it is equally true that there is nothing of which we have absolutely no knowledge. He confounds the abstract with the vague and unknowable. Hegel also takes the position that pure being is indistinguishable from non-being and so absolutely unknowable, but with Hegel this is only the first step in an argument by which he shows

that the Absolute is the infinitely concrete, manifesting itself in and through all things, and thus infinitely knowable. It is to be observed also that when Spencer arrives at the thought of the principle of unity in his Absolute, he leaps a chasm which he has not bridged. The thought is true, but how has he reached it? The only process which he recognizes is that of repeated abstraction; but this would lead, not to the principle of unity, but either to manifold being or to an abstract universal.

CHAPTER II.

THE VORSTELLUNG.—THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE SUPERNATURAL ELEMENT IN THE UNIVERSE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY IN HUMAN LIFE.—THE THREE IDEAS OF THE REASON AS GUIDES IN FINDING A PHILOSOPHIC BASIS FOR THE TERM “SPIRITUAL” AS APPLIED TO THE ABSOLUTE.

WE are in a position now to ask once more the question with which we began: Can the supernatural be conceived as spiritual? Does the Absolute, the principle of unity in the universe, stand in relation to itself as well as to the universe? Does it merely pass out and out through its manifestations infinitely, and so lose itself wholly in the universe? Or does it find itself in the universe? In other words, is it conscious?

We have recognized the incompleteness of all knowledge. It is impossible to know perfectly the simplest aspect of nature. Not only is there much of which we are entirely ignorant, but such knowledge as we have is often coarse; we see things in wrong relations. As we stand under the arches of a cathedral they take their form according to the position from which we see them. In a similar way, in every partial view of the universe, where we have failed to get at the centre of things, the arcs of the circles of our vision do not fit into the true circles. Any concept, therefore, which we may form will be inadequate. Is an inadequate concept, then, worth anything? It is easy to say No, and yet common sense tells us that if we can form no perfect concept, an imperfect concept is better than nothing. We cannot picture to ourselves the whole ocean, but the concept of it which we have is certainly worth something. Furthermore, such concepts, however imperfect, are the forms under which we represent to ourselves the truth. A definite term for representation of this kind

has been found in the word "*Vorstellung*."¹ It has no exact equivalent in English. The word "Idea" has been substituted, and is good so long as it is used only in the popular sense in which we say, "I have no idea of it." But common usage employs it in so many senses besides, and among them as the translation of Hegel's "*Idee*," that it is difficult to avoid confusion. The word "Representation" is also used, but this again is inadequate, for it implies a more objective background than "*Vorstellung*" and has not the more limited and technical significance which attaches to the German word. "Symbol" has been suggested, but although we do use the symbol as a means of representation, it is only as the representation is contrasted with the object represented and consciously compared with it. The *Vorstellung*, on the other hand, does not imply a comparison; although it is a representation, it may be, and sometimes is admitted to be, finally true. The two words, therefore, are not synonymous.

As regards the place and value of the *vorstellung* theologians have differed. According to Hegel all religious truth presents itself first in the form of a *vorstellung*; but whereas the *vorstellung* itself is finite, its content, the truth for which it stands, is infinite, and this infinite content is constantly breaking through the finite form of the *vorstellung*, as new conceptions of the content lead to readjustments of the form in which it is presented. Thus the history of religion is that of the formation and shattering of *vorstellung* after *vorstellung*, all finite, but each in turn more inclusive and adequate than that which has preceded it. The Christian religion, according to Hegel, is still only a *vorstellung*, although the grandest and most beautiful of all. Schleiermacher recognizes with Hegel the importance of the *vorstellung* as a half-way house. To Hegel, however, nothing is beyond the possible range of thought, and each *vorstellung* simply marks one stage in the advance toward truth, whereas to Schleiermacher the Absolute

¹ Hegel, *Werke*, Berlin, 1832, Vol. XI, pp. 79, 215. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Vol. I, p. 121. Lipsius, *Evangelische Protestantische Dogmatik*, p. 68. Park, *Theology of Head and Heart, Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. VII, p. 533.

is unknowable, and the vorstellung is all that we can have. Biederermann makes the vorstellung the mean between abstract thought and conception. According to Pfleiderer it hovers between the spiritual content of religion and the corporeality of its form. According to Lipsius all religious thought moves in sensuous figures, the language of religious dogma never ceasing to express itself under the form of the vorstellung. Professor Park made a distinction between the theology of the intellect and the theology of the heart which aroused much discussion at the time. He himself did not give to the theory which he advanced its full sweep, but it was a theory the application of which might vary according to the person who made use of it, and many felt that it imperilled everything that had been considered fixed in religious thought and opened the door to all sorts of skepticism.

When we come to the practical application of the theory of the vorstellung, we find that four results are possible. First, the recognition that all expressions of religious truth are inadequate may lead to catholicity of feeling toward the various forms of religious belief and worship; an element of truth is seen in all these forms, and a certain relation and sympathy between them; all are imperfect and yet all are attempts at the expression of truth. This view is more and more commonly taken, and to a certain extent it indicates a healthful spiritual attitude. But it may be carried to an extreme if one assumes that because all forms of expression are imperfect all are therefore of equal value. It is with religious forms and beliefs as with names. We may say that abstractly all names are artificial and that therefore one name is as good as another. Yet when names connote as well as denote, we cannot use them indifferently. We may say with Pope "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord,"¹ but we have to recognize that the name "Jove," for instance, is entangled with superstitions and the forms of a comparatively low mythology, and that such a name for God is not so good as one that has higher associations. Catholicity is rightly interpreted when we mean by it an attitude of sympathy toward all forms of belief and worship, but the

¹ *The Universal Prayer.*

so-called catholicity which merges all forms and reduces all to the same level is untrue.

In the second use of the vorstellung a change of emphasis leads from the same premises as before to precisely the opposite conclusion, and instead of catholicity there is skepticism. In the first use the emphasis was upon the content, and since all forms contained some element of truth all were therefore to be accepted. In this second, negative, use it is the form that is emphasized, and since all forms are found to be similarly remote from absolute truth, all are rejected as equally false, and with the rejection of the form the content also is lost. A good illustration of the result that follows when a form is thus broken up, before its content has been thoroughly apprehended, is seen in the passage from Catholicism to unbelief which many people in Italy have experienced during recent years. All the religious thought and feeling of these people had been associated with a single form of religious observance, and the loss of faith in this particular form carried with it all belief in any religion at all. There is this advantage, perhaps, in the variety of creeds in our own country, that when one form of observance no longer satisfies the worshipper some other form is at hand which may meet his need, and he is less likely to identify all religious belief with any one of the forms in which it finds expression. Under any circumstances, however, it is dangerous to approach too violently forms which are seen to be incomplete or even untrue. The wisdom of Jesus appears nowhere more clearly than in his teaching in this regard.¹

In the third use of the vorstellung a distinction is made between the demands of the intellect and those of the heart. The intellect pronounces the vorstellung false, but the heart requires it and therefore is bidden to use it. This use of the vorstellung is common with some of the German theologians. Thus the expression, "infinite personality," is held to be a contradiction in terms so far as definite truth is concerned, and yet liberty is given to speak of God as personal.² This position, however, is most perilous.

¹ *Matthew*, xiii, 24-30.

² Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Vol. II, pp. 538-544.

It introduces into religion an element of dishonesty, and those who uphold it forget that the heart is above all sincere and cannot be trifled with. The passion for truth is in itself an emotion, and of the heart; it is the method of seeking truth which is of the intellect. Furthermore, the head and the heart cannot rest in such divergence; either the vorstellung will become less vivid as the intellect asserts itself, or the heart will be victorious and declare its intuitions more trustworthy than the reasoning of the intellect.

What forms, then, and what uses of the vorstellung are justifiable and helpful? All, we may answer, in which the vorstellung is recognized as partially true and as representing truth which may be more and more nearly approached. This will include both those forms and uses to which we are driven by the intellect itself, and also all those which spring from the needs of the heart as adding force and warmth to the intellectual statement or in which the intellect accepts the longings of the heart as suggestions of truth. Limited as we are, we recognize that our knowledge is incomplete as regards even the common objects and relations of life, and that much less can we expect to attain to complete truth in regard to supersensuous objects of thought. It is as Jesus said to Nicodemus, "If I have told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things?"¹ Yet the use of such terms as we have is necessary and helpful. However imperfect they may be as compared with ultimate terms, we know that we approach nearer to the truth by using them.

In the *Autocrat of the Breakfast Table* Dr. Holmes suggests how when two persons are talking together, John and Thomas, at least six personalities may be recognized as taking part in the conversation; there is the real John, he says, who is known only to his Maker, and there is John's ideal John, and there is Thomas's ideal John, and then there are similarly the real Thomas and Thomas's ideal Thomas and John's ideal Thomas. We might go farther than this and say that there are as many Johns and Thomases as there are persons with whom John and Thomas

¹ *John*, iii, 12.

come into relation, and although all the ideas of John and Thomas, except the view of Omniscience, are imperfect, yet all contain some truth. The love of the child toward its father is different from that of the father toward the child. The child says, "Father," without at all realizing the full content of the name. Yet the child's love is nearer the truth than indifference would be on the ground that the child could have no adequate knowledge of the father's nature. As we go out of some cavern into the daylight the first twilight is not yet the full light of day, but it is better than the darkness of the cavern.

Take, for instance, that expression "infinite personality" to which I have just referred. It is said to be a contradiction in terms.¹ Suppose, however, that we should discover that we cannot conceive of the Absolute apart from personality, and cannot think of personality adequately unless we think of it as infinite.² Then the relation between intellect and heart would be no longer one of opposition but one of entire harmony, the intellect arriving at the result which is demanded by the heart. If the expression "infinite personality" should then fail to represent the truth, it would fail only in so far as it was inadequate, and not because it involved contradiction. It would be at least a step in the direction of the truth. Have you ever seen the ocean? Can you tell how it differs from a lake? You say that its vastness differentiates it. But you have not seen its vastness, and yet you know that you have seen the ocean; you have seen it imperfectly, and your knowledge of it is imperfect, but your concept although incomplete is not untrue. So it is with the thought of God.

This position is quite different from the extreme catholicity which assumes that one form of representation is as good as another. The position here taken assumes that one form of representation comes nearer to the truth than another, and we have to ask by what process we are to arrive at the form that shall be most nearly adequate. We can proceed only from analogy. It was by analogy, however, that men came to experience religious

¹ John Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 408.

² Pages 41-47.

feeling in the first place, the savage assuming that the nature which he found manifested in the universe was a nature more or less similar to his own, and in making analogy our starting point we are on the beaten track of all religious thought. Philosophy, too, has trusted much to analogy. Thus Schopenhauer, early in his treatise on *The World As Will and Idea*, uses the double knowledge that each of us has of the nature and activity of his own body as a key to the nature of all phenomena, and assumes that as in one aspect these phenomena are *idea* like our bodies, and in this respect are analogous to them, so in another aspect that which remains of objects apart from their existence as phenomena must in its inner nature be the same as that in ourselves which we call *will*.¹ This is not induction but analogy. The reasoning is from one case to innumerable cases. We are given not proof but suggestion. (It is as though our mind were a mirror upon which the world about us is reflected.)

What help, then, will analogy furnish here? According to the third definition which we have reached, religion is a feeling toward a supernatural presence manifesting itself in truth, goodness and beauty. By "nature" we mean the universe as a composite whole, and by "supernatural" the non-composite unity in and through which this composite whole exists; the supernatural is not a disturbing influence apart from and over against the natural, but the absolute unity which manifests itself in and through the diversity of nature.² Is any analogy to be found for this supernatural element in the universe as contrasted with the natural? We find in man something that is similar. There is in man a non-composite somewhat just as there is a non-composite somewhat in the universe, a unity in his life upon which all the various manifestations of that life depend. This principle of unity, this supernatural element, so to speak, in the life of the individual man, we call his "spirit." Can the same term be applied to the supernatural element in the universe? Both in the universe

¹ Translation of Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, pp. 128-137.

² C. C. Everett, *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, pp. 89-92.

and in the individual man there is a non-composite unity, in each preserving itself similarly through all the changes of the composite nature through which it is manifested. If the term "spirit" is applied to the non-composite unity in the life of the individual man, can it not be applied to the non-composite unity in nature?

Before we answer we must ask whether the result of this analogy could be accepted critically. What effect, for instance, would it have upon our second definition of religion, that religion is a feeling toward the supernatural?¹ If there is a supernatural presence in the individual man, why is not our feeling toward others and toward ourselves religion? The difficulty thus suggested, however, is not serious. In the first place, the supernatural element in men is not often recognized either by themselves or by others. We live outside ourselves, seeing what is composite in life, measuring life by the abundance of the things which we possess. Furthermore, when we do recognize the unity in ourselves and in others, the feeling which is aroused is akin to religion. The admiration of the hero passes easily into hero worship, exalted friendship mingles reverence with love, and whenever the possible sacredness of our own lives is felt, when the conscience utters protest, when some lofty soul in a depraved age gives voice to the spirit of righteousness, the recognition afforded to such manifestations of the spiritual life is closely allied with religious feeling. Thirdly, we perceive the vast difference between the conception of the infinite presence which manifests itself in the universe and the spirit which gives unity to the life of the individual. We see how infinitely more dependent we are upon the unity of the universe, and that considered absolutely there is only one supernatural presence of which all lesser unities are manifestations. This analogy, therefore, does not stand in the way of our definition of religion but rather helps to confirm it.

Analogy, however, serves only as a starting-point. Can we go further? Is there any philosophic basis for the use of the term "spiritual" as applied to the Absolute? Our third definition of religion suggests an answer. According to this definition the super-

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. VII.

natural presence manifests itself in the three ideas of the reason, truth, goodness and beauty,¹ and in our attempt to reach a more positive result we may use these as guides. It is a method which has not been followed generally by students of philosophy. They have oftener been content to begin as it were at second hand and to take much for granted in their premises. With the philosophers, however, this method has been a favorite one, and almost all of them have begun by taking as a foundation one or another of the three ideas. Thus Plato found in the idea of beauty the animating principle of his philosophy, Spinoza built up his entire system upon the absolute unity, and Kant swept aside the system of Spinoza and based religious belief upon goodness alone, the postulate of the moral law. Spinoza and Kant try each to exclude from their systems everything but the single principle which they have adopted, but with both of them other elements creep in unobserved. Spinoza cannot escape the harmony that results from the moral sense, and Kant implicitly assumes results that are not allowed by his negations. We shall profit by the authority of all these profound thinkers in so far as their contributions are positive, but we shall use as our guides, not one or another of the ideas of the reason, but all three, as all fundamental and essential to religion.

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. IX.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST IDEA OF THE REASON MANIFESTED AS UNITY IN TIME, OR ETERNITY.

BEGINNING, then, with the first idea of the reason, *truth* or *unity*,¹ we find that there are four forms in which it manifests itself. It appears as unity in time, *eternity*; as unity in space, *omnipresence* or *immensity*; as unity in essence or being, *ideal unity* or *omniscience*; and as dynamic unity or unity in force, *omnipotence*.

Before we go further, it is well to distinguish between two kinds of theological thought which differ from each other not as methods but as habits of mind, the so-called theology of common sense and the theology called mystical. The distinction between them is not complete; there is no profound religion without the mystical sense, and the more mystical faith must find limits within the understanding; but in general common-sense theology emphasizes what is known, the *a* in the *ax* of religious faith,² and mystical theology emphasizes *x*, the unknown. We see examples of common-sense theology in Socinianism and the kindred schools of religious thought, while mystical theology has been more prominent in the so-called orthodox belief of Christianity, meaning by orthodox that which on the whole has been accepted by the Church in the course of its history.

The distinction between these two habits of thought appears at once when we begin to examine the different views that are held in regard to unity in time, eternity. According to common-sense theology eternity is endless time, and the Eternal Being is one who has existed without beginning or end. This view assumes the reality of time. There is here an element of sublimity, for that struggle between the imagination and the reason is involved

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. X.

² Page 4.

which Kant holds to be the essence of the sublime. Yet Hegel, to whom nothing physical suggests sublimity, regards such an eternity as one of the lowest forms of infinitude, "die schlechte Unendlichkeit," and finds it wearisome, "langweilig."¹ Mystical theology regards eternity not as the prolongation of time but as its absolute antithesis. According to this view time has in itself no reality but belongs to the world of phenomena, and eternity is a timeless condition without change. Between these two views there is an intermediate popular view which regards both time and eternity as real, eternity beginning as time comes to an end, and the life of the individual passing from time into eternity at death. Here, as elsewhere, misinterpretations of passages in the Bible have given rise to much that is most picturesque in theology. The misinterpretations have been corrected, but the results still remain. This popular view of time and eternity has found special confirmation in the passage from *The Revelation* where the angel who stands "upon the sea and upon the earth" is made to declare, according to the King James version, "that there should be time no longer."² These words have been understood popularly as meaning that there should be an end of time and that eternity should begin, whereas their true interpretation is that there should be no more time, that is, no more delay.

Objectively considered, time is the most mysterious thing with which we have to do. Hegel brings out this element of mystery in the striking definition that he gives in his *Natur-Philosophie*.³ "Time," he says, "is that form of being which, in so far as it is, is not, and in so far as it is not, is." That is, time in its very essence consists in flux, and any form of being that is permanent is not time. We assume that a circle is composed of an infinite number of infinitesimal straight lines, but we may not in a similar way assume that time is made up of minute points of duration, for time is simply succession, or rather the abstract of succession.

¹ *Werke*, Berlin, 1840, Vol. VI, p. 184. *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by W. Wallace, pp. 149, 168.

² *Revelation*, x, 5-6.

³ *Werke*, Berlin, 1842, Vol. VII a, § 258.

Some writers have thought of eternity as excluding succession. If they exclude succession, they exclude that which makes time what it is. Eternity, then, must be a positive something which is the antithesis of time. Kant sets this forth in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹ To him time has no reality, but is simply phenomenal. Reality is timeless. Just as space is the form of our external perception, Kant argues, so time is the form of our internal perception. Therefore time is a form of thought. But we cannot think without thought, and therefore we cannot reach the conception of timelessness any more than a bird can fly out of the atmosphere. To reach the conception of timelessness we should have to enter into a world as distinct from thought as the world of internal perception is distinct from the world of outward perception. Thus the difficulty in conceiving of eternity, if we assume that it excludes succession, is fundamental. We may make the positive statement that eternity is the antithesis of time, and we may believe it, but that is as far as we can go in this direction.

Nor do we make further progress by the aid of definitions such as that which Hodge gives when he states that "eternity is infinite duration" and "time is limited duration" and quotes the schoolmen's *punctum stans*, "an ever abiding present."² For the term "duration" is meaningless apart from the thought of time, and there can be no present which does not imply a past and a future. When Hodge says that eternity is infinite duration and that time is limited duration, he evidently uses duration in the sense of time, and his definition, therefore, is confused. It is no more helpful than that definition of Quenstedt's in which eternity is stated to be, not duration without beginning or end, but "simple interminableness."³ Spinoza avoids this difficulty of defining eternity without the use of temporal terms by describing eternal being as that which exists from the necessity of its own being.⁴ This definition, however, is quite out of the line of our present examina-

¹ Trans. by F. Max Müller, Vol. II, pp. 27-36.

² *Outlines of Theology*, p. 109.

³ *Theologica*, p. 311.

⁴ *Opera*, ed. Bruder, Vol. I, p. 111.

tion. Schleiermacher comes nearer to what we have in mind when he defines eternity as "that timeless causality of God which conditions all that is in time and time itself."¹ This definition of Schleiermacher's is better than Spinoza's in that it recognizes a relation for absolute being, whereas Spinoza considers the nature of absolute being rather than any relation in which it stands. But Schleiermacher's definition does not conform to the conditions of our problem; it gives us no conception of eternity.

In any discussion as to whether time is real or phenomenal we must of course recognize the relativity of time. We can measure time only by the difference in rapidity between one movement or succession and another, as for instance the difference between the movement of the hands of a clock and the movement of the sun. If all the successions in the universe were to increase or decrease in rapidity simultaneously, it is easily conceivable that we should not perceive the change. Everyone has noticed, also, in the common experience of every-day life, what a difference there is between what may be called real time, that is time as measured by some standard, and apparent time. Apparent time lengthens or shortens according to one's mood. Thus expectancy lengthens time, and "the watched kettle never boils." Grief or pain tends also to lengthen time, and joy to shorten it. If heaven is absolute blessedness, then we may conceive of heaven as eternity in a moment, and hell would be a condition of absolute suffering in which every moment would equal an eternity. Contemplation is to large extent a lost art in these days. When we think, we think about something, and we pass from one object of thought to another. But the Hindu practised a contemplation in which the succession of thought ceased and all sense of time was lost. You may recall the legend of the monk who had not believed in eternity but who saw one night in prayer the beatific vision and when it passed found that years had gone by in what had seemed a moment. The ability to forecast the future, also, in so far as we admit that such ability exists, offers another illustration of the relativity of time. I do not mean, of course, the

¹ *Werke*, Abth. I., Vol. III, § 52.

reflective prophecy which declares what outcome is reasonably to be expected from present conditions and tendencies, but that clairvoyance in which future events are seen as though they were already taking place. Here, however, the facts that are presented to us are open to question.

Recognizing, then, the relativity of time, shall we say that time is phenomenal and eternity the antithesis of time, or shall we say that time is real and eternity the endless duration of time? The more profound philosophers have considered time phenomenal and eternity the antithesis of time, but the question is one that cannot be definitely settled; it does not admit of either proof or disproof. Furthermore, it is a question which, as students of religion, we are not obliged to try to decide. For it is a metaphysical problem, interesting to philosophical thought, but without any important bearing upon religious questions. There is involved, however, a truth which is often overlooked,—that phenomena are as real as anything else. Only when the phenomenon is regarded as representing something other than itself does contradiction arise. Phenomena as phenomena are real. In Buddhistic nihilism everything is resolved into a dream, and dream and dreamer are held to be alike unreal. But a dream as dream is real. Granted that we dream, there must be at last the ultimate dream of that which we have dreamed. In a similar way, if we agree with Kant and others that time is phenomenal, we have still to do with time as a reality. Besides, if there is a unity in the world, this unity must embrace phenomena as well as all that we commonly regard as more real than phenomena. To a passenger on a swiftly moving train the various objects in the landscape appear to pass in quick succession. Another person on a hilltop sees the same landscape stationary. Now, if the consciousness of the person on the hilltop is to be complete, he must also have experience of the landscape as it appears to the passenger on the train. So absolute being must be related to time as well as to space, and must preserve itself through the phenomena of time.

How are we to conceive of such a unity in and through time?

If we say that only the changeless endures, what do we mean by "changeless"? What is identity? When are we to say that one thing is like another, and when are we to say that it is the same as another? Identity of function we recognize easily. The legs of a table have each the same function in supporting the table. But here the element of time does not enter. In certain cases of functional identity we may indeed try to add the element of time. We may say, for instance, that the meal which we eat today has the same function in supporting the body as the meal that was eaten yesterday. However, this question of functional identity need not detain us. It has been said that two things are identical which are indistinguishable. But this is unsatisfactory. We cannot distinguish one point in space from another, but if points in space because they are indistinguishable were therefore identical, all space would shrink to a single point. We speak of having the same thought today that we had yesterday, or the same headache, but in reality it is only a similar headache or a similar thought. Again, it may be said that anything retains identity which has had a history between the different moments at which it has been presented to our consciousness. This, however, is merely formal. A river from moment to moment has a history, but the river is always changing, and any change whatever in an object destroys its identity. A boy speaks of his jack-knife as the same knife although blades and handle may all have been renewed. But suppose that the boy lends his knife and that it is returned to him nicked or tarnished. "This is not the knife I lent you," he declares, and strictly speaking it is not.

Practically, however, we may say that a thing is the same if whatever is essential to it remains unchanged. An extreme application of this practical view is found in the case at law in which the title to certain property is in question. So long as the house remains a certain person is to own the land. "Let the chimney stand," argues the lawyer, "and the house stands." Suppose, however, a series, a, b, c, d, \dots, z , to represent all the qualities that make an object what it is. Then if we omit a single letter there is a change in the series, and the object is no longer

the same. The change in it is real, and the amount of the change does not matter. It may be said that if the bulk of anything remains the same, the object is the same. But a broken watch, even though all the pieces are there, is by no means the same as when it was whole; the materials of a building are not the same as the finished structure. In a word, whatever is composed is subject to change. How is it, then, with the atoms? Do they, perhaps, remain the same, and are the changes that we see only the varying combinations of the atoms? But, on the other hand, is an atom in rapid motion the same as when it was moving slowly? Are the atoms in one form of chemical compound the same as in another? If we raise a to various powers, a^2 , a^3 , a^4 , it is not the same a that enters into these various combinations. For a as such is left behind at the beginning; a becomes a^2 , and it is a^2 and not a that becomes a^3 , and so on, and if we are to find a once more we have to reverse the process.¹

Then are we to accept the theory of absolute flux? Shall we say with Heraclitus that no one has ever bathed twice in the same river, or with Buddha that no man lives two moments in the same universe? Absolute identity requires that both form and material shall remain the same, but in everything both form and material are all the time changing. We seem therefore to lose the possibility of identity.

But how is it that we reach this consciousness of change? Flux cannot be recognized except as there is something permanent by which the flux may be measured, some power by which past and present may be brought together so that they can be compared. We find this only in conscious spirit. Therefore only a conscious being can preserve identity. It is true that like everything else conscious spirit changes. But it endures through change. It does not leave the past behind, but through memory takes it up into itself, it carries a forward into a^2 . Through remembrance and through personal recognition the conscious being knows himself in the past and in the present, and thus we find the enduring

¹ Lotze's *Metaphysic*, translation edited by Bosanquet, p. 51. B. P. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, Part I, Chap. III.

not in that which denies change or is opposed to change, but in that which has the power to preserve itself in and through change. Locke recognizes the truth of this,¹ holding that even if the substance changes every moment, memory would constitute identity. Lotze also presents² with great clearness this conclusion drawn from the recognition of the past in the present. So also Professor Bowne.³

No doubt there are certain difficulties that must be recognized. Shall we say that the continuance of personal identity is to be measured by the power of memory and personal recognition? What gaps sleep and unconsciousness would leave! How imperfect is our endurance through the changes which we experience! How much of our thought of yesterday has gone from us! How we meet men whom we once knew and fail to recognize them! How we look back upon our childhood and ask ourselves whether we did certain things or whether it was some one else who did them! Do we remember what we did, or has some one else remembered, and told us of them? When, however, we conceive of infinite spirit, these difficulties no longer exist. In the identity of absolute consciousness there can be no gaps or breaks. The imperfect endurance of the individual through change is due to the incompleteness of his knowledge. As the knowledge is increased there is a corresponding gain in the endurance. The skilful chess-player feels no surprise in the moves made by his opponent, for in his knowledge of the game he has anticipated them from the beginning. So Grant, it is said, at the battle of the Wilderness, when told that a wing of his army had given way, replied, "I don't believe it," and the event proved that he was right. Now in the case of infinite spirit we conceive of a consciousness to which all knowledge is open, and in whose unity past and future alike are taken up absolutely into the present.

¹ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. XXVII.

² *Microcosmos*, trans. by Hamilton and Jones, Book II, Chap. I.

³ *Metaphysics*, Part I, Chap. III, and Part III, Chap. I.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST IDEA OF THE REASON MANIFESTED AS UNITY IN SPACE, OR OMNIPRESENCE.

WE have considered up to this point the first of the four forms in which the first idea of the reason is manifested, and we have found that in so far as the supernatural presence toward which our feeling is directed is regarded as manifesting itself in unity in time, it must be regarded as a conscious, spiritual presence. We pass now to the consideration of the second of the four forms in which truth or unity is manifested, namely, *unity in space*, or *omnipresence*. Here there is a difficulty at the outset, in that we have no word to express our meaning which does not imply relation to space. Eternity, as we have seen, does not necessarily mean endless time; it may be conceived of as polar to time. But omnipresence is not polar to space but has a distinct relation to space; it is presence in space. The term "immensity" has been used; but this also is a term which we commonly apply in space relations, as when we speak of something which is very large, in space and not outside of space; when we use the term apart from space relations it is of something which does not come within the category of measurement, as when we say that the soul is immense or immeasurable.

The idea of omnipresence like that of eternity comes somewhat late in the history of theological thought. In the earlier forms of religion the need of the attribute of omnipresence was not felt, for though no one god was omnipresent divinity was everywhere; fetishism conceived of divinity as in or behind everything, polytheism provided in every place some divinity or *genius loci*; the only hint of a need appears in some complaint that the gods are absent. With the development toward monotheism, however, the need of omnipresence as an attribute of divinity is felt increas-

ingly. The deistic conception of a universe in which all divinity is gathered up in one being, separate and remote from the world, is to many minds repellent, and rather than accept such a world out of which the thought of a present divinity has been taken, they cry out with Wordsworth to

“Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.”¹

At first an attempt is made to meet the difficulty by assuming an omnipresence through knowledge. The divinity is not everywhere but knows everything. Sometimes he sits upon a throne in the centre of the universe from which he can look out over all, sometimes he is given countless messengers, sometimes, like Varuna in the Vedic hymn, he has a thousand eyes. Even Christian monotheism has held this conception of a constructive, practical omnipresence, using the term in regard to the godhead in much the same sense as that in which we speak of the omnipresence of an earthly king. It is the view of the so-called common-sense theology. Thus, according to Socinus, deity has its place from which it rules the universe. So also in the case of the four kinds of omnipresence which Hodge and others of the older theologians recognize,—omnipresence in essence, in knowledge, in manifestation, in power,—only the first is really omnipresence; the other three naturally result from the first, and, apart from it, are all merely so many forms of constructive omnipresence. The moment we try to reach the thought of real omnipresence we pass into the region of mystical theology. To any common-sense view nothing can be more apparent than that the same person cannot occupy two places at the same time. Yet the most profound truths often set at naught the dictates of common sense.

Is there any symbol by which we can represent omnipresence? Attempts have been made to meet the difficulty by physical comparisons; but the warning given by Augustine of the danger of trusting to such comparisons is justified. No physical illustration

¹ Wordsworth, *Miscellaneous Sonnets*. “The world is too much with us.”

of this sort can be used with safety except as we recognize its inadequacy. Suppose, for example, we say that air is everywhere. But what is air? Air is not a unity, some one thing, present everywhere, but only an aggregation of certain particles, a multiplicity. Similarly there is no such thing as water except as collective matter. Light is a succession of undulations, each distinct from all the rest, and one not even propagated by another. Of ether we do not know anything except that it is manifested in light.

Spencer suggests power as a symbol.¹ But power involves force, and, however subtle the suggestion of omnipresence in the thought of force, it is a suggestion which carries with it its own limitation. Gravitation, for instance, is a force not only unexhausted but inexhaustible. Considered, however, as a unity, there is no such thing as a force of gravitation any more than there is such a unity as air or water. What we call the force of gravitation is really the collection of numberless forces, every atom its own center of force, attracting every other atom and in turn attracted by every other. The word "gravitation" is a collective term in which each individual tug, as it were, of all the atoms is represented. Thus gravitation is not a unity but a multiplicity, and similarly any physical symbol of unity in the universe is necessarily inadequate. Schleiermacher avoids the difficulty here as he does in the case of eternity, defining omnipresence as the non-spatial activity of God by which space and all spatial relations are conditioned. But here again as before he fails to conform to the conditions of our problem.²

Up to this point the difficulty has followed us which we recognized at the outset, that there is no serviceable term which we can use to express unity in space corresponding with the term *eternity* as an expression for unity in time. The fact, however, of unity in space is more easily reached than the fact of unity in time. For when we were considering unity in time we found no world to which we could retreat from time in order to view time. There-

¹ *First Principles*, 4th ed., 1880, §§ 18, 50, and Appendix.

² *Werke*, Abth. I, Band III, § 53.

fore the phenomenality of time had no meaning which could be made real to us. We could make definitions, but the definitions themselves were paralyzed. In our consideration of unity in space, on the other hand, a world is open to us which is not spatial, the inner world of mental, spiritual life, and in answer to the question whether space is phenomenal or real, psychology teaches that space as such is phenomenal, that it has no existence outside the mind.

There are two views in regard to space considered as phenomenal. The first is that of Kant, that space is a form of perception bound up with mind or spirit as such, a part of that which is fundamental in human nature; antedating all experience, it is that which makes experience possible.¹ There are some writers who recognize the essential principle in Kant's theory, but deny his conclusion and affirm that space is at the same time a form of perception and also something external to the mind which corresponds to the perception.² This position, however, is not tenable. For whatever is mental belongs to the mind alone and cannot be associated with an objective fact. The heat which I feel as I touch a kettle of boiling water is my sensation. The kettle itself is not hot in the sense in which it feels hot to my finger, unless indeed the kettle also has sensation. Similarly in any theory of space relation there cannot be something outside the mind corresponding to the mental perception.

According to the second view, held more commonly by later writers, the idea of space is derived through a process of abstraction from our various experiences of extension. We unite a great number of sensations and project the result. There is, of course, the difficulty which Kant presents, that it is the idea of space which makes possible the recognition of extension. How, then, are we to derive the idea of space from the experience of extension? Kant, however, is dealing with consciousness as it is found when fully developed. It may be true that to the fully developed con-

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. by F. Max Müller, Vol. II, pp. 20-26.

² William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, Chap. XX.

sciousness the relation between the idea of space and the recognition of extension is that which Kant discovers. But psychologists do not begin their study with the conditions presented by fully developed consciousness. What they find in the mature mind is the culmination of processes which have had their growth not merely from the infancy of the individual but from generations back. Thus the phenomena of extension must have presented themselves to the nascent mind practically long before they made their appeal to the full consciousness, and in the case of any individual an inherited tendency assists from the first the conscious efforts at perception. It is thus that the chicken as it first pecks at the grain of corn hits it accurately.¹

Just how the process of abstraction, the coalescence of the various sensations, takes place, we cannot say. We can only recognize the fact that it does take place. It may be that the first measurement of distance is through the sense of expenditure of force. The great step, however, appears to be in the development of sight. A person formerly blind whose sight has been restored does not distinguish distances at first, but does come to distinguish them after a little experience. With all of us the perception of distance is acquired; various experiences blend with vision until we no longer separate them, and we learn to see the distance of an object just as we see the relation to each other of objects in the same plane. We can represent distance also where it does not really exist. We look at a painting of some landscape; it is in one plane and without real distance; but the appearance is of distance and we seem to see this distance as though it were real. In the case of a blind man the idea of space may be conveyed by sound, or by the varying pressure of the atmosphere as objects are nearer or more remote; absolute space would then be for him an echoless void without interruptions. But this is of course only conjecture, for in the absence of a common terminology the blind man cannot tell us how he arrives at space perception.

The infinity of space is something which every one recognizes.

¹ C. Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct*.

No object is so distant that we cannot conceive of something beyond it. We illustrate the infinitude of space by the infinite possibilities of the enumeration table. There is, of course, this difference between the infinitude of space and the infinitude of the enumeration table, that the enumeration table is not in any way associated with sensation. But just as there is no number so large that it might not be larger, so in the thought of space the final point of extension cannot be reached. We have thus a definition of space as the negative possibility of indefinite extension.

Kant insists on the necessity of the *a priori* perception of space as a basis for the apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles and the possibility of their construction *a priori*; if space perceptions were gained from experience, he argues, the first principles of mathematical definition would be nothing but perceptions; the certainty of geometrical principles is the result of their abstractness.¹ In ordinary life conditions are all the time changing, so that the cause which in one instance produces a given result cannot be depended upon to produce the same results in a second instance. A remedy may cure one man of his disease, but because another man has the same disease it does not follow necessarily that the same remedy is to be recommended. Under such circumstances we can reach conclusions only through observation, overcoming by the great number of examples of a given class any doubt which may underlie our generalizations. In mathematics, on the other hand, all the concrete, variable elements which in ordinary life confuse or modify our conclusions are abstracted, and there is nothing to interfere with the relation between causes and results.

We have already seen² that space is purely subjective, and that any theory by which it is considered to be both a form of perception and also something which corresponds to the perception is untenable. Yet to say that space is subjective is not at all to say that there is nothing in the external world which causes the idea of space. Just as there is the hot body, the kettle of

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Vol. II, pp. 21, 22.

² Page 29.

boiling water, which causes the sensation of heat in my finger, so there may be a reality in the external world which causes our perception of space. But space as it is to our mind cannot be the same in the external world any more than heat as I feel it in my finger can exist in the kettle of boiling water. Objectively considered, space is pure objective externality.¹ It is externality, not simply in relation to ourselves, but absolutely, in the exclusive sense, as non-Being is external to Being. It is objective, because the externality is that of the objective world outside the world of thought. It is pure because it is without content. We speak of points of space, but points do not constitute space. Space is always filled, because for convenience or by necessity we break it up into points, but in itself it must be thought of as absolutely unbroken and uninterrupted.

If we turn now to the thought of omnipresence we find that our question in regard to it assumes a new form. We have excluded the crude forms under which it first appeared to us, and do not need to conceive it in terms of space. Only that form of being can be omnipresent which can pass beyond itself and either take its opposite into itself or find itself in its opposite. No point in space can do this, for every point excludes all other points. Spirit is the only form of being which can meet the condition. For the very *quale*, the essential attribute, of spirit is unity in and through diversity. This unity we do not easily comprehend at first thought. We live so habitually in the external world that all our formulas are taken from it, and we have no language in which spirit can be described at first hand. Yet there is nothing which enters into our experience so deeply and universally. What is it, for instance, which constitutes self-consciousness? There is an *I* and a *me*, the *I* conscious of the *me*, the two distinct from each other and yet manifestations of the same unity. The *I* may indeed be conceived as greater or less than the *me*; we may say that it is less than the *me* in so far as the *me* has content while the *I* is without content, or on the other hand we may say that the *I* is greater because it is the entire per-

¹ Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. VIIa (Berlin, 1842), *Natur-Philosophie*, § 254.

sonality, involving all the possibilities of which the *me* can represent at any moment only one. Yet fundamentally the two are one, the *I* recognizing the *me* as itself.¹

It has been said that self-consciousness is a mere matter of memory, that we are conscious at any moment not of what we are but of what we were, the subjective and objective consciousness succeeding each other so rapidly that the process presents a seeming unity. This, however, is no new theory of consciousness. It is as old as Hindu philosophy, and in the *Sankhyas* the fallacy of such a view is recognized as involving an infinite *regressus*. For if at any moment I am conscious only of the moment before, no basis remains for consciousness, and I should never get hold of self at all. But in reality the identity which I recognize is that of the present and the past together; when I am conscious of a pain, it may have been the pain of a previous moment, but it is *my* pain and I associate it with a present *me*.

A second illustration of the unity of spirit in and through diversity, though less complete and satisfactory than the illustration which self-consciousness affords, is found in the *idea*, the union of manifold manifestations in a single concept of the reason. Neither the idea nor the consciousness is a composite whole. Each is a perfect unity. The unity may be suggested by the various manifestations of the different elements in and through which it expresses itself, but it is nevertheless unbroken and perfect in itself. Thus the circle is a unity in which the arcs can have no existence except as they are dominated by the idea of the circle. The idea of the watch is a unity perfect in itself as compared with the composite whole, the mere assemblage of all the parts of the watch. Suppose that a man is playing billiards. He strikes a ball with his cue, that ball hits another, and so on. The first ball gives up the force which has propelled it to the second, the second may transfer the force in like manner; each moment force is lost and gained and broken up in constant play and variety. Is there any unity here? Yes, in the mind of the player. Before the stroke is made, he knows what he is going to do, and he recog-

¹ C. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*, Chap. IV.

nizes his thought in all the process which he starts. The unity is thus the unity of the idea, the player's purpose, controlling the whole movement and embodying itself in it.

Still a third illustration appears in the relation between the life within and the life without, the life within perceiving in the life without that of which it is itself a manifestation, recognizing a community, whether in goodness or in beauty, between its own nature and the nature outside of it.¹ This recognition is found in one form or another in all the more profound philosophies and in all deeply religious natures. There are natures, it is true, which although deeply religious are without conscious recognition of the spiritual unity in the universe. Yet such natures do recognize under some form the doctrine of the holy spirit, the presence of a life within leading us to the discovery of the life that is higher than ours, the indwelling of the God in whom "we live, and move, and have our being." It is to be noticed that this mystic consciousness of unity may pass over into pantheism. The absolute is then conceived as merged in its manifestation or *vice versa*. We find still a spiritual unity, but the *I* has been absorbed in the *me* or the *me* in the *I*, and personality and consciousness have disappeared.

¹ C. C. Everett, *The Science of Thought*, pp. 144, 153, *seq.*

CHAPTER V.

OBJECTIONS TO CONSCIOUS SPIRIT AS A VORSTELLUNG, BASED ON THE ANALOGY OF FINITE CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE importance of the position which we have reached is very great. We have found that the only adequate form or *vorstellung* under which we can represent unity in the universe is conscious spirit. This is a result so great in itself and in all that is implied that we might easily fear to accept it if it were not already familiar to us, and if the heart had not already assumed it. As it is, many thinkers do not accept it, and we have to consider their objections.

These objections are based on the analogy of finite consciousness. To speak of "infinite personality" or "infinite consciousness," it is said, is a contradiction in terms. We must remember, however that the argument from analogy is to be used with caution. Analogy may be empirical or it may be rational. I may say merely that I have never found *a* without the presence of *x*, or I may say that I have found a reason why *a* should never be found without *x*. Only those analogies which upon analysis are found to be rational are of any real worth.¹ Therefore before we can accept an argument from the analogy of finite consciousness, we must examine the analogy to see whether it is rational or merely empirical.

The general analogy of finite consciousness presents itself under three different aspects, physical, philosophical, and psychological. Of these the physical is least important but is often urged. The argument is based on the physical conditions of human consciousness or thought. "No thought without phosphorus," is its motto. Now it is true that thought is found in human beings only in connection with phosphorus or some tissue into which phosphorus enters. But to assume that therefore this relation between thought

¹ C. C. Everett, *The Science of Thought*, p. 274.

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and material organism must always exist and that there can be no consciousness apart from organic structure, is to fall into the fallacy, *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. The analogy is merely empirical, and if it is pressed at all it becomes absurd. Thus it has been said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, and that to speak of a conscious Infinite is therefore as impossible as to speak of a bilious Infinite. But in the secretion of bile blood has entered the liver and passed out, and bile remains behind in the form of a liquid, its molecules separated from the molecules of the blood. Is there any similarity between this process and the process by which thought is produced? On the contrary, every molecule or atom that enters the brain passes out, unless some loss takes place in the cells of the brain, and no molecular secretion remains. Thought is not a molecular result, and the brain as a thinking organ is not the same with the brain as a secreting organ.¹ The use of the analogy in this aspect merely illustrates the superficial character of a certain kind of popular scientific thought.

In its second aspect, the philosophical, the analogy is more real. Consciousness involves intelligence, and all human intelligence, all human thought, implies limitation. Therefore, it is urged, no thought is possible without limitation, and since the Absolute must be conceived as unconditioned, to attribute to it thought or consciousness is impossible. In the first place, however, we have already seen² that the theory that the Absolute must be unconditioned is mistaken, and that an unconditioned Absolute is not only inconceivable but impossible. And secondly, all human intelligence is finite intelligence and involves two factors, consciousness itself and the finite, human mind in which it appears. Does the limitation that appears in human consciousness belong to consciousness itself, or only to the human mind?

This question obliges us to examine human intelligence more closely. Three facts appear in regard to it. First, we can think of nothing by itself. No absolutely single element can be the object of thought. Thought implies contrast. In a world of unbroken light we could have no idea of light. Secondly, no two

¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 101.

² Page 6.

elements can be thought of at the same time. Suppose that a pendulum swings to and fro between two points and that as it reaches either point a bell strikes. No person ever sees the pendulum at the point in the same moment in which he hears the bell strike; if he listens intently he hears the bell before he sees the impact, and if he looks intently he sees the impact first. One element crowds out the other from the mind. Now if we were to stop here with the recognition of only these two facts, thought would appear to be impossible. But there is a third fact which must be taken into the account. Thought is organic and consists of various elements which enter into it organically. With all that pertains to spirit, it is a unity which exists only in and through diversity. Our human thoughts mutually exclude each other, because each thought comprises elements that exclude other elements. Our mental grasp is not large enough to include many elements. But the larger the mental grasp becomes, the more nearly thought approaches perfection, the greater is its power to possess facts simultaneously, and great thinkers bring into given relation a number and variety of elements which ordinary minds would think distinct. As Jevons points out, "knowledge in the highest perfection would consist in the *simultaneous* possession of a multitude of facts. . . . There is no logical foundation for the successive character of thought and reasoning unavoidable under our present mental conditions. . . . We must describe metal as 'hard and opaque' or 'opaque and hard,' but in the metal itself there is no such difference of order; the properties are simultaneous and coextensive in existence."¹ When we conceive of infinite spirit the difficulties which arise from the imperfection of finite thought disappear altogether. In the thought of God the universe must be one, that "idea of God, from which infinites follow in infinite modes."²

The philosophical form of the analogy, however, easily passes over into the third or psychological aspect, and here the objections which are offered are more important and must be considered

¹ W. S. Jevons, *The Principles of Science*, Book I, Chap. II.

² Spinoza, *Ethica*, Pars II, Prop. IV.

more at length. The first of these objections is based upon Spencer's definition of life as the correspondence between external and internal changes.¹ Thought as a form of life is thus conceived as by nature progressive, an adjustment to external relations. The lower forms of animal and vegetable life make instantaneous response, but as relations become more complicated response becomes slower, and the delay results in consciousness. It is this definition of thought which Physicus uses in the chapter on "the argument from metaphysical teleology" in his *Candid Investigation of Theism*.² Spencer admits that according to such a definition we cannot know the world as it really is, and that our knowledge of it can be only like the reflections seen in a distorted mirror; the reflections change with the changes in the object reflected, but are no more true to them in other respects than was the original reflection to the object itself. "But what of that?" asks Spencer. The mirror may indeed give us *x* and *y* and *z* instead of *a* and *b* and *c*, but *y* follows *x* as *b* follows *a*, the changes in the reflection follow the law of the changes in the object, and that is enough; for the essential function of thought is that it shall guide us through life. Thus consciousness, if it is as Spencer describes it, is simply an instrument by which annoyance is to be avoided, and if we could only work automatically in the higher relations of life as we already do in lower relations, we should get along perfectly well without it. Furthermore, consciousness, since it results from friction in the working of the mental machinery, implies difficulty and loss; it is not only an accident but an accident to be deplored.

We may in passing contrast with this theory the theory of Hegel according to which the end of existence is reached only as life becomes thought. We may not accept Hegel's theory, but as compared with the theory involved in Spencer's definition it is more in accordance with our conception of what is highest. We may hold that there is something higher than thought, but thought

¹ *The Principles of Biology*, Vol. I, Chap. V. *Essays*, Vol. III, pp. 246-249.

² George J. Romanes, *A Candid Investigation of Theism*, Chap. VI.

is certainly higher than automatism. However, without entering upon debatable ground, we have to recognize that although Spencer's definition covers certain aspects of consciousness there are others which it excludes. First of all it provides no room for contemplation. For in contemplation there is no adjustment of inner relations to outer relations. We do not try to adjust ourselves to our environment, we try, on the contrary, to keep our thoughts from wandering. Thus in an ocean voyage we enjoy the fullest benefit when we can forget even time in our contemplation of sky and sea; the rest and satisfaction which come to us are found not in any action which is to follow contemplation but in contemplation itself. Again, the esthetic sense is to a large extent excluded. According to Schopenhauer, when we contemplate a beautiful object that which gives pleasure is not the object but the idea which the object represents.¹ Here there is neither adjustment nor the result of adjustment. It is the same with the whole realm of the imagination, the world of artistic creation. Spencer's definition provides no place for them, and yet there is no form of thought that we prize more highly; the thought of the artisan who adapts we place instinctively below that of the artist who creates. In conversation, too, thought is not for the sake of any organism but is an end in itself. Conversation, therefore, would find no place under a definition by which thought is made to consist in a series of adjustments.

A second class of objections based upon the analogy of finite consciousness in its psychological aspect assumes that self-consciousness or consciousness of any sort cannot be attributed to Absolute Being without a contradiction in terms. For in the first place, it is said, the *me* depends upon the *not-me*; consciousness implies something other than itself of which it is conscious. Therefore if Absolute Being is conceived of as conscious it ceases to be absolute. It is true that differentiation is necessary to consciousness and that if consciousness were emptied of all content, or of all but a single form of content, there would be no consciousness. But the process of differentiation is not dependent upon

¹ *The World As Will and Idea*, Book III.

that which is outside consciousness. All consciousness is in reality self-consciousness, and what is commonly called self-consciousness is merely consciousness raised to a high power. We are directly conscious only of that which is going on in our own minds. We do indeed speak of the consciousness of "realities" outside ourselves, but we mean only that we cannot help believing that there are such realities; our consciousness is not of the outer universe but of the way in which we ourselves are affected by that universe. Thus all that is needed is that the consciousness should be to a certain extent complex. It is significant, as Fichte points out,¹ that we have only the negative term, the *not-me*, for that which is outside ourselves. The positive aspect is the *me*, and, as the terminology itself suggests, we do not start from the *not-me* to reach the *me*, but differentiate the *not-me* from the *me*. If the outer, foreign element be taken away, as actually happens in dreams, the consciousness of individuality is as strong as when one is awake. It is this truth that underlies the doctrine of solipsism which reaches its full expression only in the *Vedanta*. It is a doctrine that no one can dispute logically, and the only answer which can be given to any one who professes to hold it is to insist that in reality he does believe what he says that he does not believe. In a similar way it is impossible to confute logically an idealism like that of Fichte which asserts that external objects have no reality.

But the objection is made, secondly, that to produce consciousness some stimulus from without is needed, an *anstoss*, a collision with the *not-me* of the outer world by which the *I* shall be reflected back upon itself. Or if, with Fichte, reality is denied to the outer world, then the collision must arise from limitations in consciousness itself. To conceive of Absolute Being as receiving such a stimulus in either way is again, it is said, a contradiction in terms. This same objection, however, is made by the spiritualist to the position of the materialist. Just as the materialist insists that spirit cannot reach consciousness except as some impact from external matter sets it in motion, so the spiritualist insists that

¹ C. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*, Chap. V.

matter is in itself dead, and that only the touch of spiritual power can stir it to life. If the materialist answers that motion is nothing new in matter or foreign to it, and that the activity of matter is without beginning or end, why may not the spiritualist make a like answer and assume that the processes of consciousness are equally without beginning or end? The argument has as much validity on the one side as on the other, and we may equally well assume that spirit and matter have been eternally active together, or that either could exist eternally independently of the other.

We have, then, as the result of all this examination, two propositions. First, we cannot represent Absolute Being to ourselves except under the form of spirit. Second, we cannot represent to ourselves ideal spirit, perfect consciousness, except as Absolute Being. In considering the first of these propositions we have to recognize the mistake which many philosophers have made in conceiving the infinite statically as over against the finite. If this conception were true, there would be, as Hegel points out,¹ not the infinite and the finite, but two finites antithetical to each other and excluding each other. The finite must be conceived not as excluded by the infinite but as taken up into the infinite, not as over against the infinite but as the manifestation of the infinite. Any conception of infinity, furthermore, which implies mere extension, mere endlessness, is inadequate, and the true symbol of infinity is not the straight line reaching on and on, but the line which returns to itself, the circle, the serpent with its tail in its mouth. The process which is symbolized by the circle is found only in spirit. It is spirit alone which returns from that into which it has gone forth. The player strikes the ball with his cue, and the force that goes out is broken up and lost,² but the player's thought is returned in the accomplishment of his plan. The sculptor chisels the block of marble and the stone gives back his thought as it takes shape according to his ideal. The absolute spirit returns to itself out of all its various manifestations in the universe, preserving itself through all changes.

The use of the circle as the symbol of the infinite may suggest

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by W. Wallace, § 95.

² Page 83.

the objection that as there are many circles, so there may be many infinites. But it is not necessary to press the symbol so far. There can be only one infinite consciousness. The circle of the spiritual life can be conceived as perfect only in that Absolute Being to which nothing is foreign or external.

The theory of the infinite as not static but a process, and a process not of extension but of return to self, is Hegel's great contribution to philosophic thought. He complements Heraclitus on the one hand and Spinoza on the other. With Heraclitus, as with Buddha also, there is process, but the flux is on and on without return. The system of Spinoza is sometimes misunderstood through a misconception of his meaning when he states that all determination is limitation.¹ If this were taken literally it would overthrow Spinoza's own theories, but what he must mean by "determination" is rather "exclusion." His theory of the absolute finds illustration in the relation between light and color. There can be no single color without limitation. But in the solar spectrum, although the light is broken up, it is no more limited than when it appeared as white light. Rather it may be said that it was more limited as white light, in that what was implicit had not become explicit. In a similar way the Absolute of Spinoza is a substance manifesting itself in infinite attributes and modes, the infinitely concrete. There is here, however, no process, but only constant equality, the infinite equal to the sum of all the attributes in which it manifests itself. With Hegel the Absolute is spirit, and the return to self is essential. How far he uses the term "infinite spirit" in the religious sense is doubtful. It will not do to push his authority too far in this respect. He certainly does not fill the theistic position which Neo-Hegelians in England have claimed for him.

It may be asked whether the terms "personality," "consciousness," "spirit," are not narrowing as applied to Absolute Being.²

¹ *Ethica*, Pars I, Def. II.

² The best negative criticism of the personality of Absolute Being is to be found in the *Christliche Glaubenslehre* of Strauss (Ed. 1840, Vol. I, § 33, p. 502), where the practical difficulties that arise when one attempts to conceive of infinite

The terms are of course imperfect, in that they are also used so commonly with some lower, more limited meaning, which we cannot easily shake off. Thus "personality" suggests, although it does not necessarily imply, one among others, and is used of the lowest as well as of the highest in human nature. "Consciousness" also has its lower associations, and the term "self-consciousness" especially, as commonly used, expresses limitation and defect. There is a certain delight, a sense of freedom, in escaping from the trammels of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness mars the beauty and dignity of an heroic act. It interferes with the full enjoyment of beauty. I sit with a friend at a concert, and we both enjoy the music; but whereas I am conscious that I enjoy it, my friend has forgotten himself in the fulness of his pleasure and appreciation. I say to him, "How beautiful it is!" He answers, "Why, then, do you not listen to it?"

Yet self-consciousness cannot be wholly done away with, even in pure contemplation. If in listening to the music we should reach a point where there was no self-consciousness, we should cease to enjoy it, for we should not hear it. In all consciousness two elements are implied, the subjective and the objective, of which the objective is not necessarily external or foreign. Self-consciousness in the lower sense appears when the subjective is over-emphasized, when the subject gets behind the object and

consciousness are clearly stated. It is surprising, however, considering his Hegelian training, that Strauss should consider so contradictory the thought of the unity of God and the necessity of representing him under manifold aspects. For in the first place, as we have already seen (Chap. IV, pp. 32-34, and Chap. V, p. 41), ideal unity is not to be conceived as over against diversity, but as manifesting itself in and through diversity. Furthermore, an object under consideration is often divided without violence to it when the division helps toward a better understanding of the object. Thus when we are studying some force which acts in a single direction we represent it as acting in two directions of which the direction in which the force really works is the resultant. Theoretically, for the sake of analysis and comprehension, we have divided the force, and there is no falsity in this division. Yet the unity of the actual force remains unbroken. Again, a similar process is followed in the analysis of certain forms of mental experience. Thus we are told that hope involves two emotions, the feeling that an object is desirable, and the feeling that the desired object is possible of attainment. Here is a compound. Yet hope itself is not compound but single.

44 OBJECTIONS TO SPIRIT AS A VORSTELLUNG

finds itself there. In the higher or true self-consciousness the objective is at its maximum consistently with any consciousness at all.

From certain points of view any form of presentation tends to narrow and belittle. The concept passes into an image, a picture, which appeals at once to the imagination and which cannot be larger than the field of vision of the imagination, and then we tend to confuse the original concept with the product of the imagination. Thus it is almost impossible to conceive of the form of the earth and of its vastness at the same time. We have two ideas of the world, one as a ball in space, and the other as composed of seas and lands, and plains and mountains. As compared with the grandeur of the mountains or the vastness of the ocean the thought of the spherical form belittles our conception. Yet notwithstanding this difficulty we do use both ideas; scientifically we conceive the form of the earth, and practically we conceive its vastness. It is a similar sort of difficulty which meets us when we try to represent to ourselves the infinite spirit. Any form of presentation which is taken from finite personality tends to introduce into our conception the little associations which belong to the limited spirit and consciousness with which we are familiar, and we cannot fill out our conception of the form of the Absolute with the infinitude of the content. Yet practically we live without sense of limitation in the relation implied by the form of presentation that we have chosen. This relation is not lost through any change of place; wherever we go, we recognize it; the imagination cannot picture any world without it. "Though I take the wings of the morning, or dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand shall hold me."

So far, then, from narrowing or belittling our conception of the Absolute, spirit is the only enlarging form under which we can represent it. If we do not conceive it thus, then we must conceive it as non-spirit. It is idle to ask why we should represent it to ourselves at all. The unity of the universe forces itself upon us, and we must conceive it under the one form or the other,

either as spirit, that which is self-conscious, or as that which is opposed to spirit and without self-consciousness. Practically there can be no *tertium quid*. The "Force" of Herbert Spencer, for instance, either belongs to the material world equally with any other force like gravitation, or, if not, swings over into the spiritual world. If we refuse to think of unity as spiritual we must think of it as material. But spirit is the only adequate form of presentation. Only as spirit can the finite go beyond itself. I take this desk into my consciousness; the desk does not thus make me a part of itself. The mind of Newton comprehends the movements of the earth and the stars; they have not comprehended him. Only as spirit does being escape from all confinement and find itself at large in the universe.

No less true is the converse of all this. As we cannot represent Absolute Being except under the form of spirit, so we cannot conceive ideal spirit, perfect consciousness, except as Absolute Being. For spirit, to be perfect, must be wholly transparent to itself, that is, its opposite must be wholly open to its consciousness; and although finite spirits may be to a certain degree thus transparent, they must from their very nature remain to a great extent closed and opaque in relation to the external world.¹ For in the first place the finite spirit has to do with forces which it did not originate. Later it may find kinship with these forces, but they remain foreign to it, and its life is always open to irruption and invasion by them. The perfect drama is transparent, containing within itself all the elements by which the plot is worked out. But no finite life is such a drama; elements from without divide its plans and contradict its foresight. We are like ships at sea; we lay our course and then a tempest drives us from it. Secondly, it is out of these very elements, external and foreign to it, that finite life has been derived. Its roots are not in itself, and our lives are not really ours until we can recall them as such. But the earliest period in them is lost to us, and of the later years we remember as a rule only certain points of experience; what was going on around those points, the circumstances and thoughts

¹ H. Lotze, *Microcosmos*, Book IX, Chap. IV, § 4.

which made up our lives as a whole, we have forgotten. Thirdly, only a small part of our experience is available at any one moment. The field in which our minds work is so limited that one thing crowds out another, and life, in so far as it is transparent at all, is transparent only in a single point of time. It is like some picture in glass with a point of light behind it, the colors revealed or obscured as the light behind is shifted from one part of the picture to another. Finally, much of the inner, subjective life never reaches the threshold of consciousness. How little, for instance, do we know of the bodily functions! I will to take up a book, and do take it up; but how do I do it? The anatomist gives us a little knowledge, but it does not carry us far. We are like guests in a house where we know nothing of the machinery by which the work of the house is carried on. Or again, I forget what it is that I was about to say or do; I make an effort to recall it, but without success: I think of something else, and presently the memory of what it was that I intended comes unbidden.¹ Or some association of ideas presents itself which cannot be explained except as we may sometimes through subsequent recognition trace the connection in our thought; thus I visit some house which I have never seen before, and presently find myself thinking of my early childhood; it may occur to me later that the paper on the wall was similar to the paper in some room with which I was familiar when a child, or again I may never know what caused the connection in my mind. As one considers how largely thought consists in the association of ideas, he realizes how much of finite life is unconscious.

These difficulties and others like them which meet us in the sphere of finite consciousness disappear when we turn to the thought of Absolute Being. The elements of our own spiritual life do not cover one another, but in the thought of Absolute Being all elements are conceived as covering one another, with no rebellion or vacillation among them, no drawing hither and thither.

¹ W. B. Carpenter, *Principles of Mental Physiology*, Chap. XIII. Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. Lotze, *Microcosmos*, Book III, Chap. III.

Furthermore, the abstract or the ideal is always more readily comprehended than the concrete and actual. Thus any one can comprehend the idea of a perfect circle; but let the most accomplished draughtsman try to draw an actual circle as nearly perfect as he can make it, and it will present irregularities that would be the despair of any mathematician who should attempt to find a formula to cover them. In a similar way the definition of spirit as something that is wholly transparent to itself is justified with difficulty so long as the analysis is confined to finite being. It is fulfilled only in Absolute Being, that ideal of consciousness in which the return to self is complete. This does not mean the perfect comprehension of the divine. Rather does mystery begin with knowledge and deepen as knowledge increases.¹ It is true that "God is light and in him is no darkness at all," but it is also true that "clouds and darkness are round about him." What we have found is that the term "infinite consciousness" is not self-contradictory, that "infinity" and "consciousness" not only do not exclude each other but are necessary each to the other.

¹ Page 4.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIRST IDEA OF THE REASON MANIFESTED AS IDEAL UNITY, OR OMNISCIENCE, AND AS DYNAMIC UNITY, OR OMNIPOTENCE.—THE FOURTH DEFINITION OF RELIGION.

DOES omnipresence imply omniscience? This question at once resolves itself into two questions. First, can Absolute Being have knowledge of that which is foreign to itself? Knowledge implies the distinction between subject and object. Is not such a distinction inconsistent with the conception of absolute consciousness? Thomas Aquinas meets this objection with the statement that since God is all in all, since it is in and through him that all things exist, there can be nothing which is foreign to him, and thus in knowing all things he simply knows himself.¹ This, however, only leads to the second of the two questions, and we must ask whether Absolute Being can have knowledge of itself. Knowledge implies comprehension. Can there be comprehension of that which is not finite? Aquinas replies that since we know that which we grasp and hold and have, it is not necessary to stand outside of an object and compare it with other things in order to have knowledge of it; therefore infinite knowledge may comprehend infinite being.

Spinoza, in using the term "knowledge" makes a distinction between absolute knowledge and finite knowledge; the knowledge which God possesses is not to be compared with man's knowledge.² To emphasize the difference he uses a picturesque though extravagant figure. The divine understanding and will, he says, have no more in common with human understanding and will than the Dog, a sign in the heavens, has with the barking animal on earth that we call a dog. The understanding of God, he pro-

¹ *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. XIV.

² *Ethica*, Pars I, Prop. XVII.

ceeds, since it is the sole cause of things, must necessarily differ from things themselves; for whatever is caused must differ from that which causes it precisely in that which it has for its cause. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of such a chasm between absolute and finite understanding and will with the position usually taken by Spinoza, for nothing is farther from his usual thought than a creator of the universe from without and apart from it. He must have in mind a distinction between the *natura naturans* and the *natura naturata*.¹

There are three ways in which the divine thought differs from human thought: first, divine thought is *a priori*, human thought *a posteriori*; second, divine thought embraces its object simultaneously, human thought in succession; third, to divine thought things present themselves as a comprehensive unity, to human thought only in detail. But these differences are only the differences between perfect thought and imperfect thought. Take, for example, the difference as regards the *a priori* or the *a posteriori* method. It is true that in general we think a thing because it exists, whereas we conceive that with God a thing exists because he thinks it. Yet to some extent human thought at times follows the method of divine thought. Thus the artist usually understands his own work better than any one else can. Of course he is finite, a product of his time, an expression of the spirit of his age, and to a large extent his genius may work unconsciously, building "better than he knew." Yet to some extent also he is conscious of his own creative power, and in so far as he is thus conscious he follows the method of divine thought and recognizes its higher nature. Similarly, as we have already seen,² although in general he may think in succession and in detail, he does make approaches toward thought which is unitary and all-embracing. The chasm, therefore, between divine and human thought is not absolute. Men think imperfectly but they think truly.

Does the conception of divine omniscience carry with it a divine foreknowledge of contingent events, the events which result from

¹ C. C. Everett, *Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 91.

² Chap. V, p. 37.

the freedom of the human will? The difficulty which this question raises has been met in three ways. Three elements enter into the problem,—the absoluteness of the divine knowledge, the contingency of events, and futurity,—and each of the three methods of solving the problem does away with one or another of these three elements. The first solution gives up the first of the three elements and affirms that God does not and cannot have foreknowledge of contingent events. This solution offers a striking instance of the method of “common-sense” theology.¹ The apparent limitation of divine knowledge which it implies is met by the argument that God has open before him all possible choices, so that when the individual in the exercise of his free will comes to make his choice, God is ready to adapt that choice to the plan of the universe. The skilful chess player, who does not know what move the other player will make next, but is ready for every move, the great ruler who meets with wise statesmanship the different situations presented to him as they arise,—it is with such knowledge as theirs, conceived as absolute, that God controls all events. So far from detracting at all from the glory of God, such a conception, it is held, adds to his dignity and grandeur.² The second solution ignores the contingency of events. Freedom of the will in man is denied, and all events are foreordained. God has absolute knowledge of all, because all has been determined by him from the beginning. This is the solution that is offered by Calvinism. The third solution does away with futurity in affirming the phenomenalitv of time.³ According to this view, the view of “mystical” or “orthodox” theology,⁴ there is no foreknowledge; but only knowledge. God does not know beforehand; he knows. He does not foresee; he sees. A certain amount of freedom is conceived working within a timeless eternity. Thomas Aquinas, in the *Summa Theologica*,⁵ gives as an illustration of this view

¹ Page 18.

² Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 278-280. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Vol. I, §§ 27, 49.

³ Pages 20-22.

⁴ Page 18.

⁵ Pars I, Quaest. XIV, Art. XIII.

the travellers on a road who can only see each the one immediately in front of him, or who can be seen by an observer on the same level with them only as they pass one by one, whereas the observer on a hill that overlooks the whole extent of the road sees all the travellers at once.¹

But why should we try to settle this question, when the answer to it is not necessary to religion? All that we hope to do is to remove the difficulties in the way of religion, and such questions as this which lie beyond our reach and are not essential may well be left unanswered. Spirit is the only form under which we can represent to ourselves Absolute Being, and when we enter too much into detail we only blur the symbol.

A question arises here which will occur more than once, as to the use of the word *infinite*. Are we to speak of the divine knowledge as infinite? Considered extensively, if the content of divine knowledge is infinite, then the knowledge itself will be infinite. Even if the universe is not infinite, its elements may be infinite, and thus the knowledge of the universe would still be infinite. Intensively, however, such knowledge may better be called *perfect*, in that it conforms accurately to the object which it embraces. It is in this way that the Socinians avoid the difficulty of possible limitation in the thought of divine knowledge when they say that omniscience is the knowledge of all that is knowable. The universe as the great object of all knowledge has many aspects. Finite knowledge must cover these various aspects separately; we know only in part. Divine knowledge embraces all as a whole. Strauss objects that if the universe is thus one to the divine knowledge all differences must be done away with and everything become a mush. But, as I have already pointed out,² this is because he forgets his Hegelian training and has in mind an abstract unity instead of that concrete unity in which the parts are not done away with but taken up into the whole.

In passing from the consideration of *omniscience*, or ideal unity, to that of dynamic unity, *omnipotence*, still another question is suggested. In the conception of Absolute Being has free will

¹ Page 22.

² Note, page 42.

any place? Does the divine knowledge extend beyond the divine will? Has God the power to choose? Many theologians have answered the question by attributing to divine being absolute freedom of will. Leibnitz, for instance, pictures God as seeing before himself the ideals of all sorts of worlds and looking over the whole and selecting the world as it exists at present because it contained the maximum of good and the minimum of evil.¹ Similarly in the creed of Peter Mogilas it is stated that God might have made six hundred thousand worlds as good as ours.² Spinoza, however, denies free will to God;³ in the sense in which freedom consists in the ability to manifest one's self without interference either from without or from within, God is free, but freedom of choice in activity God does not possess any more than man. In thus denying free will to God, Spinoza does not intend to limit God but rather to enlarge and dignify the conception of his activity. For freedom of choice on the part of Absolute Being would involve one or the other of two alternatives. Either it must be assumed that God has thought of something which was not worthy of execution, or else he has been obliged to choose between this or that possible course because he could not accomplish both. In either case there would be a confession of weakness. It is the second of these alternatives which Spinoza especially emphasizes. Men choose, he says, because they are finite; their freedom of choice is the result of their limitation; they have to decide whether they will do A or B because they cannot do both A and B. When a difficult ravine is to be bridged, the engineer or architect of limited knowledge and experience, or of lesser genius, studies different plans, hesitating as to which is better; but the great engineer, the perfect architect, at once sees in his mind's eye the one bridge that is suited to the spot. Yet it may be that the infinite mind may still see all other possible bridges together with the one perfect bridge.

¹ *Théodicée, Essais sur la Bonté de Dieu, etc.*, Partie II, 225.

² Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. II, p. 290

³ *Ethica*, Pars I, Prop. XVII.

Here again, however, religion has little concern with the answer to the question and may accept or reject it as it will. If it find the thought of free will in Absolute Being essential to the religious spirit, let it assume free will, and *vice versa*. The case is not one of those which involve a contradiction between the reason and the heart, the reason denying what the heart demands.¹ Here, whatever the answer to the question may be, no contradiction of the infinite unity is involved. But we have to recognize the limitations of finite thought, and such questions are beyond the reach of human understanding to determine absolutely.

Finally, of the four forms in which the first idea of the reason manifests itself, there remains to be considered dynamic unity, or unity in force, *omnipotence*. What, then, is meant by omnipotence? Is it the ability to do everything? Or is it the ability to do everything that is possible? For example, is it a limitation of omnipotence to hold that Absolute Being cannot transcend the law of contradiction, that God cannot make himself other than he is? Or, again, if omnipotence can make arbitrary all distinction between truth and falsity, what becomes of omniscience? If there is a power that can make evil good, what becomes of goodness? What becomes of all attributes if omnipotence is conceived as absolute? Would omnipotence itself remain? For power means not merely accomplishment, but the might which accomplishes, and if there is no obstacle to overcome there is no power. We say how easily the water boils *in vacuo*, not how powerful is the fire; how easily the balanced rock is tilted, and not how mighty is the hand of the child that moves it. It may be said that omnipotence is *perfect* power, the ability to overcome the maximum of obstacle which is consistent with overcoming the obstacle at all. But we are dealing with Absolute Being. Where are any obstacles to it to be found? and what difficulty could it have in overcoming them?

Some have found a way of escape from this problem by assuming that there is some form of matter, the *ὕλη* of Aristotle, upon which the divine power acts. Thus Martineau assumes the

¹ Page 12.

necessity of a *datum* upon which the creative power of God may be asserted.¹ We cannot, however, conceive of the two as distinct. Back of the creative power and the objective *datum* there would have to be some higher unity, an absolute behind the divine and the material, the undifferentiated somewhat that is assumed by Spencer.² Others have offered the conjecture that there may be ideal irreconcilables, elements which contradict one another, universal necessities to which the divine being like all else is subject.³ So Leibnitz, with his theory of the best possible world, recognizes difficulties as existing in certain relations from the first; evil is not to be wholly eliminated, but good is to be attained at a cost.

The question is simply one that cannot be solved. But it is helpful to find that the difficulty extends to all relations. Where do relations abide? I draw a line, A, by itself. Then I draw another line, B, and instantly there is a relation, for one line is shorter than the other, or one is previous to the other. But where is the relation? It is not in the first line, for so long as the first line remained alone the relation did not exist, but neither is it in the second line. We may say that it is in our thought, but even so the elements must exist to which the differences relate. The mistake which is commonly made is in attempting to reason *from* the infinite. The only course that is possible for thought is, as Dr. Hill has said,⁴ to reason *to* the infinite, to start from the realities which are given and make such progress from them toward the infinite as one may. Thus, instead of assuming that the thought of the infinite is the basis of religion, we begin by finding that there is something which is at first feared and worshipped and then loved and obeyed. Then we ask that this something shall be infinite. Starting from a definite content, the infinite which is

¹ *Essays*, Vol. III, p. 17. This theory, however, is modified later in the *Study of Religion* (Vol. I, pp. 405-408), where Martineau inclines to the view that if certain difficulties could be removed, *space* would provide the condition necessary to Absolute Being for its activity.

² Chap. I.

³ Lotze, *Microcosmos*, Book IX, Chap. V.

⁴ Thomas Hill, *Postulates of Revelation and of Ethics*, p. 46.

reached in this way will be infinite *something* and not an abstraction without content. It is thus that we find the presence of God in the universe. We find there certain ideal elements in control, the three ideas of the reason, truth, goodness and beauty, and these lift us into the realm of the divine. These ideas are manifested under concrete forms, they are related and conditioned, they manifest themselves only under conditions. Yet they compel us to believe that they are supreme, and that in their triumph the divine omnipotence declares itself. Through them we do not *prove* the Absolute, we *find* it.

Our examination of the first idea of the reason ends here. We have considered it in the four forms in which it is manifested: as unity in time, as unity in space, as ideal unity or omniscience, as dynamic unity or omnipotence. Each of these forms of the first idea of the reason has been found to require that the absolute principle of which it is a manifestation shall be a conscious or spiritual presence. Whatever the direction in which unity is manifested, it appears always as a form of spiritual being. We have reached the position, therefore, where the word *spiritual* can be substituted for the word *supernatural* in the third definition of religion.¹ and we have, as the fourth definition, **RELIGION IS A FEELING TOWARD A SPIRITUAL PRESENCE, MANIFESTING ITSELF IN TRUTH, GOODNESS AND BEAUTY.**

¹ Pages 1, 9, 15.

CHAPTER VII.

ABSOLUTE BEING, AS A SPIRITUAL PRESENCE, IN RELATION TO THE SECOND IDEA OF THE REASON.

WE have now to consider this spiritual presence in relation to the second idea of the reason, goodness. We have not yet to do with the problem of evil, the difficulty of reconciling the existence of evil in the world with the conception of absolute goodness. That is something which must be considered later.¹ The question here is as to the form under which absolute goodness is to be represented.

Goodness, we say, is a manifestation of Absolute Being. We may say with Schleiermacher that God is good because he is the author of goodness, the source of the moral law. But this is not enough. The religious feeling requires not only that there shall be a power behind goodness as its author, but that this power shall itself be good, and worthy to be worshipped because of its goodness. Is it possible, however, to conceive of Absolute Being as itself good? If we think of God as the author of goodness, and of goodness as dependent upon the will of God, then God himself is behind and above goodness, and the term "good" as applied to him has no meaning. If on the other hand we begin by applying to God the term "good," do we not imply the measurement of God by some standard of righteousness that is external and superior to him? The argument that this standard is not external but is involved in the nature of God, that his being embodies the moral law, offers only a verbal escape. The real difficulty remains. It is an antinomy similar to that which is found in the nature of the moral law itself.² Is goodness right because it is right, or is there a reason why it is right? If there is a reason, then there must be

¹ Page 239.

² C. C. Everett, *The Science of Thought*, pp. 209-221.

something higher and better than righteousness. If there is no reason, then righteousness is something arbitrary and unreasonable. According to Kant, nothing is higher than goodness. It is absolute and categorical. But, if this is so, goodness claims an authority for which it can show no reason. According to the Utilitarians, on the other hand, goodness exists for the sake of happiness. Then there is something more authoritative than goodness.

The real solution of the difficulty is found only as morality is seen to be not the highest form of goodness. It is true that goodness is used in the sense of conformity to the moral law. But goodness in this sense is only a step in the transition to something higher. Beneath the moral law is a principle of which the moral law is only an imperfect manifestation, the principle of love. The man who does right simply because it is right is not yet the perfect man. The perfect man will do all the things which ought to be done because these are just the things which he desires to do. As husband and father, for instance, he works to support his wife and children, not because it is his duty but because he finds in caring for them his greatest happiness. Duty has its own peculiar majesty in the enlargement which it brings to a man's life. But in love the man himself is manifested. The moral law can only attempt to do imperfectly what love without the law does perfectly. The moral law impels toward love those who have not yet risen to the higher form of goodness, and it stands ready to meet and restrain any who may have fallen from that higher plane; in Paul's phrase, it is the schoolmaster, the tutor, by whom men are led to love.¹ But love is the fulfilment of the law.² The person who simply obeys the moral law is conscious of duty. He is conscious either that there is something which he ought to do, or that he has done something which ought to have been done. But love is unconscious of duty. Furthermore, when we see a thing done in love we do not merely approve as when some duty has been performed. We rejoice in it.³ A child does not measure

¹ *Galatians*, iii, 24-25.

² *Romans*, xiii, 10.

³ Horace Bushnell, *Work and Play*.

his father by some standard of goodness and approve of him. He simply loves his father and rejoices in him, and similarly the father does not approve of the child who is living the normal life of childhood, but loves him and delights in him. Now, if we say that "God is love,"¹ we pass beyond the difficulties which are involved in the question as to the goodness of God. In one of the phrases of the creed of Mogilas God is said to be "good and more than good."² Whatever may have been in the mind of Mogilas, we have certainly found a sense in which God is more than good. It is a philosophical definition, also, that is given in these words of the New Testament. For when we say that God is love, we are only saying in another form that God is that spiritual unity of the universe in and through whom all things consist. For this unity implies that all the elements of the universe are in some way bound together, and the recognition of this relation takes form in the feeling of love. In love it is as though the bond by which all things are united became luminous, and presented itself to our consciousness not as a mechanical tie but as a life-giving relation.

Are we to conceive of the divine love as infinite? Yes and no. As I have already pointed out,³ it is a question of terms. If the term is regarded quantitatively, we may speak of the divine love as infinite, meaning by this that all being is included in it. But if the term is regarded qualitatively, intensively, we must use the term "perfect" rather than "infinite." For something besides absolute surrender is essential to the true balance of love. There must be self-relation as well as sacrifice. The person who loves may not give himself up wholly to the person loved. When a mother effaces herself in her love for her child, the child may take the mother's love as a matter of course and become selfish; his nature may become less fully rounded and complete. If the child is to love the mother in return, it is not enough that the mother shall be lovable, but she must also maintain in its strength her own personality. Lovableness and strength of personality,

¹ John, iv, 8.

² Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. II, p. 281.

³ Page 51.

both of these must be present to make the relations of love as nearly perfect as possible. Where either element is in some degree wanting, love is given more often where strength of personality is present with less of lovable ness than where lovable ness is found without strength of personality. It is this which explains the hero worship frequently given to men whose lives are essentially selfish. In perfect love, however, the life preserves its own centre at the same time that it finds this centre in the life of another, and it is this perfect love which we attribute to God. If we were to conceive of the divine love as infinite, meaning by infinite that the divine self-surrender was absolute, we should have simply pantheism, the loss of God in the universe.

The term "infinite," however, may be applied to the divine love, when it is considered in relation to other attributes of Absolute Being, in the sense that it is not limited by other attributes. Love and justice, for instance, have sometimes been represented dramatically as opposed to each other, love pleading against justice. It is thus that Calvinism has asserted the absolute justice of God, and Universalism has emphasized the supremacy of love. But love and justice, far from limiting each other, complete and imply each the other. Justice is essential to perfect love, as love is essential to perfect justice. The justice of a mother in dealing with her children is not in contradiction to her love for them.

CHAPTER VIII.

ABSOLUTE BEING, AS A SPIRITUAL PRESENCE, IN RELATION TO THE THIRD IDEA OF THE REASON: THE DIVINE GLORY, THE DIVINE ASEITY, THE DIVINE BLESSEDNESS.—THE TERMS “INFINITE” AND “PERFECT.”

THE last of the three forms in which, if our definition is correct, the spiritual presence in the universe manifests itself, is the third idea of the reason, beauty. It is an element which has been too much left out of account by many theologians. They have been inclined to approach religion either philosophically, basing their study on the thought of unity, or ethically, with goodness as their starting-point. Yet pure devotion, the joy of religion in the contemplation of the object of its worship, manifests itself especially in beauty, and to disregard beauty is to neglect one of the most important elements in religion.

We have to ask, therefore, what assistance will the consideration of beauty afford toward further knowledge of the spiritual presence which is the object of religious feeling? Schleiermacher did not raise this question, but just as he says of God that he is good because he is the source of goodness, so he would probably have said that God is beautiful in that all beauty proceeds from him. But we must go further than this. And first of all we may say that beauty is obviously the manifestation of the glory of God. This term “glory of God” has often been misunderstood and to many is repellent. It suggests to them the splendor of an earthly sovereign, and as we should condemn such a sovereign if he were to make the magnificence of his reign his first aim, so to say that “the chief end of man is to glorify God,” or to represent God as seeking to be glorified, seems to imply a self-absorption in the divine nature. This objection, however, is no longer felt when we think of the definition of beauty. For beauty is the idealiza-

tion of the actual, the manifestation of the ideal in the real.¹ The glory of God, therefore, is the self-manifestation of the divine nature regarded as the sum of all ideals. It is not something added to the divine nature from without, a halo, as it were, given to God as to a saint. It is the outpouring from within of the divine nature itself, God's very being. Here is seen the relation to one another of truth and goodness and beauty under a more concrete form. For if the ideal which is embodied in nature is the unity of the world, then beauty as the manifestation of that ideal is the manifestation of truth and goodness.

Where the divine nature is conceived merely as abstract unity there can be, of course, no self-manifestation, no outpouring of the divine nature, no glory of God. Thus there was no glory of Brahma, there was only Brahma. Brahma did not manifest himself in outward things, for outward things were an illusion to be escaped. There was therefore no irradiation from him. He was like a sun shorn of its beams. When, however, as in Christian thought, the divine nature is conceived as self-manifesting, we see how it may be said that the chief end of man is to glorify God. For man glorifies God by filling the place in the universe which he is set to fill. As the heavens declare the glory of God by filling their place, manifesting the vastness and majesty of their ordered movement, so man glorifies God in proportion as he manifests most clearly and completely his own true nature. In this manifestation of self there is self-surrender, not, as in Brahmanism, the effacement of self in which the worshipper gives himself up to abstract being, but the surrender to all that is best in life in the concrete, the surrender to high aims and noble activities, that surrender of self which is the fulfilment of self. This thought that man glorifies God by filling his place in the universe involves a further step. For we must ask, what is man's place? It is different from that of any other created thing in that man alone can recognize the source from which he comes. In this consciousness of his own spiritual nature man's place is to recognize and reflect the divine

¹ *The Science of Thought*, pp. 153-164.

life which is embodied in him, and as he fills this place his life becomes the highest manifestation on earth of the divine life. For in the recognition of the relation between his own nature and the divine nature man rounds out the circle of being with the return of life to that which is its source.

Again, beauty helps us to apprehend the spiritual presence in the universe, in that it suggests the divine aseity, the self-dependence and self-completeness of Absolute Being. For this self-completeness and self-dependence are found in beauty. Beauty exists, not like duty, for some service, but simply for itself. It is "its own excuse for being."¹ Further, in the enjoyment of beauty the mind is lifted out of anxieties and conflicts, and there comes a sense of peace. This is especially true of the contemplation of nature, for, to use Emerson's words again, "nature will not have us fret and fume. . . . When we come out of the caucus, or the bank, or the Abolition-convention, or the Temperance-meeting, or the Transcendental club into the fields and woods, she says to us, 'So hot, my little Sir?'"² Nor is this peace found in the contemplation of nature merely in her gentler aspects. For there is beauty in everything in nature in its place, and even the wildness of the tempest not only is beautiful, but, if once we can escape the terror of it, is seen by us to be beautiful, and thus its very tumult brings inward calm.

Furthermore, the divine self-completeness and peace imply a divine blessedness. In almost all religions happiness, in one form or another, has been associated with the thought of the divine life. Sometimes, as in the philosophy of Epicurus, it is the distinguishing attribute of the gods. They are conceived as existing chiefly because the craving of human hearts must be satisfied which demands that somewhere there shall be perfect happiness. They are happy because they are remote from earth and untouched by any responsibility or care for human interests. Akin to this is the happiness suggested by Homer's "inextinguishable laughter" of the gods.³ For the sense of the comic implies remoteness from

¹ Emerson, *The Rhodora*.

² *Spiritual Laws*.

³ *The Iliad*, I, 599, 600.

the reality of the relations of life.¹ Nothing is so tragic that it may not appear comic to those who look only at the outward form of some relation and disregard its substance. The conception of the gods as remote from human interests is of course incomplete and low. But the happiness which is ascribed to divine life in these lower forms of religion is conceived on a higher plane in the higher forms of religion. The blessedness of God in Christian thought does not imply remoteness from human relations or indifference to their reality, but only the freedom arising from the self-completeness of the divine nature.

It may be asked whether there is not a certain irony in this thought of celestial joy and peace brooding over and above the suffering and misery of the world. Does it not make a breach between the divine and the human? But such a thought dishonors human nature. It may be that in some great affliction the peace of nature seems a mockery, and that at such times men have the "contempt of the landscape" of which Emerson speaks,² or ask with him why some angel from

"the host
That loiters round the crystal coast"

might not have stooped to prevent the loss.³ But feeling of this sort is usually transient, coming in seasons of weakness, before the mind has recovered from the shock of grief or pain. It passes away as strength returns, and is not found as a universal and permanent element in human nature. Nature herself tends to conquer it, and to draw the soul into new sympathy with her deeper and more significant aspects.

There is nowadays a certain discontent which leads men to cry out against any happiness in which they do not share. It springs from various sources. There is demagogism, which flourishes in discontent and naturally works to create it. There is philanthropy, which, in aiming at the relief of suffering, at the same time causes men to become more keenly conscious of the

¹ C. C. Everett, *Poetry, Comedy and Duty*, pp. 187-190.

² *Nature*.

³ *Threnody*.

existence of suffering. There are the newspapers and the various other agencies by which men are brought into closer touch with one another, so that the poorer see just what are the enjoyments and the character and disposition of the richer. Finally, there is the general movement of democracy by which everything, so to speak, is brought within the possible reach of everybody; we do not envy men powers or benefits which are beyond our reach; it is in the thought of benefits which might be ours but are not that we become dissatisfied. Still, although the existence of discontent must be recognized, to hold that discontent is general would be to travesty human nature. The tendency always has been to enjoy whatever is higher or more beautiful than one's own immediate possessions or surroundings. The happiness of the crowds of people who go out from Boston on a fine Sunday afternoon in winter to see the driving on the Brighton road, is only one of the many illustrations that might be given of the inherent unselfishness of human nature. As we look about us in the world we wonder not that there is so much discontent but that there is so little.

Furthermore, the thought of any breach between the divine and the human because of divine blessedness not only is unjust to human nature as it is, but fails wholly to recognize human nature as it ought to be. It is quite true that to "rejoice with them that rejoice" is hard,—far harder than to "weep with them that weep."¹ One can bear his own burden or his own loss or disappointment until he sees another rejoicing in the freedom from such losses or burdens. Then he realizes the full meaning of the command and the difficulty in obeying it. Yet joy in the joy of others is recognized as the culmination of the ideal life. Perhaps you may recall the story of the lost soul that waited outside the gates of heaven and watched the blessed as they entered. "Thank God," she cried out at last, "thank God that there is a heaven, though I may not enter it," and immediately, so the story goes, she found herself within the gates. Human nature would feel itself poorer if it could not picture to itself such unselfishness of

¹ *Romans*, xii, 15.

joy, and as the village would mourn if the great mansion which is its pride were to burn or fall into decay, so life would lose for men in beauty and dignity if the conception of divine blessedness in all its completeness were to be taken from them. No doubt it is difficult at first thought to give this conception definite form. No one comprehends easily a satisfaction or joy which he has not himself experienced. Men live in different worlds so far as pleasures are concerned, and have little conception of the worlds in which they do not live. They wonder that others can find happiness in pursuits which are to them unattractive or wearisome. The student absorbed in his work and the pleasure seeker think each that the life of the other must be barren and joyless; Spencer finds society a bore, and society finds Spencer tedious. So one man goes to church and another to the theatre, and neither understands the satisfaction of the other. The happiness of the child is in receiving, and he does not yet know the joy of the father or the mother in giving. In a similar way the divine blessedness appears to be beyond our power to conceive or represent.

At this point, however, we need to ask what the difference is between blessedness and happiness. We may not say with Spencer that blessedness must be either happiness or unhappiness, for another alternative might be open. Because hope is not fear, it is not therefore courage. Yet although the form of his argument is faulty, Spencer is right in his conclusion that blessedness is one kind of happiness. The question, therefore, takes another form, and we ask, what is there in blessedness that distinguishes it from the sort of happiness which is not blessedness? For an animal may be happy but not blessed; the people at a festival may be very happy and yet not blessed; we may even speak of a drunkard as happy, but we hardly call him blessed.

A certain element of pathos is sometimes associated with blessedness as compared with happiness. Men speak of the dead as "blessed," and the saints in glory are conceived as rejoicing in a blessedness which they have attained through a double death, the death of the body and the death to self. It is this death to self which suggests, as we look more closely, the real distinction

between blessedness and happiness. Happiness may be either self-centred or self-surrendering, but only that happiness in which there is some form of self-surrender can be called blessedness. In other words, blessedness is found in and through love. For the self-surrender that springs only from the sense of duty involves no blessedness. It is true that in human relations love brings with it sorrows, some of them among the greatest that men have to bear. Our suffering in the sorrows and disappointments of those whom we love; the anguish that follows upon the shattering of an ideal, as when a son finds that his father is a swindler or worse; the pain of a love that calls forth no return of affection:—it is such griefs as these that come frequently to those who love. That is why the highest blessedness has been more often found in religion. For in the relation of the soul toward God these hindrances do not occur. The object of its love is permanent, and the ideal to which it turns is one that cannot fail. Yet even in human relations the very things which seem to stand in the way of love only testify to its power and to the satisfaction that it brings.

“Pains of love be sweeter far
Than all other pleasures are”

we cry with Dryden, or, with Tennyson,

“‘Tis better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all.”

Another element, however, besides love, enters into the highest forms of happiness,—the element of activity. For there is always happiness in any action in so far as it is action, and the higher the form of the activity the higher the happiness that it brings. By the higher forms of activity I mean those forms which are the fullest and most intense, and which occupy the greatest portion of our being, the intellectual activities rather than the animal, the spiritual rather than the physical. Activity, then, and love, these two elements, are essential to the highest happiness. In so far as happiness has its source in love we may call it static; in so far as it springs from activity it may be called dynamic. It is true that

in a certain sense love may be regarded as activity. Yet it is rather a feeling that accompanies activity.

If now we turn to the thought of God, we find that these two conditions of blessedness, as applied to the conception of the divine nature, suggest at least no *a priori* difficulties. The schoolmen were in the habit of speaking of God as *actus purus*, pure activity. So far as we can attach a meaning to the phrase, and so far as we can accept it as representing the truth, we must attribute to such a being the highest blessedness. At least we can conceive to some extent the fulness of satisfaction in a divine activity which creates its own environment absolutely, controlling not only the form but the reality of things, as compared with the human creative activity which can make for itself only the form of its environment. On the static side, also, the divine blessedness may be conceived as free from the limitations which hinder complete human happiness. For the divine love would be one with the divine knowledge, and in the absolute survey of present and future all temporary discords would be taken up into the final harmony. If we take this view of divine blessedness as arising from perfect activity and perfect love, the objection which we have been considering may be regarded as done away with, at least in theory. The thought of divine blessedness, so far from being an element of separation between the divine and the human, is found to bring them more closely together.

Of course there are a host of practical difficulties. Thus the presence of evil in the world at once raises the question whether even temporary suffering may not disturb the divine blessedness, and if the suffering is regarded not as temporary but as continuous, the difficulty becomes more intense. It is true that the father who has to hold his child during some painful operation may be full of joy in the knowledge that the operation is to free the child from deformity or disease. Yet for the time being he must feel for the child in his pain and must suffer with him. Such difficulties, however, belong to the practical sphere which as yet we have not entered. We may find that they cannot be removed, or that we can come no nearer to their removal than the suggestion which is

conveyed in illustrations like the one that I have just used. But we are considering now not the practical but the ideal difficulties, the objections which are raised by those who assert that Absolute Being is unthinkable, and that any attempt to conceive it involves contradiction, especially the attempt to associate with it any spiritual qualities or attributes. We are trying to show not only that Absolute Being is thinkable, but that the conception of God as a spiritual presence is one to which reason itself would lead us. In meeting thus upon their own ground those who object to the possibility of such a conception of God, we may at least clear the way and leave the religious feeling free to follow its own instincts.

In concluding this examination I wish to speak once more of the distinction between the terms "infinite" and "perfect." We have already had to ask once or twice which term should be used.¹ The question would be of little importance if it were not for the difficulties which arise from the use of the term "infinite." Thus a definition of God that has been commonly given describes him as a perfect being with infinite attributes. My own definition would be precisely the opposite of this. I should describe God as an infinite being with perfect attributes. The infinite nature of Absolute Being I have already discussed at length in these lectures. The question as to the use of the terms "infinite" and "perfect" as applied to the attributes of God I have considered in the *Science of Thought* in what I have there had to say in regard to "Limit."² The principle which I wish to emphasize is that all qualities are limited, and that if any quality is too much extended it tends to change its nature, and often, if not always, to pass over into its opposite. At least it loses itself as soon as it passes beyond a certain point which forms its *limit*. In saying this, I refer, of course, to the quality as considered generically and not as taken by itself. For the very fact that we speak of the quality as extended beyond a certain point, implies that the quality has not changed its real, that is its primary, nature. I may illustrate this from Aristotle's theory of virtue as a mean. According to this theory, generosity if pushed too far becomes extravagance

¹ Pages 51, 58

² *The Science of Thought*, pp. 37-41.

or prodigality, economy becomes meanness. In each case the virtue, when extended beyond a certain point, tends to pass over into its opposite and become a vice. Yet the qualities retain their primary nature; both generosity and prodigality are giving, and both economy and meanness are saving.

By its very nature *quality* is a partial manifestation. So long as Being is conceived as unbroken and without manifestation it has no qualities. Qualities appear only as Being is manifested under various forms. Thus in the physical realm, a world of unbroken light would be undistinguishable from a world of darkness. I do not wish to push this sort of illustration too far, but can we conceive of anything as absolutely hard? And how is it in regard to the terms "high" and "low"? We may start with the thought of height, but as we ascend do we not reach a point at which the term becomes meaningless? It appears to me to be one of the fundamental principles of thought that quality implies limit, and if this is so, then the attributes of God, as in a certain sense qualities, involve severally the idea of perfection rather than the idea of infinitude. Of course we have to bear in mind always that we are obliged to look at the subject from our own standpoint. We break up the divine nature in our analysis and separate quality from quality, just as in analyzing our own natures we have to break them up and separate their qualities. In human life one part of the environment calls forth one feeling and another part another feeling, or the same part of the environment may call forth two or more different feelings. But there is no *a priori* reason why qualities should thus exclude one another, and in our thought of God we may conceive of all these elements which we have separated and set over against one another as in reality one.

CHAPTER IX.

THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT.—THE ARGUMENT FROM ATTRIBUTES: SAMUEL CLARKE.—THE ARGUMENT FROM DEFINITION: ANSELM: THE DEFINITION OF PERFECTION.—THE ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF THE DIVINE BEING: SPINOZA.—THE ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF MAN'S APPREHENSION OF THE DIVINE BEING: DESCARTES.

THUS far we have considered the objects of our study wholly from the theoretical or ideal point of view. We have asked, not what is true, but what may be true, not what can we know, but what can we conceive. Before we leave this part of the discussion we have still to examine the so-called *a priori* argument for the existence and nature of God.

What, then, is the nature of this argument? It involves something absolutely given in thought. It reasons, not from some result that has been reached through previous processes, but from something which is bound up with the mind itself. For example, the law of contradiction is accepted by the mind without question; the mind does not attempt to prove it, but simply rejects whatever is contrary to it. Now to some the idea of God has appeared to be one of these fundamental principles of thought. They have held that man is so constituted that he necessarily believes in God. As we examine this position, however, we find that the idea of God is very concrete, the most concrete, indeed, that we have. For the concreteness of anything depends upon the extent to which it is related, and our idea of God is that of a being that is related to everything in the universe. Yet if this concrete idea of God can be separated into its elements, then there is room for the *a priori* argument. For we find that these elements are the fundamental principles of man's spiritual nature and that from them

we can proceed to the one great idea in which they all have their place. Furthermore, even if the idea of God is regarded as given outright, it may still be considered in relation to other matters of belief in such a way as to bring the belief in the existence of God into prominence and reality. In making this examination I shall follow the method which I have used before and shall consider first of all some of the views that have been held, with such criticism upon them as they may suggest. I shall not undertake, however, to give a complete history of the matter, but only to present those forms of thought which are likely to prove most helpful.

Four methods of the *a priori* argument, as applied to the divine nature, are historically important,—the argument from attributes, the argument from definition, the argument from the nature of the divine being, and the argument from the nature of our apprehension of the divine being. At first thought, the second and third forms may seem to cover each other, but as we come to discuss them we shall see the difference between them, and the necessity for making the distinction. The first of the four methods, the argument from attributes, is of little importance except for its historical interest. As used by Dr. Samuel Clarke in his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, it was one of the earliest attempts in English theology to introduce the higher methods of pure reason already current in German thought. It constituted only a small part of Dr. Clarke's discussion as a whole, but it is the part which has been regarded as distinguishing his entire treatment. The argument is of this kind: Eternity and infinite space are not entities. Yet we recognize them as existing; they are ideas from which we cannot free our minds. If they are not entities, then they must be attributes. But as attributes they cannot have an independent existence; they force upon our belief the existence of a being who is eternal and omnipresent, and who must be independent, immutable and self-existent. In insisting upon these qualities of independence and immutability and self-existence Dr. Clarke occupies common ground with other philosophical writers. When, however, he proceeds to affirm that this infinite subject must also be intelligent and good and so

on, he abandons the *a priori* argument and enters the field of *a posteriori* argument. Thus he reasons from the nature of the world which is dependent upon the infinite cause that this cause must be intelligent. Dr. Clarke's argument had a certain plausibility. But he confounded eternity with duration, and infinitude in space with extension. Strictly speaking, infinitude in time or in space is rather an *a priori* possibility than an actuality. It is neither an entity nor an attribute. All must recognize the necessity of the idea of eternal existence, but this ought not to be confounded with the idea of something which has existed eternally. We have no doubt that there is something which has existed thus eternally. But our assumption rests, not upon the idea of an attribute which implies some entity, the thought of an eternity which must be filled, but upon our recognition of the law of causation.

The second form of the *a priori* argument, that from definition, is the famous argument of Anselm. It is given in his *Proslogion*¹ and is also stated by Descartes in his fifth *Meditation*. In an earlier treatise Anselm had shown the necessity of assuming the existence of a greatest or most perfect being, but he had come to feel the need of some shorter argument, sharp and decisive, which should carry conviction to all thought. After long meditation he arrived at this statement: We have the idea of a greatest being; but this idea involves the idea of existence, because if this being did not exist, and another being that possessed the same attributes did exist, this second being would be greater than the first; therefore our idea of the greatest being involves the idea of the existence of that being; therefore the greatest being exists. To put the argument in another form, just as the idea of a circle involves the idea of arcs, so the idea of the greatest being involves the existence of that being. In the argument as stated by Descartes, Anselm's phrase, "greatest being," is replaced by the phrase, "most perfect being."

The argument was conceived and accepted in good faith. In Anselm's own day it was opposed by a monk, Gaunilo, whose argument is given in Anselm's works together with the reply of

¹ *Sancti Anselmi Opera*, 2d ed. Gerberon, p. 29.

Anselm.¹ But it held its own until Kant made clear the fallacy which it contained.² Since then it has not been used except as the Hegelian school have attempted to rehabilitate it in a modified form in line with Hegel's position as to the close relation between thought and being. The flaw in the argument is so obvious that I hardly know how to point it out. It consists in the use of the term "existence" in two senses, *ideal* existence and *real* existence. The idea of the most perfect being of course involves the *idea* of the existence of that being, but it does not follow that the being really exists. If a circle exists, its parts must have certain relations to one another. But because in the idea of a circle all points in the circumference must be conceived as equidistant from the centre, it does not follow that the circle itself exists.

The question may arise here whether the idea of perfection does not imply a reference to some external standard. Some have held that it does, and that therefore the term "perfect" cannot be applied either to God or to the attributes of God. This term, however, is used in three senses. It is true that the difference between them is one of degree rather than of kind. Still it is so great that practically the three uses may be regarded as distinct. First, the term is used of that which conforms to some recognized outward standard. The idea of perfection in this sense is more or less conventional. Thus we speak of perfect manners or perfect gentlemen, but there is one standard of perfect manners in China and another in France. Again, the florist calls a flower perfect because it has the form and color which have come to be regarded as the standard. It is evident that this conventional idea of perfection cannot in any way relate to God.

In the second sense of the term a thing is regarded as perfect of its kind. This use may in part run into the first use. Yet the two are distinct, in that the standard in the first use is determined by convention, whereas in the second use the standard has been reached through observation. Thus a spider is said to be

¹ *Opera*, p. 35.

² *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. of F. Max Müller, Vol. I, p. 181.

perfect because it is a complete exemplification of its species. According to this use a flower is considered perfect, not, as before, when it conforms to some outward standard of form or color, but when it contains all the parts of the class which it represents. If one passes beyond such concrete examples into a more abstract realm, further instances appear of this sort of perfection. Thus a perfect color is one in which there is no admixture of anything else. In this second use of the term, although nothing that is conventional is involved, there is much that is accidental. For instance, if processes of development are going on, the types may change; the perfect horse of one generation may be a little different from the perfect horse of another, as this or that quality is developed.

Finally there is the ideal perfection. Here again, this third use of the term may seem to overlap the second use, as the second appeared at first sight to overlap the first. But as the second was found to be distinct from the first, so the third use is similarly distinct. For different forms of being are the expressions or manifestations of certain conceptions of ideal relations. Thus all animals represent the idea of life. Now we may observe what is essential to perfection in a certain class of animals through the study of a number of specimens of that class, reaching our conclusions wholly through *a posteriori* processes. But the idea of perfection that we have arrived at in this way may also be gained to a large extent through an *a priori* method. For we know what is essential to the manifestation of life, and we know under what forms life is most perfectly manifested. Thus the idea of life involves activity, and therefore in proportion as activity is free or impeded, in so far life is manifested in greater or in less degree. The idea of life carries with it its own standard, and as the idea of life rises the standard of the perfection of life also rises. As higher and higher standards are conceived, as higher and higher regions of abstraction are entered, we reach at last the conception of perfect being in which all the conditions that are involved in the complete manifestation of ideal life are fulfilled most absolutely. Thus the idea of perfect being implies independence, self-existence

and other similar attributes. For any form of existence which depends in part upon some other form is necessarily less full and real than that form which has its being solely in and through itself. We rarely find a perfect crystal, because the crystal is so far dependent upon the rock behind it that when it is broken off one end of the crystal is left rough and undeveloped. All dependent being is like this broken crystal. When we try to take it by itself, we come upon the ragged edge which marks its dependence upon something else. We cannot find perfect being until we reach a perfect being, that is, a being which we can consider from any point of view and find always wholly complete. Therefore the idea of perfect being is not conventional, and the standard which is applied is not external and artificial but is involved in the very idea of being.

The third form of the *a priori* argument is based upon the idea of necessary being. It differs from the second form, the argument from definition, in this respect, that whereas in the argument from definition existence was a deduction from the definition of the most perfect being, this third form of the argument recognizes the necessity of existence not in any attribute of being but in being itself. In his treatment of this argument¹ Spinoza is guilty of a curious fallacy. At first he reasons that, since the "substance" of which he speaks exists and always has existed it must exist by some necessity within itself, but later he changes his point of view and states that it exists because it must necessarily exist. According to Spinoza, the idea of necessary existence involves the idea that the being which necessarily exists is its own cause, "causa sui." This expression has been much criticised, but somewhat fallaciously and from a point of view quite foreign to the thought which Spinoza intended to convey. For if we inquire as to the existence of any finite thing, we are at once referred to something which was the cause of its existence, and as we continue to inquire we recognize either that there is an endless chain of causation, and therefore no real cause, or else that there is something which has no cause. If it has no

¹ *Ethica*, Pars I.

cause, says Spinoza, it must be its own cause. Of course the opportunity offers here for a more subtle form of criticism. If a thing has always existed, why speak of it as caused at all? Why not say of it simply that it exists? There is a certain justice in such criticism. Yet if we look at the question from a different point of view, we may regard existence at any one moment as the outcome of that existence in a previous moment. Thus the universe as it is at the present moment may be said to have for its cause the form in which it existed the moment before, and similarly, if we say that being exists now because it always has existed, and that its existence at any moment is dependent upon its preceding existence, then in this sense we may speak of being as perpetually the cause of itself, and thus a very real significance attaches to the phrase "causa sui."

In this discussion in regard to necessary being we must discriminate between the two aspects in which necessary being may be considered. In the first aspect the idea of necessary being is approached from the idea of dependent being. Everything as we see it seems to be dependent upon something else, and therefore if there is any absolute being it must be something which is not thus dependent, but which is, in Spinoza's phrase, its own cause. In the second aspect necessary being is conceived as that form of being which carries the necessity of its own existence within itself. Although these two forms of thought are distinct from each other, they are often confounded. Furthermore, the second form has been pushed too far. It is urged that nothing has necessary existence which we can imagine not to exist, but of all the finite things about us there is nothing which we cannot imagine not to exist. It is doubtful, however, whether this is so. For when we think of ourselves or of trees or houses as not existing, we do not think of the *elements* of which we or the objects around us are constituted as not existing; we think of them only as entering into other combinations. Indeed, Spencer insists that he proves the permanence of matter and force by *a priori* reasoning, and that it grows out of the necessity of thought.¹ We cannot think of

¹ *First Principles*, Part II, Chaps. IV-VI.

the universe without thinking of those elements of which the universe is composed as existing permanently through all changes. It may sound the opposite of paradoxical to say that we cannot think of anything without thinking of something. But there must be a basis for our thought which we cannot think away, and the elements of thought which cannot be thought away are the elements which we have just recognized as those of which the universe is constituted.

In all this, however, we have not reached the idea of a being that must exist because of its very nature. We have reached only the ground that, given the universe, there must be something that underlies the universe, that given dependence there must be independence. Further than this we cannot go. Any conception of a form of being which shall be seen to carry within itself the necessity of its existence we cannot reach. We may with Spinoza reach the thought that independent being must have the necessity of existence within itself, but we cannot say with him that therefore independent being exists.

Of the two aspects of necessary being, the first is reached by a method allied to the *a posteriori* argument, whereas the approach to the second professes to be more purely *a priori*. In the one case we start with the fact that the existence of all beings which we can observe is a dependent existence. We cannot help feeling that if there is any real being behind the mere appearance of being, this real being must be independent, existing in and through itself alone. This is a form of *a posteriori* argument, for we approach the idea which we are seeking from facts which we have observed. Kant, it is true, considers this appearance of the *a posteriori* element in the argument wholly fallacious, and holds that the only thing which really has weight with us is the necessity that we feel in our own minds of recognizing some independent or absolute being.¹ The fact remains, however, that this approach to the conception of absolute or necessary being under the first aspect is from the *a posteriori* side, and that we follow the *a priori* method only when from the very nature of

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Vol. I, p. 364.

the being that we conceive we conclude that it must be necessary being.

Let me state the two affirmations in still another form. Under the first aspect, given the universe of dependent things, we cannot help believing in the existence of being that is absolutely independent; recognizing that the things which we see are caused, we cannot help believing in that which is "causa sui." Under the second aspect, if we leave out of account the universe of dependent things, we cannot help believing that there is a being which is seen to involve the necessity of its own existence within itself. In the one case this absolute being is seen to be necessary because of its relation to dependent being. In the other case it is held to be necessary considered in itself. The nature of the necessity in the second case I cannot in any way attempt to explain, for the position is one the reasonableness of which I do not understand. I cannot conceive of any being which can be regarded as necessary except under the first aspect, that is, except as the approach to it is made from the world of dependent being.

In summing up this discussion we may assume that there are two points in regard to which all would agree. First, something must have existed eternally, and, second, that which has existed eternally cannot be merely a series of existences but must be something permanent. In other words, not merely must *something* have existed eternally but the *same* thing must have existed. For if that which is produced is dependent, it must be dependent upon something, and this something must be that which eternally exists. If, on the other hand, we regard that which is produced as independent, we cannot conceive of it except as another form of that which existed previously and produced it. That is, independence can be produced only from independence, and through the communication of its substance. To produce independence in any other way would be to create something out of nothing, and this again would contradict the law of causation. For the law of causation must be respected in both of its aspects, not only as regards the efficient cause but also as regards the material cause.

I have said that on these two points all would agree. But

difference arises when we ask what it is that has existed thus eternally. The materialists would say that it is the atoms, and so far as any *a priori* necessity is concerned, this answer is satisfactory. For here is a persistent substance or collection of substances which remains the same, and of which all the changes which appear, all the variations in the forms of things, are only modifications. In other words, here is independent eternal being, with all things depending upon it. This satisfies the *a priori* need of eternal being. According to this view, the changes, the variations, which take place, are produced through unstable equilibrium. There would be the question here as to what would happen in case perfect equilibrium should be reached. But the real difficulty in regard to this position arises when we come to ask whether all that we find in the universe could be produced in this way,—whether, for instance, spirit can be accounted for, and all that pertains to spirit. This, however, is an *a posteriori* difficulty, and does not greatly concern us here. The materialist would say that the atoms are all that have existed eternally, the spiritualist would say that spirit must have existed eternally. If only one or the other can have existed eternally, must matter be considered as dependent upon spirit, or is spirit to be considered as dependent upon matter? If the reply is made that both may have existed eternally, then may not one still be dependent upon the other, and if so, must it not be assumed that the one upon which the other is dependent is Absolute Being? If, on the other hand, it should be found that neither is dependent upon the other, then there would be two principles existing eternally side by side. But as I have just said, the *a priori* idea of necessary being cannot take us further. For it is purely abstract: it is simply the idea of being that is necessarily conceived or necessarily assumed. After all, the necessity is one not of being but of thought. As Hume says of causation in general,¹ it is a subjective rather than an objective necessity. That is to say, the laws of thought are such that we must necessarily assume the existence of a cause.

This brings us to the consideration of the fourth form of the

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part III, § III.

a priori argument in regard to the divine nature, namely, the argument from the nature of our apprehension of the divine being. It is here that Descartes enters with the famous formula, "Cogito, ergo sum." There are three steps in the argument of Descartes, two of which are *a priori* and the other *a posteriori*. First he borrows from Anselm the argument from definition, substituting, however, for Anselm's "greatest being" the term "most perfect being." Next he tries to throw away all beliefs and to start afresh, asking himself whether there is anything which he absolutely believes, and, if so, in what respect this differs from the things which are not absolutely believed. He finds that thought is something which he cannot escape, something which he cannot imagine not to exist. But thought implies a thinker, and so he reaches the formula, "Cogito, ergo sum." When he proceeds to ask what the mark is by which he recognizes this as absolutely believed, he finds that it consists in the method of his apprehension. That which he so absolutely believes is distinguished from that which is not absolutely believed because he sees it so clearly and distinctly. Clearness and distinctness of perception, therefore, constitute the mark or test of that which must be believed. Then, taking the third step in his argument, he looks about him to see what else there is to which this mark can be applied. He arrives at the thought of God. This again presents itself to him so clearly and distinctly that he recognizes it as belonging in the same class with the thought of his own existence.

It is a peculiarity of the *a priori* argument that it sees from the beginning the point at which it is aiming. This peculiarity does not necessarily affect the force of the argument. When, for instance, the mathematician reaches a point in some long process where the lines of inquiry divide, and selects that line which promises to lead him nearest to the point at which he is aiming, his method is wholly legitimate. But if the nature of the argument is affected by this consciousness of the desired end, the method is not so legitimate. We cannot help thinking that when Descartes stripped his mind of all belief and prepared to plunge into the sea of absolute doubt, he knew in advance where he was to come

out. However, setting aside such surmises, what strikes us as very obvious is that the two things which he clearly and distinctly sees do not stand upon precisely the same level. That is to say, his belief in his own existence and his belief in the existence of God seem not to have offered themselves to his mind through the same method of apprehension. We infer this from the fact that when he made the search for something that was indisputably believed, it was his own existence which first offered itself, and it was after he had planted himself on this belief and looked about him to see if there were anything else which was equally indisputable that he found the belief in God. If the belief in his own existence and his belief in God had stood in exactly the same relation to his thought in this respect, one would suppose that they would have offered themselves to his mind together, or even that the belief in God might have offered itself first. But we cannot conceive that Descartes might first have reached his belief in God and then the belief in his own existence. Even if we grant that both beliefs may have stood in the same relation to his thought, and that the belief in his own existence offered itself first, not because it was more clearly seen, but only because it was nearer to him, still the impression remains that it was the belief in his own existence which offered itself as most certainly indisputable.

The phrase of Descartes, "clearly and distinctly seen," finds illustration in the "adequate conception" of Spinoza. By an adequate conception Spinoza means, not a conception that is complete and does full justice to its object, but one which sees a thing in its necessity. For example, we know that an eclipse is to take place because the astronomer tells us so, but we do not have an adequate conception of it. The astronomer has a more adequate conception, although his conception is not complete. It is doubtful, however, whether Descartes had elaborated his thought to the degree of distinctness conveyed in Spinoza's phrase, and Hume perhaps represents him more nearly, although in a ruder way, when he defines belief as the lively, forcible, firm and steady conception of a thing.¹ It is easy to see that this definition of

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part III, § VII.

Hume's cannot be completely accepted. For we may often have a lively conception of a thing without believing in it. Thus a man may have met with an accident in driving, and when he plans to drive again it is quite possible that he may have a "lively, forcible, firm and steady" idea of an accident,—so lively and steady, indeed, that whether he drives again or not, he cannot get rid of it.

If you ask what tests of belief I have to offer if these are set aside, I must reply frankly that I have none. Belief is something by itself. It cannot be explained, or expressed in other terms. We believe what we believe, and the only test of belief that can be applied to that which claims to be an object of absolute belief is whether or no we can help believing it. Probably nothing more than this was involved in the formula of Descartes, and we may imagine him as thinking, "I cannot help believing that existence and thought must go together; if there is thought, there must be existence; *cogito, ergo sum.*" We may criticise the argument of Descartes, but his thought marks an era in *a priori* argument. For he transfers the ground of argument from the external to the internal world, from the objective to the subjective. The definite results that he obtained amount to little at the present time, but he opened the way of modern thought.

CHAPTER X.

POSITIVE DISCUSSION OF THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT.—THE ARGUMENT FROM UNIVERSALITY OF BELIEF.—THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT AS INVOLVED IN THE THREE IDEAS OF THE REASON.

IN entering on the positive discussion of the *a priori* argument we have to consider not necessity of being but necessity of thought. What is it, then, which constitutes necessity of thought? What is there that we cannot help believing?

There are two forms under which necessary thought may exist. It may be simple and absolute, primary, or it may be something which is seen to be involved in a primary belief and therefore is secondary and dependent. According to the first form I say that I cannot help believing this or that. Under the second form I say that if I believe A then I must believe B and C. The second form, furthermore, appears in two minor forms,—first, where the dependent belief is a resultant from the primary belief, and second, where the dependent belief is a postulate of the primary belief. According to the first of these minor forms, if we assume that A exists, then B must exist as a result of A. Under the second of the minor forms, if we assume A, then we must assume B also; for, in order that A may exist, B must also exist. In the one case B exists because it is dependent upon A, while in the other case B must exist because the existence of A is in some sense dependent upon the existence of B.

The term “postulate” is sometimes used rather vaguely, and therefore it is well to have in mind the distinct meaning which it carries in this connection. All belief rests at bottom upon some primary assumption. Strictly speaking, nothing can be proved. All arguments imply something which must be taken for granted without proof. No links in the chain may be wanting, but with-

out the staple to which the chain itself is attached the chain is powerless. Therefore argument is effective in proportion as it brings a proposition into relation with some necessary belief. This does not mean that the assumption of a belief as necessary and fundamental is an argument with which to convince a doubter. We may assert that the belief in the existence of God is innate and universal, but this will not convince a man who does not himself believe in God. We may use our assumption as an explanation of the wide-spread belief in God, but not as an argument. For if we were to say that just as we believe in the existence of the outer world, although we cannot prove it, so by the same necessity we believe in God, the man who doubts might reply that all men believe in the existence of the outer world in some form or other, but all do not believe in the existence of God. What would then become of our assumption of the universality of a belief in God?

It is sometimes said that there is no real atheism. But unless we adopt a very low theory as to what constitutes belief in God, we must admit the existence of a practical atheism, the atheism of those who may or may not accept intellectually the proofs which are offered, but who show by their lives that they have no profound belief in the existence of a divine being. We may say of such men that they really do believe in a divine power, and that under certain circumstances this belief will manifest itself, but although this may explain certain facts, it does not prove the existence of belief.

This argument from the universality of belief meets us in its broadest form in the so-called *consensus gentium*, the fact that everywhere in all times men have believed in God. First of all, however, we have to confirm the fact, and the doubter might well ask whether it were not rather a poor business to rest religious faith upon the answer to the question whether or no some tribe of savages had an idea of God. The recognition of God cannot be made a question for universal suffrage, in which the vote of one person has as much weight as the vote of another. The vote of a Plato must far outweigh the votes of hundreds and thousands of

degraded or undeveloped minds. Furthermore, if we succeed in proving that all primitive peoples have believed in the existence of a divine power, we have to meet the objection of Comte that such belief belongs to the stage of undeveloped spirit. According to Comte the theological view of the world is first and lowest in the process of human development. As the development continues, the theological view gives place to the metaphysical, and the metaphysical in turn to the positive. We may say to the doubter that certain beliefs accompany certain stages of development, and he may accept our theory but reply that he has passed beyond the stage at which belief in God is possible.

Again, if we assume that in some form the belief in God is universal, what are we to do with the increasing number of those educated men of trained habits of thought who find no basis for the belief? Here, to be sure, our explanation is ready. These men, we say, cannot believe because certain elements of their nature have been developed disproportionately so that the voices of other elements are overpowered. If a man says that he finds in the universe nothing but matter and force, it is because he has trained himself to see these and nothing else. This may be, and in my judgment is, a fair explanation. But it is not an argument, and it cannot be used as an argument. Granted that the development of the senses or of the understanding has been disproportionate, the man occupies the position which he has reached completely, and he cannot be made to look at the universe in any other way than that to which he has become accustomed. Thus under whatever form we present the assumption of the universality of belief, we are brought back to the same point, that it is not an argument.

There is one aspect, however, in which the test of universality has weight. Thus far we have considered only assertion and counter-assertion, and no argument has been suggested which has objective value and is independent of the position held on either side. But suppose we begin by assuming that no man can have a belief or a standard that is not natural, that no matter whether it is high or low the mere fact that he holds it shows that

it is natural. We have then to ask whose system includes that of the other. The glutton, for instance, says that his pleasures are natural. "God gave the vine and all the good things of life, and He gave me the taste for them." "Yes," we answer, "that is true, and we also enjoy the good things of life and the pleasures of taste. But we enjoy other things, besides, of a different and higher kind. These higher pleasures are as natural as yours, and the fact that we have both kinds of pleasure while you have only one shows that our development is fuller and more nearly complete than yours." Or take the profound, exalted pleasure which the person who is thoroughly musical derives from music. Any one who has this intensely developed enjoyment is as truly more complete than those who cannot share in it as the man who sees and hears is more complete than one who is blind and deaf. I say, as *truly* complete. I do not say that the difference is as great. In a similar way all the pleasure which the materialist has in the working of material laws and forces is open to the spiritual nature as well, but the spiritual nature enjoys in addition emotions for which the materialist has no place and of which he has no knowledge. Of course such a test as this can be used only in the most abstract and universal manner. It applies only to principles and not to matters of detail. A materialist, if he is a scientist, may have knowledge in some directions beyond that of a man of spiritual experience and so may enjoy certain specific emotions and pleasures into which the man of spiritual experience does not enter. Yet even so, such pleasures and emotions are open in kind to the spiritual nature.

The test holds good in the comparison between different forms of religion. Thus if Christianity has place for all that is positive in Brahmanism, while Brahmanism has no place for all that is positive in Christianity, then Christianity is to that extent higher than Brahmanism. Or take different forms of Christianity as found in the Catholic and Protestant churches. Each has place for some things which are not found in the other. The first inference, then, is that neither of the two forms is perfect, that neither provides fully for all the needs of the completely rounded nature.

But one may go further. The essential principle with the Catholic church is faith, with the Protestant church, reason. Has the Catholic church, then, the place for reason which the Protestant church has for faith? If not, if the Protestant church more fully recognizes both faith and reason than the Catholic, then the test is in favor of the Protestant church. On the other hand, one may ask whether the Protestant church has such a place for the esthetic sense as is found in the Catholic church for the moral consciousness. If not, then in this respect the test would favor the Catholic church.

When all is said, however, although we may prove to a man that the religious sense is normal to the soul, we do not thereby make him religious, any more than we make him musical by proving to him that the sense of music is normal and that he is deficient if he does not possess it. The argument is more powerful to convince than to convert. The assumption that religion is natural to men has its great value in renewing and strengthening the faith of those who already believe. If one has any religious faith at all, the thought not only of the multitudes who share this faith with him but also of the many among the number who represent all that is noblest in human nature, must give him fresh confidence, both for himself and in any appeal which he may make to others. For just as the man who believes in the universality of the sense of justice has greater confidence in appealing to that sense in others, however undeveloped it may be in them, so the man who believes that the religious sense is normal in the human spirit is more confident in any effort to awaken faith in those about him. The preacher knows that in public religious services the presence of the mere fact of worship may give to lives hitherto unmoved a lasting consciousness of the reality and worth of religious faith, and that a prayer sometimes converts where argument has failed.

From what has been said thus far it is plain that only the second form of the *a priori* argument can have real weight with any one who does not already believe, that form which presents the reality of the existence of God not as in itself a necessity of thought but

as involved in something which the mind has already accepted as necessary. Here our general psychological analysis again serves us. The three ideas of the reason, which we have found from the content of religious faith,¹ suggest a method of argument. From this point of view the most universal form of the *a priori* argument begins with the recognition of each of the three ideas of the reason as absolute. But there cannot be three absolutes. Therefore these three, truth, goodness and beauty, must be in essence one, and wherever truth and goodness and beauty are found there is the thought of God. I have made this statement elsewhere² in the form of a syllogism, but perhaps it should rather be given as an intuition.

This principle is one which we may hesitate to announce, but practically we accept it. Our minds do not rest until they have reached the highest unity. Truth and goodness and beauty belong together, and although we may find them apparently manifesting themselves as differing one from another, we are compelled to regard them as really blending in one. It is to be noticed, however, that while the three ideas of the reason cover one another, their unity must be considered as a whole and not in detail. In the discussion of the subject in *The Science of Thought* I have considered at some length the fallacies which arise when instead of taking the ideas of the reason in their broadest sweep we take them partially, and attempt to prove their identity in their minute elements.³ It is as though we were to assert the identity of isothermal lines and parallels of latitude. There is but one world. The isothermal lines represent this world, and so do the parallels of latitude, and in their completeness the lines and the parallels must cover one another. Yet the parallels and the isothermal lines themselves are different, and the world is differently divided according as it is considered from the one point of view or from the other. So a picture may be perfectly beautiful as a whole although one part or another taken by itself may not be beautiful. In Raphael's "Transfiguration" the demoniac

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. IX.

^{2, 3} *The Science of Thought*, pp. 176-186.

boy is not beautiful, but he is a part, and an essential part, in the complete beauty of the masterpiece.

We must pass on, however, from this universal form of the argument, and consider how far the *a priori* argument is involved in the ideas of the reason taken separately. As I said at the outset,¹ in speaking of the two forms of the *a priori* argument, the second form may appear in one or the other of two minor forms, according to the relation which the dependent belief bears to the primary belief, whether as resultant or as postulate. But we shall find that of these two forms the postulate will naturally play the greater part, since our reasoning is in regard to the Absolute. To begin, then, with the first idea of the reason, how far is the *a priori* argument involved in the idea of truth or unity? Spinoza attempts to base his philosophical system upon this idea alone, for his "substance" is simply another name for the absolute unity. He carries this one principle so far that in theory he excludes the element of freedom and leaves no place for goodness,—for goodness, that is, in the ordinary sense. But we notice that as he proceeds with his discussion and we enter with him into his higher thought, we have a sense of exaltation which cannot be understood or justified unless we recognize in the absolute unity a moral perfection. By this I do not mean to imply that there is any contradiction between the denial of freedom and the attempt to lead others to a higher life. Every necessitarian admits the influence of motives, and even insists that we are always governed by the strongest motives, and Spinoza is merely applying this principle. His fundamental assumption is that if men do not rise to the higher life it is on account of ignorance. But it seems to me that this higher life to which he summons men implies a certain moral perfection, or at least that beauty of character which rests upon moral perfection. The greatest height which he reaches is love. But love must mean that there is something which is lovable, something which is not mechanical but which involves spiritual attraction and therefore spiritual power.

The ideas of the reason are not found apart from one another.

¹ Page 88.

If an attempt is made to build a system of thought upon any one of them exclusively, the aid of the others becomes necessary if we are to reach the results at which we aim. It is as though an organist were trying to produce the noblest music by the use of a single stop. As we listen we wonder at the fulness of the harmony, and then we find that other stops have not been fully closed and cannot be closed. In a similar way, in those philosophies of the understanding which attempt to deny the higher ideas and to account for everything as the result of external influences, we often meet a fulness of life, moral and spiritual, which at first seems to justify their assumptions. But when we look more closely, we see that other elements have crept in unawares.

There is another way, however, in which the first idea of the reason involves the *a priori* argument. We have already seen¹ that it is impossible to conceive of absolute unity under any other form than that of infinite spirit. But we have also seen² that the idea of absolute unity is a necessity of belief. Then, just so far as we cannot help believing in absolute unity, just so far must we also believe in that infinite spirit which is the only form under which absolute unity can be conceived. How is this argument to be classed? Is the conception of unity a resultant of the belief in infinite spirit, or does it postulate infinite spirit? To speak of the idea of unity as postulating the idea of infinite spirit is hardly permissible. For a postulate is more naturally something which is distinct from that which forms the basis of the postulate, and here the two are one, the unity must be a spiritual unity. On the other hand there is a similar difficulty if we say that the one is a resultant of the other. We can only repeat that the two ideas are one. We cannot conceive of absolute unity without conceiving of infinite spirit, and to the extent to which we are compelled to believe in absolute unity we must also believe in infinite spirit.

How is it as regards the moral character of this absolute spiritual unity? Can the idea of absolute goodness be reached in this way? It may be said that if there is an absolute unity in and

¹ Chapters III-V.

² *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. IX.

through which all things exist, then anything that is foreign to this unity would be excluded, and there would be a harmonious universe in which the discords of sin and evil must be regarded as only subordinate and transient. Seydel has developed this aspect of the argument more thoroughly than any one else.¹ He begins with the thought that the manifestation of absolute being cannot ultimately be other than positive. For the problem of sin and evil, therefore, no solution can be found except as they are recognized as transient; they serve as means to an end, arising from some absolute necessity, but they have no permanent place in the universe.

If we ask whether the idea of beauty also is to be approached through the thought of absolute unity, we come upon a fundamental affirmation which needs no argument. If the universe is the manifestation of absolute unity, it is a harmony, and ultimately, as transient discords appear, the most magnificent harmony that can be conceived. All that we know as beauty is a portion of the one beauty, some strain of the great symphony heard imperfectly and at a distance.

We have next to ask whether the second idea of the reason, goodness, also carries with it the conception of divine existence. Here we meet the Postulates of Kant.² As Spinoza is the classic example of the attempts to construct a system of thought upon the first idea of the reason alone, so Kant is foremost among those who have made goodness the foundation of their systems. Kant denies all power in the intellect taken by itself to reach any result which can be accepted as having a reality independent of the mind itself. He shows that the ideas upon which religion rests cannot be proved by any logical process, nor can they be disproved. They lie outside the world of human reasoning. If, therefore, there is any extralogical ground for accepting them, they may be held without fear of attack from the side of intellect. He finds this extralogical ground for their acceptance in the moral

¹ *Religionsphilosophie*, Part II.

² C. C. Everett, *Essays Theological and Literary*, "Kant's Influence in Theology."

law. He does not, like Martineau¹ and many others, reason back to the thought of God as implied in the very existence of the moral law. The thought of God and of immortality are to him the elements without which the fulfilment of the moral law is impossible. The moral law is absolute. It must be fulfilled. Therefore we have the right to postulate God and immortality, since these furnish the only conditions under which obedience is possible.

Kant presented his postulates under two different forms. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*² he urges that the moral law is a mere phantom of the brain unless it be regarded as the expression of the will of a lawgiver, and unless its authority be enforced by the sanction of rewards and punishments. The first of these requirements involves the existence of a divine Lawgiver, the second involves a future life in which the sanctions of the law can be fulfilled.

The second form of the postulates appears in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, published seven years later. Here Kant has come to feel the inconsistency in the more personal aspect of the postulates in their earlier form, and so far as is possible strips his reasoning of all personal feeling. According to the principles which he now lays down, an act, to have moral value, must be performed purely from moral motives. The fear of punishment or the hope of reward introduces an unmoral element and cannot be recognized as an impulse to moral action. The only source from which the stimulus to obedience can be sought is reverence for the moral law itself. The end of the moral law is the attainment of the highest good. This highest good consists in the adjustment between happiness and desert. If the moral idea is to be fulfilled, a Being must be assumed who has power to make this adjustment. Furthermore, the personal element cannot be wholly left out of the account, and since the individual cannot at any moment of time become perfectly moral, the moral law

¹ James Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 21, Vol. II, p. 28.

² Trans. by F. Max Müller, p. 491.

demands eternity for its fulfilment. Thus we have the postulate of immortality. This infinite character of the moral law is given more definite form by Fichte. Individuals are points of consciousness into which the infinite consciousness has differentiated itself. Each individual point feels the impulse of its infinitude and strives continually toward the perfect fulfilment of the moral law. But the finite point, although it is always approaching the infinite manifestation, never reaches it. This thought of an infinite progress is the basis of Fichte's optimism. In its negative aspect the same thought becomes the basis of Schopenhauer's pessimism. Fichte emphasizes the idea of continued advance, Schopenhauer that of a continual demand which is never satisfied.¹

The two forms of the postulates are wholly different from each other. In the first form the personal element is emphasized, in the second the impersonal and universal. In the first the question is, how shall weak human nature find strength to fulfil the moral law. In the second the moral law demands that certain conditions shall be fulfilled without regard to human strength or weakness. Instead of human need, the necessity of the moral law itself becomes the basis of the postulate, and the moral law is no longer applied to the individual, but only to the universe. The later postulates contain elements foreign to the moral law, so far as the individual is concerned, and they lay upon the individual a duty which is not included in the moral law. Evidently Kant based his postulates upon his belief rather than his belief upon the postulates. He felt that there was a most intimate relation between morality and religion, that morality was the basis of religious belief. When he found that the first method by which he had attempted to establish this relation had involved him in inconsistency, he did not say, "Why, then, my results are false, and there is not this necessity for a belief in God and in immortality." Instead, he simply went to work in another way to reach the same results. What right had he, however, by either method, to make such postulates? The moral law is simply a

¹ C. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*, Chap. XII.

demand, a "categorical necessity," to use his own expression. What right has he to assume that this demand must be fulfilled? He himself is the first to see that he has no such right. He says simply that it is a moral necessity. We cannot prove that there *is* a God, we can only feel that there *must* be one.

Yet there must be a logical basis for any postulate. Suppose, for instance, that a man is starving, and that there is a loaf of bread or some money which is within reach but which belongs to another. His only hope for life is to take it. Here is a postulate based upon the absolute necessity of life to this individual. That is, the impulse of self-preservation justifies to him his act in taking the loaf. But just because the loaf is necessary to his existence, can he therefore assume that there is a loaf? Because a man is drowning and has that intense longing for existence which demands something to which it may cling, has he a right to assume that a raft or a log shall be present? Or again, to return to the starving man with the loaf before him which belongs to another, has he the right to appropriate it? Some men have died rather than violate their conscience; the first cry of the individual necessity has been, "I must live," but the moral sense has answered, "Why?" Kant was certainly right in so far as he placed the demand of the moral law above the demand for life.

But let us take another illustration. In our Civil War the Government of the United States performed a number of extra-constitutional acts. These acts were justified on the ground that the necessity for national existence had given rise to the Constitution and was therefore superior to the Constitution, so that to sacrifice the national existence to the Constitution would be to sacrifice the end to the means. May not a similar argument hold in the case of the individual? In all cases, we answer, in which a postulate of this kind is to be accepted, there must be some underlying philosophy. If the starving man thinks himself justified in taking the loaf or the money, it must be through some principle of socialism, more or less consciously recognized, by which he holds that society owes a life to every individual. If

the nation assumes the right to violate its own constitution, it can be only on the ground that the nation is more universal than the individual, that individual lives and individual property depend upon the national existence, and that therefore the life of the nation must be preserved at all hazards. It is the same with the old-time assumption that "the king can do no wrong."

In a similar way, if goodness is to make this postulate, if the moral law makes necessary the belief in God, there must be some basis for the postulate, some underlying philosophy, whether held consciously or unconsciously. In Kant's philosophy goodness is made supreme. But there are two kinds of supremacy, supremacy *de jure* and supremacy *de facto*. If we take the moral sense by itself, all that we can say with absoluteness is that it is supreme *de jure*. Kant, however, assumes that it is supreme *de facto*, and that the universe itself must conform to the demands of the moral law. Otherwise life would be left incomplete, and there would be a mighty demand with no fulfilment. That is, there would be an infinite breach in the universe, on the one hand the demand of the highest spiritual nature and on the other the absence of all response to this demand. Why should there not be such a breach? If we reply that it is inconceivable, it is because consciously or unconsciously we recognize the fact that the universe is one. In other words, while Kant was attempting to work out his system upon the basis of the second idea of the reason alone, unconsciously he was accepting as one of his premises the first idea of the reason. His postulate would be simply an infinite demand like the demand of the drowning man for something to cling to, except as the unity of the universe is assumed, a unity implying the correlation of all elements of the universe with one another, and especially, in this case, the correlation of the absolute fact with the infinite demand.

A comparison of the thought of Kant with that of Anselm may make Kant's position clearer. Anselm bases everything upon the thought of the greatest, the perfect being. His conception of sin and of the necessity of the atonement rests chiefly

on his idea of the divine glory. Sin is a violation of what is due to God.¹ With Kant the fundamental thought is the highest good, and God is postulated in order that the moral law may be fulfilled. The moral law does not follow upon the recognition of the relation of man to God, but the relation of man to God is demanded for the accomplishment of the moral law. With Anselm God is the end, with Kant God is the means to an end. There is an illustration here of a tendency in theology to follow in its development the political development of the world. At first the idea of absolute monarchy furnished the type for theological conceptions, but with the recognition of democratic principles in government theological conceptions also were modified. Thus Anselm assumes that the kingdom is for the monarch. With Kant the monarch is for the kingdom. With him it is not God who is first, but the ideal universe. It is worth while to notice this tendency, partly because it may help to explain certain transitions in thought, and partly because in recognizing it we shall be more likely to use judgment in furthering or in checking it, as the case may be.

In closing this part of our examination we have still to ask whether the third idea of the reason involves the thought of divine existence. The idea of beauty has been too much neglected by theologians, and this neglect has more or less colored our theologies. Even in philosophy it has hardly received fair treatment as one of the fundamental elements of thought. Yet in justice we must add that it is less fundamental than the others. If we describe the three ideas of the reason by saying that truth or unity affirms that which is, goodness that which ought to be, and beauty that which is as it ought to be,² beauty is seen to be rather the resultant of truth and goodness than equally fundamental with them. Still, the dissatisfaction which the human mind would feel in the thought of an incomplete world, the contradiction to its esthetic demand which it would have to face, points to the conception of a perfect universe, and if we deny the teachings of religion it is hard to imagine a way by which

¹ Page 304.

² *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 200.

the discords in the world may be overcome. Religion, to be sure, does not do away with all discords, but it does point to the possibility of their ultimate banishment and the final harmony of a completed world. Of this, however, I have already spoken at some length in our examination of the psychological elements of religious faith.¹

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. XII.

CHAPTER XI.

THE POSITIVE DISCUSSION OF THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT CONTINUED.—THE ADVANTAGES OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THE THREE IDEAS OF THE REASON.—THE POSTULATES OF THE INTELLECT.

THE *a priori* argument as based upon the three ideas of the reason holds, of course, only in so far as there is faith in these ideas. But to a certain extent this faith is found in all men, or at least there is the germ of it in every mind.¹ What is important for us to notice is that the least recognition of the three ideas implies their absoluteness, even though this absoluteness be not granted. For there can be no reason for the slightest recognition of any of them as absolute in any one direction which does not involve its absoluteness in all directions. If because of a law of conduct a person surrenders self-interest to duty, or even if he condemns another for failure to do this, he has recognized the absoluteness of the moral law. For there is no reason why it should be applied in one case unless it is to be applied in all cases. Indeed it may be said with little exaggeration that the law is not really obeyed unless it is obeyed in all respects. For suppose a man should be in debt to a number of persons all of whom have claims equally just and resting upon the same basis, and suppose that he should be moved by his conscience to pay one of his creditors in full. If he pays one and does not pay the others, his act of justice toward the one becomes through its partialness an act of injustice.

There is this advantage, also, in the method of reasoning which we have been following, that the ideas of the reason are funda-

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, pp. 140-149.

mentally bound up with religious faith.¹ They are the element which to a large extent constitute religious feeling. If we succeed, therefore, in exciting the feelings which correspond to any one of these ideas, we have made just so much progress toward awakening religious faith itself. Any result gained, if actually accepted, is not a mere logical result, but a real accomplishment. We may convince a person without converting him, but if we can stimulate these ideas in his mind, he is at least so far on the way to conversion, if not already converted. Practically, we find that religious faith is easy in proportion as the ideas of the reason are strong in our nature, even though we may not see any logical connection between the ideas and the faith. Thus faith in immortality is never easier to hold than in those moments of exaltation when one is inspired by pure and lofty music, and similarly a lofty moral faith is not only akin to religious faith but makes that religious faith easier.

"Whene'er a noble deed is wrought,
Whene'er is spoken a noble thought,
Our hearts, in glad surprise,
To higher levels rise."²

If the analysis which we have been making is complete, our argument will be found to follow along the line of the historical development of religion. Now in studying comparatively the different religions of the world we have seen that they tend to follow one or another of the paths which have been marked out by the ideas of the reason. Thus the first idea underlies the various forms of Hindu belief, the Mazdean religion follows the impulse of the second, and Greek religion has the inspiration of the third. We must not dwell longer, however, upon the argument from the ideas of the reason, for we have to consider another form of the *a priori* argument, the postulates of the intellect. The instinct of thought is fundamental in human nature. The longing for knowledge for its own sake comes at a comparatively late stage

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chaps. IX-XII.

² H. W. Longfellow, *Santa Flomena*.

in the development of human thought. At first men think, practically, just as they act. But men at all times trust in their thought, or at least believe that any difficulties which they meet can be solved by more thought. Then comes the love of truth for the sake of truth, and of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. The two inherent impulses in human thinking are, first, faith in thought itself, and, second, thought for the sake of thinking, that is, knowing. The postulate of the intellect is the demand for that which shall make thought and real knowledge possible.

We can best begin this part of our discussion by referring to Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable,—not his thought of the Absolute as unknowable, which we have already had occasion to examine,¹ but the doctrine of the universe as unknowable. We could meet his argument in regard to the unknowability of the Absolute. For the position which he held involved one positive element, the Absolute itself, and we could show that the term was meaningless unless the Absolute were recognized as Absolute Spirit. It is more difficult to meet him when he takes the more negative position that the universe is unknowable.² What knowledge we have, he says, is through the nerves. But the mind and the world are at opposite ends of the nerves, and it is inconceivable that the nerves should give to the mind any true account of that which lies beyond them. His argument is singular in that he appears to forget that the nerves themselves are a part of the objective world, and that we have no right to assume that we know anything about them. But he presents to us one of those logical circles which are as hard to meet as any argument.

Spencer justifies agnosticism in regard to the external universe by saying that such thought as is possible for us serves us as well as if it were true. What it gives us is "transfigured realism." By this he does not at all mean anything like a transfiguration in the sense of a glorification of realism, but simply realism under a changed form. It is, he says, as though we saw the universe reflected in a distorting mirror. The reflection gives no real

¹ Chapter I.

² *The Principles of Biology*, Vol. I, p. 356.

picture of the objects contained in it, for it follows the lines of the mirror rather than those of the actual objects. Yet every change in an object produces a corresponding change in the reflection, and thus we have a world which for all practical purposes is as good as though it were real. This, however, involves the assumption that we think about the world merely for our own advantage, that we may adapt ourselves to our environment and gain from it the greatest possible pleasure with the minimum of pain. But such a harmony with our environment for merely practical purposes is not what we regard as one of the most important ends in thinking. We think in order that we may know, and we wish to know, not merely that we may use the object of our knowledge, but because knowledge is in itself a joy. The impulse toward harmony with the environment is not only practical but actual, and Spencer himself yields to this impulse as readily as anyone, and thinks for the pleasure of thinking and for the sake of knowing. For what relation have all his theories of the ethereal origin of the universe to our present ease or convenience? And when in his speculation in regard to the future he reaches forward toward the time when the world shall again become an ethereal mass as before, is it because he expects that we or any of our posterity are to be alive at that time, or because we can do anything to postpone or to advance the ultimate results? In all this he follows out his thought simply because he is by nature a man hungry for greater knowledge.

But what can we know of the external world? Clearly no knowledge is possible upon the plane of sense or materialism. The knowledge of the spiritual life, however, is open to us in all the various forms of manifestation in which it is presented. Thus we have a real knowledge of other persons. The mind cannot comprehend what is different from itself, but it can comprehend that which is similar to itself, and although I cannot understand what heat is as it may exist in the bar of iron, I perfectly comprehend the feeling which you have when you touch the hot bar of iron. It is often said that the idealist who denies the existence of the world of matter must be *ipso facto* a solipsist, and must

deny equally with the rest of the external world the existence of other units of subjective consciousness. But this position is evidently incorrect. We rightly say that we have no knowledge of the material world, for the senses cannot report to us the facts of the material world correctly. But we can have knowledge of the feelings of others. Between our own feeling and the feeling of another there is a resemblance, and the language which in reference to the material world was a foreign tongue here becomes the language of the fact itself. Moreover, in the second place, we have real knowledge of anything which is the embodiment of an idea. For instance, I utter words, I use a certain form of expression. If I succeed in making myself clear, these words have a meaning for you. They are transparent and through them you know my thought. It is the same if I put my knowledge into a book. The book is an object in the material world, but it is also, or at least it is supposed to be, the embodiment of an idea, and that idea is comprehended by you. The same is true of all the objects of human creation in so far as they embody ideas. There may be a material element of which you have no knowledge, but that may be left out of the account for the present. So far as the book or the picture or the house or the railway or the cathedral embodies some idea of writer or artist or builder, so far it becomes transparent to you, and to that extent you have knowledge of your environment. What, then, is needed to make the whole world transparent to us and real? Only that it shall be the manifestation of spirit, the embodiment of an idea. Grant this, and the universe becomes absolutely comprehensible. For the demand of the intellect is that the world shall be thinkable. The impulse to think, which is fundamental in human nature, is not satisfied merely to play with thought, or to consider phenomena merely for practical ends. Men think in order that they may know the truth. They recognize with Hegel that only that which is false is unthinkable. Religious faith, therefore, offers precisely what the intellect demands, for it recognizes in the universe as its very essence this ideal element, the manifestation of Absolute Spirit.

I may put this in another form. We often use the term "object" loosely as we do the term "subject," but strictly speaking the term "object" is meaningless except as that of which it is used is relative to a subject. Now we can represent the world to ourselves only as object. We cannot conceive of it as a thing, or as made up of things. We can conceive of it only as made up of projected sensations of our own. Take away our sight and hearing and feeling and the other sensations, and what is left? If we say, that which is the cause of all, the thing in itself, even as we answer the thing in itself becomes a thought. We remain still in the world of thought and cannot escape from it. But if the world is made up of our objectified sensations, what becomes of it when we are not there? Does it spring into existence as we look at it? Gray sings that "many a flower is born to blush unseen," but is this conceivable? Can there be color or fragrance where there is no one to see or smell? The only escape from the difficulty is to postulate an absolute subject to which the world shall always be related as absolute object, to say with Theodore Parker whenever we find ourselves in some new and beautiful spot, "God was here before me."

In all this we have done nothing in the way of proof. We have simply considered a postulate of the intellect. The impulse to think requires that the universe shall be thinkable, that it shall be transparent and real, not necessarily to your mind or to mine, but conceivably so, and this need postulates that which religious faith offers, the existence of Absolute Spirit. Dr. Royce has approached this question most interestingly from the opposite side.¹ Basing his argument upon the fact of error, he finds that the only thing which cannot be open to error is the possibility of error. How, then, he asks, is error possible? Every mind reacts in relation to its environment according to its nature. Every individual looks at things for himself and takes impressions for himself. Every one, therefore, being what he is, is justified. How, then, are we to recognize the possibility of error? How, for instance, are we to prove that the man whom we call color-blind

¹ Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*.

does not after all see the world as it really is? Dr. Royce finds that what is needed is an absolute standard of measurement, a real, ideal content of the world, and an absolute mind by whose thought of the world the truth or falsity of the thought of finite minds may be determined. No dynamic relation of the absolute mind with the world is established. This should follow, however. For unless we complete Dr. Royce's thought by regarding the world as the manifestation of the absolute mind, we shall have on the one hand an absolute mind reacting in relation to the world as absolute, and on the other hand finite minds reacting as finite, and there will be the same possibility as in the case of two finite minds that each is true and that there is still no error. As *creative* thought the absolute mind becomes the true standard, for since it is through it that the world exists, its knowledge of the world must be the true knowledge.

Of course this question as to how error is possible is only the negative aspect of the question which we had just before considered as to how truth is possible. Interesting as the discussion is, it seems to me better to make the postulate in the positive rather than in the negative form. Not only do we believe as positively in the possibility of truth as in the possibility of error, but we could not conceive of the possibility of error at all if we did not believe that ultimately we may reach the truth.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SECOND GENERAL DIVISION OF THE DISCUSSION: THE MOMENT OF NEGATION: CREATION, FREEDOM, SIN AND EVIL.—THEORIES OF CREATION: AS HAVING A BEGINNING: AS WITHOUT A BEGINNING.—THE DIFFICULTIES OF EITHER THEORY.

WE have come now to the second general division of our discussion. Under the first division we have had to do with ideal relations, the moment of abstract affirmation. We have now to consider the moment of negation or separation. The unity which we have reached is broken up, and experience enters to test with its apparent exceptions the truth of the *a priori* argument. Here our real difficulties begin, the practical difficulties which always arise when one passes from the abstract to the concrete, from the ideal to the real. The ideal circle is easy to comprehend. It is the circle as actually drawn for which it is hard to find the formula.

The negation has three stages, which correspond to the three ideas of the reason. Over against the idea of unity there is found in the world an infinite diversity. The doctrine of creation presents itself as the first stage in the negation, on the one hand the world in its complex variety, and on the other hand the unity which is its source. What can we understand of creation? How are we to represent the variety of the world, its otherness, its relation to absolute unity? The antithesis only strengthens as we reach the second stage of negation in the doctrine of human freedom. Not only is the creation other than the creator, but it has a life of its own, it is free and independent. With the third stage in the negation this freedom and independence become antagonism. The individual does not merely follow a course of his own in the freedom of his will, but sets himself over against the absolute will. In relation to the idea of goodness this antagonism is found to

be that which we call sin, a hostility in which the idea of unity seems wholly lost. Finally, in relation to the third idea of the reason, the conflict appears in still another aspect. In relation to goodness the individual takes the offensive against the environment. Now, in relation to beauty, the environment has its revenge upon the individual and puts him upon the defensive. In this antagonism in relation to beauty the problem of evil is presented, the problem of pain and suffering. It is true that sin also is opposed to beauty, that sin as well as evil is a discord. But with sin the antagonism is fundamentally to the idea of goodness.

In considering the first stage in the negation, the doctrine of creation, we have first to recognize the different views of creation that have been held or that may be held. As regards its relation to time there are the theories, *a*, that it had no beginning, and *b*, that it had a beginning. In relation to substance there is the theory, *a*, that the universe was created out of something, either (*a'*) the divine substance or (*b'*) some pre-existent matter, and there is the theory, *b*, that it was created out of nothing. Thirdly, as regards the method of creation there are once more two theories, *a*, that creation was a matter of necessity, and, *b*, that it was a matter of freedom. According to *a* God created the universe by a necessity of his nature, and not only the fact but the form of creation was a matter of necessity. According to *b* both the fact and the form of creation are held to have been a matter of free choice on the part of God.

If these theories are compared together, it will be seen that all those which we have marked *a* involve a certain conception of creation, and all those which are marked *b* involve another conception. Those which are marked *a* represent the form of thought which may be called philosophical, while the theories marked *b* imply the form of thought which would be most naturally suggested by religion. I do not here make this distinction absolute, as though the philosophical form could not also be the religious form. I merely say that the theories marked *b* would most obviously, from a superficial point of view, be suggested by religion. The theories marked *a* are held by certain theologians and are not

hostile to religion. It is for us to learn, if we can, which are the forms best fitted to religious faith. The theories which are brought together under *a* recognize no possibility of interruption or caprice; all is regular and inevitable. Those which are marked *b* either involve, or at least suggest, a dependence upon will. Thus in the first group, the theories in regard to the relation of creation to time, the idea of a creation which has no beginning most naturally suggests the thought of necessity. Such a creation would be by its very nature eternal. The theory does not exclude the possibility of volition, but it falls easily into line with the philosophic view of the universe which recognizes no break or crisis. On the other hand the theory of a creation with a beginning suggests more naturally an arbitrary act of will. Similarly, in the second group, the theory of a creation out of something, and especially out of the divine substance, most easily lends itself to the principle of necessity, whereas the theory of a creation out of nothing suggests again an arbitrary act. These relations culminate in the third group in which one of the two methods of creation proposed is necessary and the other voluntary.

To speak first of the relation of creation to time, the church has generally held the theory that creation had a beginning. The exceptions have chiefly taken the form of a belief in a series of creations following one another in succession. The theory of a creation with a beginning has appealed to theologians, first, I suppose, because of its greater conformity to the scriptural account, and in the second place because of the greater ease with which creation is conceived as having a beginning. For a creation is that which causes something to begin to be which before had no being, so that a creation without beginning, an eternal creation, would seem to be no creation. It is the difficulty which we have already met in discussing the *causa sui*.¹ How can anything be the cause of itself? and how can that be caused which has always existed? Either theory of creation involves certain difficulties and removes others. The theory of a creation without beginning presents first of all the great difficulty that it implies a completed

¹ Page 75.

infinite, a thing difficult, if not impossible, to conceive.¹ For if we have a series of events which has no beginning and which includes the present moment, then the series is completed at the present moment. But since it has no beginning we have a completed infinite. Further, to draw the line at any given moment is to say that behind that moment is a completed infinite, and since the number of such moments is infinite we have an infinite number of completed infinites. Then, since the number of events behind moment *b* is greater than the number behind moment *a*, is the infinite behind *b* larger than the infinite behind *a*? To measure infinite with infinite is a contradiction in terms. It is through paradoxes like these that Kant is led to believe in the phenomenality of time. They all have to do with the quantitative infinitude, and many of the difficulties which they present would not occur if we had any real sense of what is meant by quantitative infinitude. All involve measurement, and measurement is something wholly foreign to our thought of the infinite. A single illustration will show what I mean. Suppose we take the point at the end of a spoke in a wheel which is revolving with infinite rapidity. Now if we lengthen the spoke and continue the motion of the wheel, will the point at the end of the lengthened spoke revolve with greater rapidity? If it must move more rapidly than the first point, and if that was moving with infinite rapidity, we are involved in inextricable difficulty. It is evident that the question is based upon a completely mistaken notion of quantitative infinitude. For my own part I hardly know what is meant by infinite rapidity. If there is such a thing, it must follow that the experiment could not be tried at all; either the spoke could not be lengthened, or the wheel would move more slowly than before.

The difficulties, however, are more pressing in regard to time than in regard to space. In regard to space the difficulty may be stated as follows: suppose a line which begins with a certain point and then is prolonged infinitely in one direction, and suppose a second line which is infinitely prolonged in both directions. Is the second line longer than the first? The first line must involve

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1850, Article by the Rev. Joseph Tracy.

an infinite series of points, and yet one's impulse is to say that the second line is twice as long as the first. But this attempt to divide what is indivisible, and to measure what is measureless, is like marking a point here in the circumference of a circle and another there, and then asking which point has the greater length behind it. In regard to time, if the series is infinite, we do have at any given moment a series which is at the same time complete and infinite, and the infinite is continually pressing forward into a new infinitude. We get rid of the difficulty, of course, if we assume the phenomenality of time,—that is always at hand as a sort of waste-basket into which our difficulties may be thrown. But if we accept that theory we gain nothing practically. We may state the proposition, but when that is done we can think no further.¹

These difficulties cannot be avoided. Practically, matter may or may not be infinitely divisible, but to thought there is a possible infinitude in every inch of space. If time be only the possibility of succession, that possibility may become infinite at any moment, and whether the world has existed eternally or not, there is the possibility that it has so existed. It is true that the difficulty which we have been considering is not one of religion. It is purely philosophical, a difficulty of conception which must remain whatever the form of thought which we adopt. Yet, if religion accepts the theory of a creation without beginning, it loses an important argument which has been based upon the assumed impossibility of a completed infinite. For if this assumption is granted, the series which makes up the universe must have had a beginning, and since it could not have had a beginning without a cause, we have a demonstration of the fact of causation. This argument has often been used with great effect, and appears to bring us face to face with the fact of creation which it assumes to prove, and through that fact with the power of God himself as it originates the universe. Furthermore, the theory of a creation without beginning involves for religion the positive difficulty of introducing any teleological principle. Creation implies a plan, the manifestation of an idea in the universe. All its elements in time and

space are members of a whole. Its movement is an advance toward a result. But what sort of whole can that be, the members of which are numberless in space and eternal in time? What sort of movement toward an end can there be, what idea of completion, in a universe made up of a limitless series?

This difficulty is clearly recognized by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. After showing how from one point of view the world of the understanding is too small for the reason, and the world of the reason too large for the understanding, he goes on to show that from another point of view the world of the understanding is too large for the reason, and the world of the reason too small for the understanding. For the reason demands an ideal world, and therefore a completed world, a world which can be conceived as a unity, a whole. The understanding, on the other hand, having to do with the great successions of causation, can recognize no limits in the universe. Dorner also recognizes the difficulty. Since the divine love may be conceived as infinite, an infinite number of individuals is needed to satisfy that love. Yet each individual, he finds, must be different from every other individual, and therefore the number of individuals in the universe cannot be greater than the number of the variations or types of the individual. Since the number of types is limited, the number of individuals also must be limited.¹ Can Dorner, however, assume that the number of types or variations is limited? It seems to me that there is no line drawn or conceivable at which the process of differentiation will stop. There must be the same possibility of an infinite number of variations among individuals that there is of an infinite number of points in a given measure of space. Dorner further assumes a sort of timeless world both before the movement of creation began and after it shall end, a changeless, timeless condition which gives way to time and change but is to reassert itself in the future. It is not unlike the idea of creation which we find in the first period of the Mazdean religion. Dorner appears to use the phrase, "when time shall be no more," with the meaning which has been popularly given to it. As the church

¹ *System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, § 34, 3.

looks forward to a period when time shall cease, and there shall follow an angelic creation which shall be eternal and removed from all limits of time, so, he suggests, there may be no difficulty in recognizing a similar celestial condition before the activity of the world began. As we have already seen,¹ however, the phrase, "when time shall be no more," is a mistranslation and in its real meaning the passage has no application in this connection.

The fact is that there is no way by which we can meet this difficulty presented by the conflict between the demand of the reason and that of the understanding, the difficulty of conceiving a creation which is at the same time the manifestation of a perfect plan and also limitless. It is a difficulty which exists because of our very finiteness. We can conceive of a universe in which the perfect plan is always approaching completeness. It is the attempt to conceive the process not only as without end but also as without beginning which seems to us so difficult, if not impossible. Yet if the conception of creation as having no beginning presents these difficulties, there are also certain other difficulties which it avoids, and first of all a difficulty connected with our thought of the Absolute which has been a favorite argument with atheists. If creation had a beginning, what, it is asked, was God doing before the creation? A question foolish enough in any case, which perhaps might best be answered by saying that it is none of our business. This difficulty the church has avoided by the doctrine of the Trinity. The eternal communion between the persons of the Trinity, the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, gives a content to an eternity which otherwise would be unfilled.

A second difficulty, however, also connected with the thought of the Absolute, is more profound. What could have been the motive for creation? Why should God create at all? Why should he create at one time rather than another? What motive could have been present with the Creator which had not been present from eternity? If the creation was without a motive, it would seem to have been an act of caprice. If there was a motive, it could not have proceeded from anything external to the Creator,

for according to the hypothesis nothing external then existed. But if the motive was from within, then there must have been some previously existing need. Some have said that there was no need, but only the desire for the manifestation of the divine love or of the divine glory. But is there any real difference between the two positions? No need is more pressing than the demand for love, or the demand for activity or manifestation. The difficulty, however, is wholly removed if we accept the theory of a creation without a beginning, for then the need which may have existed would never have been unsatisfied, and a need which from all eternity has been satisfied is not a limitation but an added completion. It is interesting to notice that in the Vedanta the same question presents itself and is answered in a similar manner.

Finally, the theory of creation without a beginning ends to a large extent the conflict between science and religion. What science insists upon is that the same forces have always tended to act in the same way. Their action may have been modified by reactions among themselves so that at different periods there may have been different results. But these results are secondary. The forces themselves have always been tending in the same direction. Anything in the nature of a break, anything like a fresh start in the history of the world, is excluded from scientific thought. It insists that all things are bound together by the same laws and in the same successions of causation, and in so far it holds firmly to the principle of absolute unity in the universe. It is on this ground chiefly that it has based its opposition to theology. There has been the negative objection to theology on the part of scientific men that theology has not proved its position, but their positive objection has been on the ground that theology has maintained a theory of interference, a system of interruptions, by which the order of nature has been continually broken in upon. But if we accept the theory of creation without a beginning, the divine power becomes a constant in the history of the world, a force which can be always calculated upon and always assumed. It takes its place as the absolute force which is always present in

and behind those secondary and resultant forces which are recognized as always present. And just as science recognizes a law of growth present in all organisms, and acting until it has accomplished its end, so must the conception of the divine power as present in the world from eternity become as truly an object of scientific recognition.

Scientific men frequently make a very unscientific use of the theory of divine agency, appearing to recognize it at certain points just as some of the theologians do. Thus Darwin suggests¹ that at the beginning God may have breathed the breath of life into one or more forms, although after that, it would appear, the world was left to take care of itself. Here the scientific position would be, either to deny that God breathed the breath of life into any form whatever,—unless indeed the phrase “breath of life” is to be understood only in a figurative sense,—or else to recognize the divine power as present everywhere, not only at the beginning but also throughout the movement of creation. In a similar way Wallace assumes that the processes of evolution sufficed until man was reached, but that with man certain faculties can be accounted for only on the hypothesis of a spiritual nature, super-added to the animal nature.² But thus to conceive of the divine power as inoperative so far as the creation in general is concerned and then as suddenly manifesting itself when a knot appears which nothing else can cut,—this is a most unscientific use of the theory of divine power. If the divine power exists at all, it is everywhere and constant. If it is seen more distinctly at certain times and places than at others, that is because of our limitations.

There is another form of this unscientific use of the thought of God which is more general. It appears in the manner in which some seek to find God in one portion of the universe and some in another. There are some persons who find him only in the unknowable, others only in the knowable. To some he is in all mystery, to others only where law and order are to be recognized, and a divine purpose. We must feel great sympathy with either view. We have to sympathize with those to whom God is revealed

¹ *The Origin of Species*, Close of Chap. XV.

² *Darwinism*, Chap. XV.

in the order and purpose of the world as they are seen and recognized, and at the same time we realize that there is no manifestation of God which so fills the soul with awe as the thought of the infinite and absolute being who is beyond the power of human reason to find or comprehend. There is another view with which we can have no sympathy, a habit of thought which recognizes God only in that which is not understood, and then, if an explanation has been found, considers that just so much ground has been taken from religion and that God must now be sought in some remoter region. There are people who have a fear, and others who have an exultant hope, that as the field of science is more and more enlarged, no place will be left for the thought of God. The fact is, that with each advance of scientific knowledge our thought of God, instead of retreating, simply takes on a new and often a clearer form. The only scientific thought of God is that which recognizes his presence and power not under one form or another, or at this or that moment only, but under all forms and at all times, in the knowable and the unknowable, in the unknown and in the known.

It is to be noticed that the difficulties which we have been considering are of two sorts. They are in part metaphysical and in part theological. The separation between them may be somewhat arbitrary, but it is important enough to be recognized. Of the metaphysical difficulties, there is on the one side the difficulty of conceiving an endless series without beginning, a completed infinite, and on the other side the difficulty of conceiving an uncaused beginning. The one has to do with our power of conception and the grasp of our thought, the other concerns the category of causation. The one may be called static, the other dynamic. Of the theological difficulties the first is the difficulty of finding any teleological principle in the conception of a creation without beginning or end, and the other is the difficulty of conceiving an unmotived beginning. This second theological difficulty is similar to the second of the metaphysical difficulties, but there we had to do with a difficulty of thought, whereas the theological difficulty arises from the feeling that an unmotived

act is more or less irrational, and that to associate such an act with the Creator is to lower our conception of him.

These opposite difficulties tend to neutralize one another. Are we to say, then, that there has been no creation? But so far as the metaphysical difficulties are concerned, they meet us equally whether we take the thought of God into the account or not, whether we assume a created or an uncreated universe. Because we have thus two inconceivabilities over against each other, are we to conclude that there is no universe? But we know that there is a universe. Then if the opposition between these two inconceivabilities does not prevent us from recognizing the existence of the universe, no more does it prevent us from recognizing the existence of the universe as created.

It is through such arguments as these that both theist and atheist have so often won an easy victory, each over the other. It is not necessary that we should decide the questions which they raise. We may, however, recognize the fact that the theory of a creation without beginning is more in accordance with the tendencies of the thought of the day. For the category of causation which demands a creation without beginning underlies all scientific thought. Furthermore, this theory implies nothing that is antagonistic to theology. For Schleiermacher is right in so far as he makes the doctrine of creation consist simply in the recognition of the absolute dependence of the universe upon God. This is all that religion demands. The question whether creation had a beginning or not is one which concerns science rather than religion. Religion merely affirms creation. It is for science to determine so far as it can the method of creation. We look at a flower and enjoy its beauty, or we look upon the mountains or the sea. All that religion demands is that we shall have the consciousness that these are God's creation, the manifestation of the divine power. When we come to ask, how did God make the flower, or how were the mountains formed, the question is for science to answer. Of course the questions as to method have an interest for religion. When I say that they do not especially concern religion, I mean simply that they are questions which

religion is not obliged to answer. Religion may accept and use the answers which science makes. It may feel a deeper awe in the presence of the mountains, a fuller sense of the manifestation of the divine power, when science has told how they were brought forth. But what is essential to it is the fact and not the method of the manifestation. It is like the service which a friend has rendered. All that friendship really needs to know is that the friend has done the service. Yet friendship is glad to know just how the service was performed, and rejoices in all the special acts of thoughtfulness which have their part in the completed service.

A second and fundamental proposition of Schleiermacher's is that creation and conservation are the same.¹ This implies that creation has no beginning and no end, that the act of creation is continuous with the existence of the results of creation. Here, however, is an antinomy. For creation involves two elements, on the one hand the dependence implied in the relation of the creation to the Creator, and on the other hand a certain independence, or rather interdependence, in that which is created, a dependence of one part upon another, which is what we mean by reality. But if the universe is created afresh every moment, how can there be any mutual interdependence, any reality of existence? If there is no relation of past to present, how can there be any unity? We are tempted to fall back into the position of the later Buddhists, that the world is merely an appearance, a dream, or to accept Berkeley's view that we are all the time receiving fresh impressions from the divine power. We have here something like the relation of the rays of light to the sun. Each ray is dependent upon the sun, and yet there is no light, strictly speaking, but only a collection of rays, or rather undulations, each of which has its source in the sun's action. That is, the light at one moment or in one place has no relation of dependence to the light at another moment and in another place. But we recognize interdependence as the fundamental element in reality. A real universe is one in which all the parts are dependent one upon another.

¹ *Der Christliche Glaube*, Berlin, 1843, §§ 36-41, 46-49.

CHAPTER XIII.

THEORIES OF CREATION, CONTINUED.—VORSTELLUNGEN: THE WORD; BODY AND SOUL; CHILD AND PARENT.—CREATION IN RELATION TO THE CREATED: SUPREMACY OF SPIRIT IN THE UNIVERSE THE MARK OF CREATION.—THE ACCOUNT OF CREATION.—SCIENTIFIC THEORIES: AS TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD; AS TO THE NATURE OF THE WORLD.—THE ATOMIC THEORY.—FORCE AND WILL.

IN dealing with the question of creation and trying to find a reconciliation for the antinomy which it presents, we cannot expect to speak with accuracy or definiteness. The question is too vast, it lies too far beyond all human experience. All that we can hope to do is to find some *vorstellungen*, some forms of representation, which may be suggestive even if they are inadequate. There are three of these which have entered into common thought and speech, each of which needs to be complemented by the others. The first is the one most commonly used in the Bible, and is perhaps most familiar to the thought of the Church. It is *creation by the word*. Although the phrase "the word" is to be understood literally as it occurs in the Old Testament, it was very early given a special significance of which the spoken word is only a symbol. This form of representation expresses in the most absolute manner the dependence of the world upon God. It leaves no room for independence in the world, or for any underlying reality except that which is received from God. The world is simply the result of the divine command. If we go a step further, however, and consider the representation somewhat more abstractly, we find that we have presented in it the objectifying of the divine will. For "the word" is the simplest form in which our ideas can be made objective to ourselves and to the world

about us. Therefore by the phrase, "creation by the word," we understand that the divine idea is made objective, or given an objective existence. This *vorstellung*, however, offers us no recognition of any material element apart from the objectification of the divine idea. What form, then, of interdependence, and so of reality, can we find in such an objectified idea? Our answer lies in the recognition of the fact that this idea, like all ideas, is concrete. We speak sometimes of an abstract idea. No idea can be wholly abstract, and the divine idea, of which the universe is the manifestation, is the most concrete of all ideas.¹ Therefore it involves elements, and these elements must depend one upon another. For the idea is an organic whole which consists in all its parts as all its parts consist in it, and in which each part demands all the other parts and all the parts demand each part. Further, since this organic whole is an absolute whole, the relations of interdependence must be more truly absolute here than anywhere else. Thus we find to a certain extent what we are looking for, namely, the dependence of all upon the divine will and power, and at the same time the interdependence and reality of the parts.

If the idea is considered in relation to time, two elements are to be recognized, first, that of permanence, of unchangeability, the eternal thought as it is in the mind of God himself, and second, the element of change, of sequence, which is involved in the manifestation of the divine thought. Here again, in the sequence of the elements, is involved the same interdependence. We find, indeed, a union more complete than that which is recognized in the common thought of dependence, for we have working together and complementary to each other the efficient cause and the final cause. We have the absolute interdependence in which that which comes before and that which comes after are bound together. This is seen in any organic product. The growth of the plant, for instance, is occasioned as truly by the principle of final causation as by that of efficient causation; the seed which a plant is to bear is, from one point of view, as truly the cause of its growth as is, from another point of view, the seed which produces it. If a man builds a house, the foundation is as truly dependent upon

¹ Pages 49, 51, 55.

the roof as the roof upon the foundation. A *vorstellung* like this leaves a great many questions unanswered, but at least it enables us to conceive the possibility of an answer to the question which we are considering, the reconciliation of the absolute dependence of the creation upon God with that interdependence among the elements which is necessary in order that creation shall be real.

The second form of representation is offered in the relation of the body to the soul.

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul."¹

It is a *vorstellung* more often used by the poets and philosophers than by the theologians, although Schleiermacher approaches it when, in his *Reden*, before he arrives at the thought of God, he reaches the thought of the world-spirit. There are three views of the relation between the body and the soul. First there is what would be called the Platonic view, that body is the result of soul. According to the second view, body and soul are independent of each other. This is the traditional view generally taken by certain religious-minded people who look at things chiefly from the outside. Body and soul have each a certain independent existence, and at some early stage the soul is introduced into the body. Then there is the third view, the view which is held by the materialists, which regards the soul as resulting from the body. I mention the three views only that I may emphasize more strongly the first of the three as that which serves our purpose best. I am not assuming in advance that this view is true and the others false. The true relation between body and soul is something which does not concern us at this point. I simply accept the first view as the one which will best serve as a form of representation for our thought of God in relation to the universe.

It is a plausible view, even if we do not fully accept it. We see how a thoroughly healthful body is simply the manifestation of the life of the spirit. Indeed there are many who hold that not only the healthful, normal body, but also the diseased body,

¹ Pope, *Essay on Man*, Ep. I, 267, 268.

is the manifestation of the soul; we are all familiar with the theory of the "faith cure," that if a person is ill it is his own fault, that the trouble is not in his body but in his spirit. Furthermore while the body is thus dependent upon the soul, we find in the body various centres of activity. In the lower forms of life these centres or ganglia can be to a certain extent separated and each will continue its activity. The same thing is seen sometimes in the animals of a higher order, as when a hen whose brain has been removed still retains a certain form of activity, or as when we find activities still present in a human limb which has been wholly separated from any perceptible relation to the central ganglia. Now suppose that while the body as the manifestation of the soul has its own central consciousness, each of these ganglia should have at the same time a certain independent consciousness. We should then have various centres of consciousness and yet one common consciousness embracing all. This thought is not foreign to science, although it is maintained that in all probability the consciousness of the various ganglia is much less when they are in relation with a central consciousness than when, as in the lower orders of creatures, the ganglia constitute all that there is of life or consciousness. It has also been suggested that the subconsciousness which is present during waking hours but is lost in the fulness of the central consciousness, makes itself felt in the dream, when the central consciousness is to a large extent dormant, just as the light of the stars is lost in the blaze of the sunshine but is perceived as soon as the sun has set. But with these theories we have nothing to do. I am only trying, in what is perhaps a rather gross if not fantastic manner, to illustrate the possibility of the interdependence of the elements of the universe among themselves, and even of a certain consciousness of their own, at the same time that all are united in a common dependence upon the one absolute consciousness which embraces the whole.

The last of the three forms of representation is found in the relation between a child and its parent. According to this view the universe is to be regarded as born of God through a process of eternal generation. If we examine in more detail the relation

upon which our *vorstellung* is based, we find that at first the child lives the life of its mother. There is a moment in which the lives are hardly to be called distinct, and then, as the little organism completes itself, the dependence upon the life of the mother continues. In this relationship the child is at first wholly unconscious, but by degrees consciousness comes, and with consciousness recognition. Finally, as knowledge and recognition increase with the fuller growth of the child, we have again a union between child and parent more real than that which existed between them at the first, the union of love. For whereas their first union was material, this is spiritual.

I know very well that if any one of these illustrations were to be pushed too far, it would fail us at one point or another. I have suggested the three in order that I may not make too much of any one of them. Each furnishes some elements which may help to make the relation between the Creator and the creation conceivable, however vaguely and imperfectly. If in the imperfect relation suggested by these different forms of representation we find imperfectly accomplished the results which we demand, we can conceive the possibility of the complete relation in which those results shall be perfectly accomplished.

Two terms are frequently met in theological discussions in regard to the relation of God to the world, the terms "immanence" and "transcendence." The first taken by itself involves pantheism; God is wholly in the world, is wholly lost in it. On the other hand the term "transcendence" taken by itself implies what is called "deism." Of course there is no inherent reason why the term "deism" should have a different meaning from the term "theism." But historically "deism" has come to express a conception of God in relation to the world as wholly outside of the world; there is a gulf between God and the world; God is the Unknowable. In view of the different forms of representation which we have been considering, which of these terms are we to use? Which expresses the relation of the soul to the body? which the relation between mother and child? I think we should not deny either the one or the other. Certainly we may not deny

immanence, for the soul is diffused through the body, and there is no part of the body which is not a manifestation of the soul; every part of the body feels and reacts, every part is amenable to the will. Yet we should not deny the transcendence of the soul, for the soul has a consciousness which embraces the body, so that the soul can say, "my body." In a similar way the life of the mother is immanent in the child, and yet, in a much larger sense than that in which the soul transcends the body, the life of the mother transcends the life of the child. Any form of statement which shall be in the most profound sense religious must include both immanence and transcendence. Immanence gives to religion that mystical element without which it is always imperfect and superficial. Transcendence preserves to this mystical element its religious character and saves it from becoming pantheism.

It may be asked whether with the last of the three forms of representation we have not introduced a physical element into the conception of the divine activity. Is not an emanation suggested, a physical process? The question is important, not only because it shows how inadequate a single form of representation is by itself, but also because the answer may help to bring the different forms somewhat more closely together. We have found that we can think of God only as absolute spirit. Therefore the ideal must constitute his whole activity. In ourselves we separate the physical and the spiritual, distinguishing between the physical products of our activity and the spiritual. The distinction is one of those which arise out of the incompleteness of the spiritual life as we find it in ourselves. In absolute spirit there can be no such distinction, and thus there can be no physical emanation from the divine being. The fundamental difficulty in the various theories of emanation as they have prevailed in different forms of religious thought has consisted in the failure to recognize this truth. Take, now, two phrases which are used again and again in theological discussion to express the relation between the Father and the Son, the "eternal generation" of the Son, and the Son as "the word of God." The first naturally suggests something

like a physical process, an emanation, the second an intellectual, a spiritual process. The one involves a physical, the other a purely ideal element. Yet the two are used continually to represent the same process, and the fact that they are so used shows how readily in our thought of the divine activity we give up the distinction between the physical and the spiritual, or rather lose the physical altogether in the spiritual.

Thus far we have been considering creation in its Godward aspect. Now we have to ask what creation means as we look earthward. What does it mean, not as heretofore in relation to the Creator, but in relation to the created? First of all, then, it means that the world is absolutely dependent upon the Creator, the complexity of the world upon the unity of the Creator. But since the Creator upon whom the world depends is absolute spirit, it follows, secondly, that the creation must have an ideal content, must be in some sort the manifestation of spirit. The mark of creation in the universe is the supremacy of spirit, and since spirit acts not mechanically but ideally, the mark of creation is found to be the supremacy of the ideal element in the world. If the world is a creation, then in it the spirit comes to its own.

To determine whether this mark is present or not, we must look at the history of creation. But where are we to find this history? Shall we take the story in Genesis? If we turn to it we recognize in the account three points which are fundamental. First there is the fact of creation, the dependence of the world. Second, there is the recognition of an order or sequence in creation. Third, we find a certain secondary dependence, what I have before called an interdependence, among the elements of creation; we read that "the earth brought forth" and that all things were bidden to increase and multiply. Thus far the story in Genesis conforms to our idea of creation. When, however, I say "conforms to our idea of creation," the very phrase suggests that there is something with which this story is compared. This something is the account of creation which is given by science. The attempt to reconcile the two accounts is a matter which does not at all concern us. I doubt if such a reconciliation can be

thoroughly carried out. At the same time we should not yield too readily to the tendency among certain thinkers at the present time, I will not say to exaggerate the difficulty, but to make light of the attempts which have been made, as though any attempt in itself implied an absence of scientific knowledge. The effect produced upon my own mind in reading such discussions as those of Professor Dana and Professor Guyot¹ was not wholly convincing, but I wondered that the argument could be carried through as successfully as it was. Still, the very fact that we apply this test to the account in Genesis shows that we look to science for our standard. Our demand is not that science shall conform to Genesis but that Genesis shall conform to science, and those who are interested in the attempt to reconcile the two, realize that the only test which will be generally accepted is that of science.

We have already referred to science a number of important questions which are often thought of as belonging to theology. You may recall the illustration of the flower which I used when we were considering the doctrine of creation as the recognition of the dependence of the universe upon God;² all that concerned religion was to know that God made the flower, how he made it was for science to tell. Now we may consider the world a greater flower. Religion is satisfied with the general doctrine of creation. For the history of creation religion looks to science. Religion asks of science four questions. First, had the world a beginning, and if so, when? Second, what is the nature of the world? what is it that was created? Third, what has been the nature of the history of creation? Fourth, in this history do we find that the ideal element is preponderant? I hardly need to say that answers in full to these questions are not to be expected, lying as they do outside the main purpose of our discussion. They are questions which involve the study of a lifetime, and then would be left unanswered. All that we can do is to glance at what is most fundamental in the answers, so far as they can be given. Of the four questions the one which concerns us most is the last, the question

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January and July, 1856; also January and April, 1855.

² Page 115.

whether it is possible to recognize in the history of the world the supremacy of spirit. The answer to this question involves what is commonly called the *a posteriori* argument for religion, and we shall consider it at greater length than is possible in our examination of the answers to the other questions.

Had the world a beginning? Science tells us that the world as we know it had a beginning. The calculations of Sir William Thomson¹ placed this beginning some one hundred million years ago. His method was to study the process of cooling which the earth has undergone, asking how long it must have taken for the earth to cool down to the degree of temperature which we find at present. In answering this question Sir William at last reached a state of things at which his calculations no longer applied, and they were brought to an abrupt stop. At that point, then, the world must have begun. Here, however, a collision occurs. The believers in the theory of a process of development and natural selection require a very long period to meet the necessities of their very slow process. The world has moved forward by infinitesimal stages, and although ten million years make a long period, that period seems hardly long enough. On the other hand, this collision strengthens those who believe in the epochal nature of creation. Clifford² is here as almost always interesting and helpful. He recognizes with Thomson the fact of such a catastrophe, but denies, and with reason, that this catastrophe would mark an absolute beginning. It is simply the beginning of the world as we know it, the beginning of an epoch which belongs to us, the beginning of an æon, but not an absolute beginning. To illustrate his position he uses the figure of a poker which has been heated and is cooling. The mathematician can calculate the rate at which the poker cools, and as he traces back the state of the poker just as Thomson traced back the history of the world, he reaches, as Thomson did, a point where his calculations fail. There is no longer any application, he has reached the crisis. But this crisis is not the moment when the poker

¹ *Popular Lectures and Addresses (Nature Series)*, 1894, Vol. II.

² W. K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, "The First and the Last Catastrophe."

began to exist. It is simply the moment when the poker was taken from the coals. To an unscientific mind this conclusion of Clifford's seems most plausible. Suppose, for instance, that we accept the position taken years ago by Spencer in his *First Principles*,¹ that the movement of the heavenly bodies is retarded by the presence of a certain ether, that this retardation points forward to a time when all these bodies shall be drawn in upon the sun, and that the inrush of the heavenly bodies upon the sun will cause an intense heat and the resumption of an ethereal form and the beginning of a new creation. Such a beginning as this which Spencer recognizes would be as truly indicated by Thomson's calculation as would an absolute beginning. We have simply the scientific formula for that which the Hindu expresses unscientifically when he illustrates Brahma by the tortoise. The tortoise puts out his legs, and then is the beginning of the universe; he draws in his legs, and the creation ends. We need not interfere in the strife between the mathematicians and the teachers of the theory of development. We have only to recognize that the world *as we know it* had a beginning.

What is the nature of the world? What is it that was created? We find in the world as we see it two factors, spirit and matter. For spirit we have all along accepted a formula. That which is the basis of all knowledge is beyond definition. If we try to define it, we bring it into relation with a further ultimate and have still to seek a definition for this ultimate. But we know spirit, even if only in its manifestation. We know it with that real knowledge which is the only knowledge, we know it through consciousness. We have also to a certain extent a consciousness of matter, but what matter is, what remains when we take from the world all its ideal elements, is hard to say. The answer most commonly given is found in the theory of atoms, points infinitely indivisible and minute, which unite in varied forms to make the world, modified by all the changes into which they enter, and yet retaining a certain individuality. When, however, we consider

¹ Chap. XXIII, "Dissolution."

these atoms in relation to the thought of creation, we meet two difficulties. In the first place they make the idea of creation most difficult. These little points of matter are absolutely antithetical to spirit. Spirit is subjective, and these atoms are so purely objective. Spirit is a unity, and the atoms are of such an infinite multiplicity. The conception of any transition of spirit to the atoms is so difficult that it is not strange that a belief in the atoms as such has been found in many minds to be opposed to the idea of creation, and that the thought of a material, atomic universe has been substituted for the thought of a spiritual universe. Of course, if we accept the idea of an ultimate duality, eternal matter independent of and over against eternal spirit, then this theory of the atoms serves well enough. But such a duality is opposed to the absoluteness of the divine nature which our conception of God demands. It implies in so far the exclusion of the creative power, the formation rather than the creation of the world.

The second difficulty which is presented in the atomic theory, although it has been less keenly felt, is more significant. These atoms themselves are only projected sensations which we have made objective to ourselves. Our whole thought of the external world, as we have already seen, is made up of our own sensations to which we have ascribed an external reality. We explain this external reality not as consisting in our projected sensations but as the cause of our sensations. Having the sensations we infer the cause. I do not go through the world with the feeling that there is something there which causes in me this or that sensation, whether of hardness or warmth or color or form, but having these sensations I make a world to correspond with them and believe in the reality of this world. Now, however minute these atoms may be, they represent nothing which we have not already reached in this way. It is as though we represented them by looking at the elements of the world through an inverted spy-glass which reduces them indefinitely. They are simply reductions of what we have already found. Take, for instance, the undulatory theory of light. These undulations we have never seen; they are too minute to be seen even if otherwise they might be visible. Yet

there is nothing in the conception of such undulations which is not taken from our thought of undulations that we have seen. So when the materialist presses us hardest he is simply urging us back into an idealism from which no logic can drive us. When he presents to us the atoms as the ultimate explanation of the world, and we ask him what he means by his atoms, we find that the terms in which he explains them are taken wholly from the realm of our inner and subjective experience.

In the attempt to meet one or the other of these difficulties other theories have been suggested. Sir William Thomson substitutes whirls of ether or "vortex-rings" in place of the hard atoms.¹ According to this theory an attenuated ether underlies all existence, so different from matter in the ordinary sense that it cannot rightly be called matter. Thus the molecules of gas have a movement as rapid as that of a swift train, and light moves two hundred thousand miles in a second. If we start with this ether we can see that the thought of creation becomes easier, for the world curdles as it were into being at a touch, as indeed at another touch the whirls may take a new flight and the world vanish. Yet no matter how different the ether may be from ordinary matter, still it is matter. Whatever is not spirit is matter, however attenuated the form may be in which it appears. Even if we were to grant that there are in the universe the three elements, spirit, ether and matter, ether would still be in the same relation to spirit as matter, it would be antithetical to spirit. Further, the ether is still nothing but our projected sensation. The ethereal undulations which form light are simply undulations of motion seen through the little end of the telescope. The theory of the whirls of ether brings us no nearer to the solution of our problem than we were before.

Another theory, that of Boscovitch, is that matter consists of centres or points of force. I do not know that Boscovitch had any problems of theology at all in mind, but certainly his theory has been found useful by theologians. Picton discusses it interest-

¹ See *The Unseen Universe*; also W. K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, "The Unseen Universe."

ingly in his *Mystery of Matter*,¹ and Martineau in *A Study of Religion*.² We know force, it is argued, only as the manifestation of will. Therefore we may assume that all force is the manifestation of will. Then all the forces of the universe are the manifestation of an absolute will. But if what we commonly call matter is conceived as consisting in points of force, and force is the manifestation of the absolute will, then matter has really passed away and the world is simply the manifestation of a divine will and power. Martineau distinguishes between force as manifested in matter and in the human spirit. He finds all force in matter to be the direct manifestation of the divine will, but man has had intrusted to him as it were a storage battery to use as he will. God has relinquished to man this force which we know as free will.

The solution of the problem which this theory offers is interesting and ingenious. But the riddle is solved too easily. I am reminded of a sentence which once impressed itself upon me as I came upon it in a European guide book,—“Beware of short cuts.” They are as dangerous in theology as among the mountains of Switzerland. The proof which is given is simple and direct, but the fundamental connection is not fairly shown. We know force as the manifestation of will, but we know so little of will that we cannot infer that all force is therefore a manifestation of will. We are certainly familiar with the fact of force as exerted by ourselves, and we also find at least an appearance of force manifested between the objects of nature, a necessary dependence of one upon another. I do not see why the subjective and objective manifestations of force are not thus as different as the subjective and objective manifestations of heat, allowing, of course, for this great difference, that the kind of force with which we are familiar we see in its beginning whereas heat is seen only in its effect. If, on the other hand, we recognize force not as existing in material things at all, but only as a manifestation of will which compels us to recognize the divine presence in the universe, we meet two

¹ J. A. Picton, *The Mystery of Matter and Other Essays*, I.

² Vol. I, pp. 405-407.

difficulties, first, the difficulty of generalization which I have just referred to,—of showing that because in certain cases spirit can originate force it therefore follows that all force is necessarily dependent upon spirit,—and second, the difficulty of finding in our own manifestation of force the revelation of the divine method. We are conscious of force as a *nimbus*, and we have seen that even omnipotence can hardly be conceived except as the overcoming of some difficulty.¹ Still we cannot easily carry over our thought of a *nimbus* into our conception of the manifestation of the divine will. If, however, we find this difficulty slight, there remains the very interesting view which is presented by Professor William James.² Professor James suggests that we have no real consciousness of any effort. We press something, for instance, and appear to be conscious that we are exerting force, but what we really are conscious of is the rigidity of the muscles produced by the exercise of the force. We have no consciousness connected with the nerves of motion. The motor nerves, the efferent nerves, are not sentient. We have only the consciousness of reaction brought through the efferent nerves. A different theory is maintained by some physiologists. Wundt, for instance, makes our knowledge of the different aspects and relations of our environment depend largely upon the amount of innervation which is necessary in order to come in contact with them.³ But this theory is mistaken. Furthermore, according to Professor James, all our action is reflex action, which takes place spontaneously as this or that object calls it forth. What we do by our will is to keep an idea firmly fixed in the mind. If it remains there long enough the act takes place of itself. Here is suggested an explanation of various acts or impulses of a somewhat puzzling character, such as the tendency of a person who is learning to ride a bicycle to run into the object which he is especially trying to avoid, or the desire to throw one's self down which we sometimes experience when standing on the edge of a precipice.

Schopenhauer recognizes two elements in the external world,

¹ Page 53.

² *The Feeling of Effort*.

³ *Vorlesungen über Menschen- und Thierseelc*, Bd. I, p. 222.

first the world as phenomenal, and then behind this the presence of will. We live, he argues, in a world of phenomena behind which no one can look except in his own case. In his own case every one finds the basis of his being in will. Then if he is a will embodied in some phenomenal manifestation, what he finds in relation to himself he is justified in expecting to find everywhere.¹ Of course one may easily object to this that the term "will" has no meaning for us except as it is connected with consciousness, that will is the conscious manifestation of force. But there are three forms under which force is manifested. Besides the manifestation consciously in ourselves and the manifestation in the external world mechanically, there is an intermediate form of manifestation in organized bodies. To the mechanical aspect we naturally apply the term "force," and to the conscious aspect the term "will," but there is no specific term by which we may represent the intermediate form of manifestation, the tendency to action which is inherent in a body in itself. If we must apply to it one or the other of the terms already familiar to us, it may be a question whether we ought to use the term "force" with its suggestion of mechanism, or the term "will" which suggests consciousness. In our ordinary use of the term "will" we certainly have in mind only the conscious aspect of the force which we are considering, and if at the same time that we take away from the force its conscious aspect we continue to apply the same term as before, I do not see that the term can retain any special meaning except as it may indicate that this inherent tendency is more nearly allied to will than to mechanical force.

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, Book II.

CHAPTER XIV.

SCIENTIFIC THEORIES AS TO THE NATURE OF THE WORLD, CONTINUED: IDEALISTIC THEORIES: MIND-STUFF.—CREATION THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE DIVINE IDEA: LIMIT, IMPENETRABILITY, DIVISIBILITY.—THEORY OF ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL SELECTION.—THE A POSTERIORI ARGUMENT.

THE theories in regard to the nature of the world which we first considered were based wholly upon its material aspect. We then considered the theories in which the attempt has been made to reconcile the material and the spiritual aspects. These theories present both a subjective and an objective element. The subjective element is made more or less clear, but the external, objective element remains as unexplained as ever. Over against all these theories of either kind are the idealistic theories which deny to the external world any real existence. Thus Fichte recognizes only individual spirits and the absolute spirit or God; all the objects which make up the external world are the products of our own imagination; this imagination, however, is not lawless or arbitrary but acts through the laws of our own spiritual being, and these laws are similar for all individual spirits, so that all live in a similar world; furthermore, these laws of the individual imagination are dependent upon the absolute spirit of which each individual spirit is a manifestation. We have also in various forms the theory that the world is simply the divine thought itself, —the theory of Berkeley, for instance, that the world is the divine thought impressing itself on the individual spirit and causing the ideas which represent the external world,¹ or again what may be called the Neo-Hegelian view, that the world is the divine thought into which man enters to a certain extent.

¹ *Of the Principles of Human Knowledge*, CXLIX.

Such views, however, do not quite satisfy us. We are conscious of a faith that there exists in the world about us something real, which manifests itself through all these different forms of sensation. Not only are we ourselves real personalities, with an independent consciousness of our own, but also the conviction is continually borne in upon us that objects about us have similarly a real existence. In fact we should find it hard to tell where to draw the line between the things which have real existence in themselves and those which are purely the creation of thought. Fichte tells us, if I am not mistaken, that the animal kingdom is as unreal as the inanimate objects about us, that only the individual spirits and God have real existence. Yet it seems to me that we have the same sort of reason for recognizing the existence of the animal world that we find for recognizing the existence of the human world, and if we go so far, why are we to stop? Can we be sure that there may not be in all organized bodies some life which is similar, although less in degree? Who can assure us that in the universe itself there is not such life? May it not be in very truth that

"The sun himself shines heartily,
And shares the joy he brings"?¹

With this in mind we are naturally more or less attracted to a view which is held by Leibnitz and which underlies the thought of Spinoza, although it appears much less prominently in Spinoza's philosophy than in the philosophy of Leibnitz,—the theory of monads, the theory that there is nothing that has not a life of its own and up to a certain extent its own consciousness. Clifford presents the same theory in a different form under the term *mind-stuff*.² This mind-stuff consists of atoms, each of which, like the monads of Leibnitz, has its conscious and its unconscious elements, its spiritual and its material aspects. Certain complications which Clifford introduces, such as the notion that our own consciousness

¹ R. W. Emerson, *The World-Soul*.

² *Lectures and Essays*, "Body and Mind," "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves."

is built up of the mind-stuff, do not concern us here. According to his general view the world about us is to be conceived as manifesting at every point, if not consciousness, at least a sub-consciousness. Everywhere is found a kinship, although there are differences in degree which the imagination cannot compass. According to Spinoza the degree of consciousness varies according as the organization is more or less complicated.¹

This view is the most convenient of all which we have thus far considered, so far as our thought of the external world is concerned. Starting with our own consciousness, we find something similar to it, although in less degree, in all objects. We can thus think the world up to a certain point, and without disregarding to any great extent the demands of our spiritual nature can realize the concrete existence that is about us. All these monads, however, have their material aspect, and this material, unconscious element involves all the difficulties which we have found presented in the theory of the unconscious atoms. Our problem still is how to get outside of ourselves, to think of that which is not thought. There are three terms, if I may use the expression, to the problem, three elements which are to be reconciled: first, the reality of the external world, second, the knowability of the external world, and third, the fact that we find in the external world something which is the antithesis of spirit. It is in the last two terms that the antinomy appears. On the one hand is the knowability of the external world; on the other hand is the fact that this world which is to be knowable is in part at least the antithesis of spirit and therefore seems to be to that extent unknowable.

We cannot expect to find a complete solution of this problem. All that we can do is to indicate the direction in which a solution may be looked for, or to reduce the problem to its lowest terms. I think that here as in every difficulty the solution must be sought in the very heart of the difficulty itself. Like the man who is splitting a log of wood, we must strike the knot. In stating our problem I have just said that the external world which is to be knowable is the antithesis of spirit. But if it is the antithesis of

¹ *Ethica*, Pars II, Prop. XIII, Schol.

spirit, it stands in the most absolute relation to spirit. For no elements are so closely bound together as those which are antithetical or polar to each other, so that one is the correlative of the other. The positive pole of a magnet is the absolute antithesis of the negative pole, and *vice versa*; yet each has its very existence in the other. We can conceive of the external world only as object,¹ meaning by object that which is correlative to subject. Now if we are to say just what we conceive matter to be, we shall define it as the abstract of objectivity. According to the statement which is generally made, matter is that which remains when all ideal content has been abstracted. But if the world is considered as object in the sense in which object is correlative to subject, the ideal content cannot be abstracted. By the very process of our thoughts we give content, and if the world is truly object the content cannot be removed. Therefore our abstract of objectivity can have no existence by itself apart from subjectivity, and so matter, which we have defined as the abstract of objectivity, can have no existence of its own. Further there can be no consciousness of objectivity in general; all consciousness must have a definite content. Thus we see once more that our abstract of objectivity is reached only by a process of our own thought and has no existence in itself. Matter cannot exist as apart from spirit, or apart from the manifestation of spirit.

What, then, do we mean by creation? Creation can be only the objectification of the divine idea, not, however, in the sense that the world is simply the divine thought, as according to the Neo-Hegelian view, but with the implication that each created thing, while of course dependent upon the absolute spirit, has also a certain self-reference, a real existence of its own. But all ideas are concrete. The world, as Spinoza has well said, is the manifestation of a single idea. This idea is concrete. It is organic, part over against part, each part distinct from every other part. Furthermore, in the objectification of this idea each element in the process is kept distinct; there is no blurring. If all this is so, every part must be wholly transparent to thought, and there

can be no limitation to the analysis to which the idea is open. What is involved in this? Here is the fact that every part, every element, in the objectification of the divine idea, is distinct and is kept distinct from all others. We have, therefore, first, the thought of limit, and then, as implied in limit, the fundamental attribute of matter, impenetrability and infinite divisibility. According to this view of creation, matter is not merely abstract objectivity, but limit. Furthermore, this limit manifests itself by surface, and when we speak of solid matter we mean that go as deeply as we will, or break as often as we will, we find always a fresh surface. Here we have at the same time impenetrability and also, in the infinite possibility of the manifestation of surface, infinite divisibility. This view of creation, therefore, sets us free from the difficulty in regard to matter.

We have reduced the thought of creation to its simplest form. The one difficulty which remains is that which is inherent in any attempt to conceive the actual creative act itself. The actual objectification of the divine idea is something which we can no more expect to understand than we can that separation of the elements of consciousness into the *I* and the *me* which is the ultimate fact of the spiritual life.

We may recognize the objectified idea as existing in three forms: first, in the mechanical world, in the attraction by which the elements are held together, each acting upon the others from without; second, in the world of organized bodies where the activity is from within; and third, in the self-assertion of individual elements in conscious, spiritual life. Any one of these forms is as real as the others, but through the different degrees of manifestation a progress is evident from the lower form upward until we reach self-consciousness.

What has been the nature of the history of creation? At present science presents it to us under the form of evolution, unbroken by any interference from without. The category of causation is carried back indefinitely. So far as the history of organic life is concerned, it is presented under the form of natural selection. That is, natural selection is the special form under which the

general theory of evolution or development is applied to organic life. We need to distinguish accurately at the outset between the two forms, between natural selection and development in general. We hear this or that view spoken of as "Darwinism," only to find on closer examination that it expresses a belief not in natural selection but in the general theory of development.

What are the kinds of argument upon which belief in organic development rests? In the first place, the general basis of all the arguments is the recognition of the absolute law of causation, the absolute *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. It is true that there is a fallacious use of this argument which permits the loosest kind of reasoning. Thus if we may designate the existing order of things at any moment by the series a, b, c, d, z, and the existing order at any other moment by the series a', b', c', d', z', then the faulty use of the argument *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, would be to connect any one term in the second series immediately with the corresponding term in the first series, to take for granted that a' was the result of a, or z' the result of z. The savage beats his pans and makes his outcry to frighten away the demon that is obscuring the sun; the demon flees, the eclipse passes, and the sun shines again; therefore the beating of the pans caused the flight of the demon. In the absolute use of the argument, on the other hand, the whole order of things as it exists at any one moment is considered as the cause of the whole order in the next succeeding moment. This is the basis of all scientific thought. It rests upon the assumption of the unity of the world.

We reason upon this basis in most relations. The theory of natural selection has been criticised on the ground that it depends upon a mass of suppositions and unproved hypotheses. But there are cases where a supposition is as good as a reality. Suppose, for instance, that a prisoner is confined in a cell, securely locked and guarded, so that it seems impossible for him to escape. But one morning the cell is found empty, the prisoner has gone. There is a little window very high up in the wall. It would be very difficult, hardly possible, for him to escape by it, but not absolutely impossible. We are sure that the lock has not been

tampered with, and that no other way of escape could have been found. We assume, therefore, that the prisoner must have escaped by the window. But a different theory is urged. It is said that an angel has let him go, or that the prisoner has used some charm to free himself. We are told that we cannot show that the prisoner had the cord necessary to lower himself from the window, that we cannot prove a single step in the process of his escape. We answer that we do not need to prove it. So long as there is the *possibility* of escape by natural process, we accept it rather than any theory of non-natural methods.

This is precisely the kind of argument which is urged by the believer in natural selection or in evolution in general. He is shown some bit of organism which it is difficult to think could have been produced in a manner consistent with his theory, but he offers one supposition after another to prove that it is not impossible that the organism should have been formed in the manner which he has indicated. The answer usually made to his argument is that it is all based upon assumption. But the scientist needs no basis of fact. So long as he can show the possibility that the result may have been reached through natural processes, the burden of proof lies wholly on the other side. If his opponent holds that the line of causation has been broken, it is not for the scientist to prove that it was not broken, but for the opponent to prove that it was broken.

Spencer enters fully¹ into the more detailed arguments which rest upon this first great assumption. Of these the first is based upon the nature of the differences and the similarities between the various genera or species of animals or organisms of any kind. The differences are found to be superficial, whereas the resemblances are profound. It is with these organisms as with languages that are descended from a common parent. In tracing the development of the languages, we find on the one hand a vast number of superficial differences, but on the other hand laws of etymology, grammatical principles, and even roots, that are either identical or similar, and because we find precisely this sort of

¹ *The Principles of Biology*, Part III, Chap. IV.

similarity and this sort of difference we classify the languages as belonging to a single stock. Of course this argument is not conclusive. Agassiz and others have argued that the similarity which appears is ideal, the outcome of the one great idea in the mind of the Creator. The similarity is made to rest upon supernatural rather than natural causes. I do not know that there is any way by which we can decide between these two lines of argument, taken by themselves. According to either hypothesis the explanation is perfect. Our decision must depend upon our general view of the world and upon such other arguments as may be brought forward in support of either view. There is this to be said in favor of the ideal hypothesis, that the element of similarity appears in cases where there is no possibility of a descent. Crystals, for instance, have a similarity in relation to one another like that of organic products, but no one assumes that one crystal was produced by another crystal or that the crystals of today are the result of crystals in the past.

However, the arguments become more conclusive as they become more concrete. The second of the more specific arguments is based upon the distribution of organic life in relation to space and time. If we accept the ideal theory of creation, we should naturally expect to find the similarity of organisms greater under similarity of conditions. But instead of this what we actually find is that where there is access from one region to another the similarity is greater, although climatic and other conditions differ, than in regions where the conditions are alike but where access to and fro is not possible. This is just what we should look for on the theory that the organisms are descended from a common source.

The third argument is based on the existence of certain rudimentary organs, which in some organisms have never been developed and are not used, but which in other members of the same group of organisms are found developed into real organs and in use. Thus the motor muscles of the ear are in man wholly useless; some have power to move these muscles, but it is a useless power.

The last and most important of the specific arguments is the argument from embryology. It is based upon the assumption that the more highly developed organisms pass through stages of development similar to those of lower organisms belonging to the same general type, so that the history of the development of organic life in general repeats itself with the birth of each individual.

These arguments seem very plausible. But when we come to look at the world as a whole, the differences are so vast between the end and the beginning, between one kind of organism and another, that it is difficult to admit the existence of the relations which are assumed. Man feels so strongly his own supremacy that he shrinks from any attempt to identify his history with that of any lower form of organism. The attempt to bridge the gap is made in the theory of natural selection, which Spencer has happily termed "the survival of the fittest," but which because of its author is commonly known as "Darwinism."¹ The three principles upon which Darwin bases his theory are heredity, the tendency to change, and the struggle for existence with the survival of the fittest. The doctrine of heredity is that the offspring tends to resemble the parent precisely. We find this indicated everywhere. But as we look more closely we see that heredity in itself also involves some tendency to variation. For the individual is descended not from a single parent but from two, and these again from innumerable others. If there is any difference between the parents, the offspring cannot resemble them both but must naturally be different from either. Besides this inherent cause of variation, we can readily understand that changes of environment may tend to produce other differences. Thus we have to recognize not only the tendency to similarity but the tendency to variation. But if there is any variation, it is natural that one form should be more specifically adapted to the environment than another; if, for instance, there is any change in color, it is probable that one shade will be better fitted for the protection

¹ Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, Chap. III. Spencer, *The Principles of Biology*, Part III, Chap. XII.

of the individual than another. We have to recognize the struggle for existence.

Suppose that a ship is wrecked and that the only means of safety is a small raft which can carry perhaps a dozen men instead of the hundred or more on board the ship. Leave out all thought of sympathy or self-sacrifice, and imagine the struggle which must take place in the attempt to gain a place upon the raft. Other things being equal, it is the strongest who will succeed. But the men who gain the raft will be exposed to hunger and thirst, to heat or cold, and one after another they will die. Only those who have the greatest power of endurance will survive. Such a raft is this earth. Until we are told in figures we can have no idea of the terrible nature of the conflict. Thus Wallace finds that in ten years a single pair of birds would naturally produce more than twenty million descendants. Yet at the end of fifteen years in any given locality you would probably find these birds no more numerous than at the beginning.¹ Furthermore, the process of destruction which we observe in one generation has been repeated through every generation, so that we can have no conception of the numbers which have perished. It is said that if all the germs of life survived, in a very few years our rivers would be solid with fish, the heavens black with birds, the air thick with insects, and the ground so covered that we could not move. Vegetable life probably increases even more rapidly than animal life. Yet the various organisms appear to continue, under conditions practically unchanged, numerically the same; the variations are insignificant. Darwin tells us that in a single winter four-fifths of the birds on a small tract of land belonging to him perished, and only the hardiest survived. The incident is given to illustrate the fact that if any of these individuals had an advantage over the rest their chances of safety would be greatly increased. There may be a tendency to exaggerate this dependence upon fitness. For we may suppose that no variation has taken place and that all the animals of a given type are equally well fitted for the struggle. The result, probably, would still be about the same.

¹ *Darwinism*, Chap. II.

The persons struggling to reach the raft may have equal strength, but only the dozen can be saved—the raft can hold no more. We have to recognize the part which chance plays in all this, the circumstances which are wholly independent of the adaptation of the individual to the environment. Still, we have also to recognize that in fact all are not equally adapted to their surroundings. The dice are some of them loaded, and the slightest advantage may produce great effects. Thus any individuals that survived because in some fearful winter their constitutions had proved hardier than those of the other individuals of their class, would no doubt propagate their powers of endurance in their descendants, and the new generation would be hardier than the generation which had preceded it. This principle would extend to every aspect of the life of the organism. It would extend to its color and form and strength; to its means of defence, the hardness of its skin, the strength of its shell. It would extend to its active organs, the keenness of sight, the strength and adaptation of the wing. It is assumed that in the course of innumerable generations the whole organic world has undergone in this way a complete metamorphosis.

Darwinism recognizes no tendency to advance. The term "fittest" means only fittest for the environment, not the absolutely fittest. In the tropics natural selection builds up luxurious growths, at the poles it favors only the reduced manifestations of life. The higher forms of whatever type are due to favoring conditions in the world. Change these conditions and there is a retrograde movement. According to Darwinism the great advance seen in the history of the organic world is merely an advance along the line of least resistance. Natural selection, therefore, is unmoral, unspiritual. Spiritually considered, Socrates was the fittest to live of all in his time, but he was not the fittest for his environment.

The origin of species is due to the principle of variation, the tendency to change, in the struggle for existence. What surprises us is the sharpness of the lines of demarcation. But this, we are told, is accounted for by the intensity of the struggle. A purely

natural cause works as accurately as any intelligent purpose. We find this illustrated in something which is seen at times in a wholly different sphere. In building bridges the upper ends of the piers are usually made pointed so as to offer the least possible resistance to the stream. Sometimes there is a bank of sand at the foot of the pier, and this sand-bank assumes precisely the same shape in relation to the current as that which has been given to the pier. The result of the mechanical working of the natural force is as definite as the product of human intelligence and skill.

So long as the environment remains the same, natural selection tends to keep the forms of life the same. It is therefore primarily a law of conservation. When the environment changes, however, the change in the forms of life which would have been disadvantageous while the environment remained the same, becomes desirable, and that which was a law of conservation becomes a principle of change. If it is asked why the process of change does not continue indefinitely, the answer may be made that life reaches a balance in which, although the conditions are imperfect, the pressure is not great enough to bring about a change. Suppose there are only five men to be carried on the raft. Since it will hold all five, the weakest is not at a disadvantage.

When we consider through what changes the world has passed since organic life began, and see how vast the field has been for all sorts of variation and their results, we realize how slow the process must have been, and we can understand better the nature of the controversy between those who would define the time at which the existing world must have begun and those who demand a limitless period.

We come now to the last of the four questions in regard to creation which may be asked of science. Is there an ideal element manifest in the history of the world? Is the principle of natural selection enough to account for what we find, or must we recognize some teleological principle? The answer involves the second argument for religious faith, the *a posteriori* argument. This argument has been presented in various ways, but as a rule it has consisted in calling attention to the marks of contrivance in the

world by which the organic life and the environment have been fitted to each other. Paley uses at the beginning of his work¹ the illustration which has become classic. A savage finds a watch and reasons upon it. He sees that it is different from the objects of nature around him, that it shows marks of design and is intended for an end, and that therefore it must have had a maker. Paley argues that the world is to us what the watch is to the savage. We see in it the marks of design and conclude that it has a maker. But Paley's illustration is not a good one. He assumes too arbitrarily that the savage would recognize mind in the watch. The savage would be quite as likely to think the watch a living thing, some very curious sort of little animal whose heart he could see beating. There is a story told of a traveller who left his cart standing for some time and the savages came imploring him to feed it. The tendency of the savage is to ascribe life to all things. Furthermore, the fact that the watch was complicated would not suggest to the savage that it was the work of design, for he sees other things in the world about him which are equally complicated. Finally, if he sees in the watch anything which leads him to conclude that it is the work of man, it will be simply its resemblance to man's work rather than to the work of nature. If he had seen any works of nature which were like the watch he would not have discriminated between it and them. Diman² urges that the argument from design is not dependent upon analogy; we see design. But analogy does enter, even although it may be of the slenderest kind. For it is because we see in nature marks which remind us of things which man has designed that we attribute design in nature.

It is this form of the argument from design which has had to bear most of the critical attacks made by the supporters of the theory of natural selection. Therefore the attempt has been made to find other grounds on which to rest the argument. There are two of these arguments, complementary to each other. The first is that of Clerk Maxwell and Sir John Herschel.³ This

¹ *Natural Theology*.

² J. Lewis Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, Lecture V.

³ W. K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, "The First and the Last Catastrophe."

theory is based upon the uniformity in size of the atoms. In Herschel's phrase, the atoms "bear the stamp of the manufactured article." Clifford, however, doubts this uniformity in size of the atoms, and maintains that it cannot be proved. It can be shown that no atom is above a certain size, but this does not prove that none is smaller. You have a sieve, and as you sift your meal it all goes through; does it follow that the grains of meal are all of the same size? But suppose that the atoms are all of the same size? What then? Why should they not be, even if they are entirely the product of natural causes? Seeing that the conditions are the same for all, one would expect uniformity in them. It is difference rather than uniformity which would require explanation. The same question is to be asked in reply to the second of these arguments, the theory proposed by Baden Powell.¹ According to this more grandiose argument, the uniformity of law in the natural world is held to imply the existence of a supreme, creative mind. But just as there is no reason why the atoms should not be of the same size, so there is no reason why the law should not be uniform. Mere uniformity and correlation do not take us beyond the mechanical view of the universe. Nature is as likely to be regular as not.

The best presentation of the *a posteriori* argument, in a general way, is that which is given by Romanes as "Physicus" in *A Candid Examination of Theism*. He writes from a non-theistic point of view, but no theist could state the argument more clearly and strongly. In the sixth chapter the theist is represented as urging that the order and beauty of the world are inconceivable except as the work of an infinite intelligence. But the reply is made that infinite intelligence is inconceivable; the only processes of thought of which we have any knowledge are those which we find in our own minds which work through successive stages of consciousness; such a succession is inconceivable as associated with Absolute Being. Here, then, are two inconceivabilities, on the one hand the inconceivability of the harmony of the universe without a guiding mind, and on the other hand the inconceivability of infinite in-

¹ *The Order of Nature*, Essay II.

telligence. Of these two inconceivabilities the first is relative, the second absolute; the first makes too great a demand upon our thought, the second contradicts our thought. Therefore the first must give way before the second, the difficulty in conception must yield to the contradiction in terms. The atheist appears to have the better of the argument. But as we have already seen,¹ Jevons points out that this action of the mind in successive stages is not essential to the conception of thought but only an accident of human thought due to its finiteness; the greater human intelligences are able to grasp many things at once, and the ideal intelligence would be wholly free from those limitations which Physicus considers the *quale* of thought. Not only is the idea of infinite intelligence or infinite spirit not a contradiction in terms, but the idea of spirit is necessary to the idea of infinite being. The second or atheistic argument, therefore, loses its basis, and the argument of the theist remains in its full force.

¹ Page 37.

CHAPTER XV.

THE A POSTERIORI ARGUMENT CONTINUED.—THE NEED OF THE TELEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE RESULTS OF ATOMIC ORGANIZATION.—THE TELEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE AND CHANCE.—THE TELEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE AS INVOLVING NATURAL SELECTION.—DIFFICULTIES.—ARE THERE ANY RESULTS THAT CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY ATOMIC ORGANIZATION?—LIFE—MIND WITH ITS POWERS.—THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE *a posteriori* argument is commonly known as the argument from design. The word “teleology,” however, is more fundamental and better suited to our purpose than the word “design.” For two elements are involved in design, a teleological element and a conscious purpose. We find teleology both in the growth of the plant and in the activities of man, but whereas in the one case there is simply teleology, in the other teleology is accompanied by intelligence. The use of the word “design,” therefore, tends to emphasize too strongly the personal and transcendent aspect of the Absolute. Furthermore, before we can prove design we must first prove teleology.

We ask, then, first, whether any principle of teleology is needed to account for the results which are produced in the world by the organization and arrangement of the atoms, and secondly, whether there are any results which no arrangement of atoms will account for. Many theologians today regard the teleological argument as obsolete, and take refuge in the instincts of the soul. The teleological argument dwells largely upon instances of correlation in nature, and it is now admitted that these may be explained on the basis of natural selection. But in turning from external testimony to the witness of the soul, the theologians forget that

what applies to the one may be made to apply to the other, and that it may be held that the instincts of the soul are also to be explained by the laws of natural selection. At the same time, in the face of all these results, now as ever there is the choice between chance and teleology.

We use the word "chance" under strong protest from certain scientists. Of course every one recognizes that there is no such thing as chance in the sense that anything can be produced without a definite cause. But there is a very important use of the word which cannot be avoided, and in which it presents a truth as absolute as that which affirms that all things are the result of law. Chance is the intersection of two or more lines of causation each of which was working independently. For instance I go to Boston on my errand, and you on yours, and we happen to meet at the same shop. It was not a chance that you went or that I went, but it was a chance that we met, for the meeting had no place in the plan which either of us had made. Again, it is not chance that a locomotive throws out sparks, or that the sun has dried the forest; but the two lines of causation are independent of each other, and it is chance when they cross, and the sparks from the locomotive set the forest on fire. Now, if in throwing dice we turn up the same numbers repeatedly, we infer that the dice are loaded. When the intersections of independent lines of causation occur more than occasionally, then we feel that something more than chance is present, and in proportion as chance is eliminated, teleology becomes applicable. It is in this sense that we have to choose between chance and teleology.

The objection has been raised that there can be no place for teleology unless we know what was aimed at. But this is to misconceive the teleological argument in its larger aspect. It is true that it does not follow, just because a man has hit a target, that he intended to hit it. Yet it is also true that if without knowing that the man was firing at the target we should see him hit the bull's-eye time and time again we should infer an intention on his part. According to the admirable statement of Romanes, the harmony which is found to exist among all the various forces of the uni-

verse in their complexity cannot be the result of chance. The universe must have been so constituted as to produce these definite, harmonious results. Either it has been a cosmos from the beginning, or it has been so guided as to take form in this cosmos. From the first, order has existed. Those who support the theory of natural selection say that these results have been produced through the play of external forces acting upon organic life. But according to teleology the tendency to produce just these results existed from the beginning, and the external forces have been only the complementary elements in the process.

To repeat, however, the two questions which we have asked, first, is any principle of teleology needed to account for the arrangement of atoms by which the construction of the universe is explained? Secondly, do we find any results which cannot be conceived as accomplished by any arrangement of atoms? In answering the first of these questions we have to consider on the one hand the original constitution of the atoms and their relation to one another, and on the other hand the process by which they have been combined in the construction of the world. The first step in this examination involves the question of evolution. The term is used in two senses which are often confused. Strictly speaking, evolution implies involution, that is, that the germ of the result, the tendency toward it, existed already at the beginning of the process. In the other more popular and superficial use of the term, it is synonymous with any process of changes by which a certain result is brought about, no matter how. Tyndall, in a famous passage in which he is speaking of the highest results of the development of life in the history of the universe, says that these "were once latent in a fiery cloud."² Here the term "latent" corresponds to the idea of evolution in the true sense; that which was before latent may be said legitimately to be evolved. Compare the growth of a natural flower and the process by which a wax flower is manufactured. The growth of a flower from its seed is a process of evolution, the flower was latent in its germ;

¹ *A Candid Examination of Theism*, Chap. VI.

² *Fragments of Science*, VII, "On the Scientific Use of the Imagination."

but in no proper sense can the wax flower be considered latent in the material from which it is made, and to call the process of its manufacture an evolution is to misuse the term. When Michael Angelo says that

“The stone unhewn and cold
Becomes a living mould,”

the phrase can be justified only in a highly figurative sense. The marble is quite incapable of evolving the statue as the plant evolves its flower.

Tyndall speaks of matter as containing the promise and potency of all great results. But how are we to conceive of matter as containing this promise and potency? There is no such thing as matter, that is, in the same sense in which there is no such thing as air or water. Air and water consist of collections of particles which are so closely similar to one another that they are indistinguishable. When these are united in a mass they produce upon our minds the effect of uniformity, and we call the collections air or water as though we were speaking of distinct things existing each as a whole. It is very much the same with matter, if we accept the dictum of the scientists. It is a collection of atoms, infinitesimal in size, and, if not infinite in number, at least inconceivably numerous. To bring about the results which we recognize in the world there must have been co-operation among these atoms. Now in so far as physicists maintain that the principle of natural selection sufficiently accounts for this co-operation, and that the universe results from the working of external laws, the proper term by which to describe the process is rather “aggregation” or “agglutination” than “evolution.” I cannot but think that the use of the term “evolution” in a sense different from that which rightly belongs to it has done much to make the materialistic theories of the universe popular and acceptable, and that if a legitimate term like “aggregation” had been used, the theories would have found less acceptance. Evolution implies involution, for only that can be evolved which was first involved. Therefore evolution implies teleology.

Suppose we begin with the individual atoms. According to

any merely atomic theory they are as unconnected, except by outward power of attraction, as though they were in different worlds. That is, each is wholly distinct from the rest and there is no contact whatever between them. To reach the results which we find in the universe, these myriads of atoms, distinct and separate, have to co-operate. Suppose, now, that we know of no guiding principle at work in the development of the world. We shall have to recognize a special adaptation of the atoms to this co-operation. If as they are shaken together they fit themselves into the forms of mutual relation in which we find them, they must have been adapted for this purpose. This appears the more plainly when we consider that this world is not one of many possible worlds. The forces which govern the atoms act with absolute invariableness, and just as under certain conditions the solution of some salt can produce only this or that particular crystal, so out of these atoms only this precise world which we see could have been produced. Here, then, is a dilemma of which one horn or the other must be chosen. A principle of teleology must be involved either in the very existence of the atoms or else in their subsequent arrangement. It is with the world as with a child's blocks. The blocks may be of uniform size and shape, depending upon the thought and skill of the child to combine them in various structures, or they may be of different forms, as in a dissected map, so planned from the first that they can be fitted together to produce one combination and only one. One or the other of these two forms of teleology must be recognized.

It may be said that if the atoms were shaken together they must have united in some form, and why not the form which we see as well as any other. This form of reasoning applies where there is a series one member of which must be taken, as for instance in a lottery, where some one must win the prize. It applies also in the case of geometrical forms; however intricate they are, it may be said of them that some forms must in any case result, and therefore these could be the outcome as well as any others. But the case is different here. Furthermore, Spencer's theory of differentiation and integration does not help us. It will explain

mechanical processes, but when we come to organic processes it fails us. For integration is only the result of differentiation as it separates, say wheat and chaff. Existing kinds of things are separated, but there is no tendency to produce new relations or a cosmos.

Of course chance can do a great deal. In the picture which the frost draws upon the window-pane the crystallization is not chance, but it is the merest chance when the forms resemble, as they so often do, some woodland or other scene. It is chance, again, and only chance, that the mountain side should have taken the form of the great profile which we know as the Old Man of the Mountain. If chance can do such things, it is sometimes asked, why should it not have built the universe as we see it? We have to answer that in many cases it is indeed difficult, perhaps impossible, to draw the line where chance is to give place to teleology. But when we consider the complication of results, the extent and variety of the mutual adaptations in the universe, we feel that we have passed beyond the domain of chance. Up to a certain point we may accept the explanation of chance or of mechanical adjustment, but when we reach organic forms we pass into the realm of adaptation, and then as we enter the world of mind, and find subject and object in contrast to each other and answering one to the other, when we find the world fitted to give the joy that it does to the spirit, and the spirit fitted to take the joy in the world that it does, then we feel that teleology must have something to do with it all. Either the atoms must have been specially adapted to come together in these relations, or else they must have been guided.

You will notice that if we admit that there is a teleological principle at the beginning, then we may admit all that is claimed for natural selection in the mechanical carrying out of this tendency. I am not insisting here upon any creative power. For our present purpose the universe may be nothing but an organism that involves a principle of teleology. To go back, however, for a moment to our starting-point, it is an interesting process of thought to try to conceive what the relation is in which the primeval atoms stand

to one another. They must represent a unity. Since they all co-operate to produce the results that we see, they must be bound together in one way or another by some principle of unity. Perhaps the question meets us quite as strongly when we consider some single, individual result. Here is the simplest plant or animal. Each organic form has started from a germ. The particles which made up this germ had an understanding among themselves by which this result has been reached. I use the term "understanding" in a figurative sense. Or take a result like the *Iliad* of Homer. We start with atoms wholly separate from one another, we shake them up indefinitely, from eternity if you will, and from among the other elements there drops out Homer's *Iliad*! Yet the *Iliad* is only part of a mighty whole many parts of which are of a like perfection. Together with the *Iliad* we shake out also the mind that produced the *Iliad* and all the minds that are to enjoy it.

To pass, however, to the construction of the world, we have here again to decide between chance and teleology. We will omit for the time being all the processes which precede the moment at which we enter the world of organic life. We will start where Darwin starts, with the beginnings of life, the minutest organisms that possess life. By certain processes these have been developed into the higher forms of life which we behold. What, then, is the nature of the change which takes place in order that this result may be reached? What has natural selection to act upon? For natural selection, as Darwin often repeats, can originate nothing, but is simply a principle of selection. Its materials are offered to it, and it selects that which is most fitting.

[It has been thought best to omit the discussion of average and individual variation, and the preservation of variations, into which Dr. Everett here enters. He purposely leaves this discussion "very general," considering "any minute discussion hardly advantageous." The question as to the processes of natural selection is outside the line of his main argument. Whatever the processes, the choice is still between chance and teleology;¹ and if any principle of teleology is recognized, "then we must also recognize the importance of the principle of natural selection."—ED.]

¹ Page 148.

For it is through natural selection [he proceeds] that teleology must work. The principle of natural selection not only does not exclude teleology; it causes teleology to stand out in fresh beauty. For if we ask under what form we should expect teleology to manifest itself, we have to reply that it must be expected to use natural laws; final causes must work through efficient causes. There is another point of view from which the teleological principle is regarded as standing over against physical relations, striking in now and then to adjust them. It is not to our purpose to inquire whether such adjustments from without ever take place. All that I insist upon is that the most profound and most normal activity of the teleological principle is to be expected not as a power working against physical relations but as a power that works through physical relations. Therefore, in seeking for evidence of the teleological principle we look first not for breaks in the line of physical causation, but for such a consensus of the elements that are at work in the world, such a concentration of efficient causes to reach certain results, as cannot be explained by any theory of chance combination. Thus we come back again to the metaphysical argument of "Physicus."¹

In this relation we regard the universe as we regard a plant. In all the processes of the growth of the plant we find physical influences, efficient causation, everywhere at work. There is no interruption in the growth. Leaf and flower and fruit come forth each of them from the nature of the plant itself, and each is developed through the agency of this external, physical force. Yet through all these physical influences we recognize the working of a principle of teleology, the tendency of the plant, from the first sowing of the seed, to reach the result that is finally attained.

We may not say with the certainty of mathematical demonstration that the organic world as we behold it cannot be the result of chance, but the probability that it is not so to be explained is overwhelming. To make the world unteleological overburdens the theory of natural selection. When we consider the complications that are involved in the attempt to explain the

order and harmony of the universe by the theory of chance variations, to use the earlier language of Darwin, we are reminded of the fate of the theory of cycles and epicycles of the older astronomy. It was a theory that explained the different phenomena fairly well, but it broke down of its own weight, and gave place to the simple law of attraction, which was found sufficient to explain all the phenomena. In a similar manner we fall back upon the principle of teleology. We admit that the earthworm is seeking its own ends as it toils away in the ground,¹ but at the same time we also admit that this is a part of the great process that nature is using in the onward movement of its development toward the higher life.

Such recognition as this of the principle of teleology cannot be called unscientific, for the tendency is found to be a constant. Take once more our illustration from the growth of the plant. In this growth it is not unscientific to recognize the principle of teleology, for at the same time that we recognize all the physical elements of the growth, we know that through them all the plant is tending to fulfil its own type. Just so the recognition of the principle of teleology in regard to the world as a whole cannot be regarded as unscientific. It might be so regarded if it were hastily assumed. But if we find that it is impossible to admit that the world as we know it today could have been produced from the elements of fiery mist without the aid of teleology, if we are actually driven to accept the principle of teleology as we are driven to accept the law of gravitation, then to recognize this principle is not to recognize an unscientific or non-scientific element, but simply to enlarge the realm of causes with which science has to do.

It is true that when we speak of this teleological principle as embodied in the world, we meet certain difficulties. If there is such a force, why do we not find it working all along the line? Why are there so many examples of what from this point of view must be called arrested development? Why do we find the exhibition of life that is stationary, organisms in which there is

¹ Charles Darwin, *The Formation of Vegetable Mould*.

no movement toward higher forms of life, and even races which show no tendency to develop into higher races? It is too much to ask, however, that we should explain this. For if the universe is moving in accordance with a divine plan, any complete explanation would involve complete knowledge of that plan. As it is, we can understand only by slow degrees. We must take the manifestation of the plan as it comes to us, and judge of what God intends to do from what he has already done and is now doing. Still, although we cannot give the explanation that is demanded, we can conceive of the explanation as possible. For what we observe in the history of the world is precisely what we see in the history of the plant or of almost any form of organized life. The plant tends to produce leaves and flowers and fruit, and seed from which shall spring another plant similar to itself. Moreover, leaves and flowers and fruit are all variations of a single type of organism, so that no reason is apparent why every leaf-bud should not produce a flower-bud and every flower fruit. Yet there are even plants like the century plant which produce only a single flower, and that one flower only rarely. Here is the same question that has been asked in regard to the world. Why this arrest of development? The evident answer as regards the plant is that the fact of arrested development is not inconsistent with the teleological tendency in the plant, but on the contrary that which is called the arrest of development is necessary to the growth of the plant. The failure of certain leaf-buds to produce flower-buds and the failure of certain flowers to produce fruit, this all belongs to the nature of the plant. The fruit that is finally developed is that which the plant was intended to produce.

We may even take a step further, though not indeed with certainty. Suppose that the highest development of life—and if the highest development of life, then the highest development of moral and spiritual life—were reached at a single point, and that from this point the world adopted it by conscious acceptance. We can conceive that a higher consciousness of unity might be reached in this way by a race of men than if the same results were arrived at through individual striving along separate lines.

Still further, we may say that the highest result is not simple but concrete, and that it can be more easily comprehended if the elements of which it is composed have severally their independent, partial development. If I may use concrete instead of abstract terms, let us suppose that Christianity is the highest result of spiritual development. Let us suppose also that this result was reached in a single race; that at first it was gained by a single individual, and that then it became the possession of the race. We can understand how a unity might thus have been attained that would not have resulted in any other way. And if Christianity is a composite unity, we can see how other religions have their place in manifesting the various component elements separately, developing them and bringing them into recognition, and at the same time illustrating their insufficiency when taken by themselves.

Of course you will not think that I am attempting to do what I have only just now said is impossible,—to lay down the plan according to which the world moves. I am only suggesting these considerations to show that although we cannot answer definitely certain questions that arise, we can still conceive of them as not unanswerable.

What has been said may be presented in a somewhat different form if we start from the position taken by Darwin. Darwin assumes two things as given. One is life with its several powers, and the other is mind with its powers.¹ It may be said that Darwin assumes them only with reference to his own system and that he is not to be understood as implying that science in general is to accept them. It seems to me, however, that Darwin goes further than this, for near the close of the *Origin of Species* he speaks of life as having been "breathed into" one or more forms, and he somewhere indicates that Spencer goes a little too far in trying to explain the origin of life.² Therefore we may take it for granted that Darwin did assume absolutely that the original fact of life was not to be explained by science.

¹ *Origin of Species*, D. Appleton & Co., 1873, p. 205.

² *Origin of Species*, p. 100.

Now, if life with its several powers is to be assumed, we have to ask, what, then, is life? The question is unanswerable. Life itself can no more be explained than the law of gravitation. We may indeed give certain characteristics of life to indicate what we mean by it. Thus we may say that life at least involves a tendency to organize; wherever we find the tendency to an organic existence we say that there is life. But organic existence has organs, and these organs are not abstract but concrete. Therefore if we recognize in life the tendency to produce organs, we must look for the manifestation of life in specific quality. Here is a vast transition, the transition from the mechanical to the vital. We no longer have to do merely with geometrical relations, but with organic relations. We have growth, not by aggregation, as we found it everywhere in the lower forms of existence, but by assimilation and reproduction. The simplest cell differs from any merely mechanical arrangement in that it is an organic whole, carrying within itself the possibility of development by putting forth higher and higher powers. At first the organism may be, so to speak, merely a single organ, but presently this single organ differentiates itself into new and higher organs. When I say that the organism is at the first a single organ, I do not describe it as simple. For a single organ is in itself complex, possessing as it does the elements which make possible the preservation of the organ through these processes of assimilation and reproduction.

There is a method of scientific interpretation which assumes that if we can show how a certain organ has been produced by very slow degrees, tracing the development back to the first steps, we have explained the existence of the organ. To attempt to explain life in this way has always seemed to me very much as though one should assume that if a ball rolls up hill by infinitesimal stages no force is needed to explain the motion. Of course as much force is needed to roll a ball up hill by infinitesimal stages as at a bound, and a principle of teleology is required just as truly to explain results when the development has been by slow stages as when the process has been more rapid. One is reminded of the story that some German writer tells about two countrymen who

are out shooting and one of whom cautions the other to pull the trigger "gently, gently," as if that would make the report less noisy.

We are brought now to the point where we may consider the second of the two questions in regard to teleology which we asked at the outset.¹ Are there any results that cannot be produced by aggregation? We find the answer in Darwin's second assumption, that is, in mind with its powers. For the antithesis between mind and matter appears from the very beginning in the lowest forms of sensitive life. There is no transition from matter to mind, from object to subject. Spencer appears to admit something of the kind when, as he comes to the discussion of mind, he speaks of approaching a class of facts "without any perceptible or conceivable community of nature with the [physical] facts that have occupied us."² We have, then, to insist that mind cannot be constructed by physical causes, by any aggregation of physical elements. Before, the results that we were considering could be produced by aggregation, although we felt the necessity of assuming some teleological principle. In the case of mental phenomena, on the other hand, no aggregation will account for the results, whether we assume the teleological principle or not. The aspect of the case might be somewhat different if we could conceive of matter and mind as passing one into the other by slight gradations. But the gulf between the material world and the very germ of consciousness is absolute. It is like a magnet,—a single grain of the magnetic stone will have its two poles with the absolute antithesis between them.

Furthermore, so far as we know what are called physical facts, they are mental facts. We cannot conceive of the external world except as objective, as standing always in direct relation to subjectivity. Schopenhauer recognizes as a fundamental difficulty the fact that external phenomena seem to be dependent upon the mind, while on the other hand, when we consider the history of the external world as it is manifested to us, mind seems to have been developed out of matter. Matter appears to have the priority in time although mind has the logical priority. Mind seems

¹ Page 147.

² *The Principles of Psychology*, Part I, Chap. VI.

to be dependent upon matter as its cause, and yet matter is dependent upon mind because we know it only in relation to mind. This difficulty, however, is met in the recognition of absolute spirit. In ordinary usage we may think of the world as material and as something that could exist without mind, but when we are pushed to the consideration of these fundamental relations, then we must appeal to the fundamental facts of our philosophical thought and make the material world know its place. We must remind ourselves that we learn the material world at second hand, and that it is only spirit that we recognize at first hand, and we must say to that which is to us only some form of ideal or mental manifestation, that it cannot claim to be supreme. We may alter a little the setting of a line of Emerson, and say that the mind is like the sky,

"Than all it holds more deep, more high."¹

One might as well insist that the mirror is in some sense caused by the reflections that float across it as to say that the mind is the product of material forces. The question may arise whether this is not after all an argument *ab ignorantia*, and whether the fact that we cannot separate the external from the internal world may not mark simply the limitation of our own powers. We may even ask whether the mirror might not reflect the process of mirror making, and thus exhibit in its reflection the secret of its own being. But if the argument is an argument from ignorance, certainly the argument on the other side is an argument from the absolutely unknown.

To pass, however, to another proposition, not open to such doubt, the unity of consciousness is opposed to any conception of it as produced by matter. The attempt to reach consciousness and the spiritual life from the material side is the attempt to construct the unity of consciousness out of a multitude of separate atoms. Certain illustrations have been used in the attempt to make clear the possibility of such a process. Thus it is said that consciousness is related to the physical organization very much as music is related to the instruments. But when we analyze

¹ *Woodnotes*.

this illustration it fails. For music has no unity except an ideal unity. It consists in a succession of undulations produced by separate movements of the strings or of whatever else may form the mechanism of the instrument, and these undulations have unity only in the mind that composed the series and the mind that appreciates the music. Apart from these minds, therefore, from which the music springs and to which the music appeals, the music has no unity, so that in the same sense in which we may say that there is no water and no air, we may say that there is no music. It is very important for our purpose that we should separate all these phenomena into their component parts, in order that we may avoid the fallacy of transferring what is purely material into the spiritual sphere and then reasoning from it as though it still belonged to the physical world. The materialist can give us only discreteness. Spirit alone can give us unity.

Psychological physiology, in analyzing the brain and dividing it into various tracts devoted severally to specific reactions, appears at first sight to furnish an argument for the theory of the production of mind from matter. But as we look more closely we find that in reality its testimony points in precisely the opposite direction. For the more distinctly the separate tracts are mapped out, the further do we find the activity of the brain removed from the unity that is essential to consciousness.

It may be urged against the unity of consciousness that men sometimes have a divided or a double consciousness, in which they are conscious of themselves as two persons or more. You may recall the story told of Dr. Johnson,—how he dreamed one night that he had been overcome in an argument, and how he was much depressed by the thought of his defeat. But he was reminded that he had been reasoning on both sides, and therefore was still the conqueror! In such cases each of the persons who figure in the dream is a form of the individual's own personality, and the unity of consciousness is not broken. The duplicity is not recognized as a division of consciousness, but consists merely in certain phenomena which the unity of consciousness puts outside of itself and contemplates. It sometimes happens in

the first stages of insanity that the sufferer experiences a feeling as though some one were trying to get possession of him, and in spiritualistic séances the medium appears to be invaded by a foreign power. But in all these cases consciousness as consciousness, however it may differ at different times, maintains its unity. When we speak of a double consciousness, we mean not that consciousness has been divided, but that there are two independent consciousnesses. Each of these, however, must be single. Let as many consciousnesses coexist as you please, each is a unit. A person may be thinking of one thing and may be writing at the same time with the planchette of some wholly different thing. But of this other thing the consciousness of thought or speech knows nothing, and the very fact that one consciousness does not know what the other consciousness is about testifies to the non-divisibility of consciousness. A multiplication of consciousnesses is a very different thing from a divided consciousness.

The line of reasoning that we have followed in regard to the unity of consciousness applies further when we consider the theory of so-called mind-stuff.¹ According to this theory there is no atom of matter that does not contain some germ of consciousness, and no element of consciousness apart from matter; each atom has its sentient and its non-sentient aspect; according, then, to the manner in which the atoms are combined, the resulting organisms manifest higher or lower forms of mental activity. Here is the same difficulty that is involved in all attempts to construct mind out of matter. For whatever the relations in which these atoms are combined, they do not lose their separateness. Organize them as you will, they remain a multitude of different centres of consciousness. It may be said that the relation of the atoms to one another tends to increase consciousness and to develop it to a higher degree. But this is true only as it is true that in a crowd of people at a camp-meeting, or rushing to a fire, or engaged in a riot, the excitement of one individual increases the excitement of another and the excitement of all increases the ex-

¹ W. K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves. Lotze, *Microcosmos*, Book II, Chap. I.

citements of each. In all this there is no fusion of consciousnesses. We speak of the crowd as animated by a single purpose, but this is only a figure of speech. All that we mean is that each member of the crowd is in a state similar to that of all the rest. In the same way, no matter how much the atoms of mind-stuff are intensified by contact with one another, they are still only a crowd of separate consciousnesses. There is no way in which a collection of individuals can produce unity of results except as they all act upon a single individual whose movement may be said to represent the activities of all. But we find no indication of any such element in the brain upon which all the other portions of the brain and of the nervous system impinge, or which they in any way affect by any process of interaction. And even if we could find such an element, if we could reduce the substratum of consciousness to a single atom, and say, "Here is the one atom which is conscious," we should still have difficulty in taking the next step toward an understanding of all the great and varied content of consciousness.

The material explanation of spiritual things has been carried so far at times that one might fear the possibility that all spiritual phenomena would be made to appear dependent upon physical processes. Thus the mental faculties, memory, thought, are found to be dependent upon the condition of the nervous system. A man has a diseased brain: what becomes of his fine reason, or his well-stored memory? A man grows old: his mental powers suffer the change so often produced by age, and begin to fail. To a large extent the condition of the physical elements is the measure of the condition of the spiritual elements. Yet, from all that has been said, we see that there is a point beyond which this sort of reasoning cannot go. Granting all the objections that can be made, there is still a centre of consciousness that must be independent of all material organization.

Little is gained by the attempt to free any one function of consciousness from relation to the structure of the brain. Various writers have made such attempts. Lotze, for instance, would make memory independent. If memory, he says, appears to be

lost through some physical disorganization, it is simply that the connection has been broken by which memory is reached.¹ In explanation of our forgetfulness of the phenomena of dreams it is said that the whole dream world is so apart from the waking world that there is no element of suggestion to recall the dream to our memory. In similar ways others attempt to show that the will is independent. But if we can reason from analogy we may assume that there is no mental change that is not accompanied by some change in the molecules of which the brain consists. The only exception is found in the fundamental element of all, that unity of consciousness which is the sphere within which all these changes are contained.

The argument that mind cannot have been produced from matter because of the inconceivability of the process is sometimes met by the suggestion that other familiar processes are quite as inconceivable. Thus Tyndall says somewhere that while he cannot conceive how material forces can produce spiritual results, he cannot any more conceive how the black earth can be transformed into the plant and flower, so that he can see no particular reason for insisting upon the inconceivability of this special relation. The two inconceivabilities, however, are of a wholly different kind. The difficulty in the case of the flower is only a metaphysical difficulty. There is nothing in the relation itself which challenges our ability to conceive it, but only the number of the changes that are involved. When we consider that the color and scent of the flower are simply different ways in which the same atoms act upon our consciousness which before acted upon it when they were in the water or the mud, we see that there is nothing inconceivable in the changes but only a strain upon the imagination. In the passage of matter into mind, on the other hand, the inconceivability is that of an absolute contradiction, the contradiction between the unity of consciousness and any possible construction of multitudinous matter.

¹ *Microcosmos*, Book III, Chap. III.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE MIND AND ITS POWERS, CONTINUED.—THE WILL.—THE IDEA OF PERFECTION.—THE PRINCIPLE OF TELEOLOGY AS INVOLVING THE “WORLD-SOUL.”—VON HARTMANN’S THEORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.—THE MOVEMENT OF THE WORLD TOWARD CONSCIOUSNESS: TOWARD THE THREE IDEAS OF THE REASON AS IDEALS.

NOT only is it impossible to conceive of mind as produced from matter, but it is equally inconceivable that certain contents of the mind can be derived from the external world or from any simple process of relation with it. They are elements that the mind itself contributes. To quote a phrase which Professor Green once used in a similar connection, and later repeated in his *Prolegomena of Ethics*,¹ they have no “natural history.” That the mind should thus make its own contributions to the universe is only what we should expect. Everything else has qualities of its own which are not derived from the environment. The atoms, for instance, we must suppose at first are simply attracted toward one another, and this power of attraction is a quality inherent in them and not produced by the environment. As they are drawn more closely together, they may reach a point where they begin to repel one another, but this repulsion is called out by the approach, and when the relations into which they are brought develop chemical and other aspects, what they manifest is still something that has been inherent in them and is now simply called forth. In the world of organic life, also, organism, as we have just seen,² means at least the tendency to organize. In a similar way we should expect to find that the mind has its own peculiar qualities or reactions,—for qualities are nothing but reactions,—and since the mind is more elastic and more widely related than anything else, since it is the only thing that can

¹ Introduction, p. 5.

² Page 158.

go beyond itself and return, we should expect to find its qualities more varied and more marked.

We are met here by the difficulty that all our nomenclature is borrowed from the material world. Shall we say, for instance, that spirit is a substance? But substance is a term taken originally from the material world, and it is hard to separate the idea of substance from that world; substance we think of as something that is fixed, but in mind or spirit there is nothing that is fixed. The same is true of the term "thing" and of other terms which may suggest themselves. The mind finds it difficult, if not impossible, to employ in regard to itself any term that is derived from the material world. This difficulty is one that occurs in various relations. Take, for instance, the phrase which is so commonly applied to the mind by the followers of Locke, "*tabula rasa*." This implies that the mind may be either written upon or else in some way embossed. Neither process, however, can apply to the mind. For in the one case a foreign element is introduced, and in the other an absolute passivity of the mind is implied. But the mind is open only to its own modifications and it never is merely passive but always reacts. It is now distinctly understood that the process of perception involves categories of the understanding just as truly as do the higher processes of thought, and that there is no such thing as simple perception. We cannot be in the truest sense conscious of a sensation without some process of thought by which we distinguish and generalize. Even the perception of a tree or of a bit of wood or stone involves categories of thought. The figure of the "*tabula rasa*" is wholly false.

As I said before, we must expect to find that the mind is marked by certain elements of its own, that it makes its own contributions to the universe. In considering some of these elements I shall pass over much that has been discussed already in our examination of the psychological elements of religious faith. Thus the element of *love* would naturally be considered here, but I have already spoken of it both in relation to the religious feelings and in discussing the theories of a natural basis for the moral

law.¹ I shall add here only that in the spiritual world love would seem to be as fundamental and inherent as attraction is in the material world, and if it is thus inherent in the mind, it cannot be the product of natural selection but is one of the elements which natural selection uses.

I must pass on, however, to consider the element of *will*. According to Spencer,² the will is the impulse to do that which is most habitual under circumstances which for the time being have made the course to be followed a matter of doubt. Thus I see some animal coming toward me in the woods, but do not know what it is. At first I think it may be some wild beast, and my impulse is to run away, but then I think it may be a dog, and I am doubtful what to do. Finally I see plainly that it is a calf, and I keep on my way untroubled. The illustration is, of course, a simple one, and where circumstances are at all involved the complications that arise are more numerous, but in all cases the principle is the same.

The general question of the freedom of the will we shall take up later. I am considering it now merely in its most external aspect. Spencer's account of the will seems to be the very opposite of the truth. What we mean by "will" is not the finding out and doing what is most habitual, but the doing what is least habitual. In other words, we recognize will where habit is broken through. The man who acts merely in accordance with habit appears to us to be destitute of will; he is drifting, not steering. Thus the drunkard is in the habit of entering the saloon, and he exercises his will in breaking the "habit." It may be said that in this case we are using the word habit in too restricted a sense; that what the drunkard has been seeking all the time is pleasure and that when he discovers that he loses more pleasure by drinking than he gains and therefore tries to give up drinking, he is still doing what he has always done.—he is still seeking pleasure, although in a different way. But this does not break the force of the illustration, for there is no good reason why a man's habit

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chaps. VIII and XI.

² *The Principles of Psychology*, Part IV, Chap. IX.

should be separated into these two elements. The method of seeking is a part of the habit as well as the end that is sought. This man has been in the habit of preferring immediate pleasure to future pleasure; now he makes up his mind to subordinate present pleasure to future pleasure. He has been in the habit of seeking his own pleasure, but now he is roused to thought for the happiness of his family. Thus his habit is broken through in two ways, first as regards the relation to immediate as compared with distant pleasure, and secondly as regards the relation to his own pleasure when compared with the happiness of others. We may be told, perhaps, that the case is one of heredity, that the man is descended from a virtuous and temperate stock and the struggle is between the man's individual habit and the habit of his fathers. But here we come upon the fact that what we recognize as the loftiest manifestation of will breaks through all precedent, establishing a new precedent and forming a fresh habit on a higher plane. It is in this way that the great leaders of the world, the epoch-making men, have broken through the constraints of the past. From whatever side, therefore, we look upon the matter, we find that will is the opposite of habit, and that it is in the power of the will that spirit manifests itself in a form peculiarly striking and original.

As regards Spencer's *Psychology* in general, it may be of great service if it is taken as a tentative or experimental work, but if considered as a final statement of the questions with which it deals, it is wholly inadequate. The materials with which he has to work are few and only such as his philosophy will admit. There is the illogical and unexplained acceptance of some reality outside of ourselves as a *datum*, but this is the only point at which the wall that shuts us in within ourselves is broken through. This external something, whatever it may be, has the power to set our intellectual activities at work. We recognize its existence, but otherwise we know nothing about it. It is assumed that it undergoes changes which correspond in a certain way with the changes that take place in our mental states, but when we have granted this touch from the outside world to set us going, we are to admit

no further impulse from it; there is no feeling that is directly caused by this "thing in itself," if I may use Kant's expression. All the elements that have direct relation to the external world are thus excluded, and we can understand better the resort to the somewhat roundabout method by which sympathy is explained. That great leap which the spirit takes in love and sympathy, by which we pass outside of ourselves and identify our interests with those of others, suffering not only with them but for them, finding it sometimes more difficult to reconcile ourselves to the sufferings of others than to our own,—for this great leap Spencer's psychology has no place or recognition.

I have given this simply as an illustration of the meagreness of the elements with which Spencer has to work. It is not strange that at times the phenomena which he is describing have to be made over to suit his system, the pegs whittled down to fit the holes. The process is not unlike that which we have found in the theology of Schleiermacher¹ where feeling is cut down to fit the place allowed for religion in his system. Spencer comes as near to the realities that he is considering as he can. In the case of the will he seems hardly to have looked at the object that he is describing. As I said before, the discussion is helpful if it is considered as tentative. We see precisely what can be accomplished with the means that Spencer recognizes, and we see also that whatever cannot be explained by his system demands some explanation that goes beyond that system.

I have already spoken of the innate character of the three ideas of the reason.² There is one aspect of them, however, which may be considered more especially at this point, the idea of God, or according to the phrase used by Anselm and Descartes, the idea of the most perfect being. The third *Meditation* of Descartes contains much that is of interest in this connection. He here raises the question as to the origin of the idea of the most perfect being. We have considered this question in relation to the *a priori* argument,³ and now the thought that it suggests may illus-

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 60.

² *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap. IX.

³ Page 72.

trate and strengthen the *a posteriori* argument. Among the various ways suggested by Descartes in which the idea of infinite perfection might have been obtained, the one that perhaps offers itself most readily to that thought of the present day which regards everything as produced by the environment, is a process by which the infinite is to be reached through the negation of whatever is finite. But this cannot be, he urges, if we are to consider infinite substance as having more reality than finite substance. We can get the idea of substance from our own being, but not the idea of infinite substance. For if we follow a process of negation we are giving up certain elements of our own experience, whereas what we are seeking is something that transcends our own experience. Hence, he argues, the idea of the perfect, the absolute, is more fundamental than the idea of the finite. For how do I recognize my impressions as finite except as I compare them with that which does not possess these imperfections? How do I know that I lack, if I do not have some idea of that which is absolutely complete? Thus the idea of the infinite is fundamental and the idea of the finite secondary. But perhaps it is false, he suggests, this idea of the perfect, and has no source and no reality. Here he falls back upon his test for the reality of belief in the clearness and distinctness with which an idea presents itself; he finds nothing so clear and distinct as this. This argument would have weight chiefly with Descartes himself and his immediate followers. Perhaps all these elements, he questions further, which I conceive as belonging to the most perfect being are in me potentially. Certainly our own good qualities do have a gradual increase, and there are elements potentially present in our natures that gradually pass from a potential to a real existence. But no potentiality can be associated with the idea of the infinite. The infinite is complete and possesses all its qualities, its full perfection, in reality. These elements that we find potential in ourselves can never by any process of development reach infinitude. Furthermore, the thought of perfection cannot have had its origin in me, for in that case I should have given myself a perfection to correspond with it, and by the same reasoning it could not have

been derived from my parents. Neither could I have obtained it piecemeal, gathering its elements here and there, for that which is most essential in this idea of the divine perfection is its unity. This idea, then, must have been impressed upon me by God himself, as the stamp which he has put upon his handiwork.

It should be said in passing that the figure of the stamp as Descartes uses it has a very different meaning from that in which Sir John Herschel speaks of the assumed similarity between the atoms as the stamp of the maker.¹ That involves only a low idea of creation. But the recognition of these great ideas as the maker's stamp is something much more profound and much loftier. For if man has his source in God we should expect to find in him some such marks of his divine origin.

Descartes can never quite free himself from the assumption of that which he is trying to prove. But although his arguments may not always convince, they do awaken us to the importance of the question, how we come by these ideas of perfection. It may be said that they are the beginnings and the indications of a growth within us, the reaching forward of the soul in the process of its development, the bud conscious of the coming flower. But whence comes this impulse to a development that transcends all experience? Fichte has suggested that the aspirations toward perfection belong to infinite being itself, and are manifestations of the infinite in the finite. Absolute being has differentiated itself into these points of consciousness each of which presses toward the completeness of its infinite origin. Other ideas we gather from experience and observation, but these absolute ideas are not the outcome of any experience but are manifestations of the inmost life of the soul itself. The ideals thus conceived by us are never attained, says Fichte, and therefore, since the finite can reach infinitude only in eternity, we are destined to eternal life.²

It is to be noticed that with the conception of the absolute ideas the motive power by which man is raised from the brute becomes

¹ W. K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, "The First and the Last Catastrophe."

² C. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*, Chap. XII.

transformed. Man is driven upward by the struggle for existence, but with the development of his nature another element enters, and he is no longer driven, but led by ideas that entrance his soul. The fitness to survive no longer depends upon adaptation to the environment but upon the possession of that which is most worthy and exalted in human nature. The individual who is in the loftiest sense fittest may be unfit in relation to his environment.

Man's faith in the absolute ideas is one of the instincts of his nature. I shall not attempt to consider this instinct of belief at this point in our discussion, except in relation to the principles of natural selection. This relation I have already touched upon¹ in speaking of the theologians who are ready to abandon without question the argument from design and appeal instead to the religious instinct. They forget that natural selection undertakes to explain the origin of instincts no less than the origin of those organs that are made the basis of the argument from teleology. The religious instinct is no more inconsistent with the principles of natural selection than is teleology. At least we must admit that religious beliefs have the support of natural selection in so far as they are recognized as filling a place and serving a need in the development of the world. Natural selection may be looked at in either of two ways. It may be regarded as the process through which teleology is working, or it may be considered as a process pure and simple in which no principle of teleology is at work. If we suppose that natural selection is the process through which the principle of teleology is working, there are again two forms under which the teleological principle may be conceived. On the one hand we may think of it as representing the supreme being, the overruling intelligence, by which the principle of natural selection is guided in its operations. If we admit this, we do not need to say anything further, for we have assumed that which is the object of religion; we have assumed as a starting-point that toward which we are reasoning. But on the other hand we may think of teleology as a simple tendency, like an organic impulse to growth, an immanent teleology, so to speak, as compared with what may be called the transcendent teleology of the first form.

If we accept this second form, then the religious instinct that has been so fundamental and so active in the history of man is given the authority of nature itself, and we can use with a certain literal truth the words of Emerson,

"Out from the heart of nature rolled
The burdens of the Bible old."¹

But what if we consider natural selection as a process by itself in which no principle of teleology is at work? What in that case will be the relation of the religious instincts to natural selection? They will have to be regarded as moulded by the outer world, and will therefore be known to bear a certain relation to the environment and so to have a certain truth. It may be urged that such results are merely temporary, and that religion is, as Comte has declared, one of the stages through which all forms of thought have to pass. But the question at once occurs whether nature can be supposed to produce her most important results by means of delusion. It is assumed that the results of natural selection are in harmony with the environment, but here would be a discord, and nature, while following truth in her lower works, would be proceeding in her highest works on the principle of delusion. A certain element of delusion may be found in the lower world, as for instance in the processes of mimicry. But in such cases the delusion is not for the advantage of the being that is deluded; thus it is the enemies of the insects that are foiled by the delusion. In the case that we are considering it is man himself who would be deceived by his delusion.

There is still another aspect of the case. We do find in the lower organisms a change in instinct corresponding with the change in the organism. The mosquito, for instance, begins its career in water and then rises into the air, the tadpole undergoes a similar change. The butterfly first crawls like a worm and then lifts itself upon its wings. May there not be a similar change of instinct in the human spirit, only with a reversal of the process, so that at first it mounts up toward the heavens and later merely crawls upon the earth? It is to be noticed, however, that in all

¹ *The Problem.*

these changes in the lower organisms, each form of instinct corresponds to some permanent reality. The organism simply is brought into relation with different parts of the environment. When the mosquito leaves the water, when the butterfly leaves the earth, water and earth do not cease to exist. Neither of them has been a delusion, but from the beginning there has been a real relation to a reality. Therefore if we are to make any comparison between the instinct of religious belief and the instincts of the lower organisms, to show that an instinct may exist for a time and then pass away, we have to recognize this fact, that instinct always has relation to some reality. On the other hand, just in so far as we believe that the religious instinct is essential to the highest life of man, so far we may believe that it has the guarantee of the principle of natural selection. For the irreligious race would tend to give way before some race that had the strength which comes from the full and free development of the religious instinct.

We have considered the relation of the religious instinct to the principle of natural selection under both of the two aspects that are presented, examining it first on the supposition that natural selection is the process through which teleology is working, and then on the supposition that natural selection is a process by itself in which no teleological principle is at work. In point of fact, however, we have found reason to recognize the principle of teleology as working through the process of natural selection. Therefore we need not dwell upon the second aspect of the relation but may turn back once more to the first aspect.

What, then, is the nature of this principle of teleology? What does it involve? If nothing more, it involves at least something like that which has been called the "world-soul," or like the "Will" of Schopenhauer, or the "Unconscious" of Von Hartmann. All these expressions embody in different language the same thought of a power that is working through all the changes of the world and in a certain sense controlling them. In Von Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* the conception is perhaps reduced to its lowest terms, for he does not call the power

that thus works in the world either will or world-soul but simply "the unconscious." He states only that which he assumes as a fact, that there is a power which works unconsciously through all things. Von Hartmann's system as a whole is disappointing. The first part, in which he undertakes to prove the existence of the principle of the unconscious, is very interesting, and even if the conclusions are not always perfectly sustained, yet it seems to prepare the way for a helpful philosophy. One difficulty is involved which is similar to a difficulty that appears in the system of Schopenhauer. Many have found it hard to conceive of Schopenhauer's "unconscious will,"¹ but it is much harder to accept the "unconscious *vorstellung*" of Von Hartmann. He argues that if the power that is at work through everything is working toward an end, this end must in some way be present to it, and it must therefore have a *vorstellung*; but since the power is unconscious, the *vorstellung* also must be unconscious. But the expression seems to be a contradiction in terms.

It is when Von Hartmann comes to his philosophical discussion that he is so disappointing. Instead of basing a system upon the facts which he has observed, he explains the facts by a system which he appears to have adopted quite independently of them. In the first part of his work he has shown that there is a teleological principle in the world, the principle of the unconscious. But the philosophy of the unconscious is not developed from this unconscious element, which is of little assistance toward his final conclusion.

Of Von Hartmann's pessimism I will not speak here, except to say that although he claims to be an optimist he is practically a pessimist; his teleology is the destruction of teleology; the purpose of the world is to put an end to itself. I have referred to his system in order to prepare the way for the suggestion of what appears to me to be the true method of studying the philosophy of the unconscious. For suppose we accept Von Hartmann's theory that there is an unconscious power working through the world. What way should we take to find the ends toward which

¹ F. H. Hedge, *Atheism in Philosophy*, "Arthur Schopenhauer."

this power is working, and thus to find what is the nature of the power itself? We should ask, what is the direction of the movement, and, given the direction, what is the goal? And then, if we had arrived at any definite conclusion, we should ask, what is involved as a postulate provided the goal is to be reached? It is some such method as this which we might have expected Von Hartmann to adopt in the second part of his discussion.

It will be helpful to follow out this line of thought briefly. In the first place the world evidently has been working from the beginning toward intelligence and consciousness. The movements of the inorganic elements before life appears, the appearance first of organic and then of sensitive life, then the appearance of consciousness, at first in its lower manifestations and then in the form of higher and higher intelligence until we reach man, the development of man in an ever-enlarging sphere of knowledge,—all these, science tells us, are stages in a single course of development. Therefore the movement has been steadily toward the highest results that have as yet been reached. But if the world has been tending toward intelligence, and if we assume that the movement is not fortuitous, then we may ask what is necessary in order that a consummation may be possible. We have a right to assume that the movement has not been fortuitous. Throughout the world we find such adaptation to the various ends, nature has such definite and perfect ways of accomplishing her purposes, that we may take it for granted that nothing has been aimed at which involves contradiction or absurdity.

The intelligence is of two kinds, according as it is related to that which is without or that which is within. On the one hand is the comprehension of the world, knowledge, and on the other the comprehension of ourselves, self-consciousness. If it is wholly attained, the world becomes transparent, within and without. Perhaps this result is never to be reached by finite beings. But it contains nothing that is in itself contradictory or inconceivable. The end toward which nature has been tending is a possible end. What does this involve as regards the external

world? We turn back to that which we have found to be the postulate of the intellect.¹ The world must be comprehensible, it must be ideal, and if it is ideal it must be the manifestation of spirit, that is, of something which is akin to man himself. For if it is otherwise, then the whole movement of the world toward intelligence is to end at last in the doctrine of the unknowable; it is to end in darkness when through all the ages of its history it has been pressing toward the light. It is this idea of the unknowability of all things that almost breaks the heart of Faust when, after devoting himself all his life to the search for knowledge, he finds that knowledge is unattainable. The case of Faust is the case of a single individual. But here is the whole world, through all its long development, pressing forward to know! If, therefore, we may thus interpret the workings of nature, we find that the end which she seeks demands for its fulfilment the same truth that is demanded by religion, the presence of a spiritual life in the universe as its source.

As regards self-consciousness, the knowledge of ourselves, the suggestion that I have to make is offered with less confidence. Self-knowledge seems to depend largely upon sympathy. We understand ourselves, in some degree at least, in proportion as we are understood by others. The sympathy of others and the expression of ourselves to others reveal us to ourselves as no dumb life can. If we place an individual alone on some island, his inner life must become less distinct and less conscious of itself, in spite of whatever help it may receive from the memory of former associations. Human sympathy, however, goes only a little way. The deepest feeling of the heart cannot be expressed even to the nearest friend:

"Thought is deeper than all speech,
Feeling deeper than all thought."²

If I am right in thinking that the sympathy of others is necessary to the fuller consciousness of ourselves, then an absolute, infinite companionship is demanded, the companionship of a spiritual

¹ Page 102.

² Christopher P. Cranch.

presence to which the very depths of our inward life are thrown open.

Again, and secondly, the movement of the world has been always toward the ideas of the reason, accepted not merely as ideas but as ideals, as powers in the life, representing the highest ends toward which intelligence itself is working. For the highest spiritual life of man is reached in proportion as the truth and goodness and beauty of the universe are recognized, not as abstractions, but as active factors in the life. From the lofty character of the ideas of the reason it might be inferred that we should have to wait for a considerable development of intelligence before we found any trace of them. It is therefore pleasant to recognize the fact that they are rooted very deeply in the life of the world, and that we find traces of them low down in the process of development before the beginning of human life. Sometimes there is a jealousy of this lower life, and an unwillingness to grant to it any elements that belong to our higher life. But we do not need to be jealous of the lower life. If we must fight for our supremacy, no doubt that supremacy is more imperilled in this direction than in any other. But the gulf is so great that we can afford to grant freely whatever we really find in the lower life. If we have no disposition to insist upon the difference between the higher and the lower, then, of course, we have no fear upon this point. It is interesting to notice how religion has almost always dreaded any new opening and enlargement in the relations of universal life, and yet when once the broader view has been accepted she has found in it new strength.

To speak first of the idea of goodness, we find an instinctive faith in goodness in the trustfulness of the lower life of the world, the trust, for instance, with which beast and bird meet the darkness. But not to press this aspect, I shall pass at once to the subjective view and examine goodness as a power in the life. Here, of course, we must use the term "goodness" in its broadest and fullest significance, for if we mean by goodness only the submission to the moral law recognized as such, our search would be useless. But we have found that love is the essence of good-

ness, the fulfilment of the law, and where love is present we find also, if not goodness, at least that which is the culmination of goodness, that for which goodness is the preparation. Some moralists and theologians are in the habit of speaking slightly of the natural affections as compared with that moral goodness which is adopted consciously and through principle. Yet if the position that we have taken is correct, the natural affections represent at certain points the results toward which morality itself would urge us; they are in a sense higher than morality, inasmuch as they are already a part of life. I do not mean to say that there is no difference between the virtue which has come to be part of the nature after passing through the stages of conscious morality and the virtue that has undergone no such conscious process. I am not insisting that the love of the beast for its own is equivalent in value to the love of the Christian mother. For while her love is as natural as that of the beast, the great spiritual realities which she recognizes add to it a beauty and fulness that otherwise it could not have. At the same time we have to recognize the fact that natural affection is in its lowest and earliest form essentially the same as in the highest, and that the life that has attained to it in so far finds itself upon the height which it is the business of life to reach in all relations. The life of animals has been spoken of as carnage. But the "struggle for existence" does not necessarily imply combat and the destruction of others, but simply self-assertion, and to this self-assertion and the development of life the element of love is as essential as the element of strife. It is even more essential, for where no struggle is necessary love still is needed for the care and protection of the young, and love is the cord which binds one generation to another. Furthermore, the love of the animal is not confined to its young or to those who stand in immediate relationship with it. Every one is familiar with the self-sacrificing love of the dog for man, a being wholly alien to him, and Darwin, in *The Descent of Man*,¹ tells the story of a small ape which when its keeper was attacked by a baboon sprang to the keeper's assistance. But in such love

¹ Part I, Chap. III.

are the beginnings of the higher life. For the higher life is life outside one's self, and in that forgetfulness of self which involves the thought of others is the true manifestation of the higher life. When once a man loves, if only a single person, a single thing, then there is found in him at least the beginning of the higher life. It may be only the germ of that life, so weak that it can hardly come to its full development, but it is there.

If the movement of the world has been toward goodness it has been no less toward beauty.¹ Everything seen in its type, its ideal, is beautiful. Not that every creature is beautiful; but wherever any one sphere of life is manifested, there we find beauty. What is of still more importance for our purpose, the perception of beauty, the esthetic sense, begins far down in the line of being. It has been said that the manifestation of the sense of beauty is first seen in the adornment of the person.² It is hard either to affirm or to deny this, but probably the beginning is rather in the adornment of the environment. Thus humming birds frequently ornament the outside of their nests, and the Australian bower-birds build their arbors not as tents for shelter, but as halls of courtship or for pure amusement, and decorate them in various ways, with bleached bones or grasses or different colored shells.³

The taste for music frequently shown by the lower animals is of course familiar to us all. Horses are easily trained to dance in time, and dogs often appear to be much moved by music, sometimes even assuming sentimental attitudes. In an article in *Littell's Living Age*, taken from *The Spectator*, entitled "Orpheus at the Zoo,"⁴ the writer tells of an experiment made in a zoölogical garden to test the effect of music upon the animals confined there; the wolves, it seems, were terrified, but nearly

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, Chap XII

² *Popular Science Monthly*, Jan., 1881, an article by Grant Allen entitled "Æsthetic Evolution in Man."

³ Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Part II, Chap XIV.

⁴ *Littell's Living Age*, Dec. 5, 1891.

all the other animals showed a great deal of pleasure; furthermore they all appeared to be sensitive to discord, the cobra being especially affected.

If we accept Darwin's theory of sexual selection, that each sex has certain marks which are pleasing to the other, and that these marks are inherited, it follows that the existence of so many birds of brightly colored plumage, or of sweet or brilliant song, may be due to the esthetic sense in animals. It has been suggested, however, that such variations are merely sexual marks, and that the individuals which possess them in a higher degree have the advantage over others simply because in them the element of sex is stronger. But if this is so, then we only have a dilemma either horn of which will serve our purpose. To some extent our dice are loaded. Whether nature has produced the beauty directly or has given a love of beauty to the lower creatures, there is in either case a tendency of the world toward the beautiful. It is said in favor of the assumption that the marks of beauty are sexual marks, that any peculiarity serves the purpose equally well; thus the headgear of the turkey-cock exercises an attraction of a sort similar to that of the exquisite appendages of the bird-of-paradise. But this does not affect the question. For if we recognize taste at all, we may recognize bad taste as well as good taste. Certainly that is what we find in the world of men. People set up pictures and statues that are as different from real works of art as the headgear of the turkey-cock is different from the plumage of the bird-of-paradise. The dress of men and women, beyond what is necessary for decency and warmth, must be considered as in some sense an expression of taste, an effort more or less distinctly made toward beautifying the person. But if we had never seen anything like the dress of the gentleman of the present day and were looking at it from the point of view of some savage, it would no doubt seem to us as absurd as we now consider the dress and adornment of the savage. Yet all this does not show the absence of taste. The effort that has been made, however unsuccessful it may appear, is in the direction of taste; it is an effort toward beauty.

It may be that we all experienced a shock when we learned that the color and fragrance of the flowers are largely governed by principles of natural selection in the attempt to attract the pollen-bearing bees. We might say that the bees themselves enjoy the fragrance of the flowers as well as the rest of us. But facts would hardly justify this assertion. For conspicuousness appears to be all that is essential. The fragrance of the flower is the sign of its little shop in which honey is offered for sale in return for the service that the bees render. Therefore the fragrance and color of the flowers are built upon utility. But here as elsewhere we must recognize that all teleology works through efficient causes, and if we find that all these elements of efficient causation, however modified, have had some part in making the world beautiful, we can only say that this is the method which nature takes, and repeat with greater emphasis our original statement that the tendency to beauty is inherent in nature itself.

When we arrive at human life, the esthetic sense declares itself still more plainly, taking form both in personal adornment and in art. Even in the stone age we find the beginnings of art, drawings of animals and the like, well done, and done for the sake of the drawings. Here is an immense step in the development of life,—the separation of form from reality, and the enjoyment of form without regard to the reality which it represents. For such enjoyment witnesses to a certain freedom from the dominion of the material elements of the world. Life has begun to be in a certain sense a play. The spirit is emancipated, and can contemplate things without regard to personal needs. After a time the passion for beauty becomes in certain natures dominant and is made a cultus, an object of devotion, so that men sacrifice to beauty as they sacrifice to goodness and to truth. I do not mean in the torture that they are willing to undergo for the sake of personal adornment, in the thought of giving pleasure; there is indeed the recognition here of an ideal of beauty, but it is a very low ideal. What I have in mind is that recognition of ideal beauty, without regard to personal relations, which impels men to give up for its sake wealth and position and ease of life. It is that

devotion which we find in artists like Millet and Corot, refusing to paint except in accordance with their ideals of beauty.

Thus in beauty as in goodness there is at first simply an unconscious movement toward the end, the tendency of nature itself. Then, as life advances, the consciousness of the impulse becomes stronger and stronger until it reaches that fulness and power which must be regarded as in a certain sense divine. The struggle and unconscious sacrifice in the earlier stages indicate beforehand the nature of the higher life of free-will sacrifice that is to come. In all the different stages the movement is the same, responding first to the pressure from without and then to the impulse from within.

In what I have been saying of the movement of the world toward the ideas of the reason I have spoken first of goodness and of beauty because the movement toward truth or unity is less conspicuous. Yet an analysis of the three ideas shows that the idea of unity is the basis of the others.¹ Therefore just in so far as power is found in goodness and beauty, must unity also be regarded as having power. It may be that the trustfulness of the lower life of the world implies an instinctive faith in the idea of truth as well as in the idea of goodness. But as I have said before,² I do not wish to give much weight to this suggestion. When, however, we come to human life we find unmistakably the recognition of unity. At first this recognition is unconscious, and the idea of unity is simply taken for granted, as in the processes of induction and the perception of the absoluteness of the law of causation. Then it comes to fuller and fuller consciousness, until at last men are ready to sacrifice to it as they do to goodness and to beauty. There is something peculiarly sublime in the sacrifices which are thus made to truth. That reply of Agassiz, that he had not time to make money, expresses not merely the feeling of Agassiz alone, but of all that immense body of men of whom he was a representative, and who in the pur-

¹ C. C. Everett, *The Science of Thought*, pp. 187-164.

The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith, pp. 149, 185, 199.

² Page 178.

suit of scientific truth have not only turned aside from paths that might have led to wealth and honor, but have given up their hope of immortality or their faith in the divine guidance of the world because they believed that truth required it.

There is, then, the same history in regard to all three ideas of the reason,—at first the unconscious movement toward them, then the more or less marked recognition of their power, and then, with the full consciousness of their meaning and value, the glorification of them as something divine, and the readiness to make them the object of the most complete sacrifice. We may even say that it is in this form that the divine has manifested itself to those who give themselves up to this special service.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE A POSTERIORI ARGUMENT THE COMPLEMENT OF THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT.—RELIGION AND THE THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION.

WHAT relation do these results bear to our general argument? We have all along recognized in the three ideas of the reason the content of religion. Therefore if we find that they are no afterthought or invention but have their roots deep down in the very constitution of things and are bound up with nature itself, then we may conclude that religion also has its roots in the history and constitution of the world. Thus the *a posteriori* argument in this aspect and the *a priori* argument complement each other. The *a posteriori* argument furnishes a basis and background for the *a priori* argument, while the *a priori* argument comes to complete the evidence of the *a posteriori* argument. Together they form a circle. It is not a vicious circle, for the one is not involved in the other; in this circle the arcs strengthen as well as complete each other as they come together.

The ingenuity and complexity of organic life do not in themselves indicate, as some of the older thinkers have held, the presence of a teleological principle in the world. But as we find one range of being growing out of another, the higher out of the lower, we are driven more and more to seek the impulse of this movement somewhere beyond any one stage in the process. In every stage we find certain potentialities which are not yet manifested and for which the necessary conditions are not given. Certain material conditions, of course, may appear, apart from which these potentialities do not exist. But that impulse which leads to the transition from the lower stage to the higher is not found in any material conditions. Thus in the plant we know from observa-

tion that any one stage in its history contains the promise and potency of all the rest, and yet there is nothing in the material conditions whether of this stage or of the stages that have preceded it to warrant the result. In a similar way it might be said that the world itself is like a plant, with one period of its existence springing from another, as the Hindu systems have represented it; but here, too, there would be the same difficulty in finding in any present, outward conditions the unifying impulse. It is when we get the outcome of it all, so far as we can as yet recognize this outcome, that a flood of light is poured over the whole history of the world, and nature at last speaks to man as spirit to spirit. Then, as we look back, we find that from the very beginning there has been a tendency toward this spiritual manifestation, a spiritual impulse working from the first. I call it a spiritual impulse because the outcome is spiritual. I do not mean merely that the human spirit has been produced out of the material universe, although this result would be sufficient for our purpose, but that man, himself a spirit, as he comes to his fuller development, meets in nature a spirit that is akin to his own, so that a great ideal of beauty greets him and exalts him.

We find, then, that from the first nature has been an idealist. That is, the ideas which we claim, whether rightly or wrongly, are in some sense innate in the spirit, have been innate in nature itself. All these material forces in their strife with one another have seemed to exclude the ideal element, so that as we have looked upon them we have been almost ashamed to assert the thought of the spiritual as anything more than an accident in the universe. But we find instead that all through the working of the material forces these ideas have been the ruling principle to which the material world has been subject. In view of this we may be surprised at finding that according to the indications of science the history of the world is to be a limited history,—that by degrees the motion of the earth will become slower and slower until it stops, that everything is tending to an equipoise in which life will be impossible. Of course there may be error in such forecasts; the scientists may or may not be right. But it will not

do here or anywhere to leave our theories dependent upon chances. At first sight, certainly, the theory of an ultimate decline in the life of the world would seem to affect the principle of teleology. It is easy to see that natural selection, which up to a certain point works in favor of the most completely developed organisms, would after that point was reached work in a precisely opposite direction. For just as when the conditions are favorable the higher forms of life, the more complex and more developed forms, have the advantage, so as conditions become unfavorable the advantage is with the simpler and lower forms.

In such an event, however, we may reply, the world must be considered as an organism like all the other organisms with which we are familiar, having like them its periods of growth and fulfilment and decay, and we do not need to deny the existence of the teleological principle in the world because of the decline in its life any more than we deny the existence of the teleological principle in the plant or animal or in man simply because after their growth they begin at last to wither and pass away. Nor would the decline of life in the world vitiate the conclusions that are reached during the period of development and fulfilment. For just as an organism is judged not by the period of its decline but by the period of its freshness and maturity, so the real significance of the world is to be found in the fullest result, the highest product, which has been attained in the course of its development. Furthermore, if we ask what place there would be for religious faith under the changed conditions that are assumed, we must also ask what place there is for faith at a similar moment in the history of the individual life. Experience has shown that religious faith is not dependent upon favorable external conditions. When external conditions are favorable, faith may indeed use them to justify itself, but when they cease to be favorable faith uses them only as something that is to be discredited; it gives up its foothold upon the earth and takes to its wings. And if we ask what manifestations there would be of the divine, we may reply that although certain forms of manifestation upon which faith has relied might be absent, yet other forms might be present

in even greater fulness, such as the divinity of self-sacrifice and love.

Our examination of the *a posteriori* argument ends here. So far as the principle of teleology is concerned, the tendency in nature toward a certain result, the argument is well made out. Given the necessity of choice between chance and teleology, we must recognize teleology. Some may hold further that teleology is incomprehensible unless it is regarded as design. I have nothing to urge against this position. There might be some question, however, whether the incomprehensibility is of such a nature as to force us to recognize the presence in the world of a conscious, designing will. If we leave out of account the *a priori* argument, the importance of which I would not undervalue, the argument that is based upon the thought of a final cause seems to me stronger than that which is based upon the idea of efficient cause. It seems to me that God is needed more as the end toward which nature is pressing than as the cause from which it proceeds. Whether the simple adaptation of means to ends in the organic life of the world would be enough to lead us to the thought of a designing will, may be open to question; but when we see the outcome of it all, when we see not only that nature is tending to certain results but that these results are ideal, spiritual results, and when we see what is demanded by them, the thought of an infinite, spiritual presence which alone can satisfy the needs of the soul, then, certainly, our side of the argument must seem to us the stronger. It is the working of the teleological principle in nature that has brought us into the position to make our demand. Everything has pointed toward this result, and we are justified by the whole great sweep of the movement of the world.

We can better understand now the limitation of that position in which Hume has been followed by Kant and others, namely, that we can reason to no greater fulness of spiritual life than that which we see manifested in the world about us.¹ This position must be enlarged by asking what is involved in the results that are reached, in the degree of perfection that we see. In examining

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 49.

a piece of machinery we do not measure the inventive genius of the man who has contrived it by our own comprehension of the mechanism, but from what we do see we reason to what we do not see. In a similar way we find in the world sufficient evidence of the power and conscious wisdom that are needed to fulfil the ends toward which the world is tending. Seeing all this we must feel that the world cannot be a failure, as it certainly would be if the needs which the development of life had excited were not to be met, and if the spirit on reaching its most mature development were then obliged to fall back into a world of material relations instead of rising into a world of spiritual relations.

“The frailest leaf, the mossy bark,
The acorn’s cup, the raindrop’s arc,
· · · · ·
The shining pebble of the pond,
Thou inscribest with a bond,
In thy momentary play,
Would bankrupt nature to repay.”¹

But what is the relation of the theory of natural selection to this process that we have been considering and the results that we have reached? We hear theologians say that religion can use the principle of natural selection, that the creative power can be conceived as working through it as easily as through any other method. But this is not the point. The question is not whether religion *can* use this principle but whether it *must*. It is this question which we have been trying to answer. What relation, then, is to be recognized?

In the first place, granting that religion is right, the theory of natural selection offers certain helps to our thought of the world. Thus it takes from the world the aspect of mechanism and from its maker the aspect of a contriver. If all the little intricate appliances by which organic life is sustained are to be regarded as the result each of some specific design, the idea of God may or may not remain for us, but certainly it is a relief to find that these

¹ R. W. Emerson, *Ode to Beauty*.

more minute results may be explained in large part through the working of general principles rather than by special contrivance. Of course omniscient spirit must recognize not only the general laws but the particular results, and the most minute results must be open to it. Yet it is a relief to approach the matter from the side of general principles and not merely from that of specific contrivance.

Another help, however, still more real, is afforded. We know how large a place is held by strife and suffering. We now see that these have been the instruments by which nature has been goaded on from point to point until it has reached the measure of perfection that we observe, and we recognize that no element of such suffering has been useless but that all has contributed to the general result. Here a greater question arises,—whether omniscience and omnipotence could not have created the world without using so terrible a method of advance as this. This question, however, is apart from our present discussion. At present we have only to recognize that although the relief which is suggested by the principle of natural selection is not final or absolute, it is nevertheless up to a certain point very helpful. Moreover, in so far as it shows that there has been progress in the world, it affords a refutation of absolute pessimism, for that world cannot be considered wholly evil in which strife and suffering have been the instruments of good, and in which the lower stages of life have given place continually to the higher. It may be urged that the real evil will come through the highest consciousness. We can only reply that no one of these suggestions is final, but that all are helpful.

The relations that we have just considered are indirect. If we ask what has been the direct part played by the principle of natural selection, we find that it has not been a force of impulsion. It has acted rather as a cog, preventing retrogression in the movement of the world and preserving at every stage the highest results already attained. We find also that a fresh light is thrown upon these results, showing more clearly the unity and harmony in the universe. For leaving out the results of conscious, spiritual life,

and turning back to the lower stages of human life and to the life below man, we see that there could have been no advance which was not supported by a real worldly or earthly power, no advance which did not make the individual better able to live and to cope with his environment. It is sometimes said that a special manifestation of the divine power which controls the world is shown in the preservation of man in his helplessness among all the wild forces of nature. But according to the principle of natural selection man could not and would not have maintained himself if he had not had some advantage in the struggle for existence. Although he was feeble physically, yet by his mental powers he was able to contend successfully with the elements and with the wild beasts. He became the master of the world because he had in himself the power to secure the mastery. Thus a special providence appears not to be needed for the preservation of man at the beginning of his career any more than for the preservation of the lion or the tiger. In the one case as in the other the working of providence is seen in the fact that to each creature is given the means by which he is able to maintain himself.

As we reach the higher stages of human life, the principle of natural selection applies less than it did in the lower stages. To repeat what I have said a little before in another connection,¹ as man advances, instead of being driven by the forces of natural selection, he is attracted by the manifestation of the higher ideas. Human ingenuity and the mental powers in general have so far changed the relation between man and his environment, that whereas up to the beginning of this more conscious and intelligent life of man the survival of the fittest meant on the whole the survival of the best and highest, when once we reach the stage of the more complex human society, that which survives may still be fittest in the strict sense of the Darwinian phrase, as most adapted to its environment, but it may not be at all the fittest in the highest sense of the word.

Greg, in the *Enigmas of Life*, has given a number of illustrations to show how in certain aspects the principle of natural se-

¹ Page 172.

lection appears to work against the survival of the fittest.¹ Thus in the middle ages, when men's interests were for the most part divided between the world of war and the world of monasticism, war tended to kill off in battle the strongest physically and the most courageous, while monasticism through its encouragement of celibacy tended to leave the more spiritual-minded without offspring, so that the general tendency of the period was to suppress the development both of the physically best endowed and also of those who were best endowed spiritually. Another singular illustration, which may apply better to England, perhaps, than to our own country, is found in the statement that since heirs are looked upon as valuable prizes in the matrimonial market and since the richest heirs are generally only children, the principle of natural selection working through the marriages of these heirs tends to a diminution in the size of families, since an only child would be less likely to have many children than the members of larger families. A larger application, however, of this theory is seen in the fact that as a rule the more cultivated part of the community tends to have fewer children than the less cultivated. In all this, in so far as it is true, there is simply another indication that in the more advanced relations of life we must trust rather to the inspiration of the ideal than to the working of natural selection. Natural selection does indeed work in these higher relations through communities. The community which possesses the higher life will be stronger than one which does not possess it. It is possible that the forces of natural selection working within the several communities may kill out the higher ideas in each, and that all may be left to contend upon the same plane. But here our trust must be in the recoil of the spiritual life. Just as in the past we see that in the very moment when things looked darkest there came some fresh access of the spiritual life, so we may have hope and confidence for the future.

As we look back upon the lower stages in the development of the world we can see in what direction the movement of the whole has tended. We can also see, as we reach the more complex

¹ W. R. Greg, *Enigmas of Life*, III, "Non-Survival of the Fittest."

relations of the higher civilization, that here, too, the movement has been mainly in the same direction. Furthermore, we recognize that it has been in that same direction partly in spite of the forces of natural selection which have been at work within each community. We recognize that in part, at least, the development of the higher civilization has been a movement against the stream. Thus the charities and philanthropies of the world have been opposed in greater or less degree to the principles of the political economy which would base itself upon the theory of natural selection. But in recognizing this we also recognize the more clearly the power of those ideals which we have been considering. As our confidence in the power of the steamship increases when we see it moving against the stream, so we may have fresh confidence in these motive forces of humanity as we find them by their own might setting themselves against the forces of natural selection.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CREATION.—MAN'S POWER TO THINK IN GENERAL CONCEPTS: AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE STORY OF THE GARDEN OF EDEN.—SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SENSE OF THE SUPERNATURAL.—MAN'S RECOGNITION OF THE IDEAL AND OF THE HINDRANCES TO ITS ATTAINMENT.—THE SENSE OF THE COMIC.—THE SENSE OF BEAUTY.—MAN THE ULTIMATE PRODUCT IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT.

WE now take up again the story of creation. Scientists tell us that the world existed for ages without man. But Philosophy asks, "How could this be? If the world exists simply as object, how could it have existed when there was no subject?" Religion answers that infinite spirit recognized the world and so gave it objectivity. Furthermore, there are those who find the germs of subjectivity in the world itself. But then comes the question, "If the world is interesting chiefly as the dwelling place of man, why should it have existed for so long a period without man? Why was not man created at once, and the world at once made ready for his dwelling place?" Or if the phenomenality of time is recognized, why were there so many stages below man?

It is to be said at once that if we assume that the world was created only on account of man, we meet difficulties on every side. You may remember the lines of Pope:—

"While man exclaims, 'See all things for my use!'
'See man for mine!' replies a pampered goose."¹

The thought of the existence of the world for long ages before man came, the recognition of creatures that are troublesome to man or useless to him or that flee before him, all show that this

¹ *Essay on Man*, Ep. III, 45, 46.

point of view is one that cannot be maintained. If in any sense man is to be considered the centre of the world, it must be rather as the final cause in the process of development, the world tending constantly toward the highest life that is possible for it, and if all things are tributary to this highest life, it is because they represent the stages which must be passed through before the highest life is reached. There is no more objection to this than to the recognition of man as the final cause in the process of embryonic development. Instead of regarding man, therefore, as a sort of afterthought, we should rather look upon the lower forms of life as cases of arrested development, like the leaf as compared with the flower.

Still the question may be asked, "Why was this final result so long deferred?" To one who compares the suffering and struggle in human life with what seems to us the peace in lower forms of life, it may seem that the question should rather be, why so soon? Emerson has given expression to this thought in *The Sphinx*, but the picture that he draws is exaggerated from both points of view. On the one hand there is a glory in human life that is found nowhere else, and on the other hand strife and suffering are found in the lower forms of life as truly as in the life of man. Consciousness does indeed add a new element to suffering in human life through the power of reflection and concentration that it brings; a man as he looks back upon the past and forward into the future may feel all the sorrow of a lifetime concentrated into a single moment. But if consciousness thus adds to the suffering of the higher life it adds in equal measure to its joy, and if man can ask of the lower forms of life, "Is there any sorrow like unto my sorrow?" he can also ask, "Where is there any joy that is like my joy?"

Furthermore we have to recognize that no process, except as it is merely a mechanical process, is completed simply in its result. In mechanical processes, such as the building of a house or the manufacture of a watch, the only thought is of the result that is to be accomplished. If the watch, for instance, is incomplete, it is good for nothing except in so far as there is a possibility

of completing it; its worth comes with its completion. In organic processes, on the other hand, each part, each stage, has a value as truly as another. I do not mean, of course, that all stages have the same value. But take the illustration that is offered in the life of the individual man. We might ask why man is so long in maturing. Why all these years of helplessness and of education and training, these years of folly and inexperience? Why should not every man come into the world another Adam, full-grown and perfect, with all his faculties matured? But we know very well that if anything of this sort were to take place life would lose a great part of its beauty and joy. For the full-grown man is the man only as he is also the child and the youth. Sometimes we speak of childhood as though its value were in the promise of manhood that it gives. But ask the poet or the mother, and they may say that man exists for the sake of the child and reaches his true flowering and beauty in the child. The truth is that neither is the man for the sake of the child nor the child for the sake of the man, but human life is for the sake of all and each stage has its value.

“Till
The traveller and the road seem one
With the errand to be done,”—

Those lines of Emerson's¹ sometimes seem to me to contain more philosophy than was ever put into so few words.

Another illustration of the same truth is to be found in the novel or the play. The purpose of the novel is not accomplished simply in the union of the hero and the heroine. If our interest were only in the fact that at last John and Jane were married, we might as well take the list of marriages in the morning paper and have half a dozen romances at once. But it is the story that we want. The end is for the sake of the story, and not the story for the sake of the end. The last act of *Hamlet* is by no means the most interesting part of the play. It is the same in a game. A man does play to win, but the game is not for the winning, as the player who cheats mistakenly assumes.

¹ *Etienne de la Boëce*.

We may find here the suggestion of a way to remove the difficulty which some have felt in recognizing the principle of final causation in the world and which may also have presented itself in regard to the principle of teleology. This difficulty is best stated by Spinoza, who says that there can be no final causation. For, he reasons, we cannot conceive of God as doing anything that is not worth doing in itself, anything that is done merely for the sake of something else.¹ The solution of this problem is found in bringing together Spinoza's doctrine that everything must exist for its own sake and our other doctrine which recognizes the working of a teleological principle in the world. We must consider everything as created both for its own sake and also as a part in a greater whole. Thus we do away with the element of aimlessness which seems to be introduced with the denial of final causation, and at the same time we avoid the mere service and secondary worth that are implied in the teleological principle when we insist upon it from the ordinary point of view.

Kant urges that every man is an end in himself and must not be made an instrument; he may use inorganic matter as instruments but he must not be an instrument himself.² We may apply to all the elements of the world this principle which Kant applies to man, and say that there is nothing which should be conceived as merely an instrument. Yet just as service is the great glory of humanity, and the crowning grace of life is found in the fact that man makes himself an instrument, so the complete beauty of the world appears as every stage or part contributes to all the rest, and all contribute to each part. This does not lower our estimate of humanity. It simply puts humanity in a fresh light, and we see in it a new beauty.

Of the beginnings of human life as distinct from the lower forms of life, science gives no account. When we first find it, it is already far advanced, for even in the stone age we find the beginnings of art. It is not strange that man should have for-

¹ *Ethica*, Pars I, Appendix.

² *The Critique of Pure Reason*, F. Max Müller, 1881, Vol. II, pp. 468-481.

gotten the earlier stages of his general existence, just as he forgets in his individual life the first months or years of his childhood, and it is equally in the nature of things that there should be no record of these earliest years, for that man should be able to make any sort of record is in itself evidence of no little progress in his development. In the story in the book of Genesis there is a picture which to many has stood, and still stands, as the authentic account of the beginning of human life upon the earth. This glimpse into the garden of Eden is like some beautiful romance. Here are earthly conditions, but earthly conditions the most favorable that are possible. All the elements are absent that can cause pain, and all that can give joy are present. There is perfection within, and without there is an environment to which this perfection is adapted. Those who have accepted this picture have differed somewhat in their interpretation of certain details. Thus the Arminians and Socinians take the ground that the goodness of Adam and Eve was rather the goodness of innocence than of virtue, the entire absence of fault rather than the presence of actual perfection. The Protestants have been inclined to regard the original perfections as natural, the Catholics have tended to consider them as gifts, so that whereas according to the common Protestant view when man fell his nature became corrupt, according to the Catholic view certain supernatural endowments were taken away from him. Here the Arminians and Socinians agree with the Catholics to this extent, that they regard immortality as a special gift,¹ instead of holding with Protestants in general that man was by nature immortal.

As we read the story in Genesis, however, we find it difficult to understand how all these qualities can be derived from it. Even a natural immortality is hardly in accord with the fear which God is made to express that man may eat of the tree of life and live forever, and moral perfection such as is attributed to Adam and Eve seems not to be consistent with their fall at the first temptation. But apart from such questions and from whatever value the story may have in general, it has a special interest in

¹ Jacobus Arminius, *Disputationes Private*, Thesis XXVI.

connection with the next step in our examination, and I shall refer to it again shortly. Leaving it, however, for the moment, and returning to the scientific account of human life, at what point are we to begin to use the term "man"? It is impossible to draw any sharp line of division, but the criterion which may be used with most safety is the power of thinking in general concepts. This is the position that is taken by Schopenhauer as well as by Locke and others. The animal thinks in pictures or in some form of sensation, whereas man although much of his thought may also be on this lower plane, has the power to think in general concepts or ideas.

This position would be attacked from both sides. On the one hand there are some who insist that man also thinks only in pictures; they confuse perception and imagination. On the other hand some maintain that the animal as well as man has the power to think in general concepts, and they urge that it cannot be proved that it does not think in this way. To this we can only answer that it cannot be proved that it does, and that in accordance with the law of parsimony the burden of proof is upon those who hold that it does. We must carry the method of thinking in pictures as far as we can, and it is astonishing to see how far one can advance without thinking in concepts. Take for instance the association of ideas. If the sound of a dinner bell always suggests to a dog a picture of a dinner, the practical effect is the same as if the dog had reached the conclusion that the dinner bell stands for dinner. There is here the germ or the hint of a syllogistic process, but we have no reason to suppose that the germ is developed into the process itself. We all know how very strong this power of association is. Here is a city street in which all the houses are so nearly alike that one must look at the numbers to make sure which is the house where he wishes to call, and yet a horse which has stopped only once at one of those houses, months before, will go directly to the same house again. A horse happens to be hit by a whip in the hand of the driver of a red omnibus, and thereafter the horse shies whenever he meets a red omnibus. These principles of association no doubt

enter largely into human thought, and, as I have already suggested, it is possible that in animals there is the germ of the power to think in general concepts. It is well to notice, however, that such beginnings of the higher intellectual life as are found in animals appear most clearly in domestic animals. It would not be strange if animals that have been brought under the influence of man should catch something of the human spirit and some elements of the inner life which they could not have originally in themselves. But although the line between the thought of animals and human thought may not be drawn sharply, it certainly is sufficiently marked to serve our purpose.

We will assume, then, that thinking in general concepts distinguishes the beginning of the life of man as man. Turn again, now, to the story of the garden of Eden. As we analyze it we find that whether by design or not it appears to deal with precisely this moment of transition from thinking in pictures to thinking in concepts. I do not mean that the story was founded upon any theoretical idea of human nature. I mean simply that if the definition of the beginning of human life which has been given is the true one, and if there is to be a picture of the moment of transition, the circumstances which are related in the story are to a great extent those which would naturally arise at such a moment. Thus the story may be taken as a symbol of this transition, illustrating concretely certain points which need to be emphasized.

There is no mark which more distinguishes thinking in concepts than language. The possession of language implies thinking in concepts. If we exclude exclamations and interjections, as only the immediate expression of momentary feeling, like the cries of the beast, words are general terms, and general terms imply general concepts. Therefore we find it only natural that one of the first acts of the first man as he enters upon his inheritance is to name the objects around him. For names are generic. Even our proper names which in present usage appear to form an exception are originally generic terms, the family name standing for the group or the clan, and the individual name given to express

some peculiarity or relation or quality, whether actual or imagined, so that in each case the name represents some classification of one sort or another.

A concept, however, is a limited universal; it implies two elements, a universal and a particular; the individual is recognized as belonging to a certain class and thus the universal and the particular are brought together. But the very fact that they can be thus brought together implies that they have been previously discriminated. In the relation of the animal or the child to the external world all this is latent, but in the man the process becomes conscious, and in bringing together the universal and the particular he recognizes the breach between them. This breach may have either of two forms according as attention is directed to one or the other of the two elements. On the one hand man thinks of himself as an individual, and in so doing he has to separate himself from the class to which he belongs and from the universe of which he is a part. Thus he becomes self-conscious. In this self-consciousness the man's sense of separation between himself and his environment may become extreme, the form of the separation varying according to the view which the man happens to take of himself. Thus we have that sense of shame in which the individual, conscious of himself as over against the universe and feeling that he is the centre of observation, shrinks from this isolation in which he finds himself,—an isolation which is still a relation. The first man recognizes his nakedness and tries to hide himself; the individual becomes conscious of his individuality and shrinks from the observation to which he feels that he is open. Here we have the beginning of some of the greatest misery in life, one of the elements that may contribute most to the degradation of life; self-consciousness so often robs what is noble of its nobility, so often it brings unhappiness and pain. Yet in another aspect this same self-consciousness enters in due proportion into all that goes to make up the real glory of living. For after all it is the element of self-consciousness which forms the distinguishing mark of man and is the centre of the mystery of life.

In contrast, however, with this subjective aspect of the breach between the universal and the individual, there is a second, objective aspect in which the universe is recognized as over against the individual. This recognition appears in various forms. First of all, and appearing very early in the history of man, there is the sense of the supernatural, the consciousness of the environment as acting immediately upon the individual without the intervention of the ordinary agencies. The individual recognizes on the one hand his own personality and on the other the divine personality or personalities. Just as in the one case he goes behind his own phenomenal existence and reaches the "I," so in the other case he goes behind the phenomenal manifestations of the world about him and reaches the power that is within and behind them all. A second form of this recognition of the universal element is found in the relation of the individual to society in the sense of justice. If this second form is taken together with the first we have the sense of justice, human and divine, the sense of wrong and the sense of sin. As man recognizes the voice of God he is conscious of his own guilt and estrangement, and in his sense of sin there appears the absolute breach between the two elements that stand in relation to each other. The individual feels himself to be not only over against the universe but under its condemnation. Lastly, the recognition of the universal element brings with it the thought of death. The individual realizes that he is only a point flitting across the face of the universe, and that the universe can exist without him.

It is interesting to notice that, so far as we can know or conjecture, man is the only being in the world that has the consciousness of mortality. As we look upon the life of beast and bird we think of them as sharers in our own destiny. But man is in a special sense mortal in that he knows his own mortality. The bird and the beast appear to have no consciousness of limit in their lives except as it may be shown in the shrinking from death and from whatever is related to death. Thus there is terror among them sometimes at the sight of blood. Yet if the animal really knows what this means, it can at most regard death as an

accident which may happen to it but which also may be avoided. Indeed one may question whether at the very first man himself does not consider death accidental; at least if he thinks of it as due to supernatural interference, he may believe that if he can avoid this interference he will live indefinitely.

The power to think by concepts, however, makes possible an ideal element in life. The individual does not rest in mere abstraction, but having received his concept he shapes it more or less to suit himself, and adds to that which he has found to be real whatever he can conceive as possible. He attempts to carry out his ideal and make the world conform to it. This is essential to human life, for man has been placed in the garden of the world "to dress it and to keep it." But he is forced to see that the world does not conform to his ideal. Obstacles arise, the "thorns" and the "thistles," which may have existed before, but which man does not notice until they seem to spring up in opposition to his attempt to fulfil his ideal, as though his own work had called them forth. Here enters for the first time the possibility of pessimism and even of absolute despair. Man's conception has two stages, first the abstract idea, and then the ideal which he creates out of his own longing and his thought of what is possible. He finds, however, that the world does not fulfil his ideal, and as he looks further he sees that although in theory his ideal is possible of fulfilment yet practically it is not possible. Here are the elements of the philosophy of despair; the truth that has been reached by processes of abstraction from the external world, and the ideal which one conceives as theoretically possible, conflict absolutely. Thus the power to think by concepts introduces not only the labor of life, the toil that comes in the effort to fulfil one's ideal, but also the sorrow of life, as man discovers that the ideal cannot be fulfilled. Just as sin is possible only for one who thinks by concepts, so thinking by concepts alone makes possible the labor and sorrow of life. I do not mean that these results follow inevitably from thinking by concepts, but only that they could not be produced without this method of thought. The question whether they are universal among men does not

affect our position. It is enough that given these peculiarities of human nature and of human activity, thinking by concepts is seen to be necessary to produce them.

Thus far the results of the transition from thinking in pictures to thinking by concepts which we have considered have been illustrated or symbolized in the account of the beginning of the life of man that is given in the Old Testament story. We have yet to consider one or two results which very naturally find no illustration there. The first of these is the perception of the comic, the sense of the ludicrous. I think it is quite safe to say that man is the only creature that really laughs. When we speak of the laughter of the hyena or the horse we have in mind only the resemblance between certain sounds and laughter. It has long been recognized that the sense of the ludicrous arises from the perception of incongruities, and this perception of the incongruous, as Schopenhauer was, I think, the first to point out,¹ comes only through a process of generalization. We are moved by certain points of similarity to bring together under a general head elements which, when we have thus brought them together, we recognize as incongruous, and the sharper the contrasts between the different elements the greater our sense of the ludicrous. In other words there is absolutely nothing in nature that is comic, nothing, that is, when taken by itself and considered apart from any process of generalization. We find the monkey ludicrous, but that is simply because the monkey suggests so obviously the thought of a very peculiar little old man: the monkey is not funny in himself. The most superficial form of the ludicrous appears in the pun. Here the basis of our generalization is merely a word, but the two meanings expressed by the one word are so incongruous that they excite the sense of the ludicrous. This is especially the case when some pointed relation is involved, such, for instance, as *Life* has chronicled in the picture of the American lady in Paris who asks a cabman whether he is *fiancé* and adds that, if not, she will take him. We laugh; and we

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, trans. by Haldane and Kemp, Book I, § 13, and "Supplements to the First Book," Chap. VIII.

laugh simply because we possess this power of generalization which man may use or misuse to his misfortune but also for his sport.

We must not forget, however, that with the exception of the mere play upon words there is hardly anything that is comic which might not also be tragic, just as there is nothing tragic which might not also be comic. Both the tragedy and the comedy of life are found in the perception of incongruities. But whereas in comedy these incongruities are recognized only formally, in tragedy they are recognized as real. We see this very clearly in certain plays. Thus in Schiller's *Don Carlos*, to give only a single instance, a love-letter miscarries and is given to the wrong person; it is a situation which might easily be ludicrous; but as it occurs in this play we feel no inclination to laugh, because we recognize the reality and seriousness of the complications that are involved. It is to be noticed also that we have here still another branch of the process of abstraction. For the sense of the ludicrous arises not only first of all from the process of generalization by which incongruous elements are brought together under a general head, but also, in the second place, from the process of abstraction carried so far that the form is separated from the substance. The subject is one that suggests a great many questions and problems, some of which are most interesting, but this is not the place to consider them.¹

The last of these results of thinking by concepts that I shall mention is the sense of beauty as shown in the enjoyment of imitative art. We may not say simply art, for, as we have already seen,² both decorative art and a certain kind of esthetic enjoyment are found in the lower animals. But in the appreciation of imitative art we reach a process of abstraction similar to that which contributes to the perception of the comic,—the separation of the real from the formal. An animal may mistake a picture or the reflection in a mirror for the reality, but the moment that he discovers his mistake his interest in the reflection or the picture

¹ A fuller discussion may be found in Dr. Everett's *Poetry, Comedy and Duty*.

² Pages 180–181.

is gone; he is interested only in things as things. Man, on the other hand, as far back as we can trace his history, shows an interest in the appearance apart from the reality. This demands thought by concepts, the power not only of abstraction but of very delicate and careful abstraction. It implies the faculty of ideal contemplation, the enjoyment of a thing not merely as a reality but as an idea. The nearest approach to this in the lower animals appears in their fondness for play. Even the industrious ant will play at the close of the day's work. Dogs love to play, and they imitate in their play the methods of the chase. Here is unquestionably the beginning of the power of abstraction. First there is an overflow of energy; energy and nervous force have accumulated and must find a vent, and they overflow along the nervous lines that are most active in the life of the animals; with this comes a certain imitation, and thus we have the beginning of the power of abstraction. But since it is manifested not in contemplation but in activity, since it is activity and not contemplation that gives pleasure, it is low down in the scale and serves chiefly as one of the indications that the line of demarcation is not sharply drawn.

Except in one point the story in Genesis gives little if any hint of the great superiority of humanity which so many have found in it. There is certainly a charm in the picture of this earthly paradise, with its freedom from self-consciousness and labor. It is like the charm still to be found in the comparatively innocent life of some of the southern islands where the complexities of civilization have not entered. But the transition must be made from this moment of the childhood of the race, and in such transition there is always peril. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and so is a little freedom. The beginnings of all the higher forms of life are perilous. Now there is in the story in Genesis one element which gives promise of safety in the transition and which does exalt the hero of the story. Man, it is said [in the first chapter of Genesis, a different account from that of the second and third chapters, but combined with it, we may assume, in the later Hebrew conception], is made in the image of God.

The whole story is here lifted to a height which otherwise is not attained. The precise significance of the phrase is hardly to be determined, but it is one of those great words which admit unlimited development in human thought. The term "image of God" has led to theologies in which man is conceived as at the first perfect. But this pushes the story too far. For granting to the first parents of the race such perfection as we may, this perfection must still be infinitely removed from the divine perfection. No perfection in man could make him equal to God, any more than any imperfection in man could absolutely separate him from God. The resemblance between God and man must be found in something which both possess. When we speak of a child as resembling its father, we do not mean that the child has the strength or the wisdom of the father, but simply that there is in the child some beginning or germ or hint of the qualities of the father. Now we have seen how from the very first the ideal element has controlled the history of the world, how the growth and tendency of the world have been from the very first toward spirit. In man we reach at last the actual appearance of this spiritual life. There is a consciousness of self, there is a consciousness, however vague and distorted, of the author of life, there are glimpses of the divine ideas that hover before man as ideals. The difference between man and God is still infinite. Yet in so far as there is found in man the germ of the spiritual life, the consciousness of himself and of the world about him by which he is enabled to enter into communion with the source of his being, in so far may it be said that man is made in the image of God. The thought may be at the outset anthropomorphic, but even so it is the recognition of a fact that becomes clearer as the world develops, and larger as human life itself grows larger.

In saying this, however, are we not speaking extravagantly? Is it not possible that man may give place on the earth to some still higher product of evolution, and that a race of beings may appear as superior to man as man is superior to the lower animals? From what has been said already it must seem obvious that this is impossible. The considerations that I have brought forward

justify us in assuming that man is the highest and ultimate product in the process of development. For in the first place man is capable of indefinite or even infinite progress without specific change of form, and this through his power to think by concepts, and to use the results which follow upon thinking by concepts. Ever since the time when the results that had been reached by his ancestors came to be worth recording, he has been able to hold results. There is therefore practically no limit to the intellectual development of man as man. The brain responds to the demands which are made upon it, and grows in power from generation to generation. Furthermore, if we consider the question from the physical point of view, we find confirmation in the fact that man is a tool-using animal. As soon as man begins to use tools he enters upon a career of indefinite progress. For if a successor is to drive him from the earth and take his place, that successor must be in one way or another the superior of man; either he must possess intellectual power greater than man's, or else he must be physically mightier. But man has a power of thought which is capable of indefinite development, and his arm has become strong not only through the use of tools but through the very forces of nature, for he has made the elements his servants. Any successor who by the process of natural selection is to drive out man not only must be wiser than man can become, but he must be stronger than steam, swifter than the steam engine or the electrical engine, swifter and stronger than all the powers of nature which man can subject to his own use.

Finally, when we look at the lower animals we see that in order to reach a higher degree of development they must transcend themselves. They do not possess either the power of thought or the power of activity which would make it possible for them to advance without such change. Without the hand, for instance, the power of thought would be useless, just as without the hand it could not have been developed. For the mental power does not develop apart by itself, but is developed largely through the varied forms of relation to the external world into which the individual is brought. A power of adaptation is demanded, a power

of use, a power to take to pieces and to put together again. In other words there must be the power of touch and the power of adjustment, both carried to a high degree of perfection. We do not reach the highest possibility of thought so long as we merely contemplate the world about us. It comes as we give to things new relations and put them to new uses. Man alone possesses the possibility of infinite development without change of structure, and by the law of parsimony in nature any further growth must tend to lie along the line of least resistance. The suggestion has been made that a race of winged beings might have an advantage over man. It is to be remembered, however, that the development of animal life always has been along certain lines; organs are produced from corresponding organs, and arms take the place of wings, and wings take the place of arms. Since man is as yet the highest product in the process of development, any higher being, if it is to come, must be developed from man, and if it is to be winged the wings must in some way take the place of arms. But the winged being is weaker than the being with arms.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SECOND STAGE IN THE MOMENT OF NEGATION: THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.—REAL FREEDOM: AUTOMATISM: REFLEX ACTION.—FORMAL FREEDOM, OR FREEDOM OF THE WILL.—THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT: THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT: THE A POSTERIORI ARGUMENT: THE SO-CALLED PRACTICAL ARGUMENT.—THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF IT: AS BASED ON DIRECT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: AS BASED ON THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

WE have been considering the first stage in the moment of negation,¹ the stage of difference, or, speaking more concretely, the doctrine of creation, in which the creation appears as other than the creator. We pass now to the second stage, the doctrine of freedom, the recognition on the part of the creation not only that it is other than the creator but that it has a life of its own, that it is free and independent. There are two forms of freedom, of which the first has been called *real*, the second *formal*. These terms have no special fitness, but we will use them because they are already in use. By *real freedom* is meant freedom in one's self, the power of fulfilling one's own nature unhampered from without. *Formal freedom*, more commonly known as freedom of the will, is freedom over one's self. The first form does not imply the second.

Real freedom is found in nearly all stages of existence. Thus a stone is free when it follows the law of its nature in the mutual attraction between its own particles and the earth; it is free in falling; if it is thrown, its freedom is impaired. In the organic world this freedom appears in a higher and more significant form. One element in the activity of the stone is outside of itself. The

organism is more truly a unity. The action and reaction which take place are within itself, and its many elements work together to one end. It accomplishes this end in proportion as it is free. A still higher form of real freedom is found when we come to the mental or spiritual world. Some even use the term "freedom" for the first time at this point, in order to mark the difference between conscious and unconscious being. For the mind is not merely a unit but a conscious unit. The man knows what he is going to do and consciously guides himself toward it, and even if we allowed to the man no more freedom than we allow to the plant, yet the fact that the man works in the light and the plant in the darkness makes an immense difference.

Is this freedom really spiritual, or is it material? Huxley and Clifford and others have urged that consciousness has nothing to do with the activities of life, and although Spencer does not quite assent to this, it would seem to follow naturally from his general theory of consciousness. It is interesting to notice in passing that this is precisely the position that is taken in the Sankhya philosophy, where consciousness is represented as merely a spectator. Clifford compares the light of consciousness to the head-light of a locomotive that only illuminates the track which after all guides the locomotive. Are we to accept this? Or is the light of consciousness rather like the lantern which a man carries in his hand in order that he may choose his way? To the objection that it is impossible to conceive that mind should influence matter, Professor James replies that it is impossible to comprehend any causation, but that it is incredible that a fact in consciousness should be the only fact out of relation with other things in the universe.¹

The chief argument, however, in support of the automaton theory is found in the fact that certain results which in man are regarded as ordinarily produced consciously, are under some circumstances produced unconsciously; frequently in the lower forms of life, and sometimes in the higher forms, processes of reflex action take place apparently without consciousness. Thus

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Chap. V.

if we take away the brain of a frog he will continue to respond to irritation as readily as though he knew what he was about, and the same thing is even more strikingly illustrated in human life, for if by some lesion of the nerves a man's leg becomes separated from the brain in such a way that there is no consciousness of any feeling in the leg, it will still respond to irritation, and more violently than under conditions of consciousness. Again, there are instances of somnambulism where the most complicated acts are carried through of which the individual on waking has no recollection. Now if the response is unconscious under circumstances of this kind, why may it not be always unconscious? Why need we suppose that consciousness is anything more than an accident in the whole process?

This argument, however, can be made to level upward as well as downward. So far as our knowledge extends we find that these responses are accompanied by consciousness. Why, then, may we not assume that consciousness is present in the cases where our knowledge does not extend? Obviously our consciousness does not extend beyond itself, and we know only what we are conscious of; the region of which we are not conscious, and from which we have no direct report through any conscious individual, is for us an unknown land. But it may be maintained with great plausibility that a certain amount of consciousness is connected with every act and that no response is without it. Even in our human organism it may be assumed that there is a certain sub-consciousness in every nerve centre, every ganglion, although these lower grades of consciousness are lost in the fuller consciousness of the great centre ganglion, just as the light of the stars is lost in the light of the sun at noon. This position is taken by Wundt and other physiologists. So far as somnambulism is concerned, there is no reason to suppose that there is no consciousness of what is taking place simply because the individual does not remember what he has done. Here, as in the dreams that we forget as soon as we awake, the lower ganglia have asserted themselves.

The two arguments, the argument that denies the necessity

of consciousness and the argument that affirms its universality, may be left to contradict each other. A more positive argument, however, according to Professor James, is furnished by natural selection. It is often said by evolutionists that if the more useful activities were not healthful, the creature could not live, and the fact that the pleasure of feeling is connected with its useful activities has been a great aid in preserving organisms, while a lack of this correspondence between pleasure of feeling and activity would tend to destroy the organisms. The theories of Huxley and Clifford and of Spencer would eliminate all this, and would make of consciousness only so much waste. But the power of any organism increases with the increase in intellect. Furthermore, Professor James holds that consciousness gives stability to the brain and increases its efficiency, through interest. The combinations of brain molecules are extremely liable to disturbance, so that there is a tendency in the brain to continual unrest. Consciousness weights certain combinations and gives them an advantage, and thus the mind is not left to fluctuate, but has kept before it useful ends.

Reflex action in the more highly organized beings, so far as we can observe it, appears to be of three kinds. The first form I will call absolute and unqualified, the second may be called qualified, while the third form is accompanied by consciousness and apparently is caused by consciousness. The first form, that which I have called absolute reflex action, appears never to have been accompanied by consciousness. Thus we do not know of any form of organism in which the beating of the heart is caused by conscious will, and the same is true of the other essential processes of life, those processes without which life itself could not be continued for a moment. If any consciousness has ever accompanied these processes, it must have been some form of that sub-consciousness to which I have already referred. At the last they are maintained through natural selection. The animal in which the beating of the heart was dependent upon the will would very soon pass out of existence. In disease we become conscious of some of these processes, and under some

circumstances they may be in a certain sense caused by our wills. Thus we can control the breath to some extent. But we breathe when we do not will to breathe, and no one, so far as we know, has ever put an end to his life by voluntarily ceasing to breathe.

The qualified forms of reflex action are those of which we know the history, those which were originally accompanied by consciousness but through long continued habit have come at last to be performed unconsciously. There are a good many things that we do without needing to think that we are doing them. A woman knits without looking at her needles. A pianist plays with no conscious selection of the keys. It is a happy circumstance in life that this is so,—that what is old may come to be habitual and leave the mind free for what is new. If we had to be thinking all the time of what we have to do in the little, familiar activities, what space would be left in our thought for the greater things? There are many mechanical processes in which the first direction to be given is that we should observe what we are doing, and the second, that we should forget what we are doing.

Finally there are the forms that are fully and absolutely conscious. It is pure assumption to maintain that action in these forms can be carried out without consciousness. I make a wide detour in order to avoid meeting some man whom I dislike. To say that I can thus avoid him unconsciously, implies a very complicated theory according to which every man is supposed to have his "sphere," and when my sphere approaches the other man's sphere or comes in contact with it, a repulsion is felt. The theory offers no explanation of the change from unfriendly to friendly relations which often occurs in such cases. Again I read in some book a discussion of the theory of consciousness and am prompted to talk about it here. What effect could the letters have in controlling my activity except through the medium of consciousness? The theory of automatism seems to be the *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt to explain the world from the point of view of mere materialism.

As regards real freedom itself, apart from this question as to

the relation between consciousness and action, there is no difference of opinion. No one disputes its existence in the world. A man is really free when he can go and come as he wills without hindrance; he is not free when he is shut up inside a prison. But what of this other form of freedom, this formal freedom, the freedom of the will? What is meant by it? It affirms that "I will what I will." But who denies this? It is mere tautology, and I may as well say, "I go where I go," or "I think what I think." I may try to make the statement more definite by saying that "I determine what I will." But this only throws the difficulty further back. For if "determination" in this connection means anything, it means will. Therefore there is an act of will behind the will, and behind this act of will still another will, and so on in an infinite retrogression, in which at last the free will is barred out of the existence of the individual in time and finds its place only before that existence.

It is interesting to notice that whereas Jonathan Edwards in reaching this result regards it as a *reductio ad absurdum* which settles the whole question, some other writers accept it as the explanation of freedom of the will. Thus Schelling¹ holds that each life is colored and controlled by a determination that took place before the existence in time began, and Julius Müller² takes the same position, recognizing an act of will that colors our existence at the very beginning of our individual lives. Fichte also appears to take a somewhat similar view, although he does not state it so distinctly as Schelling. With Kant it is a noumenal act in contrast with the phenomenal life of the world.

If, however, we leave out of the account these determinations outside of time, our difficulty remains the same. How is it possible to accede to a proposition which cannot be even formulated? It is true that we may recognize a meaning in it, even though we have no language at our command to express the meaning. Practically, the question that we have to ask is whether, supposing that all the circumstances except a man's act of will remained

¹ F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophische Schriften*.

² *Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*.

just as before, the man could do differently. Furthermore, the evolutionist might insist that the confusion has been introduced by the necessitarian, who has degraded the term "will" to his own use. Yet the necessitarian would reply that he believes in freedom, and certainly there is no grander statement of freedom than that of Spinoza, who believes only in real freedom. We still must acknowledge the difficulty so far at least as terms are concerned.

The world is full of books on freedom of the will. Jonathan Edwards' great treatise is of course the classic presentation of determinism. Buckle in his *History of Civilization in England*¹ gives the statistics that bear upon the question. Martineau has an interesting discussion of it in his *Study of Religion*. Ward's *Philosophy of Theism*² is especially interesting because of the discussion with Mill into which he enters and the pertinence of what he says. Alexander von Oettingen, in his *Moralstatistik* offers a classification in which those who deny freedom of the will are described as *determinists*, *naturalists* and *objectivists*, while those who affirm it are termed *indifferentists*, *atomists* and *subjectivists*.³ Those who believe only in real freedom and deny freedom of the will are called *determinists* because everything is fixed for them in advance. Given the organism and the environment, the result is certain and it is possible to predict absolutely what will take place. Thus if a rose-bush is planted in favorable soil, we know that it will produce roses, and similarly, to the determinists, all human activity is determined in advance. This same class are called *naturalists* because man, like a plant or a stone, is regarded as simply filling a certain place in nature; and just as there can be a natural history of a plant, or of one of the lower animals, so there can be a natural history of man. They are called *objectivists* because man is regarded as merely an object, with no interior life that may by freedom of action change his nature; he is a product of his environment, and if he reacts upon the environment, it is only in such activity as the environment

¹ Vol. I, Chap. I.

² W. G. Ward, *Essays on the Philosophy of Theism*.

³ *Die Moralstatistik in ihrer Bedeutung für eine christliche Sozialethik*, pp. 788 f.

has fitted him to use. On the other hand those who affirm the freedom of the will are called *indifferentists* because in the extreme view man is regarded as wholly indifferent in advance as to the course that he will take, and it is impossible to predict what he will do. They are called *atomists* because each individual is regarded, so far as concerns his will, not as part of a great whole, but as an independent centre of activity, a law unto himself. Indeed we might add to Von Oettingen's list the term *separatists*, for each individual is as truly apart from the universe, according to this view, as though he lived in a world of his own. Finally those who affirm the freedom of the will are called *subjectivists* because their action is determined wholly from within. Both of the views that Von Oettingen describes in this way are extreme and are recognized as such by Von Oettingen himself. Mill would not allow himself to be called a determinist because the term implied causation from without as opposed to the theory of causation that he derived from Hume as the invariable sequence of one event upon another.

Many deny both of these extreme views, and adopt a medium position in which they speak of *liberty under law*. We may find that there is such a thing as this liberty under law, but as the expression is ordinarily used it seems to me utterly meaningless. It appears to assume that the mere collocation of two contradictory terms is to be regarded as an explanation of the difficulty involved. It is a little as though we were trying to reconcile the circle and the square, and finally were to say that we had a square-circle. At the same time we have to recognize that this mingling of the two elements is something which we are to seek.

Of the various arguments against freedom of the will the first that I shall consider is the *a priori* argument, based upon the principle of causation. We recognize this principle as absolute. But the theory of formal freedom, it is argued, the theory of the undetermined freedom of the will, disregards the law of causation. It assumes that the spirit stands as it were at a place where the roads separate, and makes its choice not as some cause may determine but by its own spontaneous act. The argument is

used largely as an *argumentum ad hominem*. For those who affirm the freedom of the will are apt to be those who hold most strongly to the *a priori* necessity of the law of causation. Our beliefs seldom hold together logically, but rather grow out of certain tendencies of our minds. Thus it is the Calvinist, taking the darkest view of the future for those who die unrepentant, who more often believes in capital punishment, while the Universalist, with his optimistic expectation for all men, more often opposes it. Each might accuse the other of inconsistency, but the course that is taken in either case is evidently the result of general mental tendencies. In a similar way those who insist most strongly upon the *a priori* nature of the principle of causation are apt to be those who most dignify the human mind and spirit, and so affirm most strongly the freedom of the will, whereas those who deny freedom of the will make comparatively little use of the *a priori* nature of the principle of causation. Edwards, however, is an exception; he used the argument more earnestly. Hamilton attempted to avoid the difficulty by assuming that our belief in causation results from our mental incompetence, that a beginning is something of which we cannot conceive. Of course, if we regard the belief in causation as the result of mental incompetence, we need not be troubled at the conflict between it and the belief in freedom of the will. But this theory has found little acceptance outside the circle of Hamilton's more immediate followers. It rests some of our most positive assumptions upon a strongly negative basis. Mill would deny both necessity and freedom, and would recognize only the law of uniformity of sequence; but this uniformity is never broken and therefore is practically equivalent to a necessity, even though Mill does not recognize it as such.

I shall consider this difficulty more fully a little later, but there are one or two considerations that it may be well to suggest here. The difficulty is based upon the absoluteness of the law of causation. But this law of causation is not the mere uniformity of sequence of which Mill tells us, but an inner relation by which all things are bound together in a common whole. In other words,

the law of causation, translated into more abstract form, is the principle of absolute unity.¹ Now if we take our idea of unity from spiritual rather than material sources, we may break somewhat the force of the argument that we are considering. For if we assume that freedom in the sense in which we are now regarding it is an attribute of spirit, and that the unity in which all things consist is a spiritual unity, then we should expect that this spiritual unity would manifest itself in acts of freedom, and that freedom, as we find it, would not be inconsistent with the principle of unity, because it is akin to it and in a certain sense one with it. But if we assume a unity that at once breaks itself up into points of independent volition, is not such a unity a contradiction in terms? This question, however, we may consider to better advantage later, when we know more fully what freedom is and how it is exerted.

Certainly, whatever our intellectual theories may be, we always do seek a cause for every event and for every act of the will. Whether formalist or realist, we ask what has made a man do thus or so. We recognize that there is no act of the will without some motive, that a man never acts without a reason. In other words, the mind will not act *in vacuo*. In accepting this, those who affirm the freedom of the will say that the will chooses between motives. They thus reduce the difficulty to a minimum, but they do not remove it. For the question, how the mind determines which motive it will follow, is still left undecided. There is still an unexplained residuum, an act of the will that is not accounted for. The objection may be made that in the choice between motives the mind might remain balanced, unable to move in one direction or the other. Practically, however, this seldom, if ever, occurs. There are, of course, persons who always find it difficult to make up their minds, and we are all of us sometimes perplexed as to what decision we ought to make. Yet when the moment arrives at which we must decide, we do make up our minds in one way or the other. As we walk across the Cambridge Common, what reason is there for taking the path to the right

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 163.

or the path to the left? Yet, when we have to choose, we choose. The mind is never absolutely balanced, because it is so concrete; so many elements enter into it that an absolute balance would be impossible; only a vacant mind could be thus balanced. The classic illustration of absolute mental balance is the story of the jackass that starved between two bundles of hay. The philosophy of that story is found in the reply of the boy, just home from college, when his father asked him, "Why did the jackass starve?" The boy answered, "Because it was a jackass."

In passing to the *a posteriori* argument against freedom of the will, the argument from induction, we have first to consider the induction based upon material facts. That is the basis upon which this argument more often is made to rest. We are familiar with the world of matter; we know that in this world of matter everything yields with absolute certainty to the strongest force that is brought to bear upon it; since this is true of everything else, it must be true also of the human will. That is the way in which the astronomer reasons about the heavenly bodies. The law of gravitation has been proved in regard to only a very few of them, but the astronomer applies it with absolute confidence to them all. Here, however, we have to notice the very important fact that the force of induction weakens with the difference in kind between the objects that are compared. The greater the unlikeness between the basis from which we reason and the basis to which we reason, the less is the force of the argument. It ceases to be induction and becomes analogy.¹ Now in the case that we are considering the difference is as great as it can possibly be. It is the difference between subject and object, between spirit and things, between the conscious and the unconscious. There is nothing here in common except being. Induction, therefore, has no place here, and even analogy has only the weakest basis. So that we may dismiss entirely the argument from induction that is based only on material facts.

There is, however, the induction that is based on spiritual facts. The only question here is whether the case is really made out. It

¹ C. C. Everett, *Science of Thought*, pp. 267-357.

is said that the will always yields to the strongest motive. This phrase, "the strongest motive," we must notice in passing, is not in itself exact. The strongest motive is not that which is strongest *per se* but that which is strongest relatively. In the case of a car on a railway track it would be a mistake to say that the car will yield to the strongest motive, if we mean that it will move in the direction in which the heaviest pressure is exerted. For a very great pressure, if made against the side of the car, will be resisted, while a much slighter pressure applied at either end may be effective to move the car. Now a man's habits are the tracks upon which his mind moves, and the pressure that directs him along the line of his habits needs to be very slight as compared with the pressure required to move him to one side or the other. But to return to the assumption that the will always yields to the strongest motive, how do we know that it does? How do we know what is the strongest motive? We have no means of knowing except that the will yields to it. There is no common measurement to apply, no exact analysis to be made. In the spiritual world we do not have things of a kind as in the physical world. Men differ from one another, and different motives vary in intensity in different men. The scientist can tell precisely what will be the lifting power of a certain energy, but in the spiritual world there can be no such accuracy, and we do not know just what the result of a spiritual force will be. The results of such comparisons as are possible here must necessarily be vague.

An application of the *a posteriori* argument of greater force is found in the inferences that may be drawn from our observation of the regularity of certain acts under certain circumstances. Buckle's great work did much to popularize this form of the argument. The statistics that he brings together all tend to confirm the idea of the bondage of the will as based upon the regularity of human action. The relation of the number of marriages to the price of corn, the number of suicides annually, and the proportion in which they are distributed between the sexes and the different ages, the number of murders and the similarity in the

kinds of instruments by which they are committed, the regularity in certain kinds of blunders such as the misdirecting of letters,—these are some of the more striking illustrations that he gives.¹ The position is one which to a certain extent we naturally take. If we place a coin on the floor, we feel sure that such and such a person if he passes through the room will leave the coin where it is, that another will put it in a proper place, and that a third will carry it away. We are seldom mistaken in our instinct about such matters. Nevertheless, from any scientific point of view, it is all very loose reasoning, a mere *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. Statistics deal with things in the rough. Consider how very little is known of all the facts that must be reckoned with. We may say that marriages vary with the price of corn, but a thousand conditions may enter into the problem of which we have no knowledge. A man may act about as we expect him to, but how loose is this expectation, and how slight is the real knowledge of the man and his history and his environment upon which it rests! Every now and then, too, we are disappointed. Thus some man commits a crime of whom we least expected it. The determinist may say that in such cases we have not known all the circumstances, we have not seen into the heart of the man. But this is only to reason in a circle. When a case proceeds according to our rule, we say that it proves the rule; when it turns out contrary to the rule, we are not to consider it an exception, because, we are told, we cannot have understood the circumstances. All this only goes to show that the argument against freedom of the will that is based on spiritual facts has not been placed on a scientific basis, and for the reason that it never can be. A presumption that human acts are determined may be based upon the regularity of those acts, but the foundation for such a presumption cannot be made so universal as to leave no room for the free play of the will to some extent.

The third argument against freedom of the will is the so-called practical argument. If the will were free, it is urged, education would be impossible, and the proverb, "Just as the twig is bent

¹ *History of Civilization in England*, Vol. I, Chap. I.

the tree's inclined," would not hold. Certainly the trust which we repose in education shows that we do believe that the will is more or less subject to the influences that are brought to bear upon it. In the business world we trust the man who has been trained in business habits rather than the man of high abstract principles who has not been so trained. Education does provide the track along which the will more naturally moves. Yet here again neither are the results certain nor is our confidence in them absolute. Furthermore, if we do not recognize freedom, we lose the highest results of education. For a man has not reached the highest point that is possible for him until his moral sense is aroused to independent activity, until he is himself moved to choose the right without regard to the direction that habit may have given. In other words, we have not accomplished education until we have brought the man to where of his own free act he will choose the highest.

Of the arguments in favor of freedom of the will, the first is based on direct self-consciousness. We are conscious, we say, of the power to choose, conscious of perfect freedom in making our choice. This argument, however, has less force than is generally attributed to it. The same difficulty appears that met us at the beginning of this discussion when we were attempting to define freedom of the will.¹ We say that we are conscious that we can take whichever way we will. But what is the source of this will itself? If we say that we are conscious of willing what we will, we only enter, as we have seen already, on an infinite retrogression. If we did not possess freedom of the will, I am not sure that our consciousness in choice would be at all different from the consciousness that accompanied our possession of such freedom. If we could give a mountain brook consciousness, I suppose that as it leaped down toward the sea it might have a sense of freedom similar to that of which we are conscious. In a hypnotic trance a person may be so affected that when no longer in the trance he will do something that the hypnotizer has willed that he should do, and yet the hypnotized person thinks that the act is done of his own free will. It is instructive to throw a chip into a stream and

¹ Page 215.

watch its movements. They offer a good picture of the exercise of our wills as we weigh first one motive, then another, and finally decide. Whatever theory we may have in regard to freedom of the will, consciousness does not go behind activities, it does not go behind itself. But any absolute power of choice must be in some sense behind consciousness, for it consists not in the weighing of motives, not in decision, but in the inexpressible somewhat that lies behind decision. Therefore little account is to be made of this argument from the consciousness of freedom.

The second argument, however, based on the moral consciousness, is more important. Here, whatever our theories may be, there are certain facts which we all recognize. Thus we blame the wrong-doing of another and praise him when he does what is right. Furthermore, our feeling in regard to another's acts differs according as he is base in character or merely deficient in judgment, and according as he is sane or insane; we pity the insane man for the act for which we condemned him so long as we supposed him sane. Again, our judgment of moral worth, our appreciation of nobility of character, is very different from our admiration of genius. But such distinctions as these become meaningless if there is no freedom of the will. When we venerate a man, when we give to him moral admiration, it is because we feel that it was in his power to do differently, and we applaud him because he chose the better course. Shall we say, then, that we make freedom the postulate to justify our moral judgments? Rather these judgments show what we actually do believe. We can often judge of a man's beliefs more by what he does than by what he professes to believe, and the praise and blame that we give one another indicate that we do believe in freedom of the will, and that this belief is very deeply rooted in our nature.

It may be suggested that we are outgrowing the feelings of blame and praise. No doubt a certain tendency in this direction does exist. Society is now considered responsible in some measure for sins for which the individual alone was formerly held to account. There is with not a few a tendency, as though the case were that of an insane person, to pity the wrong-doer instead of

blaming him. Some urge that all life is necessary, no matter what form it takes, and therefore there is no place for praise or blame. There is a limit, however, to all this. Indignation against wrongdoing not only is a part of healthy character but has been a great element in doing away with evil in the world, and if it is allowed to disappear, much that is noble must at the same time pass out of life. Some critics have felt that the condemnations uttered by Jesus take from the nobility and dignity of his character, but to healthy minds nothing more contributes to exalt the thought of Jesus than his words of terrible rebuke when they are taken in connection with the habitual tenderness and graciousness that mark his life.

In comparing these arguments that we have been considering, for and against the freedom of the will, we may dismiss for the present the *a posteriori* arguments. The facts upon which they are based are too general to admit of accurate results. Of the *a priori* arguments we have seen that the argument against freedom of the will is based upon the absoluteness of the law of causation, or in other words upon the first idea of the reason, the idea of absolute unity. It is assumed that to break the line of causation is to break the unity of which the universe is the expression. On the other side, the argument for freedom of the will rests upon the second idea of the reason, the idea of moral goodness. Let us suppose that each carries the weight which is assumed for it, that belief in the first idea of the reason excludes freedom of the will, and that belief in the second idea of the reason demands freedom of the will. Let us grant that the opposition between the two is as great as possible. What then? Are we to assume that in this collision it is the first idea of the reason that must prevail? Is there any reason for assuming that the idea of unity should be recognized as supreme over the idea of goodness? Suppose them theoretically balanced. I think we must see that the second idea of the reason has even then the advantage, because it involves a postulate that is necessary to our highest idea of life. If we find that the noblest life demands freedom of the will, and that if the moral idea gives way to the principle of unity we have simply mechanism

in life instead of spiritual beauty, the second idea of the reason is given a certain advantage, and the balance inclines to its side.

There is another consideration, also. The practical instinct is more likely to be correct than the theoretical instinct. We have found indications of this all along. The understanding attempts to illuminate the universe for us, but the practical instinct represents to a large extent that unconscious part of our nature which, however we may explain it, is larger than the conscious part and in general is more to be relied upon. We may say that the unconscious part of our nature is the result of long forgotten inheritance, the result of the moulding of all the advantages of life upon the world, or we may say that it belongs to our nature as created. In either case it is larger and usually truer than the conscious part. The history of philosophy has been to no little extent the story of the understanding setting up its little light and spreading its illumination, only to find that the unconscious part of the nature has after all been right.

We may say that on the other side there is also a postulate,—that in all the affairs of life we have assumed a unity in nature and acted upon it, and that in all our dealings with men we assume that they are reasonable, and that they yield to the motive which is relatively the strongest. We have, then, one postulate over against another, and we can only ask which is the more important, the postulate that has reference to character or the postulate that has reference to being.

In all this we are assuming that the collision here between the first and second ideas of the reason is absolute. As we go further, although we cannot expect to remove the difficulty altogether, we may find that we can reduce it to a minimum, and that practically all that is demanded by the postulate of unity may be held in connection with all that is necessarily demanded by the postulate of character.

CHAPTER XX.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL, CONTINUED.—ITS LIMITS.—FREEDOM OF THE WILL AS THE POWER TO PUT MORE OR LESS OF EARNESTNESS INTO LIFE.—EFFECT OF THIS VIEW UPON THE A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREEDOM OF THE WILL.—ABSOLUTE FREEDOM.—THE MEANING OF THE TERMS “NATURE” AND “NATURAL.”—THE DIVINE FREEDOM.

SUPPOSE that we look at freedom of the will as though we had never heard of it before. What sort of freedom do we want, and what sort can we conceive as possible? Do we want intellectual freedom? We speak of freedom of thought. Do we mean by that the freedom to think what we please? Do we wish to think $3 + 2 = 6$, or do we wish to be compelled to think $3 + 2 = 5$? Freedom of intellect or freedom of thought is here reduced to its lowest terms. There is no question as to what we want in such a case. We wish to see things as they are, to judge correctly. None of us would want freedom of thought in the sense of freedom to think what we choose, or of freedom to choose what we think. The intellect in this sense is passive and leaves itself to be acted upon by the forces of the universe. Just in so far as it fails to do this and interposes any caprice of its own, just in so far is the intellect imperfect; it is like a mirror that is scratched or discolored. Do we want freedom in regard to beauty?—freedom of taste? Do we wish to be free to prefer one painting or building to another according to our individual judgments? We certainly do not want freedom to admire what is poorest; we wish rather to cultivate our taste and to free it from caprice. But cultivation of the taste, like cultivation of the intellect, tends to exclude individuality and to make the individual conform to the universal. How is it as regards freedom to act? Do we wish to be free to act according to our caprice, independently of reason?

There are people who do act thus independently of reason, but we speak of them not as free but as crazy men or fools.

We have asked these questions in the attempt to conceive what kind of freedom is possible and what kind we desire. There is a fallacy, however, in our method of proposing our questions. We could not ask the same questions in the moral sphere. What we really wish is to act according to law, but to feel that we are doing this of ourselves and not as mere parts in a machine. We want room for criticism, for blame or praise. We do not want a freedom of the will that allows us to make fools of ourselves, but a freedom that shall give dignity to what we do.

The attempt to prove the possibility of freedom of choice is often made in relation to unimportant matters, where there is no evident reason why a person should take one course rather than another. Thus we are asked to touch one of the squares on a checker-board. Choice enters here, and so freedom. Not that freedom exists only under such conditions. Indeed a freedom to choose merely among things to which one is indifferent is no freedom of worth. But if we find freedom in such cases as this, it is urged, we may assume that it exists elsewhere. Yet we have to notice that even in these unimportant matters the balance is not wholly even. Some of the squares in the checker-board are nearer and some are more remote. When we cross the Common and come to the place where the paths divide, some habit determines us in going to one side rather than the other. A rope may not reveal to the closest scrutiny one part as any weaker than the rest, and yet when the strain comes that breaks the rope the weakest part is known. In a similar way, whenever we have to make a choice, the pressure upon the will finds the point of least resistance, and, as I have already suggested,¹ the mind is so concrete, so many elements enter into it, a very slight pressure is enough to disturb its balance.

There are certain limits to our freedom which are easily recognized. There is first of all a man's nature, the result of heredity and of all the general circumstances connected with his birth. Peter may admire and imitate Paul, or *vice versa*, but Peter

¹ Page 220.

cannot by any possibility ever become Paul, or Paul become Peter. Secondly, there is education, whether technical or untechnical, the influences that are brought to bear upon a man in and through his environment. From these influences he can never escape. He may react against them, but even so he is not the same that he would have been had they been different. Then, thirdly, there is the result of habit. We may break our habits, but we are other than we should have been if we never had had those habits. What God makes man, what society makes him, and what he makes himself,—these are limits from which he cannot escape. In recognizing these limits there is this gain, that we see at the same time that there is no break in the history of society or of the individual. The new is always the child of the old. Luther was as truly the child of the church in which he was educated as though he had remained faithful to it; the influence of his environment was upon him whether he yielded to it or resisted.

Granting these limits, then, what place remains for freedom of the will? It is to be found in the power to put more or less of earnestness into life. A man is under restraint everywhere; whatever the immediate sphere in which he finds himself, he is bound by the laws of that sphere. But by greater earnestness of life he may pass from one sphere into another. In this other sphere he is equally bound, but he is bound in a different way. Take the case of a school-boy who has been given a sum in arithmetic to work out: his will cannot affect the true solution of the problem, but if he is indifferent, the result which he obtains is likely not to be the true result, whereas if he gives his mind to his task, his figures can hardly fail to come out right. Again, the owner of a music box cannot change its tunes, but he can determine which of those tunes shall be played. A man in a balloon is in a certain sense at the mercy of atmospheric currents, but these currents move in different directions at different heights, and the *aeronaut* can cause his balloon to rise or fall from one current to another.

Freedom of thought thus becomes the power to look facts in the face. By a change of mental tension we bring ourselves under

the power now of one set of associations and now of another. A man may dismiss the thought of duty by relaxing the tension of his mind and allowing superficial, more pleasurable elements to rush in. On the other hand, if his thoughts have been occupied with lighter things, and duty presents itself, the fulfilment of that duty depends upon his power to exert the necessary tension. The minister who would not permit himself to look into the question of slavery because, he said, every one who did became a fanatic, is only the type of many men. Many men have some fact or facts in their lives which they will not face,—the skeletons in their closets.

However, in thus putting greater earnestness into life, are we not after all merely following the strongest motive? Is this anything more than determinism in another form? It is of course impossible to prove that it is not. Freedom of the will is not something that can be proved. The only absolute implication of freedom is contained in the moral sense. The moral sense both requires us to recognize a certain amount of freedom and implies that we believe in a certain amount. If a person denies moral responsibility, no further argument is possible with him in regard to freedom. We can only say that for the sake of his system he is giving up one of the most important elements in life. The measure of freedom that is required by the moral sense is most easily recognized in earnestness of living. If it is said that the place that is thus left to freedom seems small, we reply that such freedom, however limited, influences the character of the whole life, and to a great extent determines it. There is a saying of Theodore Parker's to the effect that freedom of the kind that we are now considering makes up about three parts in a hundred of our life. We may admit this in the same sense in which he makes the statement, but we must recognize at the same time that these three parts in a hundred are at the very centre, so that the result of the exercise of freedom here affects all the rest. Measured by its effects, therefore, it may be momentous. Furthermore, we cannot estimate the amount of freedom by the results that are obtained. The measure of the result does not express the measure

of the effort that has been necessary to bring about the result. The effort of the school-boy in working out his sum may involve as much moral energy as that of the great mathematician in solving some problem beyond the reach of ordinary minds.

This view of freedom lessens the force of the *a priori* argument against freedom, in that it recognizes the unity of the world. Absolute indeterminism, a freedom in which any one could do anything that he pleased, would break up this unity. But according to this view the continuity of life is not broken. Man is not free to branch out in any direction as he pleases, but must move within the limits set by nature and education and habit; he is free not to escape from law but to pass from one sphere of law to another. It is equally open to Peter and to Paul either to exalt or to degrade the Petrine or the Pauline spirit, but the Petrine is always Petrine, whether good or bad, and the Pauline is always Pauline. Augustine is always Augustine, whether profligate or regenerate. This combination of the freedom of the individual with the limitation of humanity finds illustration in the way in which the heroisms of one age become the commonplaces of the next. Thus great earnestness of life, great heroism, was needed once in this country to face the question of slavery, but what heroism does it require of us today to pronounce on the moral character of slavery? Another illustration is seen in the fact that so often some discovery is made by several persons at about the same time. The discovery may have been impossible a little earlier because the data upon which it must be based were not yet clear. But then came a time when the earnest attention of the strong minds that were studying these data seized upon the relations between them and leaped to the conclusion. Thus we may almost say that it is the age rather than the individual that has made the discovery.

Can the hero, then, do more than hasten a result? Has he the power of origination, or is the question merely one of time, and does he perceive only a little earlier facts which would in any case become obvious later to other minds? It seems to me that we must recognize the fact of an originating power in certain minds, and this in moral and spiritual things as well as in other relations.

Just as certain mathematical results are beyond the reach of ordinary powers, so there are moral and spiritual results that may not be attained except as genius and earnestness united pass beyond the line which humanity otherwise would reach. Spencer is mistaken, therefore, in thinking that merely by living together men may work out the highest results in altruism and morality, that because they live in social relations the social instincts must therefore become the strongest. Selfishness is as possible in the social life of modern civilization as in the life of a savage tribe. Indeed, social life develops an intense selfishness, a conscious and calculating selfishness, to which the savage life is a stranger. An ideal must be struck out to which men shall seek to conform, and such an ideal does not necessarily manifest itself to all men or even to the majority of men simply because they are living together in social relations. It may be an ideal which ordinary men could not have discovered for themselves, however glad they are to recognize its worth and beauty when once it is presented to them.

We have still to ask whether the *a posteriori* argument against freedom of the will is affected by this view of freedom. We have seen that the facts upon which this argument is based are too general to admit of accurate results, and that although the regularity of human acts permits a presumption that those acts are determined, the foundation for this presumption cannot be made so universal as to preclude the possibility of a certain degree of freedom.¹ Now this degree of freedom is precisely what the view that we have been considering suggests. It allows a certain space within which the will has free play. There is no inconsistency between this degree of freedom and the regularity of action that is observed in ordinary life. Such regularity is to be expected. For truth may be so coercive as to leave no opportunity for freedom, and in the ordinary relations of life it is generally thus coercive. But when some occasion arises where truth is not so compelling, or where it does not so immediately force itself upon the mind, then the will asserts its freedom.

¹ Pages 221, 222.

When all this has been said, the mystery of freedom still remains, the mystery of that choice which the individual determines by some act of sovereignty within himself. This mystery of freedom has led many to deny it. But what do we mean by mystery? We mean in general that which cannot be formulated, and we are especially inclined to consider as mystery that which cannot be expressed in physical formulæ, because it is in physical formulæ that we express to so large an extent our thought and observation. For this very reason, however, we need never think that we are on the wrong track when at the heart of a subject and back of all our formulæ we find mystery. For there must be a mystery behind all formulæ. This mystery of freedom is simply the unformulated essence behind all ethical formulæ without which those formulæ in any real sense would be impossible. At times the term "mystery" is used in a somewhat different sense, of that which cannot be explained or for which a cause cannot be found. Now, if we give up the idea of such freedom of the will as this which we have been considering because it is a mystery, in the sense that it cannot be formulated, we come face to face with mystery in this other sense, in that we recognize the fact that the moral sense and the moral judgment make up a great part of life and yet we can find no adequate cause for them. But the mystery that arises from the impossibility of explanation, the impossibility of finding any cause for a given fact, is far more troublesome than the mystery that comes from the inability to formulate. The inability to formulate is only what we must expect sooner or later in the course of any examination that we may make, whereas the mystery of causation is a mystery which it is the great business of science and philosophy to do away with.

We have now reached a point at which we must recognize that there is a third form of freedom, uniting real freedom and formal freedom. Absolute freedom is found when both real and formal freedom are present, when the most perfect real freedom is reached by the power of free will.

"Our wills are ours, we know not how.
Our wills are ours, to make them thine."

There are limitations from which no one can escape. When Paul says, "Know ye not, that to whom ye present yourselves as servants unto obedience, his servants ye are whom ye obey,"¹ representing both the higher and the lower life as states of servitude, his view is true. But so also is the view that finds expression in those words of the *Gospel according to John*, "If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."² Whatever life we lead, we do indeed serve, and the man who acts from the principle of love is no exception; there is perhaps no servitude so absolute as that of love. Yet this servitude of love may be considered in the highest ethical sense as freedom. For if we recognize the fact that one form of life is more natural than another, then that form is nearest to freedom which is most natural. A form of life lower than the natural life is slavery even when it has been adopted freely; the drunkard has chosen to drink, and yet he is the slave of his passion. On the other hand the higher life that is nearer the natural life is in so far freedom, however subject a man may feel himself to the moral laws that control the higher life. Thus the service of him who works from love is freedom because it is according to his nature.

But what do we mean by "nature"? There are three uses of the term, each true if taken in its proper relation. First there is the use in which both the higher and the lower life are recognized as equally natural. This is the view which Mill insists upon so strongly in his essay on Nature,³ and to a certain extent he is right. We cannot escape from the power of nature; no one can do anything that is not natural. That great word of Shakespeare tells the whole story,

"Yet Nature is made better by no mean
But Nature makes that mean."⁴

The unnatural is simply the impossible. In all the history of organized life and development there is no point at which the life is unnatural. Civilization is as natural as the savage life, result-

¹ *Romans*, vi, 16.

² *John*, viii, 36.

³ *Three Essays on Religion*.

⁴ *The Winter's Tale*, Act iv, Sc. iv.

ing as it does from the development of man's nature. The Brooklyn Bridge is as natural as the beaver's dam. If we say that the bridge is the result of conscious effort, and therefore artificial, we are reminded that conscious effort also is natural. In the second use of the term the lowest stage of life is considered natural. This use is common in dogmatic theology, which contrasts the state of "nature" with the state of "grace," the state of nature being that lower state out of which a man is lifted by the power of grace. In a similar way we often speak of a person's "nature" as over against the moral life to which he has attained through self-discipline and self-control. When we think of the life of impulse and of possible selfishness into which men are born, the truth and propriety of this use of the term are evident. Yet there is a profounder truth in the third use, which recognizes the higher life as after all the most natural. For it is in relation to the higher life that we use the word "freedom," and if the higher life is the freer life, then it must be the most natural, since only that can be called free which is the fulfilment of the natural.

The explanation of these different uses of the terms "nature" and "natural" is to be found in the fact that every man has two natures, or rather that there are two aspects of his nature, the static or individual, and the dynamic or universal. They are the two aspects which appear in everything that has life. Thus a grain of corn in one aspect of its nature is the hard kernel that we see, and tends to remain so, but at the same time there is another aspect of its nature which tends to break up the kernel into something different from what it is. The static nature tends to preserve the kernel in its first form; the dynamic nature, the germ of the plant within the seed, is always pressing out to make it something that it is not. The static nature is the individual nature in which the seed "abideth alone"; the dynamic nature is the universal nature by which the seed is made to "bear fruit" and take its part in the great processes of the universe. It is the same with the egg. There is the hard shell without and there is the germinating life within, and the shell holds the chicken in until the chicken by its own effort breaks through the shell. Here as

everywhere the static offers a certain resistance to the dynamic. In the lower forms of life this struggle is to a great extent unconscious. In man, however, it becomes conscious, and often the collision between the two aspects is violent. It is this struggle that Paul describes when he tells of "the law of God after the inward man" and the "different law" in his members warring against each other.¹ In every man there is at the same time the impulse to remain what he is, and the impulse to become what he is not, and the tragedy of life consists in the struggle between these impulses.

Of the two impulses, the two aspects, which more truly represents the real nature of man? The dynamic could not exist apart from the static. But just as it is the dynamic element that differentiates the seed from the stone, so the dynamic impulse in man is that which more profoundly represents his nature. We have seen how from the first a teleological principle has been at work in the universe. The dynamic aspect of human nature is this teleological principle working in man. The pressure of the individual toward the higher life, this pressure which is not from without but from within, is the manifestation consciously of that advance, hitherto unconscious, which has been taking place from the beginning of the world. Here is the justification of the use of the term "nature" to describe the higher life of man. The static aspect is natural, for all life must have a starting-point. But the static exists only that it may be overcome and give place to something higher. When the static impulse is obeyed, when a man rests in the static aspect of his nature, then his life becomes unnatural, as unnatural as the life of the grain of wheat which has been preserved in some Egyptian tomb and so restrained for centuries from all development and growth.

Of course, if no principle of teleology is recognized, or something that is the equivalent of such a principle, there is no absolute standard by which to determine what is natural; one thing is as natural as any other thing, one condition or aspect of life as much according to nature as another. But if we are right in as-

¹ *Romans*, vii, 22-23.

suming that there is a teleological principle, then whatever conforms to that principle and makes itself its instrument is in the highest sense of the term natural, while that which opposes the teleological principle is unnatural. We have seen that there is nothing in nature that is absolutely static. It may be said that God makes only "seeds." Everything is germinant. But whereas in the lower forms of organic life there can be no considerable advance without change of structure, in man such advance with no change of structure is possible to an indefinite extent. The strongest recognition of this is seen in the belief in the possibility of the incarnation of God in man. As I have said, the pressure is not from without but from within. The principle of teleology does not work over against man as a *vis a tergo*, but as embodied in him and as a part of his nature. His growth is by his own consent, and most of all are his highest advances made by his conscious will. Through the teleologic impulse working unconsciously the seed dies in the lower aspect of its life that the higher aspect may take its place. By the same teleologic impulse, but consciously, man surrenders the individual life that he may find his place and fulfil his part in relation to universal life.¹

One question suggests itself at which I shall only glance. In human life we have to recognize the fact that freedom in the object of reverence is essential to the deepest reverence. How is it as regards reverence toward God? What are we to say of the divine freedom? I refer to this question because it comes naturally in our way, but it opens up one of those transcendent problems which I for one cannot undertake to discuss. We can have our guesses and our theories, but the account of freedom that we have followed up to this point is based on analogies of human life and human consciousness, and here these human analogies fail. God is absolute being. In the phrase of the schoolmen he is *actus purus*, absolute activity. Whether it would be possible for divine power to hold itself back, whether it might remain static instead of becoming dynamic, is a question upon which each of us may exercise his thought if he wishes to do so. I shall not venture to discuss it.

¹ *Matthew*, x, 39.

In the history of Christian theology the metaphysical difficulties in regard to freedom occupy only a small space. They were not felt until late. Augustine and Calvin hold that man was free before the Fall but after the Fall lost his freedom in reference to the higher life. Here the metaphysical difficulty is entirely ignored. Calvin says that man has freedom in little things and in wrong-doing. The difficulty rests wholly upon theological grounds, and no *a priori* difficulty is recognized. Man is free to do wrong, says Calvin, but has lost his freedom to do right. Can this properly be called freedom?—a freedom to move in one direction only? Augustine says, "Yes"; that as God is free, but free only to do right, so man must be considered free when he is free only to do wrong. It might be urged that the two cases are not parallel, because right-doing is the complete nature. But these theologians would say that although wrong-doing is man's present nature it was not his original and true nature. Furthermore they recognize that man is not always free to do wrong. For there may come a time when God wills to save a man, and then he is no longer free to resist. The Pelagian and Socinian theologians recognize a certain freedom. According to their view man needs God's help but can resist; very much as the great forces of nature are always ready to serve our ends, so God's help is at hand, and man can choose whether or no he will avail himself of it. Is the divine foreknowledge destructive of freedom? Calvin answers, "Yes," and Augustine, "No." "You know that you will always wish to be happy," argues Augustine, "and yet you know that you will will this freely." From the metaphysical point of view the whole discussion is crude and superficial, and fails to meet the real difficulties. It is not until we come to Jonathan Edwards that we find a profound discussion of the problem.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE THIRD STAGE IN THE MOMENT OF NEGATION: SIN AND EVIL.—

THE THEORY OF SIN DEPENDENT UPON THE THEORY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL.—CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS SIN.—ATTAINMENT NOT A MEASURE OF THE AMOUNT OF SIN.—SIN PRIMARILY A STATE.—SIN NEGATIVE.—SIN FOR ITS OWN SAKE.—SIN FROM THE DESIRE TO CAUSE SUFFERING.

WE have considered thus far the first two stages in the moment of negation,¹ the stage of difference, or the doctrine of creation,² and the stage of independence, the doctrine of freedom.³ We come now to the third stage, in which the negation appears in its most intense form, and the freedom of the second stage becomes antagonism. This antagonism manifests itself either as sin or as evil, according as it is considered in relation to the idea of goodness or to the idea of beauty.⁴

The theory that we hold in regard to sin depends upon the theory that we have adopted in regard to freedom. According to the definition commonly given by liberal thinkers, sin consists in doing consciously that which at the time we know to be wrong. According to the opposite view, sin belongs to man's nature and therefore is essentially unconscious. In the first definition the emphasis upon consciousness reduces sin to a minimum, for it is comparatively seldom that the average well-meaning man deliberately does that which he knows at the time to be wrong. On the other hand, the second definition raises sin to a maximum, and perhaps exaggerates it. St. Augustine's remark that the virtues of the heathen are splendid vices illustrates one aspect of this exaggeration, but it appears in a form especially familiar to

¹ Page 105.

² Page 105.

³ Page 210.

⁴ Page 106.

us in the doctrine of total depravity, the theory that all that a man does in a state of nature is sinful.

We have to recognize, I think, that only the smaller portion of sinful acts are committed in *full* consciousness. Now if consciousness is to be considered an essential element of sin, the degree of sinfulness should vary with the degree of consciousness. But experience does not show this. We find that if we have only a partial consciousness of sin at the time when the act is committed and later become fully conscious of it, the sinfulness does not vary with the degree of consciousness but may even be considered in some degree independent of consciousness. A man may at the time of wrong-doing see the ideal before him and feel the pressure of duty, and may shrink from the exertion that he must make in order to do right. But in such cases, and in nearly all cases, there is a tendency on the part of the wrong-doer to excuse himself and to make light of his offence. Thus a man who appropriates money belonging to his employer may do it with the hope and expectation that he can return it soon; he takes it to bridge over some temporary need, and the offence seems small in comparison with the advantage that is to be gained; there is a minimum of the consciousness of sin. I do not mean that there may not be those who sin with full consciousness of what they are doing, who cry out, "Evil, be thou my good!" We meet them in poetry and romance, and we may meet them also in real life.

The question, however, which is the most important for us to answer is whether unconscious sin is possible. We admit at the outset that the idea is illogical. It is easy to urge that if a man does not know at the time that he is doing wrong, he cannot be blamed. But we have already found that life is not logical, especially the moral life. We might say that it is impossible that a man should feel an obligation if he cannot explain the reason of it, and yet men do feel the obligation of the moral law when they can give no explanation of it or only a mistaken explanation. But whatever disposition we make of the logical aspect of the case, our first business is with the facts. Take the case of a cap-

tain of a steamship who knows that in an hour his vessel will be in a dangerous position where all his care will be needed, but that meanwhile his presence on the deck is not required. He is tired, and knowing that some relaxation will most refresh him and prepare him for his coming duty, he goes below to amuse himself among the passengers. He becomes absorbed, the time passes unheeded, and he is aroused to a sense of his duty only by the shock with which his vessel strikes upon some rock in the dangerous passage. The ship is lost. Are we to blame the captain? He was perfectly right in assuming that he was at liberty for the hour, and that relaxation for a time would enable him better to meet the coming strain. He was not conscious how fast the hour was passing; he had no consciousness, no "sub-consciousness," that anything was wrong. There was no one point at which it could be said that he was to blame. Yet we do blame him. We hold him to be not only responsible but criminally responsible for the loss of his ship. Or again, take the case of a child who is going to school. The child purposely leaves home half an hour earlier than is necessary so that he may have time to play on the way and not be late. The time passes and the child is late. He is blamed, but why? There was no moment at which he was conscious that he was doing wrong.

Furthermore, we have to recognize the fact that in life every mood tends to justify itself so long as it lasts. While we are angry, thoroughly angry, we do not blame ourselves. We see only that act of the other person which appears to us to justify our feeling. We may even apply in self-defence Kant's principle, that a man should act as every one might act under the circumstances. We often say when angry or discontented that every one would feel and do as we feel and as we are doing. In a certain sense every mood is justified. For every mood has some cause, but no cause could produce an effect if the cause were not equal to producing that effect, and in so far as it has a cause the mood finds its justification in that cause. The difficulty is that so long as the mood lasts we look only at a single point in our environment. Thus while we are angry with another person, we

see, as I have said, only that act of his in which we find justification for our anger. But when the anger passes, we find that whether we were or were not mistaken as to the cause, we were looking at a single act of the person with whom we were angry instead of at his whole life. When we come to ourselves, we see the one act no longer apart by itself but in relation to the man's life as a whole. How shall we blame these moods? According to the view that denies all freedom of the will we shall not blame them; it is only a misfortune that men experience them. But in so far as we affirm freedom of the will we leave a place for blame. We say that the man knows that he is liable to this infirmity and should be on his guard against it; he should exercise his power of self-control. For the power that a determination has over the unconscious life is very great. We have a striking illustration of it in the way in which certain persons by willing beforehand can rouse themselves from sleep at a given time. How does one do it? How does the unconscious nature keep the run of time? There is no satisfactory explanation. But we recognize the fact. We have this power over our lives and are responsible for its use, and it is in the failure to exercise it that the occasion for blame arises in these different cases that we have considered. Any one of these persons,—whether the man beside himself with anger, or the child late at school, or the captain who has lost his vessel,—any one of them may say, "I did not mean to." But the reply in each case must be the same,—"Did you mean not to? Did you will earnestly enough not to do the thing that you did do?"

There are some who never take command of themselves or realize that it is their duty to do so. What are we to say of them? There are men who grow up without ever facing the great problems of life. They are not without knowledge of the higher relations, because they live in a community in which such relations are recognized as commonplaces. But other habits of life such as those to which they are accustomed are also considered commonplace; other men besides themselves are living carelessly and indifferently and merely for themselves. They have never

lived earnestly enough fairly to ask what sort of life they ought to lead. They have not refused to ask, but they have not asked. They are taking it for granted that in some way or other they will come out right. Here there is no consciousness of wrong-doing. But we blame such men just because they do not question and do not choose, because they do not take hold of life in earnest and will to make something of themselves for the world. We blame them because instead of steering themselves they only drift.

Actual attainments amount to little in determining the amount of sin, for they vary both with the moral condition of the community in which the individual lives and also with his own nature. Thus one man may be living in a community where the habit is simply that sort of idle self-seeking to which I have just referred. It would require a great effort on the part of a man so situated to commit a crime. But take a man who lives in a lower stratum of society, where a certain amount of crime is as habitual as the mere self-seeking by which the first man is surrounded. It is easy for the second man to commit a crime. The two cases, however, are alike in that in both the individual has yielded to external influences. The first man may be simply a harmless member of society, while the second may belong to the dangerous class. Yet in so far as both fail to exercise the power to reach the best that is possible under the circumstances, both alike sin and in the same degree. Or again, the habitual drunkard may have struggles which serve at most only to prevent him from sinking lower and are powerless to lift him higher, but which would make a saint of one more favorably placed. Or compare this poor child of earth, endeavoring to struggle upward, with an angel fallen and present among us. The angel might seem to us to be holiness itself, and yet because he would be living on a lower plane than that which his nature had made possible he would be sinful as contrasted with the drunkard who is trying to work his way to something higher. It is like the great tree, blighted and dying at the top, and the little sapling that is just beginning to lift itself above the earth. We judge the life not by its attainment, its present condition, but by the direction in which

it is tending. It is with this in mind that Jesus is represented as telling the priests and elders that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before them.¹ Of course in all this I do not refer to isolated acts or momentary tendencies. I do not mean that a single fault committed by one who occupies some exalted height implies a degradation such as I have referred to. What we have to consider is the general tendency of the nature, whether that which it is seeking is above it or below it. A man may fail in his highest endeavor and find himself doing that which he knows to be wrong, and yet may be able to say with Paul, "it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me."² A man's real life is in his ideal, that which commands the general tendency of his nature, and whatever is exceptional to that ideal and tendency does not really belong to him. There are men whose faults do not really belong to them just as there are men whose virtues similarly are not part of their real life.

Our logic may perhaps have led us to results which might not recognize themselves in concrete form. Emerson says that "when we see a soul whose acts are all regal . . . we must thank God . . . and not turn sourly on the angel and say 'Crump is a better man with his grunting resistance to all his native devils,'"³ and our feeling very likely responds to Emerson's and we doubt if Crump is better. Is not the man who stands higher the better after all? Is not the distinction that we have been making somewhat artificial? We must distinguish, however, between judgments that are really artificial because they are foreign to the facts, and judgments that may appear to be artificial simply because they have to do with facts which are not obvious. Our feeling toward persons is determined by their relation to us and others. But the judgments that we have here to make require us to go behind this relation and deal with the actual thoughts and purposes of the heart. Our esthetic feeling toward people is one thing,—the love that we bear them and the pleasure that we take in their society; our moral feeling, the moral judgment which we

¹ *Matthew*, xxi, 31-32.

² *Romans*, vii, 20.

³ *Essays: First Series*, "Spiritual Laws."

must pronounce, is quite another thing. We may not enjoy the society of the man who is trying to get the better of his temper, and we may not choose as our companion the man who is struggling against his habit of drunkenness. Yet we may feel toward them a real sympathy and a profound approbation, and it is even possible that as we come to realize the heroism and pathos that are involved in such struggle, the esthetic charm also may be as great as in those relations which at first thought seem more naturally to suggest it.

Furthermore, we have to recognize that all beauty of character is in some sense or other the result of moral triumph. If certain characteristics of kindness and sympathy and truth have become habitual, so that they are commonplaces and can be acquired by individuals without effort, this is to a very large extent the result of struggles in the past by which men's natures have been softened and made more true and tender and sympathetic. It is not necessary to suppose that these victories were won by the effort of the direct ancestors of an individual, or by the community at large in which he finds himself. We know what power may be exerted by certain ideal lives.¹ The moral struggle and triumph of a single individual may render beautiful and noble living easier for multitudes. The influence of such a person becomes an element in the environment, and his life helps others to lead lives that shall be somewhat similar. Thus the whole aspect of society may change as the result of the moral triumph of a single life. But wherever we may lay the stress, whether on the individual himself, or on his ancestors, or upon the influence of certain ideal lives, we see that all moral excellence bears witness to a moral triumph, so that the approbation which we give is not without foundation even in the case of those who seem to attain without personal struggle the grace that we find in them. Of course the most perfect result is reached when the highest nature and the happiest environment meet, when the individual recognizes and adopts as his own the best that he finds, whether within himself or without. Under such conditions we have a character that can be contemplated without hesitation or mental reservation, a char-

¹ Pages 156, 157.

acter which at the same time wins our sympathy and commands our approbation.

Sin is primarily a state rather than an act. In strictness we may speak of sin rather than of sins. I do not mean that we are to give up the term "sins," for there are many terms that we should not use in an abstract discussion which we still may use in common speech. Sin, the sinful state, manifests itself in acts and in failures to act, and these forms of omission and of commission in which sin thus manifests itself may properly be called sins. But sin itself is a state of inertia, the resting on some lower plane of life when it is possible to rise to a higher plane. As we have already seen,¹ the sins, the forms in which sin manifests itself, vary according to the environment in which one lives, or according to the inherited or acquired tendencies of the individual. Sin itself, on the other hand, is the same thing always, whatever the environment and whatever the nature of the individual; it is the same thing on Beacon Street that it is at the North End. It may be well at this point to distinguish between the term "sin" in its stricter sense and certain other terms that are used to express moral wrong. Not only does *sin* denote a state, but the term is theological or metaphysical, according as that state is considered in relation to God or in relation to some universal principle. *Vice*, on the other hand, has a personal as *immorality* has a social significance.

I have said² that our theory in regard to sin depends upon the theory that we hold in regard to freedom of the will. We have seen³ that this freedom consists in the power to put more or less of earnestness into life. It follows that sin is the failure through lack of earnestness to reach the best that is possible to our nature and our environment. Therefore sin is negative rather than positive. To many in our time this seems a very lax doctrine, but it is the view that has been held by the profoundest theologians. Thomas Aquinas and Jonathan Edwards would not be considered superficial, but they define sin as negative,⁴ and so does

¹ Pages 243-244.

² Page 239.

³ Page 229.

⁴ Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quæst. XLVIII, Art. I. Edwards, *Works*, Vol. VI, Original Sin, Part IV, Chap. II.

Augustine,¹ and so does Leibnitz.² Those who oppose this view are apt to say that it renders sin "merely" a negation, as though the description of anything as a negation made light of it. But there is nothing mightier or more terrible than negation. Negation does not mean nonentity, and to say that a thing is a negation does not mean that it accomplishes nothing. Cold is a negation, the absence of heat, and we know how powerful it is. Leibnitz takes it to illustrate the power of negation generally, using the experiment in which a gun-barrel that has been filled with water bursts when the water is allowed to freeze. The negation that is most terrible to our thought and imagination is death. It is "merely" a negation, but it is a negation before which all tremble. There is no limit to the illustrations that might be given of the negations that bring suffering and terror to our lives.

It is true, of course, that in all these cases we are met by positive results, and that the elements which immediately produce these results are positive. When the earth is cooling, it is the power of attraction, we are told, that lifts up the mountains. It is the positive genius, the force of will, in a Napoleon, however selfish he may be, that overturns all Europe. It is the positive passions of lust and anger and the rest, that bring about all that we recognize as sin. This is all true. Yet what we have to notice is that the action of these positive elements is dependent upon the presence or absence of other elements. It is only as heat is taken away from the earth that the attractive power by which the mountains are lifted begins to work. It is not the elements themselves that bring about a certain result, but those elements *acting without the restraint of some controlling principle behind them*. It is the same in human life. The elements that produce the positive results, the passions and the will, the powers of calculation and of combination, are none of them sinful in themselves. But sin results through the absence of the higher principle which should restrain and control these forces.

Nothing is wrong in itself. There is no element of the nature, no instinct, no power, that does not have its place. A thing be-

¹ *Confessiones*, Books II, VII.

² *Essais de Théodicée*, § 153.

comes wrong only when it takes the place of some possible better thing. Beastliness is not wrong in the beast, because nothing higher is possible for it, but for man a higher and better life is possible, and therefore beastliness is for him sinful. It is the same with all our ideals and tendencies. No ideal is bad except as it takes the place of an ideal that is better. No tendency is wrong. If a tendency appears to be excessive, it is only because other tendencies have not been developed to correspond with it. There may be disproportion in the moral and spiritual life, but not excess. This is not true of the body. Certain bodily organs may be too large simply because if a man were framed throughout upon the model that such an organ suggests, the man would be a monster. That is because we recognize a certain size as normal for the body. It is a matter of habit with us, or of convention. In a colossal statue all is in proportion, but it does not represent the normal man, and any member of it taken in relation to a figure of ordinary size would be not only out of proportion but excessive. In the spiritual life, on the other hand, there is no norm of development, but the larger and fuller the development the better. The possibility of development in the spiritual life is infinite, and therefore the greater development of any one part may invite a corresponding development in all the parts without making a monster of the spiritual nature as a whole.

In holding that nothing is in itself wrong we recognize that there are some difficulties which we must face. Thus we may say of sickness that it is merely the unregulated, abnormal action of functions which all have their natural place in the organism. But how is it in the case of a disease like cancer? Is there not here a process—I ask, of course, as one without professional knowledge—which appears to have no normal place in the body, and which is not to be explained but only extirpated, if extirpation is possible? And are there not similarly certain aspects of sin which are exceptional or which at least appear to be so?

Of these sins that occasion special difficulty in relation to our general theory there are two classes. To some extent these classes

overlap each other, but on the whole they are distinct enough to require separate treatment. The first class includes all those cases in which the wrong is done just for the sake of wrong-doing, where no temptation exists except in the fact that the thing to be done is wrong, whereas if the thing were right we should not think of doing it. The second class includes the cases where the wrong-doing results from the love of tormenting, the desire to cause suffering for the pleasure of inflicting it. The consciousness of wrong-doing may add zest to the love of tormenting, but there is an element in the love of tormenting that does not belong to the pleasure in wrong-doing considered by itself. This pleasure in wrong-doing for its own sake finds illustration at once in the proverb about the sweetness of stolen fruit, which we have in so many forms. Augustine, at the beginning of his *Confessions*,¹ in the account of his boyhood, gives the classical presentation of such cases. He tells how with other boys he robbed a pear tree in a neighbor's orchard. The pears were very poor, and he could have got much better at home. The stolen pears were thrown away. What induced him to commit the theft? At the end of a long discussion of the question he concludes that the act was done for fun, that it was not the love of doing wrong which caused him to steal, but the excitement, the adventure, in the act. In all this, however, I am not sure that Augustine goes to the heart of the matter. What was it that gave to the fun its particular zest? Was it not the fear of discovery and the danger of punishment, the excitement that comes from peril? But perhaps Augustine implies this. Then there may also be in the wrong-doing a certain joy of liberty. We are surrounded by all sorts of conventions and rules of propriety, and often we feel a restraint from which it is a great satisfaction to escape. But there are many who confound morality with conventionality, and who protest against the laws of morality as though they were only conventions. Furthermore, we have to recognize the fact that the sense of freedom which constitutes the joy of wrong-doing of this kind is after all a type of the highest life of the spirit. The spirit is not meant to be perpetually under

¹ Book II.

suffering,—the gladiatorial show, or the bull fight, or the public execution. Even here, however, there may be an appeal to something besides the desire for excitement. For together with the suffering there is often present at such times a heroism, whether in animals or in men, which is not possible except when there is the risk of death.

It may be asked whether some of these tendencies may not be a survival from a lower stage of existence. Certainly there is a place in the lower animal life for the love of destruction. We all know that the mere eating for the sake of satisfying one's hunger is hardly enough to preserve life at its best. In order that food may have its best effect there must be something to attract the taste. Now the lower animals of the carnivorous sort cannot flavor their food with condiments and sauces, but they do have the instinct for destruction, the joy in the chase, the joy even in tearing their prey, which give zest to their food and add much to their chances for continued existence. It may be that it is this element which survives in men in the love of tormenting, or in that desire for excitement which, as we have seen, appears to account in part at least for the pleasure that men find in causing suffering.

Finally we have to recognize the fact that the joy in causing suffering has a certain place in the normal development of human nature. Just as there is a righteous anger, so there is such a thing as a righteous exultation in the punishment that befalls the wrong-doer. Whether this joy will ever be outgrown is a question that we do not need to discuss, nor do we have to ask within what limits the feeling should be confined. We have here only to recognize that it exists and that it has played a necessary part in the progress of the world. If men had meted out justice to one another with only the cold impartiality with which the judge upon the bench utters his sentences, the world would have been far less advanced than it is today in the direction of the higher morality. As it is, wrong-doing has aroused in men a terrible sharpness of condemnation, with hatred and scorn toward the offender, and there has been a joy in striking down the wrong-

doer and in feeling that he has had to experience the same sort of treatment that he has inflicted upon others. Even gossip, or something that is akin to gossip, has its place. There is a duty in the discovery and exposure of wrong-doing. The difficulty in gossip is that the process is ordinarily *ex parte*; the tribunal is a secret one, and no opportunity is given either for defence or for impartial examination. Yet it is only a morbid form of what is really an essential element in the health of society. Unless a wrong-doer knew that his character might be exposed and his wrong-doing pass from mouth to mouth, a great restraint upon men would be lacking. Of course the joy in retribution may be detached from the sense of justice, just as anger may be detached from its normal relation either to self-preservation or to the preservation of the community. We must consider all the various facts together in order to arrive at a right understanding of them.

CHAPTER XXII.

SIN AS SELFISHNESS.—SIN AS DEATH.—THE MEANNESS OF SIN.— SIN IN RELATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION.—THEORIES OF SIN WHICH TAKE AWAY ITS SINFULNESS.—THE THREE BASES OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH IN REGARD TO SIN.

IN line with the definition of sin as *negation* which we have been considering is a second definition of it as *selfishness*. Sin is the absence of altruism, the separation of one's self from the universe, or the attempt to make one's self the centre around which the universe revolves. This definition is not new. Like the definition of sin as negation, it has been insisted upon by both theologians and philosophers. Thus in the interesting table which Bunsen presents in *Christianity and Mankind*,¹ in which the theological terms are placed on one side and the philosophical terms on the other, selfishness is given as the equivalent of sin. But do the terms *sin* and *selfishness* exactly cover each other? Sin consists in the absence of self-control. May not a man exercise self-control selfishly? May he not abstain from momentary indulgence merely because he recognizes that self-control will enable him to prolong his pleasure in whatever seems to him most attractive in life? Self-control of this sort, however, is rather a form of prudence. It is not to be confounded with that self-control in which, regardless of his individual happiness, or without any distinct recognition of it, a man contends with lower impulses just because he feels that they are unworthy. Such self-control is plainly self-surrender. If it were not, we could not understand how a person who had been cast away upon some desert island, without any prospect of restoration to society, could have either sin or holiness. As it is, taking this larger view, we can see that for such a person there still are higher principles

¹ Edition of 1854, Vol. IV, pp. 212-219.

and relations to which he may yield himself, so that even under these conditions there is the opportunity for a self-control that shall result in self-surrender.

In saying that sin is selfishness we must remember that just as no one is wholly sinful, so no one is wholly selfish. There is no human being who is not in some direction or other taken out of himself, none who has not some love, some self-sacrificing spirit. I speak of this in order to prepare the way for the consideration of a difficulty that has been urged. If sin is selfishness, it is asked, what are we to say of the wrong that is done for the sake of another? Thomas Aquinas attempts to meet this difficulty by saying that the friend for whose sake we do the wrong is an "*alter ego*," another self, and therefore what is done for him is done as though for one's self. But this is hardly satisfactory. For we do distinguish between the wrong act of a man who does it for himself alone and that of another who does it for the sake of a friend. It is at least the beginning of a higher life for any man to have an "*alter ego*." That to some extent he should have his life in another instead of in himself shows that he has broken through the barriers of his selfishness. If a man has an "*alter ego*" it must remain an "*alter ego*" and can never become an "*ego*," and in so far selfishness is set at naught. Therefore if the definition of sin as selfishness is to stand, the term "selfishness" must be qualified. It must be used as meaning the preference of some smaller, narrower relation to one that is broader and larger. The man with his "*alter ego*" is unselfish as compared with one who lives only for himself, but his life is narrow as compared with that of a man who lives not merely for one other person than himself but for the good of many, and in relation with higher and broader laws than those which make only for his own individual interest or his friend's. In cases of this sort selfishness is often a matter of emphasis. Thus patriotism is a virtue in so far as the individual gives himself in service to his country, but when he says with Decatur, "our country, right or wrong," a larger principle is sacrificed to something smaller.

Still another definition or characterization of sin, but this time

in figurative form, is found in the description of it as *death*. The term "death" as applied to sin occurs frequently in the New Testament and is often used in common speech today. The most obvious explanation is that death is insensibility. It is in this sense that Paul speaks on the one hand of being "dead unto sin but alive unto God"¹ and on the other hand of being "dead through . . . trespasses and sins."² Here a question arises similar to that which met us when we were considering the use of the term "natural."³ Can the term "death," in any true sense, be absolutely applied, so that when we say that a spirit is dead we need not specify whether the death is to the higher or to the lower life? We may reply that if the higher development is that which belongs to the truer, deeper, more absolute nature of the spirit, then the failure to reach that higher development may be considered in some absolute sense as the death of the spirit, and therefore except when the term is expressly referred to the lower life it will always mean the death to the higher life.

There is another and more profound sense, however, in which the term "death" may be used of sin without any possibility of misunderstanding. In any living creature, man or beast, the lower elements of the bodily life, the various mechanical and chemical forces that enter into it, are all to great extent under the control of some vital principle. What we commonly call death is the withdrawal of this principle. We do not have to inquire here as to the nature of the controlling element. We have only to recognize that it exists as the higher law in the life of the body, and that when its control is no longer felt, and the lower laws have full sway, dissolution follows. Now the death of the spirit is of very much the same sort. So long as the higher purpose, the will to do right, is present, all the lower elements of the nature are held in subordination and controlled. The subordination may not be perfect, any more than the similar subordination of the lower elements in the life of the body. But so long as the will to control is active, any lack of subordination in the lower elements appears abnormal and, as it were, acci-

¹ *Romans*, vi, 11.

² *Ephesians*, ii, 1

³ Page 234.

dental. "It is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me."¹ Paul has so committed himself to the higher life that whatever happens to have remained over from the lower life is foreign to him, and in so far as he is doing his best to conquer it he is not responsible for it. But when in sin the will relaxes its hold, and all the lower elements, all the baser passions and desires, assert themselves uncontrolled, then the dissolution of the spiritual nature follows.

A living body has command to a certain extent over its environment. It reacts against it according to its own nature, and derives health from it instead of sickness. The bracing cold of a winter day, instead of lowering the vitality of a vigorous body, increases it; the body responds with fresh vitality. In a similar way the spiritual nature which has control of itself, the nature which is truly alive, moves among temptations unharmed and makes them contribute to its greater strength. On the other hand, just as the dead body is at the mercy of its environment, so when the elements of the spiritual life lack the supreme control of the higher purpose, the individual yields to the influence of his environment, whatever it may be, and responds to it according to the tendencies of the lower elements of his nature. The process of dissolution may be retarded. The dead body may be so shielded as to remain for a long period in a state of incorruption, and the individual who has fallen into the state of sin, or who has not risen above it, may have an environment that protects him to some extent from the worst transgressions into which he might otherwise fall. But ordinarily the processes of dissolution and decay are swift.

This characterization of sin as death is especially helpful in that it sets the nature of sin in its true light. The dissolution and corruption of any form of life are always disgusting, and the higher the nature of the life the more disgusting its dissolution. The corruption of the soul is more horrible than that of the body as the corruption of the body is more horrible than that of the plant, and if our spiritual sense were as finely attuned as our physical senses, we should have the same feeling in even stronger form

¹ *Romans*, vii, 17, 20.

toward the corruption of the spirit that we have toward the corruption of the body; we should have the same dread of it for ourselves and the same shrinking from it in others. The only modification that there might be in this feeling would spring from the thought that the corruption of the spiritual nature may not be complete, or perhaps never is complete, but that some germ of life always remains to afford hope or promise.

The last characterization of sin that I shall give is less a characterization than the expression of feeling or judgment in regard to it. All sin is meanness. There is nothing strong or noble or admirable in any sin. Sin always implies weakness and at least the tendency toward selfishness, and if anything may receive the condemnation of meanness, it is the mingling of weakness and selfishness. It is true that there are sinful lives from which we cannot withhold a certain admiration. But what we really admire is not the sin but the quality of the nature which has yielded itself to sin. The appearance of strength in a sinful life is due to the positive elements that enter into it. Thus Napoleon showed a keenness of intellect, a vastness of design, a power, which compel our admiration. But the spirit of the man who would gain the whole world and hold it for himself alone is as mean as the spirit of the boy who will filch from a companion's lunch basket the cake or the apple that he wants.

If we accept the doctrine of evolution, sin is the lingering in a lower stage of existence when one has the power to attain to a higher stage. The sinful man fails to take the place that the development of the world makes possible for him. If we ask what is meant by the terms "lower" and "higher" in this connection, Spencer's definition is as good as any other,—the higher life is that which carries with it the more complex relationship.¹ Breadth and length are the terms used by Spencer, but the breadth is so much the more important of the two that we may speak of it without regard to the length. On the one hand is the individual who lives for himself alone, on the other is the man who lives for the great interests of the world about him. The purely selfish

¹ *The Principles of Biology*, Part I, Chap. VI.

person touches the world at only a single point, the other derives sustenance from many directions and various sources. The most perfect man would be one who should consciously and by his own choice always make the best of himself, maintaining himself always upon the most advanced wave of human progress. It is not the fault of the great mass of men that they do not occupy this position. A man such as we have in mind would be one in whom the elements of human life are happily combined and whose environment has been the most favorable. In the case of most men conditions are not thus wholly favorable. A man's character varies much according to the position from which he starts, and his starting-point may be anywhere along the line of human progress as it is represented in different communities and nationalities. Men live in different centuries, as it were, at the same time. Yet, whatever a man's position, it is always possible to make the most of it, and sinfulness in any man, in the strictest sense of the term, consists, as I have said, in remaining in a lower stage of progress when it has been in his power to make some advance, however small.

There are certain theories in regard to sin which define it in such a way as to take away its sinfulness. That is to say, they take out of it all that calls for condemnation. Such theories naturally include all those that deny the freedom of the will, for where there is no freedom of the will, there can be no condemnation, no blame.¹ There are two general classes of these theories, the first philosophical, the second theological. The philosophical theories present first of all a view that rests upon a recognition of the fact that in an infinite world of verities some must be higher and some lower, and every place must be filled, the lowest as well as the highest. Thus there comes imperfection, and if sin is imperfection, then we have sin. The best statement of this view, although not in precisely the form in which I have suggested it, is to be found in Spinoza's Letters.² Spinoza here urges that sin is made to exist through a faulty generalization. We put Judas and

¹ Page 224.

² *Epistole XXXII-XXXIV.* R. Willis, *Benedict de Spinoza*, pp. 295-312.

John in the same class and apply to both the same standard, and then we call Judas sinful, and blame him, because after we have ourselves classed him with John we find that he does not possess the qualities that John possesses. But what right have we, Spinoza asks, to make such a generalization? What right have we to put Judas in the same class with John and then blame him because he does not fulfil the conditions which that class implies? We do not attempt such generalization in other relations. We do not put a stone in the same class with a plant, or a plant in the same class with an animal, and then find fault with the stone or the plant because it does not fulfil the conditions of a class in which it does not belong. In nature there are no classes, but only individuals, and we must judge each thing by itself and not make our judgments depend upon our own arbitrary classifications. Spinoza, however, does recognize that John has an advantage in occupying the higher position. Each individual life is to be measured by the fulness of being that it possesses, and since being is the highest good, greater fulness of being is the greater good. Therefore we ought to try to raise Judas to a condition in which he may be ranked with John. Just as it is our duty to help the poor out of their poverty, so we ought to help these imperfect existences out of their imperfection.

But the sin that is simply imperfection can hardly be considered real sin. Real sin, as we have seen,¹ consists, not in a man's holding a lower place, but in his holding that lower place when it is possible for him to rise to something higher. It is no sin in the brute when he fills the place intended for him, however low, but when a man lets himself sink to the place of the brute it is sin for that man.

Another view that is presented in these philosophical theories about sin is that just as darkness is necessary to light, so sin is needed in order that holiness may exist. It is true that light must be interrupted by darkness, and darkness by light, if we are to be conscious of either. But to assume therefore that sin must exist in order that there may be holiness, is to go too far. For all that is necessary to holiness is the possibility, not the actuality,

¹ Page 246.

of sin. Sin has its place in the universe of free spirit, but only as a foe that is to be met and conquered, and it may be conquered as truly when it is present only in idea as when it is actually present. You may contend with an enemy while you keep him shut out from your city walls as truly as after he has been admitted into the city. There is no reason, theoretically at least, why any individual should be absolutely sinful in order that sin may be overcome. In Raphael's painting of St. Michael the dragon has its place in the picture, but its place is at the foot of the angel, and this is the place of sin in life.

The second general class of theories that exclude the sinfulness of sin are theological. Schleiermacher's theory in regard to sin is of this class. First in his statement of the nature of sin and then in his account of the history of sin he takes from it all real sinfulness. His statement of the nature of sin follows from his definition of religion. Religion is the sense of absolute dependence. Then sin is a state in which absolute dependence either is not felt at all or is felt with difficulty, a state in which the individual feels himself more or less independent. This definition of sin as independence may seem to come very near to the definition that we have already considered¹ which identifies sin with selfishness; for independence, in so far as it is a matter of the will, is the affirmation of self. There are various ways, however, in which one may fail to reach the sense of absolute dependence, and the sense of independence becomes identical with selfishness only when the individual is unwilling to have the sense of dependence, and clings to a certain autonomy. In general the sense of absolute dependence involves to a very marked degree an intellectual recognition. The individual must have a large view of the universe, and of his own relation to it, if the sense of absolute dependence is to force itself upon him. But this is not true of the ideas which we have recognized as entering into the content of religion. One does not need such absoluteness or vastness of knowledge to admire that which is beautiful or to feel the weight of the moral law.

Furthermore, I do not think that most persons would consider

¹ Page 255.

the sense of dependence a matter for praise, or the lack of it a cause for blame. Here Schleiermacher's definition excludes that which to the ordinary consciousness is necessarily implied in the thought of sin. We might feel like congratulating the person who had the sense of absolute dependence or commiserating the person who did not have it, but this commiseration or congratulation would be very different from the blame or praise that is given the individual who is or is not guilty of sin in the ordinary sense of the term. It may be asked, why need we hold to the ordinary sense of the term? Why not let our notion of sin conform to whatever theory we adopt in regard to it? But our theories must conform to the fundamental elements of our consciousness. We must take these elements as they are, and if at any point our consciousness in regard to them is disturbed by our theories we must question the correctness of the theories.

In his history of sin Schleiermacher makes sin result from the fact that in the development of life the physical or natural has the start of the spiritual, and so the spiritual is always at a disadvantage. The consciousness of sin arises as those who are behind in spiritual progress compare their position with the stage that has been attained by those who are in advance. Now we may certainly recognize the fact that "that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: then that which is spiritual."¹ But here again I think that we make a mistake if we oppose the natural and the spiritual too sharply. We may say that first there is the selfish and then the altruistic; a man must have a self before he can surrender it. But if sin is to exist there must be some freedom, and no matter how much the spiritual may be oppressed by the physical, if the individual is only doing his best to overcome the lower nature he is in so far free from sin.

I have referred to Schleiermacher's position in this way because his theory of sin is somewhat different from the theories that have marked the history of the Christian Church in general, but these also if urged to an extreme take away from sin its sinfulness. For, in the first place, if sinfulness is real only in so far as

¹ *I Corinthians*, xv, 46.

it is a matter of blame, then in the ordinary sense of the word "blame" the doctrine of total depravity allows room for only one act of sin in the history of man, that act of Adam through which all men have inherited the taint that is called sin. Here is something of the nature of a terrible disease. The individual is no more to be blamed for it than a man is blamed because of some disease of the body which he has inherited. Making allowance for all the distinctions that have been made between different kinds of freedom, the fact remains that from Augustine down this doctrine denies that it is possible for any one to free himself from the power of sin. But if he cannot free himself he is not to blame, and he may make his confession of sinfulness very freely and openly; if we all have the disease we can speak of it frankly and without any real self-condemnation. Furthermore, the state of sin in which a man is placed by the doctrine of total depravity does not necessarily affect his character; as some one has said, he may be "a very good man and yet totally depraved." In stricter phrase, moral character may be denied to virtues that exist in the unregenerate, and, with Augustine, we shall see in the virtues of the heathen splendid vices. Now it is perfectly true that a man may be honest and kindly and may preserve his relations with others honorably, and yet may be profoundly selfish. His goodness may be wholly superficial, and yet enough to enable him to make a fair showing in the world. It is also true that a life may be lived honestly and purely and yet lack the transforming grace of religion, and this lack must take something from the beauty of character. A virtue in an individual who feels himself isolated in his struggle for the right has a somewhat different aspect from that of the same virtue when it is possessed in the full light of the consciousness of the divine presence, and the thought of a relationship to God gives an inspiration that may enable one to reach greater heights of virtue than would otherwise be possible. Yet it may not be a man's fault, sometimes, but his misfortune, that he fails to reach the religious consciousness. Inheritance or habit or environment may have so entangled his spirit that it does not recognize the source of the higher elements in his life;

intellectual difficulties may hinder, or the presentation of religion under a form which he cannot accept. Such a man lacks the grace of religion as a landscape on a cloudy day lacks the sunshine. It is a different matter when the failure to reach the religious consciousness results from frivolity or hardness.

The theories of the Church have rested on one or more of three bases: first, some real or supposed scriptural authority, second, philosophic speculation, and third, some fact or facts in human nature. It is to be said in passing that the selection of the passages from scripture is usually determined by some picturesqueness of statement rather than by any critical knowledge of the text. Scriptural authority may be considered the ultimate basis of the theories. Yet it is hardly in human nature to accept and hold a doctrine on this basis alone. Man is a rational being, and it is impossible for him to hold any one view wholly distinct from other views. Therefore the doctrine which he accepts first of all on the authority of revelation must be incorporated into a system of philosophy; he must justify his theory of sin by showing that it stands in natural harmony with a general theory of life. Furthermore, no matter how strongly the authority of scripture or philosophy may be felt, a doctrine will not stand unless it appears to be supported in some way by the facts of life and to some extent explains those facts.

The doctrine of the Church in regard to sin first of all regards man as wholly evil and exposed to the wrath of God; secondly, he is so by nature; thirdly, his condition is the result of Adam's sin. In the "Formula of Concord,"¹ a distinction is made between man's nature and the corruption of that nature. There is a sense in which human nature is still good. God still makes it, and all that he makes we may suppose to be good. Christ took man's nature upon himself but did not at the same time take his sin. Sin is not nature, in the most profound sense of the term, but a corruption of nature. This corruption is not something external, merely hindering goodness, as the garlic juice that is rubbed over a magnet is said to prevent the communication of

¹ Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. III, p. 98.

its power. It is so profound and universal that it leaves nothing sound. In a sense which, as the theologians are careful to explain, is purely philosophical, sin is an accident. The danger in using this term is recognized. In common usage, to say that a thing is an accident is to make it something superficial. The theologians insist that it must be taken in a profound and philosophical sense. As we have already seen in another connection,¹ this accident of sin is regarded from the Catholic point of view as the result of a withdrawal of the divine grace, whereas from the Protestant point of view it has been more generally regarded as a corruption of man's nature.²

The scriptural basis upon which this doctrine of sin is made to rest is furnished especially in two passages in the New Testament, *Romans*, v, 12, and *Ephesians*, ii, 3. The first of these passages as given in the King James version appears not to carry fully the significance that has been attributed to it. But the translations in the *Vulgate*, "in whom all sinned," and in the revised version, "for that all sinned," perhaps lend themselves more easily to an interpretation which identifies the sin of all with the sin of Adam regarded as a momentary act. I should like, however, to refer those who insist upon precision of translation in such cases to the passage, *Romans*, iii, 23, in which the same word and the same tense are used evidently in a different sense and with a different application. It will be urged that the circumstances here require the special translation. That is a question which I will not discuss, but in general we may doubt how closely Paul should be held to the minuteness of grammatical requirements. In the second passage, *Ephesians*, ii, 3, the phrase "by nature children of wrath" admits two interpretations, according as the word "nature" is understood to refer to that into which a man is born or only to his present character. In this case the broader interpretation is given by some of the commentators who are very strict in their interpretation of *Romans*, v, 12. Meyer, for instance,

¹ Page 198.

² Jonathan Edwards, *Doctrine of Original Sin Defended*. John Tulloch, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*. Charles Hodge, *Essays and Reviews*, II.

insists that "nature" is here only a general term for character. This, too, is a question which I will not discuss. But no study of New Testament theology is complete without a knowledge of contemporary thought. The rabbinical doctrine of sin appears to have been similar to Paul's doctrine, but less strict. It recognizes such a tendency to sin since Adam that practically all men are sinners. But man is still responsible for sin, for although with very few exceptions all men sin, there is no necessity that they should sin. Paul stiffens this doctrine by lessening the opportunity for freedom.¹

Of course the two passages to which I have referred do not stand alone. They are only especially emphatic and distinct. We find a number of passages in both the New and the Old Testament which emphasize the universality of sin. "There is none that doeth good."² "The heart is deceitful above all things."³ We have to remember, however, that in all such passages the element of rhetoric enters largely, not rhetoric in any artificial sense but the rhetoric of passion. These books of the Bible were in large part written by two classes of persons, on the one hand the prophets and holy men who were lashing sin in others, and on the other hand saints struggling with sin in their own hearts. In either case, whether a man is himself struggling with sin or is exposing the sin of the world, whether he is full of penitence or full of wrath, he does not weigh his words very carefully, and it is a mistake to take the utterance of his passion and base a dogma upon it. A case in point is that famous passage in which Paul declares himself chief among sinners.⁴ No doctrine has as yet been based upon it, and I do not suppose that the most literal interpreter of the New Testament would insist that Paul was the chief of sinners. Yet that is what he calls himself, and when he said it, no doubt he said it in earnest. The phrase has often been used since in imitation of Paul, and perhaps in the same profound sense in which he used it. We can understand how he could feel justified in applying the term to himself. When he

¹ F. W. Weber, *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud*.

² *Psalm*, xiv, 1, 3.

³ *Jeremiah*, xvii, 9.

⁴ *I Timothy*, i, 15, 16.

thinks of the light that has come to him, and then of his cruelty toward the followers of Christ, the passion of his self-condemnation is only natural. I dwell upon this because it illustrates the kind of speech in which the Old and New Testament writers so often refer to sin. The view that I have suggested does not at all lessen the real force and point of such utterances. We are made to see how evil a thing sin is, and how these holy men hated it.

When we turn to the philosophical basis of the doctrine of the Church in regard to sin, we find that strictly speaking it is rather a result than a basis; that is to say, it presents itself naturally after one has accepted the scriptural basis. It has rested in general on a recognition of the solidarity of the race. Presented by Edwards in its extreme form, it has been softened by later thought. Edwards uses the figure of the tree and its branches.¹ The branches, he says, partake in the act of the root and in its consequences. If the objection is made that we are not identical with Adam, he answers that we are not identical with ourselves from one moment to another. Edwards denies any causation other than that of the divine will. God can establish whatever causation he desires, and therefore he can connect our sin with that of Adam. We have to bear in mind that the doctrine of absolute individuality is of comparatively recent growth. The tribe was responsible for the act of any of its members, children and children's children were held accountable for the deeds of their parents, and the law of attainder was regarded as the natural expression of a real relation. The sense of a vital connection between a man and his posterity affects us still. If you learn that your companion is the son of a murderer, very likely you will at first thought shrink a little from him. The instinct is a remnant of the old realism.

The third basis of the doctrine of sin as commonly held by the Church is found in certain facts. The first of these is the universality of death. Edwards makes much of this, assuming that death came as a consequence of sin, that sin involved death.²

¹ *The Doctrine of Original Sin Defended*, Part IV, Chap. III.

² *The Doctrine of Original Sin Defended*, Part I, Chap. II.

The second fact is the universality of sin. There are two senses in which the term "total depravity" may be used, one intensive and the other extensive. According to the first sense, everything is as bad as it can be, and consequently no germ or beginning of good is to be found in human nature; it is "totally depraved." In the other sense there is nothing that is perfect; no one is as bad as he can be, and yet no one can be wrong in part and not be affected in his whole nature. If we may use the expression, there is a totality of imperfection,—"for whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all."¹ A man's virtues are not quite what they would be if he were without faults. Thus a man has the virtue of thrift, but he has the vice of niggardliness; is his thrift a virtue in the highest sense, considering that it grows out of a disposition which disinclines him to help others? Or he is generous, but is also prodigal; has his generosity the merit that it would have if there were not this prodigality in other directions? A prodigal man does not fairly weigh the worth of that with which he is prodigal, and the generous man who does not weigh the worth of what he gives, of course has less merit in his generosity than one who does fairly weigh the value of his gift. The list of such illustrations might be extended indefinitely. It is as impossible to lower character in any one respect without lowering it in all as it is to draw water out of one of a series of connected vessels and not change the level in them all. Character seeks its level as truly as water. We are not made up of a bundle of characteristics or of faculties. We are individuals, and if the unity of our character suffers in one respect it suffers in all.

To go back for a moment to the philosophy of the doctrine of sin, there is one point that should have been touched upon,—the measurement of sin. There is here a curious antinomy. According as the sinfulness of sin, its demerit, is regarded in relation to the object of sin or in relation to its subject, it may be held either that since sin is committed against an infinite God the demerit must be infinite, or that the sin which is committed by a finite being cannot be absolute. According to Edwards there is an

¹ *James*, ii, 10.

infinite demerit in our relation toward God which must infinitely outweigh all merit that may be found in any virtue which we possess, and this view is often urged by others. It would seem, however, that sin should rather be measured by the nature of the sinner.

In speaking of the universality of sin, I said that there were two senses in which the term "total depravity" might be used, the one intensive, the other extensive. In this latter sense the term becomes very much softened, for one might be on the very verge of sainthood and still be considered totally depraved, on the ground that imperfection at any point involves imperfection everywhere. We may approach the same position in another way. Suppose that you dislike a person. You dislike everything that he does. Even his virtues have a certain taint. The presence of whatever it is that causes you to dislike him is felt all through his nature and in all his ways. A father or mother may sometimes feel in regard to a child who shows ability and goodness here and there, but is indolent and careless, that the very excellence of the child is displeasing, in that it suggests how different the child's life as a whole might be. In this aspect we realize a certain truth in that phrase in *Isaiah* which is so often quoted, and sometimes carelessly, "all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags."¹ The highest virtues of the imperfect life are tainted and fragmentary.

Still a third fact to support the doctrine of sin is found in man's nature. Nature in this sense is the original state into which a man is born. Now that state is one of self-love. We can hardly call it selfishness, because as yet there has been no collision between what the individual claims for himself and what he owes to others. The infant is the centre of its world; it considers itself a king and is regarded as such. Here there is only innocence. But if the child, as it grows up, continues in this state, and still claims the service of others, and considers the rights of others as nothing, then the state in which it has thus continued has become a state of sin. Are we still to call it nature? It is nature in so far as it is the state into which a man is born; it has become sinful as it has been persisted in.

¹ *Isaiah*, lxiv, 6.

Another of these facts is the absence in many of any real principle. They may show various good qualities, but they have not really made them their own. They are living through the impetus which they have received from their ancestors or their environment. Their virtues are in a certain sense accidents. If Paul can say, "it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me," why may we not say to these men, "it is not you who do it, but right that dwelleth in you"?

Then, finally, there is the difficulty that men experience in raising themselves from a lower to a higher state, a difficulty so great that if we look at it by itself, such rise seems to be an impossibility. Think what it is that a man has to do. The change that is required is not merely a change of belief, or a change in the activities of the life, but a change of heart, a change of affection, a change by which the man shall come to love that which now he does not love, and hate that which now he loves. How is it possible for any one thus to control and transform his nature?

These facts and these possible points of view have been held to support the doctrine of the Church in regard to sin, and to justify the use of terms which express this doctrine even if the doctrine itself is somewhat broadened and modified. They are in general facts of human nature and must be accepted as such. The question is, what are we to do with them? In what light are we to regard them? Of course the entire aspect of such facts will differ according to the life out of which the facts in each experience have sprung, the background against which we view them. What would show as spots of darkness against one background will appear as points of light against another. In the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1880, there is an interesting comparison between Calvinism and Darwinism.¹ The two systems are at once seen to have much in common. In both there is something of the same necessity, in both the whole of the past cleaves to us in all our life and activity. But whereas according to the one point of view man is seen against the background of

¹ G. F. Wright, *Some Analogies between Calvinism and Darwinism*.

the original holiness of his first parents, according to the other the primitive savage state furnishes the background. In the one case the movement, if not itself downward, is the result of a downward movement; in the other the movement is upward. From the point of view of Calvinism the virtues that we find in human nature as it now is are the remnants of what was once complete; from the point of view of Darwinism, these virtues are the beginnings of that which may at some time become complete, or will at least tend more and more toward completeness. The difference in the two views is like the difference in our feeling toward the evening twilight and the twilight of the morning. If we were to awake from some long slumber at one or the other of the twilight hours, we might hardly know for a little whether it were morning or evening. But as the moments passed, what a difference there would be in our feeling, according as the darkness or the light increased! The evening twilight brings with it a certain sadness, the morning twilight a sense of freshness and of inspiration.¹

As regards the argument that the difficulty which is experienced in raising one's self to a higher plane implies the hopelessness of man's condition, it must be remembered that no character is wholly upon any one plane. We are so accustomed to abstract definitions that we often attach to them more reality than they possess. We speak of saints and sinners, the altruistic and the selfish, the converted and the unconverted. But I take it that no term of the sort applies absolutely to any individual; a selfish man is something more than a selfish man, a murderer something more than a murderer. It is this that gives ground for hope. The lower elements in human nature may react upon the higher, but so may the higher react upon the lower. Certainly the opportunity for conflict is given, and with conflict the opportunity for victory. Furthermore, no life is left wholly to itself. We have to recognize the working of "the power not ourselves

¹ Horace Bushnell, *Sermons for the New Life*, "Dignity of Human Nature Shown from Its Ruins." C. C. Everett, *Tracts of the American Unitarian Association*, 2d series, 3, "Human Nature Not Ruined but Incomplete."

that makes for righteousness." Speaking philosophically, we recognize a teleological principle or tendency in the world which exerts its pressure upon every individual life; speaking theologically, we recognize the spirit of God everywhere striving to find entrance into the individual soul. In all this we do not expect any sudden transformation, although it may take place. But we do look for an uplifting of the nature. To dwell longer, however, upon this subject at this point would anticipate the discussion of *Conversion*, which will have its place later.¹

There are theories which try to place the source of sin in some previous state. Thus there is the theory held by Schelling,² that at some moment preceding the actual entrance upon his present existence he commits himself to sin or to righteousness. The same theory from a somewhat different point of view is found in the doctrine that we are fallen angels, and are given the opportunity in this world to reach once more the state from which we have fallen. Such theories, however, do not help us any more than does the doctrine of the fall of Adam. We have still the fall, the beginning of the sin, to account for, and the beginning is as difficult to explain in a preceding state as in man's present existence. We may go back and back into the infinite, but we must still face the question of the origin of sin in all its mystery.

¹ Page 456.

² Julius Müller, *Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 128-153.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF EVIL.—EVIL AS INDEPENDENT OF SIN.—PESIMISM: THEORIES OF SCHOPENHAUER AND VON HARTMANN.—EVIL AS DEPENDENT UPON SIN.

WE have now to consider the doctrine of evil. Evil is distinguished from sin as referring not to that which is morally wrong but to that which causes suffering. As freedom is the negation of the first idea of the reason, and sin is the negation of the second idea, so evil is the negation of the third idea, beauty. The beauty of the universe consists in its absolute harmony, and evil is the discord in this harmony. Of course sin also is a discord, but, as I have said before,¹ the antagonism in sin is more fundamentally to the second idea, goodness.

In considering evil two distinct questions present themselves: first, the question of evil as independent of sin, and second, the question of evil as dependent upon sin. In the first place, then, we find that evil exists apart from sin. It is found among the races which can do no sin as well as among those to which sin is possible. Bushnell, indeed, regards the suffering and death among the lower creatures as anticipatory of sin.² As a jail is put up in some new settlement before there are any criminals to occupy it, so evil is the anticipative effect of human sin. But Bushnell is less strong as a theologian than as a preacher. Independently of sin, then, suffering arises first of all through the conflict of man with his environment. Man enters upon the world under those same conditions of the struggle for existence which govern the development of all life; he has to suffer until he becomes adapted to his environment; furthermore, the environment changes, and each change requires still further adaptation. In his struggle for existence man has adopted two methods

¹ Page 106.

² *Nature and the Supernatural*, Chap. VII.

of defence, first a hardening by exposure, and then the fortifying of the person by external protection. But as perfection has been approached in one direction, it has been lost in the other; the adaptation has remained always imperfect. Accident, also, must be taken into account. Finally, the environment at last triumphs, and like all the other inhabitants of the world man succumbs.

I need only hint at the evil that is involved in all this. Death itself, physically considered, we recognize to be an anaesthetic; it brings an end of suffering. Yet if the suffering of the individual who has died has ceased, there remains the suffering which his death has caused for the friends who are left behind. Furthermore, the fact of death is not to be taken by itself. Although there are cases where death is sudden, without previous warning and without pain, generally it does not come in a moment, but is preceded either by the shrinking and weakening and dulness of old age, however peaceful, or by the wasting of disease. It is true that in general death is more dreaded at a distance than when it is close at hand. One of the most striking facts in war is the readiness with which, as a rule, soldiers meet death when their time has come. It is as though when life had reached its limit it detached itself, as fruit falls of its own accord when ripe. Henry Ward Beecher has compared the dread of death to the dread that children have of being put to bed in the daytime. Still, when all has been said, we must recognize death as one of the most terrible elements in the suffering of the world.

The question may occur whether it is proper to speak of death, as I have done, as the triumph of the environment. Is not death the natural result of the development of the organism itself? Just as we have among the flowers the annuals and the biennials, is there not an appointed term for man, his "three score years and ten"? and can it be said of man that he is overpowered by his environment, except as the end of life comes before the fulfilment of his given term? A ship is fitted out for a voyage across the ocean: when it reaches its destined port it is no triumph of any environment that coal and provisions shall have been exhausted.

We have to remember, however, that from the point of view of the theory of development the term of duration is itself the result in every case of the balance between the individual and his environment. Each stock is strong enough to last under the most favorable circumstances a certain time, and that time is fixed for the descendants by the strength and endurance of their ancestors. Therefore what may have been at first a matter of chance, the issue of a struggle in the past between the individual and his environment, becomes at last a matter of habit and is regarded as the allotted term of life for animal or plant. The builder of a ship may be able to calculate very closely how long that ship is likely to last, and we may say of it as of the plant or animal that it has its allotted term. Yet we know that the ship has within itself the elements of weakness, and that it yields itself finally because it becomes so weak that it is overpowered by wind and wave. In a similar way, whatever the process has been in the development of the plant or animal, when the end comes it is because the environment has overpowered in the individual the tendency to live.

We are reminded here that death itself, together with all this struggle of the individual with his environment, has been held by the Church to be the result of sin, and that consequently evil in this form should be considered as dependent upon sin. Against this view there is no positive proof that can be urged. The answer commonly made is that death was in the world before man began his course. There are cliffs all made up of tombs, the shells of the little toilers that have wrought their vitality into the strength of the earth. But in reply it may be said that the spiritual nature of man differentiates him from the lower creatures, and that therefore it does not follow that because the lower creatures were mortal man would also have been mortal if he had not sinned. But if there is no positive proof that for man death was not the result of sin, positive proof is equally lacking for the argument that it was the result of sin. Of course if we accept Paul's statement that "sin entered into the world, and death through sin"¹ as made with the absolute authority of certain

¹ *Romans*, v, 12.

knowledge, there is no room for further question. But it is another matter if we believe that Paul was only expressing views commonly held by his contemporaries.¹ So far as the account in Genesis is concerned, immortality does not appear to have been a part of the dower with which man began his course.² In the absence of proof on either side it seems to me to be the more natural presumption that man should have entered upon the world subject to the same law as that which governs all other forms of organic life.

We recognize, therefore, that there is suffering in life independent of sin, that suffering is bound up with life. Even in Spencer's golden age³ there must be suffering. For suppose that men have become perfectly altruistic. They will still be exposed to the conflict with the environment, and the triumph of the environment; they will be exposed to accidents, using that word in its largest sense; they will be exposed to evils that come through mistakes. Suppose a community that is wholly altruistic, but does not understand the laws of health or the principles of economics. Then if sanitary measures are neglected, or if charity is applied in an unscientific manner, we have at once the elements of possible unhappiness. Spencer might say that the altruistic development should be accompanied by the development of the understanding. But even then the possibility of accident would still remain.

This view of evil which recognizes that a great deal of suffering in the world is independent of sin, is not necessarily pessimistic. For in the first place the evil may be regarded as working for ultimate good, and in the second place, however great the amount of suffering may be, happiness may still preponderate. Yet a tendency that is not merely of the present time, to exaggerate the evil in the world,⁴ has given prominence to certain forms of pessi-

¹ Page 266. ² *Genesis*, iii, 22-23. ³ *The Data of Ethics*, Chap. XIV.

⁴ Examples of this exaggeration are to be found in an article by Frances Power Cobbe in the *Contemporary Review* for January, 1888, and one by Huxley in the *Nineteenth Century* for March, 1888. These articles are reviewed by Dr. Everett in an article entitled "Rhetorical Pessimism" in the *Forum* for September, 1893. Martineau in his *Study of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 80-104, perhaps makes too light of the difficulty.

mistic doctrine. The first of these theories that I will consider is that of Schopenhauer.¹ It is based upon the assumption that whereas suffering is positive, happiness is merely negative; what we call happiness is only a lessening of unhappiness. Just as ice can never become warm, but as it reaches the point where it would have become warm ceases to be ice, so happiness ceases at the very moment when it might have become complete. When we are thirsty we enjoy water, but our enjoyment varies according to the degree of our thirst; as the thirst lessens, the enjoyment lessens, and when the thirst is wholly satisfied enjoyment has ceased. Schopenhauer finds this true of all forms of happiness; what is called happiness is always nestling in the arms of unhappiness. Furthermore, the fundamental element in the life of the world and of the individual is the will, and the will is never satisfied. The present moment is always like the spot in the landscape that is shadowed by the drifting cloud; the sun has shone upon it and will shine upon it presently again, but just now it is in the shadow. So men think of themselves as happy in the past or as about to be happy in the future.

“Man never is, but always to be, blest.”²

Or to quote the Buddhist saying, the satisfaction of desire is like drinking salt water.

In so far as Schopenhauer’s argument rests upon the assumption that happiness is merely negative, it is easily met; the recognition of a positive element in happiness overthrows the whole system. Thus the mere fact that there are such vices as gluttony and intemperance is enough to show the falsity of the theory. For these vices spring from the pleasure that men find in eating or drinking after the line of hunger or thirst has been passed. We all know how the positive pleasure in eating may lead us beyond the point at which hunger is satisfied; the Roman habit of taking an emetic during a banquet only illustrates the extent

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, Trans. of Haldane and Kemp, 3d ed., Vol. I, pp. 397-420, Vol. II, p. 372, Vol. III, Chap. XLVI.

² Pope, *Essay on Man*, Epistle I, 96.

to which men may go in their desire to renew or prolong this pleasure. Schopenhauer himself recognizes an exception to his rule in the case of esthetic pleasure. He sees that in the enjoyment of beauty man is for the time being lifted out of the struggle for existence and made free, and that therefore such pleasure is positive. But there are other pleasures of a similar nature with the enjoyment of beauty, the pleasure of friendship, of love, etc., and these also, at least in their ideal form, are positive.

As regards the argument from the nature of the will, that unsatisfied desire in which Schopenhauer finds a basis for pessimism is made by others a basis for optimism. Thus Fichte sees in the absolute demand of the spiritual life the promise of its eternal continuance and blessedness. Whereas Schopenhauer emphasizes the negative aspect of the demand, the desire that is never satisfied, Fichte lays stress upon the positive aspect, the continual advance and the renewed satisfaction in it. It is all like some journey. "The end can never be reached," Schopenhauer might say. "Very true," Fichte might reply, "but there will always be the joy of passing from one charming region to another."¹ It should be noticed, however, that Schopenhauer insists that his doctrine is not hard but merciful, especially as compared with those doctrines of the Church which assume a waiting hell.

In so far as Von Hartmann² claims to be an optimist we may not, perhaps, consider him a pessimist. He does indeed say that the world is the best possible world. But when he proceeds to urge that the best possible world is worse than none at all, his theory is quite different from what would ordinarily be called optimism.³ Von Hartmann sees the mistake of Schopenhauer in saying that happiness is merely negative. He recognizes a positive happiness in the world, and does not attempt to prove on any *a priori* principle that happiness is only the lessening of suffering. But he finds that the proportion between the pleasure in life and the pain is like that between the portion of an iceberg that shows

¹ C. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*, Chap. XIII

² *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 7th ed., Vol. II, C, XIII

³ Sir William Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, XLII, XLIII

above the water and the greater bulk that lies below the surface. He makes a list of the various possible forms of happiness, and shows how each of these involves more misery than happiness. This gives a wholly different aspect to his treatment from that of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's pessimism is like sad or plaintive music. He had in him much of the poet, and there is a certain enjoyment in reading even his most extreme statements. Von Hartmann is more prosaic. He seems like a grumbler and fault finder, and his complaining lacks the charm of Schopenhauer's pessimism.

Von Hartmann recognizes three stages or "stadia," as he calls them, of illusion: first, the thought that there may be joy in the present life; second, the thought that there may be joy in the life after death; and third, the thought that there may be joy in a future state of the world. This third form of illusion is the expectation that happiness may be reached on the earth in some more complete stage of its development; but life upon the earth then, he argues, will involve the same conditions as before. The second form of illusion, the hope of happiness after death, is based upon religious ideas which he regards as illusory, and therefore any satisfaction which is taken in such a hope must be an illusion. He forgets that the happiness based on an illusion is very real if that illusion is believed; the joy of the world in its religious faith remains. As belonging to the present life he enumerates various deceitful forms of joy. There is the joy that brings with it more pain than pleasure. The delicacy and sensitiveness of organization in persons of artistic temperament undoubtedly make possible for them a keener pleasure, but at the same time expose them to greater pain. Thus there is more bad music in the world than good, and the cultivation of the musician's ear opens up to him more discomfort and pain than satisfaction. Then there is the joy that brings pleasure to one but pain to another, the joy of the hunter. There is the joy that may bring more pleasure than pain, but is produced at a cost.

Youth and health Von Hartmann calls the zero points in life. They are not in themselves pleasures, they simply enable one to

take pleasure; in health one is free from the pain of illness, and in youth one is free from the infirmities of old age. But here experience contradicts his theory, for health and youth as we know them are not zero points. In perfect health there is a sense of physical well-being which is in itself a joy; the very tingling of the blood brings with it a satisfaction. Emerson tells of the "perfect exhilaration" that he has enjoyed when in good health, in "crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky," without having in his thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune,¹ and we have only to carry his statement a little further to recognize the fact that every activity of life gives pleasure so long as it is not overdriven. In climbing a mountain there is delight in the very strain of the body, and then, when one reaches the summit tired, the satisfaction in resting is one of the most exquisite pleasures in life. It may be said that this is negative, that the nerves accumulate a certain amount of energy, and that there is a sense of oppression until this accumulation of energy is set free. But our own experience tells us that our pleasure in activity and rest is more than this, and that both the process of setting free one's nervous energy and the reaction that follows are positive joys. I have wondered how laborers on a strike could endure standing about in a public square doing nothing, until I reminded myself that for them the mere rest was in itself a delight. It was a blacksmith who said that he believed himself to be the only man who thoroughly enjoyed Sunday, the sense of cleanliness and of rest was such a pleasure to him.

As I have already said, Von Hartmann does recognize a positive happiness in the world. But he fails to realize how largely happiness consists in the reasonable activity of the functions of mind and body. A child when active may be called perfectly happy, because practically all its faculties are engaged at the same time. As men grow older all their powers are seldom active at once; differentiation is greater, and whole fields or types of activity are suppressed, and capacities are left unsatisfied. A man's happiness, therefore, is largely a compromise. He cultivates certain forms of activity, but not all, and those that are not cultivated

¹ *Nature*.

protest. But if all the powers of the man could be fulfilled as nearly at the same time as are those of the child, he would be as much happier than the child as his capacities are vaster and more varied.

What has been said, however, needs a good deal of qualification. There is much that is unpleasant which cannot be explained. Take for instance unpleasant tastes. I do not know of any theory that explains why some things are agreeable and some disagreeable. Tastes change, they can be cultivated, and these changes show that there is no absolute reason why one thing should be pleasant and another unpleasant. If we go back to a period where life is guided by instinct rather than reason, we find pleasantness or disagreeableness of taste corresponding to the healthfulness or unhealthfulness of food. You may recall how in *The Swiss Family Robinson* the monkey was used to test food and discover whether it was poisonous or not. It is possible that we may have some inherited reason for disliking the things that are unpleasant to us. But all this is mere conjecture.

When we turn to the question of evil as dependent upon sin, we have to notice first of all that according to some forms of religion all evil is the result of sin. This is true of both Buddhism and Parseeism; but whereas the Buddhist considers evil the result of the wrong-doing of the individual, the Parsee makes it the work of Ahriman, the personified power of evil. In his *Glaubenslehre* Schleiermacher recognizes all evil as the effect of sin except unavoidable imperfection and necessary stimulus.¹ His statement here is so vague that it amounts to nothing. By "unavoidable imperfection" I suppose he means in general the sort of imperfection that results from the differences in grade between men; those who are lower in the scale will lack some things which those who are higher will possess. But just what imperfection in any given case is unavoidable, I confess I do not fully understand. Neither is it clear what is to be understood by "necessary stimulus." We may have a general notion of the kind of evil that is needed as a stimulus, but when we undertake to draw the line,

¹ *Der Christliche Glaube*, §§ 62-75.

we find it impossible to say exactly what is necessary, the degree of the stimulus in every case depends so entirely upon the nature of the individual; the amount of temptation which will rouse one man to a noble life may have no effect upon another or may overpower a third. Consequently the temptation which each man is to meet would have to be proportioned to his nature, and we should have to have a separate universe for every individual exactly adapted to his need. Even then the conflict might remain doubtful, for who could make it certain that the stimulus would be maintained? The response which one or another makes to temptation and sorrow is like the response of a bell to the blow that is struck upon it. The bell should answer the blow with the music that is its natural note, but just as there may come a blow which will crack the bell, so that the reply thereafter will be only a dissonance, so the sorrows and temptations which come to men may overpower and crush them. We can reconcile this with our general principle only as we remind ourselves that men are to be measured, not by their apparent success or failure, but by the actual resistance that they offer to these assaults. The men who fought at Bunker Hill were no less heroes because they were defeated.

When all is said, however, sin must be regarded as the cause of the greater part of the unhappiness of the world. Not necessarily for the individual, for lives are different; to some men their greatest unhappiness comes through accident or mistake. But taking society as a whole, the greater part of unhappiness or evil results from sin. Evil of this sort falls into two divisions. In the first place there is the suffering which comes to the individual through the sins of others. We see the part that selfishness and injustice and greed have played, either positively or negatively, the oppression that exists in most civilized communities, the disregard of others' feelings, the failure to help where help is possible. If all these forms of sin were to be removed, we can easily see how much less of evil there would be. It is this that Spencer would bring about in that golden age to which I have already referred,¹ when men shall have become perfectly altruistic. Some indeed have held that such an altruistic state would be undesirable and

in itself an evil, on the ground that if life were to be freed from all struggle it would become dull and commonplace. Mill tells in his *Autobiography* how he was disturbed for a time by the question whether there would be anything left to live for when all the reforms that he had in mind should have been accomplished. He found comfort in reading Wordsworth, for he was thus brought into relation with the beauty of nature and made to see that life had an esthetic charm which would remain after the battle had been won. A life of esthetic contemplation, however, would be a life of rest and inaction, and the question arises whether no form of joyous activity would remain. An answer is suggested by the change which takes place in the course of the development of the world as life ceases to be driven and is instead attracted and led. Just as a man who is not obliged to labor with his hands in order to live nevertheless exercises his body of his own accord because he wishes to, so in the spiritual world men who are drawn by ideals of truth and goodness may still find opportunity for full activity, even when all hindrances have been overcome.

Perhaps even more important than the suffering which results for the individual from the sin of others is that which he experiences in consequence of the sin within himself, his own lack of right feeling. Some persons are all the time in an attitude of warfare; they think themselves persecuted, or they attribute false motives to those about them, or they dwell upon the evils of life. If one could only take whatever wrong or misfortune may come in a spirit of patience and forgiveness and trust, much of the evil of the world would be removed. In fact, if we should draw a line through society, leaving the greater part of the external happiness in life above, and the greater part of the seeming unhappiness below, we should very likely find more real happiness below the line than above it; the greatest happiness would be found not among those who appeared to be better off than their fellows, but among those whose circumstances appeared to be less fortunate. At all events, happiness and unhappiness do not correspond with external prosperity or adversity. The way in which a man takes things is a more important factor in his happiness than external circumstances.

ness than the things themselves. If we say that this is a matter of temperament, an inheritance, we merely carry the sin a little further back; instead of the man himself, it was some ancestor or ancestors who neglected the elements in life that we are now considering. Furthermore, while the question how far the individual can struggle against his temperament is to be determined only by experience, certainly something can be accomplished; the evil may be lessened by true feeling, it is immensely magnified by bad feeling.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE BREACH CAUSED BY SIN AND EVIL: BETWEEN MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT: BETWEEN MAN AND GOD.—THE MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF MAN TO HEAL THE BREACH: SACRIFICE: VICARIOUS SACRIFICE, REAL AND FORMAL.—THE MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF GOD TO HEAL THE BREACH: PENALTY.—RETRIBUTION AND REFORM.—THE NATURE OF THE PENALTIES FOR SIN.—THE FINAL HEALING OF THE BREACH.

EVIL and sin together constitute a breach between man and his environment, a breach of which some trace appears even in the very earliest times. In sin man sets himself up against his social and spiritual surroundings, and as he does this he feels that no sympathy exists for him any more than he in turn has sympathy for those against whom his hands are raised. The sense of separation increases with the awakening of conscience. Not only has he cast out the world, but the world has cast him out. What is true of sin is true of evil: evil also causes him to feel that he is not in accord with his environment.

The breach, however, is not merely with the environment. If the divinity is recognized either as the sum or expression of the environment, or as that which has made the environment what it is, the separation becomes a breach between man and the divinity. Of the elements that have entered into this breach there is first of all, in the case of the divinities that are considered friendly, the uncertainty whether their friendliness will continue; they are friendly so long as one keeps on the right side of them; yet the most friendly are capricious. In this capriciousness they are like the forces of nature, of which indeed they are often the embodiment or personification. The forces of nature favor us, but only so long as we keep them under control. Fire is a good

servant but a bad master. The elements are very restive under the yoke which man places upon them, and if at any moment he remits his care they rise and overpower him.

This characteristic of the divinity is distinctly recognized in a high sense in the teachings of the Chinese religion; in a certain high sense the gods are not to be trusted. That is to say, because a man has hitherto received favors, he may not therefore look for a continuance of them, except as he still does what is right. The same thought appears in the Hebrew phrase, that "God is no respecter of persons,"¹ used in the high moral sense that only so long as the individual does right will he be favored. In a similar way, but from a lower point of view, the conception of the divinity as no respecter of persons is found in religions of a lower order. Here each individual must keep the favor of the gods by fulfilling the required observances according to the required manner, or prosperity will fail; and a city that is wanting in proper devotion to its divinity is liable to the wrath of that divinity. There was often more danger in the rites themselves than in the performance of them. This was especially true of religious observances among the Romans, for the same minuteness that characterized their laws was carried into the forms of their religion. De Coulanges draws a vivid picture of the condition of things where men can never feel themselves free from danger from the malice or anger of some god, where among the multitude of divinities it is difficult to know precisely what divinity should be propitiated, or what methods or rites should be observed, and where any remissness or mistake will produce the same sort of peril that would result from a mistake in a matter of law.² No doubt De Coulanges exaggerates the feeling of fear in men who lived under such conditions. To take continued precautions against evil does not necessarily imply that one lives in terror of evil. We lock our doors without any special sense of a peril that must be warded off, and the general custom of insuring property does not mean that people are in constant terror of fire. Still there is much truth in the view that he has given. Religion of

¹ *Acts*, x, 34.

² *The Ancient City*, pp. 213-280.

this sort was to a large extent a source of fear, especially when it is remembered that to the anxiety lest the divinity might be offended was added the apprehension that he might be seduced by other worshippers and go over to the enemy. Thus the Vedic worshippers must be punctilious and lavish in their gifts of soma juice, or the divinities most trusted may help the enemy, provided that enemy gives more lavishly and regularly. This is the reason, it is said, why the divinities of cities often were not named; the name was kept a secret so that it might not be known to the enemy.

All these perils were connected with the divinities which were on the whole favorable. But, as a second element in the breach, there were also hostile divinities, on the one hand demons and other beings that were by their very nature enemies of man, and on the other hand the divinities of other peoples, the divinities of the enemy. When there was war upon earth, there was war also among the divinities, and the worshipper had to fear not only that he might lose the friendship of his divinity, but that his divinity might be overpowered by the mightier divinity of his enemy. Here again the comparison between these divinities and the forces of nature suggests itself. For there are natural forces which seem to be in themselves hostile to man, such as pestilence and tempest and earthquake, and between these and the forces that seem friendly men have to take their course, keeping those that are most friendly in subjection lest they go over to the enemy.

Thirdly, there is the element of fate, the sense of absolute limit, of a force that cannot be escaped, of a barrier against which men may beat but which they cannot pass, the consciousness of a power to whose decision even the gods themselves submit. As we see the various divinities representing one aspect or another of the forces that rule the world, we may almost regard the idea of fate as that of the undivided residuum of the divine might, not represented by any special form, but remaining after all these special forms have been constructed from it. Akin to the consciousness of fate is the thought of the jealousy of the gods, the feeling that

if any human being has prosperity beyond a certain point, the gods become jealous of him and bring suffering upon him. Thus Herodotus tells the story of how Amasis, the king of Egypt, refused to form an alliance with Polycrates on the ground that Polycrates was so prosperous that there must come to him some change of fortune. Such a view is not unnatural. In all games of chance a course of uninterrupted success is always followed by a succession of reverses, and so far as life may be considered a matter of chance rather than of skill, the same result may be expected. The ancient thought of the jealousy of the gods finds its counterpart in the proverb that we use so commonly, "pride goeth before a fall."

Finally there enters into the breach between man and his environment, or man and the divinity, the element of suffering and death. Suffering is obviously a form of evil, and of suffering death is the climax. It is true that it was met fearlessly in the ancient world. Often it was accepted in place of what would seem to us a much lighter evil. Among the Romans suicide not only was not uncommon but was considered often worthy of a certain reverence. We find even Epictetus using so light a comparison as to ask, "Is the house smoky? If only a little," he answers, "I will stay; if very smoky, I will go out. For you must always remember that the door is open."¹ Sometimes also the life after death is spoken of with enthusiasm. Thus we read of one who to reach Plato's Elysium leaped into the sea, and Cicero's exaltation in his treatment of this theme is familiar to us all.² Nevertheless, the attitude toward death was on the whole one of apprehension and dread. The life beyond was regarded as a place of shades, a world of unrealities. The most that men could hope for from death was peace. Furthermore, the apprehension was intensified by the thought of sin and the penalty for sin. No doubt sin in the thought of the ancient world was in part formal, but it would be a great mistake not to regard it as also to a certain extent real. Anything by which the gods were offended was regarded as sin, whether it was the omission of a

¹ *Discourses*, Book I, Chap. XXV.

De Senectute, XXI-XXIII.

form, or a mistake in some ceremonial, or what we should consider sin. It would be a grave mistake to eliminate this sense of sin, and to disregard its power in the lives of men.

There have been two methods of healing the breach. On the one hand is the attempt from man's side through sacrifice, and on the other a movement on the part of the divinity through penalty or retribution. Perhaps nothing is more often misunderstood than the term "sacrifice" and what it represents. It is often understood as the transference of a penalty, as though in sacrificing some animal a man conceived that although he himself deserved punishment, the punishment could be transferred to the animal, and thus the law be satisfied or the offended deity appeased while the man himself went free. Incidentally some such element may have entered into the thought of sacrifice, but if so it came in very late. If we ask what was the nature of sacrifice when men first began to offer it, we find that it was simply a gift to the divinity. There was no thought of a transference of sin or penalty, but the worshipper brought to the divinity something which he believed the divinity would like. In his relation with the divinity the man acted precisely as he would have done in relation to other men. If a man has offended his neighbor he seeks to do something that will please him; if it is a judge before whom he is being tried, he resorts to bribery; if some ruler is angry with him for good cause, and he wishes to remove his ill will, he makes him a present of a lamb or some other animal that is good for food. One may say that in a certain sense the animal has borne the man's fault, for the man was in fault and the animal has suffered in his stead. But the suffering of the animal has nothing to do with the result; the man simply presented the other person with something that he liked, and incidentally it happened that this something must be put to death before it could be presented. This is exactly what happens in the earlier sacrifice to the gods. The suffering and death of the animal are incidental to the offering, but not at all essential to it. A good illustration of the point that we are considering is found in the similarity that appears between offerings made to the spirits of the dead and

those made to the gods. Spencer uses this similarity as an argument to prove that all divinities were developed out of spirits of the dead.¹ As I have said elsewhere,² in the course of a somewhat fuller treatment of the question of sacrifice, Spencer's reasoning in regard to this matter seems to me entirely wrong, but it does illustrate the point that I am making, that the offerings made to the divinities were of the kind which were supposed to be pleasing to them, and if suffering and death were involved, it was only because the gift could not be made in any other way.

This is equally true of later forms of sacrifice. When the Hebrew psalmist represents God himself as urging the uselessness of animal sacrifice, saying "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee," and bidding the worshipper to offer "the sacrifice of thanksgiving,"³ it is plain that in the time of this writer at least the sacrifice was supposed to be simply an offering to the divinity of that which was acceptable to him. In the only instance in Hebrew ceremonial in which the sins of the offender are openly and obviously identified with the animal and are put upon it so that it becomes the bearer of them, this animal, the scapegoat, is not sacrificed but is sent out into the wilderness; it is to bear the sins away, not to suffer for them.⁴

The use of blood would seem to be one of the most obvious methods of connecting the sacrifice more closely with the person who is offering it. It reaches its most extreme development in the Taurobolium of the later Roman ceremonial.⁵ In this the worshipper places himself under a perforated platform upon which the victim is slaughtered, and as the blood runs through, the worshipper is literally bathed in it. This may have been only to identify as closely as possible the gift and the giver, so that the divinity should see the giver through the blood of the gift, and his satisfaction in the gift thus be made inseparable from satis-

¹ *The Principles of Sociology*, 3d ed., Vol. I, Chap. XIX.

² *The Gospel of Paul*, p. 12.

³ *Psalm* l.

⁴ *Leviticus*, xvi, 21.

⁵ Gaston Boissier, *La Religion Romaine*, Vol. I, p. 442.

faction with the giver. It is possible also that we have here an example of the principle to which W. Robertson Smith first called attention in the use of sacrifice to renew or intensify the sense of tribal community between the worshipper and the divinity.¹

The human sacrifice, in which the value of the offering reaches its consummation, offers no exception to the general principle. The sacrifice is still the gift to the divinity of that which shall be most pleasing and most serviceable to him. It is thus that the Chinese noble, in praying for the recovery of his sick brother, offers to die himself in his stead; the noble tells his ancestors not only that his brother is needed upon the earth, but that since he himself is accustomed to serve, he can be of more use to them in the heavenly state than his brother could be.² Furthermore, the fact that human sacrifices appear to have been made quite as often in times of joy as in times of disaster indicates that they were not offered with any idea of substitution.

In what I have been saying I have already suggested that there are two uses of the term "vicarious." A man may kill some pheasants and by the gift of them may appease his judge: the death of the pheasants may be said to have been in a sense vicarious, but it was not necessary to appease the judge. Suppose that a city is besieged and that the garrison make a sortie. Some of the men are killed, but the city is freed. These men who were killed suffered vicariously for all the rest, but their *death* was an incident only in what they did, for the enemy might have been driven away without any loss on the part of the besieged. On the other hand, if the enemy had given the town its freedom on condition that half a dozen, let us say, of its citizens should first have been put to death, the aspect of the sacrifice is entirely changed. In "real" vicariousness death is only incidental; where death is essential we have "formal" vicariousness. So far as ancient sacrifices appear to have been in any sense vicarious, their vicariousness was "real"; death was the incident and not

¹ *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, pp. 236 f., 257 f.

² *Shu-king*, Part V, Book VI.

the essential thing in the transaction. The view of sacrifice as formally vicarious crept into the Christian world in connection with certain theories in regard to the death of Christ. As the Church came to hold the doctrine that Christ vicariously and formally suffered for the sins of men, preceding sacrifices were explained on the same principle, and "real" terms concerning them were interpreted formally.

The second method of bridging the gulf between men and the divinity was by the act of the divinity, through penalty. Sacrifice attempted by perpetual offerings to keep the account square. Penalty wiped out the debt by exacting payment in full. Penalty is generally recognized under three aspects: first, as *warning*, where a person suffers for a crime in order that others may be deterred from it; second, as *retribution*; and third, as *reform*. The first aspect does not concern us here. We are considering penalty only as a method of healing the breach, and penalty considered as a warning does not affect the relations of the individual who has committed the crime; he is punished for the sake of others. We may notice in passing, however, that in the opinion of many people this is the only aspect in which penalty may properly be recognized by the state. According to their view the state has the right to do no more than is required for self-defence.

In approaching penalty in its second aspect, as retribution, we have to recognize the fact that there is in most men the feeling that sin deserves punishment. Often there is a sense of joy when the punishment has been inflicted. People who are in other respects sympathetic and affectionate show a certain exultation in the acute suffering of any one who has caused suffering in others. It is true that this sense is less keen today than in some former periods of the world's history, and that with the tendency to look upon punishment only as a means of reformation, many shrink from the thought of suffering, even in the case of those who are guilty. But to many healthy minds this leniency appears excessive. I shall not discuss the question here. It is enough for us to recognize the general prevalence of the sense of satis-

faction in the punishment of sin. However much it may have been mitigated in the progress of the years, either by true sentiment or by a false sentimentality, it still remains, and the mildest of philanthropists would probably feel something of a pang if the wrong-doer should go unpunished. Even the criminal himself shares the feeling; not infrequently a man gives himself up and makes confession of his guilt voluntarily, partly, it may be, because he fears discovery, but also because of the restlessness of conscience, the sense that the balance is against him, and that relief can come only when the balance is made right. This is perhaps the view that is commonly held in regard to penalty as retribution,—that it is a righting of the balance. It is the view that Hegel takes in general, but he adds something which, so far as I know, is peculiar to himself. Retribution, he suggests, recognizes to a certain extent the rights of the criminal. That is to say, it accepts the law which practically he himself has laid down.¹ "You believe in violence," it says to him. "Very well, let violence be the law, and we will apply it to you." It accepts the wrong-doer as his own arbiter, and makes him pronounce his own sentence. We have here an illustration of that irony which to a certain extent underlies the whole process of the Hegelian system. Each partial position is accepted and allowed to work itself out until, simply because it is partial, it works its own destruction.

It is possible that the demand for retribution may be allied to the instinct of self-preservation. This instinct intensifies itself into vengeance, blinds itself into justice. Altruism renders the feeling of the individual stronger against the wrongs done to others than against those done to himself; thus Jesus is indignant at the suffering of the poor and helpless, but prays God to forgive the men who are putting him to death. The question, however, for us to answer, but which I must leave for the time being unanswered, is whether there is an absolute basis for this feeling. It is one of the most difficult questions that we have to meet. If

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, W. Wallace, pp. 233, 243. *Werke*, Berlin, 1832, Vol. XII, p. 19.

a man has done wrong, how does his suffering right the wrong? How does the breach of a man's privilege in any way counter-balance the injury which he may have done to others? Yet a world in which there should be no retribution would seem to us a false world. In fiction, although poetic justice does not always demand that the innocent should be rewarded, it does invariably demand that crime shall meet its penalty. But what we demand of fiction is what we demand of life. We are willing that in fiction the innocent sufferer should sometimes fail of any compensation, because that is what we so often see in life. We demand that the guilty shall be punished, not because it is what we always see in life, but because it is what we demand of life.

As I have already suggested, however, there is a growing feeling that all punishment should aim at reform. It is this feeling which underlies the objection to the death penalty, and because of it no form of demagogism more quickly excites indignation than that which would forbid useful labor to the prisoner; to condemn a man to a life of idleness or of unproductive toil is to degrade him. But how does punishment reform? At first thought there seems to be something illogical in the idea, and this illogicalness is often urged against it. Here is a boy who is not fond of his books, or who has the habit of lying. The boy is whipped. What logical connection is there between his dislike of books or his habit of lying, and the whipping which is to correct him? It may be that through fear of another whipping the boy will study and will not allow himself to be caught lying, but has he become either studious or truthful? Have you not rather made him sullen or sly or craven? Without insisting on the advantage of this method, it is often found to produce an effect precisely the opposite of this, for instead of becoming sullen the boy who is punished becomes more tender-hearted and affectionate, and instead of losing his spirit he becomes more manly. There is a sense of justice in the boy, and he must not have reason to think that he has been punished unjustly. But if he recognizes the justice of the punishment, he bears no ill will; he takes account, also, of the feeling with which the punishment is given. Of course we see that children

made subject, or, perhaps better, abject; if the enemy preserves his pride, if he smiles serenely back, the vengeance is incomplete. Browning has given the classic example of such failure in the retribution of revenge in his *Instans Tyrannus*,¹ where the tyrant tries to smite down his enemy; but the enemy conquers, at first through his indifference, and then at the last through the prayer to God which causes the tyrant himself to fear. In the same way Prometheus conquers Zeus by remaining steadfast under his torment.

In the highest form of humiliation self is given up. The individual no longer constitutes himself the centre of the universe, but finds his life in the realities that are about him. Humility is a term that is often misunderstood. It is apt to bring to mind a person who is conscious of his own abasement or inferiority. But such self-consciousness really involves a certain pride. Why should this man compare himself with others? Why should he think of himself as inferior to others? Why should he refuse to sing because others may sing more skilfully? True humility is the self-forgetfulness of the child. It is to live in the realities that surround one, taking one's place naturally, without thought of its lowness. It is at this point that we return again to our doctrine of penalty as retribution, for at this point retribution and reform meet. Retribution seeks to accomplish by violence that which reform strives to make voluntary. Retribution would crush the individual who asserts himself against the universe, reform endeavors to bring him to the point at which he will gladly surrender himself.

What is the nature of the penalties for sin? They may be either artificial or natural, but of these the artificial penalties may be left out of account, at least for the present. For what we want to see is the inevitable connection between the sin and the penalty, and when the penalty is inflicted from without the inevitability of the connection is not apparent but the connection seems rather to be only accidental. The natural penalties for sin are those results to which the sin naturally leads. If a man is selfish and arbitrary, he becomes unlovable; people

¹ *Dramatic Romances*.

may serve him, but only because they must. If a man lies, he finds himself no longer believed, even when he may be telling the truth; his lies and his truthfulness alike fail him. In business dishonesty is the worst policy, for business is done on credit, and the dishonest man cannot maintain his credit. Again, if a man gives himself to intoxication and licentiousness, he is sapping the vitality of his physical and mental strength.

But real and terrible as these results of sin are, they still do not satisfy our demand for retribution. They sometimes fail, and what we demand is not only that the penalty shall be natural but that it shall be infallible. But the most selfish man is sometimes the most beloved. What an affection followed Napoleon! How his soldiers worshipped him! We may say that he was not wholly selfish, but the fact remains that he was largely selfish. We may say that people did not know how selfish he was, but that is not the question. Our point is only that here was a very selfish man who still was widely and greatly loved. Again, can we affirm that honesty is the best policy absolutely in this world? Suppose preachers to speak out this whole thought, would it be for their worldly good? Is not the person who is most successful very often the one who is not absolutely honest but "indifferent honest"? Certain men have been dishonest, and known to be dishonest, who nevertheless have acquired great wealth and have become leaders in the financial world. The man who is best adapted to his social environment is most often the one who succeeds, and the environment may determine the standard of his virtue. Finally, men may indulge in sensual excesses and still to all appearance preserve their vigor unimpaired.

If we turn to conscience, we find that its rebuke is also uncertain. Some of the best men in the world are those whose consciences trouble them the most; the higher a man's standard the more likely is he to have a keen and sensitive conscience. Conscience is also uncertain in that men are often more concerned because of petty weaknesses than on account of their graver wrongdoing.

Furthermore, the natural punishments are often disproporti-

tionate. A man's environment is made up of various strata or systems of laws, using the term "law" in the impersonal sense, and whatever the system that is violated, the man must expect to suffer the penalty. No matter what the spirit is in which the law is violated, whether ignorantly and without a purpose, or with a good purpose, or with a sinful purpose, the punishment comes in every case alike. It takes no account of motives, it regards only the facts. A child may fall into the fire through someone's carelessness, a man may enter into it to save another's life, and both are burned; the fire does not consider motives. Over-work of the eyes ruins them; Milton thus abuses his sight in a good cause, and he becomes blind. And in a similar way, if Socrates violates the ethical and religious laws of his environment and suffers, he suffers not because he is good, but because he has violated the public sentiment of his time. For what is true of physical law is also true when we rise above the realm of physical law and enter the realm of duty. There are lower duties and there are higher duties, and though it may be for the sake of a higher duty that we violate the lower, we must still pay the penalty.¹ It is in its recognition of this conflict between duties that Greek tragedy differs so widely from the modern drama. In the modern drama it is usually guilt which is punished as guilt, and the conflict is between guilt and innocence. In Greek tragedy we have to do not so much with guilt and its punishment as with the conflict between duties, the recognition of law above law. Orestes avenges his father but slays his mother. The gods have urged him on, but none the less he is pursued by his mother's furies. One may violate the law of the family for the law of the state, or the law of the state for the law of the family, but in either case the penalty must be paid.

Two elements, then, are necessary to the perfect punishment of sin,—certainty and proportionateness. Neither of these is fulfilled in the natural penalties. We find the complete punishment of sin only in sin itself, either a deeper sin or, if there is repentance, in the pain of the struggle with which sin is relin-

¹ C. C. Everett, *Science of Thought*, pp. 209-221.

quished. Either sin becomes fastened upon the sinner more terribly than before, or else he recognizes his sin and makes the wrong right, but only with suffering. Obviously this sort of punishment is both certain and proportionate. It may seem at first thought to lack the terror that punishment should carry with it. We may ask what fear a man who loves sin can have before a punishment which consists in fastening sin upon him. But have we not here a hint of the terrible nature of the punishment, that a man's whole being should become so degraded as to lose its dread of spiritual death? It is a fearful thing to be conscious of one's own degradation. But suppose that that very consciousness is lost! No doubt there may be less pain in consequence, but the spectacle will not be on that account more cheering. A man cruelly wounded may rejoice in the cessation of his pain, when the physician sees in it only the beginning of mortification and death. The question whether the punishment of sin may ever become capital, so that the whole spiritual life is at an end, is one which we cannot attempt to answer here. But the thought of such a possibility may account in large measure for the horror of sin that is felt by the healthy spirit.

From a wholly different point of view a punishment of sin is found in the loneliness which results when in the extreme of selfishness the individual has cut himself off from that communion with his fellows and the world in general which constitutes the true life of men. It is true that there is also a loneliness of holiness, the loneliness of the saint. But this is not a real loneliness. For the love of the individual still goes forth and embraces even those who are most opposed to him; although others may not recognize him as their fellow, he still feels himself one in the great body of mankind. The real loneliness is that which a man makes for himself when his own sympathies are so shut in that there is no exit for them, when there is no play for the great beatings of the heart. That is the absolute loneliness. Repentance may indeed replace it, or interrupt the progress toward it, but the struggle of the individual in the attempt to rise will correspond to the degree of his sin.

We have recognized the existence of a breach between man and his environment. We have seen how attempts have been made to heal this breach through sacrifice, and how the gulf has been bridged in a negative sense through retribution. But the breach itself still remains; the blood of bulls and goats cannot take away sins.¹ We come now to the point where we must recognize the fact that suddenly there appeared in the world a religion bearing certain marks which differentiated it from all the religions that had preceded it. In the first place it was a religion without the rites of sacrifice. Secondly, whereas in the classic religions especially the element of fate was present, in this religion we find instead a recognition of providence. Thirdly, suffering, hitherto looked upon as one of the chief elements in the breach, is now accepted and glorified. Finally, death, which has been feared as the great enemy of man, is welcomed with joy.

In the palace of the Vatican there is a long gallery in which the opposite walls are covered, one with inscriptions from the pagan columbaria, the other with inscriptions from the Christian tombs. On the one side we read again and again the words "In Pace"; on the other wall, "In Spe." In Spe. The element of hope has entered, and men are enabled to regard death as a blessing. Obviously in some way or other the breach has been healed. Something has been done, or men believe that something has been done, which has closed it. We enter here upon the third general division of our examination. In the first division we have considered the moment of *affirmation*,² and in the second the moment of *negation*.³ We have now to consider the moment of *reconciliation*.

¹ *Hebrews*, x, 4.

² Chapters I–XI.

³ Chapters XII–XXIV

CHAPTER XXV.

THE THIRD GENERAL DIVISION OF THE DISCUSSION: RECONCILIATION.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT.—THE “*CUR DEUS HOMO*” OF ANSELM.—PETER LOMBARD AND THOMAS AQUINAS.—THE REFORMATION.—THE SOCINIAN AND GROTIUS.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT AS INVOLVING THE PRINCIPLE OF VICARIOUS SUFFERING.—THE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TOWARD VICARIOUS SUFFERING: THE EXPLANATION OF IT SUGGESTED BY COMTE’S THEORY OF THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

IT may seem as though we were only now beginning our examination of the content of Christian faith. But that content is both general and special, and in its general aspect it involves all the various questions that we have been considering. Of the doctrines that are specifically Christian we find that in the history of the Church three have been regarded as fundamental, the doctrine of the Incarnation, the doctrine of the Atonement, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Of these the doctrine of the Incarnation is the most fundamental. For the doctrine of the Atonement to a large extent has been developed in order to account for the doctrine of the Incarnation. God became flesh; for this mighty act there must have been some adequate motive; this motive is found in the theory of the Atonement. Anselm brings this out most strikingly in his great treatise on the Atonement, *Cur Deus Homo*. The doctrine of the Trinity appears also to have grown out of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

Although the doctrine of the Incarnation is the more fundamental, we shall find it helpful to study the doctrine of the Atonement first. At the very outset, however, we have to observe that

there is no orthodox doctrine of the Atonement. That is to say, no one form of the doctrine has been recognized so long or so invariably as to claim for itself the authority of the Church. The one thing to which the Church has held throughout is that in some way or other man is saved through Christ, and that in this work of salvation the death of Christ has been a very important element. But the great question remains, *how* does Christ save the soul, and to this question there have been various answers. Down to the time of Anselm the leading thought is that Christ saved man from the devil by giving himself into the devil's power; in seizing the body of Christ the devil committed an act of such unrighteousness that he lost his power over the souls of men. By violating the law of God man had come into the power of the devil. Not that the devil had really any right over him; the right was only in seeming, for both the devil and man were rebellious servants. If, now, the devil could be induced to overstep his rights, man would be freed from any appearance of duty to the devil. This is effected by the incarnation. The divine man appears among men, wholly sinless, and offers himself in the way of the devil. It is like bait upon a hook. The devil seizes this bait and himself becomes the prey. To state it more generally, the devil, by causing the death of an innocent soul, loses his power over all who identify themselves with Christ by putting their trust in him. This is the view that is taken by Augustine, who states it very clearly.¹ He emphasizes the thought that the devil was to be conquered, not by the power of God, but by the justice of God,² that men might see the importance of acting with justice rather than injustice. Although nothing was found in Christ worthy of death, the devil slew him. Therefore it was just that those debtors of his should be freed who believed on him whom without any debt he had killed. Thus it is, Augustine adds in a most impressive manner, that we are said to be justified in the blood of Christ.³ It may be said in passing that passages in *Colossians*⁴ and *Hebrews*⁵ possibly furnished some ground for this

¹ *De Trinitate*, IV, xiv, etc.

² XIII, xiii.

³ XIII, xiv.

⁴ *Colossians*, ii, 15.

⁵ *Hebrews*, ii, 14.

view of the atonement, although they should be explained otherwise.

With the teaching of Anselm, in his *Cur Deus Homo*, we reach a turning-point in the development of the doctrine. Ever since Anselm the view that he held has been the germ of those views which have the strongest claim to be considered orthodox. At the same time his statement of the theories that were current in his day as to the nature of the work of Christ illustrates what I have said of the absence of any distinctively orthodox doctrine in regard to it. The treatise of Anselm is written in the form of a conversation; a monk is introduced, as a learner rather than a controversialist, who proposes the questions which Anselm answers. Quite early in the treatise Anselm insists upon the fitness of the method by which the Deus-homo saved men. Since it was through a woman that man had been lost, it was fitting that he should also be saved through a woman, and since it was through the enjoyment of the tree that the devil had conquered, it was fitting that the devil should be conquered by the passion of the tree. At this point Anselm recognizes that man should properly be the servant of whoever should save him. Then follows a most interesting statement of the things from which man is held to have been saved by the death of Christ,—his own sins, the divine anger, hell, the power of the devil.¹ The list shows plainly how conflicting are the theories of the time as regards the atonement, and how prominent still is the idea of salvation from the power of the devil. It is also plain from the references made by Anselm that the theory was still prevalent that it was proper that the devil should have been conquered by the justice of God, and also the theory that although man deserved punishment, the devil had no right over him, because both were the servants of God.²

In the eighth section of the first book we are told that God did not really suffer. When we say that the Deus-homo suffered, we understand that the suffering was only in respect of his human substance. But ought God to have caused an innocent one to suffer? He suffered willingly, is the reply. Still, it is urged, he

¹ Book I, § vi.

² Book I, § vii.

was commanded to suffer. Jesus owed obedience to God, is the further reply,¹ but not to death, for only one who had sinned deserved death. Therefore death was not required of Christ. Yet God could not free man without it, though he did not ask the sacrifice, and Christ, knowing the desire of God, freely gave himself. It was because Christ wished to save man that God gave him the command. Christ's will to save man ran in advance of the expressed will of God, and just as we tell a person how to do a thing which we know that he longs to do and which we consider desirable, so God laid his command upon Christ as the direction by which he might perform that which he himself desired to accomplish.² We are told further that no mere man can be free from sin, nor can he be blessed without this freedom. This leads to the fundamental question,³ what is sin? Sin, we are told, consists in withholding from God that which is his due. What is God's due? That the entire will of the rational creature should be subject to the will of God. The will to accomplish this subjection pleases God even if one is unable to carry it out. Whoever does not do this takes honor from God, and this is to sin.

But why does not God forgive sin outright?⁴ It is a very different thing, is the reply, for the private individual to forgive offences against himself and for the ruler of a kingdom to do so. For if the ruler were thus to forgive offences, disorder would be introduced into the kingdom, and justice be made less free than injustice. Yet God commands us to forgive? Yes, but it is because vengeance belongs to God alone. But if God is free and wholly loving, why can he not forgive? Liberty is for what is fitting, and benignity does not imply anything that is unworthy of God. Whatever God wills is right. Yet if God should will that which is wrong, the fact that he had willed it would not make the wrong right; it would show that God was no longer God. Nothing is less to be borne than that honor should be taken away from God.⁵ For if there is no punishment, God shows himself either unjust, or else impotent to preserve his honor or to avenge

¹ Book I, § ix.

² Book I, § x.

³ Book I, § xi.

⁴ Book I, § xii.

⁵ Book I, § xiii.

the loss of his honor. But if God loses his honor, does he regain it by punishment?¹ God does not lose it, is the reply. Either man pays it voluntarily, or God takes it by force. Can God suffer his honor to be lessened at all?² No one can really add to or take from God's honor. He who serves God is said to honor him, and he who does not serve him is said not to honor him, but in reality neither affects God's honor.

In the sixteenth section the question is approached from a new point of view. God will restore the number of the fallen angels from man. Why not create new angels to fill the place of those who have fallen?³ New ones would not be on the same footing, is the not very obvious reply. Then will there be in the future more saints than there were bad angels?⁴ Apparently there will be. But if men are to replace the fallen angels they must be like the good angels.⁵ Is this possible for those who have sinned unless satisfaction has been paid? What, then, shall be the satisfaction?⁶ Satisfaction should be more than what is due. The Bible promises forgiveness upon repentance, but this promise holds only for those who have looked for Christ or have received him.

In the twenty-first section one of the most fundamental questions is presented. Of what weight is sin? We are told that if one tells you to look one way and God says "No," it would be better that the universe should perish than that you should disobey God. Furthermore, the satisfaction must be more than the sin; the whole universe would not balance sin, and the satisfaction must be more than the balance. Man was placed in Paradise without sin, to live aright and to shame the devil, but he yielded to the devil.⁷ If man could not stand then, what can he do now? By conquering the devil man must restore to God what he took from him in yielding to the devil.⁸ Man cannot be saved without paying what he owes. But how is this to be done? Only through Christ.⁹

¹ Book I, § xiv.

² Book I, § xv.

³ Book I, § xvii.

⁴ Book I, § xviii.

⁵ Book I, § xix.

⁶ Book I, § xx.

⁷ Book I, § xxii.

⁸ Book I, § xxiii.

⁹ Book I, §§ xxiv, xxv.

At the beginning of the second book it is stated that man was created righteous in order that he might be happy by enjoying God, and that if he had not sinned he would not have died.¹ In the resurrection body man must be what he would have been if he had not sinned. For God must finish what he began; it is foreign to God that any rational nature should wholly perish.² This is a very strong statement,—stronger, no doubt, than Anselm intended. But if God acts thus by a necessity of his nature, why should we be grateful? Although he acts by necessity, is the reply, he still acts also from love.³ One must be able to give to God more than all besides.⁴ But no one can do this except God, and no one is bound to do it except man. Therefore it must be done by the God-man. Here we have the kernel of the whole discussion. In the God-man the two natures must be perfectly united and each must be perfect in itself.⁵ There are four ways in which the Deus-homo could be produced; from the union of man and woman in the ordinary manner of birth; from earth, like Adam; from man alone, like Eve; from woman alone. The last way has not been tried, and it is well to try it; and furthermore since sin has come from woman, so let redemption also come from woman, that woman may not despair.⁶ Why should it be the second person of the Trinity rather than the first who enters into the union? Because if the Father had become incarnate, there would have been two grandchildren in the Trinity. The Father would have been the grandchild of Mary's father, and the Son would have been the grandchild of Mary. This would be unfitting. Moreover it is more fitting that the Son should pray to the Father than that the Father should pray to the Son.⁷

Christ was under no obligation to die, for Christ could not sin. But if this is so, why should we honor him for his holiness? God and the angels cannot sin, is the answer, and yet we honor them.⁸ Is not the Deus-homo mortal because of the human part? Not necessarily, for if Adam had not sinned he would not have been

¹ Book II, §§ i, ii.

² Book II, §§ iii, iv.

³ Book II, § v.

⁴ Book II, § vi.

⁵ Book II, § vii.

⁶ Book II, § viii.

⁷ Book II, § ix.

⁸ Book II, § x.

mortal. Christ is free to die or not to die. But if man fell through pleasure, is it not fitting that he should be saved through suffering?¹ After a consideration of the possibility of the divine suffering,² the question is asked whether Christ put on ignorance as well as mortality. The reply is that all was done of his own knowledge.³

How can the death of Christ suffice for the sins of the world? Would you slay him knowingly, is the counter-question, to escape the guilt of the world? No. Then his life is immeasurably more precious than all, and outweighs all. You would willingly take upon yourself all the other sin of the world to escape the sin of knowingly putting to death the God-man.⁴ How is it, then, with those who killed him? Are they not beyond the possibility of redemption? They did it ignorantly?⁵ How is it with those who were born before Christ? They also share in the benefit of his death.⁶ In the discussion in regard to freedom which follows,⁷ an interesting circle occurs: Christ could be born only of a pure virgin; the virgin could be pure only through the death of Christ; therefore Christ must die in order that it might be possible for him to be born.

The Deus-homo ought not to be without remuneration. If nothing is given to him he will seem to have done his work in vain. Yet what can the Father give him? However, he can transfer his merit to others, and to whom should he transfer it rather than to men. God can reject no one who comes in his name.⁸ After a discussion, first of the divine mercy, and then of the question whether the fallen angels as well as men are reconciled to God in the death of Christ, the argument ends with the conclusion that everything in the Old and New Testaments is justified.⁹

I have dwelt upon this treatise of Anselm's at such length because of its importance in showing both how late was the development of the doctrine of the atonement and how loosely it was

¹ Book II, § xi.

² Book II, § xii.

³ Book II, § xiii.

⁴ Book II, § xiv.

⁵ Book II, § xv.

⁶ Book II, § xvi.

⁷ Book II, §§ xvii, xviii.

⁸ Book II, § xix.

⁹ Book II, §§ xx-xxii.

held even then. There is a certain grandeur in the argument in spite of what seems to us the pettiness in some of the questions and answers. We need not notice here the contradictions of a superficial nature which occur. But a more fundamental difficulty is found in the statement, first that man must pay the debt, and then that the Deus-homo can transfer his merit to man. What is more important to notice, however, is the precise manner in which Anselm views the atonement. He regards it rather as a transfer of merit than as a satisfaction or penalty suffered for another, and it was the great merit of Jesus in undergoing what was for him a needless death which deserved reward. The element of sacrifice has its place in the discussion, but this other element appears to be more prominent. The use which Anselm makes of the thought is illustrated in his *Admonitio Morienti*,¹ when he says, "I offer his merit for the merit which I should have but have not." Sin, according to Anselm, is a mere negation; he uses the figures of a beast without a chain, a ship without a helm; that which is absent constitutes the sin.² As regards Anselm's central doctrine, what surprises us is that he does not support it by any Biblical authority; he assumes from the New Testament the fact of an atonement, but the form, the method, of this atonement he constructs for himself on general grounds. Ritschl calls attention to the fact that Anselm's theory was in accordance with the Germanic law, by which either the wrong-doer might be punished or satisfaction made,—a principle foreign to either Greek or Roman law.³

According to the view of the atonement held by Peter Lombard,⁴ justification takes place in two ways: the love of God removes sin, and Christ frees men from the power of the devil by suffering death. The devil had rushed into the strong man's house, seized us as vessels and filled us with bitterness, but God poured out the bitterness and filled the vessels with sweetness. Christ offered

¹ *Opera*, p. 194.

² *De Casu Diaboli*, X-XI.

³ *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3d Ed., Vol. I, p. 40.

⁴ *Sententiarum Libri Quatuor*, Lib. III, "De Incarnatione Verbi."

himself to the Trinity and not to the devil, although primarily the devil supposed that he could get Christ into his power as a man, and being thus deceived lost his apparent power over man.

When we come to Thomas Aquinas, we find that his views in regard to the atonement are somewhat confused.¹ He seems to be trying to bring together certain elements which do not belong together. The method recommends itself to us, he says, because it commends God's love to us and gives us an example. Again, man is bound by sin both to God and to the devil, to God as judge and to the devil as tormenter, man is to be redeemed out of regard to God, not out of regard to the devil. Again, the devil puts to death Christ who did not deserve it. And again, Christ's death frees from punishment for sin in two ways: first, directly, because through the infinite nature of Christ the satisfaction given is more than enough, and secondly, indirectly, through its influence upon man. Thus three elements are presented,—the satisfaction that is given to God, the price paid to the devil, and the subjective influence upon man himself. Of these the price paid to the devil and the subjective effect are on the whole brought out most distinctly. In the matter of the infinite sacrifice Thomas Aquinas is opposed by Duns Scotus, who insists that it was not God who suffered, but Christ's mortal body.²

I will not dwell longer upon these earlier statements. The Reformation gathered up all the scattered elements. It welded together and wrought out the whole system of doctrine into sharpness and definiteness. Together with the doctrine of the Trinity the doctrine of the Atonement was developed. Luther added what had been lacking in the argument of Anselm. Anselm had not made it clear why the death of Christ was pleasing to God. Luther shows how Christ in his own person should not suffer, but because he took upon himself the sin of the world, therefore he must hang upon the cross. Forsaken of God for a little while, he bears on his body the sin of all, and atones for them with

¹ *Summa Theologica*, Part III, Q. XLVI-XLIX.

² R. Seeberg, *Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus*.

his own blood. Luther brings out the relation of Christ to the individual sinner with a peculiar distinctness and picturesqueness. When Christ came into the world, he says, God threw upon him all our sins, saying "Thou art David, thou art Paul," etc. As regarded Biblical authority, Luther found to a certain extent what he was looking for in *Galatians*, iii, 13.

It often happens that just when an organization is complete, it begins to fall to pieces, and hardly does the doctrine of the Atonement reach its full development before a process of disintegration begins. This is due in large part to the work of Socinus and his followers. First they insisted that Christ could not have offered an infinite sacrifice for sin. For Christ suffered only for a very short time, and the most intense suffering for a limited period is as nothing compared with the eternal suffering to which man was liable. If it is said that the suffering is greater in so far as he who suffers is infinite, so also is the power to endure the suffering greater. But even the suffering of an infinite being cannot take the place of eternal suffering. Furthermore, if it is granted that Christ has offered infinite atonement, it is impossible to speak of the forgiveness of God, or of man's gratitude, for before God remitted the penalty he had required an absolute satisfaction. Here, however, an antinomy must be recognized which may affect the strength of this position. If Christ is considered distinct from God, the Socinian argument holds; in that case man would owe no gratitude to God. But if the Son is regarded as God, and if the penalty was owed to him as well as to the Trinity, then the aspect of the case is somewhat changed.

In the third place the Socinians urged that the law was no longer binding; since the penalty for sin had been paid in full, man had full liberty to do what he would. Within certain limits Paul had said this very thing as strongly as it could be said. But the Socinians went beyond Paul. For whereas Paul had declared simply that the redeemed were no longer under the law but under grace, and that they had no disposition to do wrong, the Socinians insisted,—and this was the fourth point in their argument,—that since the offering of Christ was absolute and

infinite it included all, and universal salvation must follow. In other words, God had no right to add further conditions. The whole price had been paid, past, present, and future, and all debtors were now free. For suppose a number of us had owed a great debt to an earthly creditor, and someone had paid it all, what right would the creditor have to make further conditions? It might be suggested, in defence of the original doctrine, that the person who had paid the debt might possibly have a right to make conditions. But this involves a complexity of relations into which I will not enter.

The argument of the Socinians was very ingenious. It threw the emphasis on the moral effect of the death of Christ. As applied to the various aspects of the doctrine of the Church, considered in its absoluteness, it put the whole matter in a new light. But if their criticism was ingenious, it was not more so than the defence that was made by Grotius.¹ Grotius was a writer on international law, and he approached the question from the point of view of a student of law. He urged that the very term "satisfaction" in itself destroyed the force of the Socinian criticism. For "satisfaction" is that which is accepted in the place of that which is required. In accepting something as satisfaction you do not consider that you have received again precisely what you have lost. Christ by his suffering had not made absolute payment, but had done that which God was willing to accept as satisfaction in the place of that which was required. It is as though some one had paid a part of our debt, saying to our creditor, "I will pay you this if you will call the account square." In such a case the creditor would still have the right to make conditions.

Let us look again at the arguments of the Socinians. The first was that Christ could not have offered an infinite sacrifice. Grotius admits this. In the second place the Socinians argued that no room remained for forgiveness or for gratitude. Grotius replies that there has been forgiveness and there is a place for gratitude, because a part of the debt has been remitted. In answer

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1879, CXLI-CXLIV, trans. with notes by F. H. Foster.

to the remaining arguments, that the law is no longer binding and that universalism must result, Grotius argues that only those who conform to the conditions which God still has the right to impose are to receive the benefit of the transaction. Thus on the one hand the peril of universalism is avoided, and on the other hand the conditions may be such that those who share the fruit of the transaction may be either those upon whom the law is binding, or those whose spirits shall have become so transformed that they have no need of the law.

If it is asked why there should be any penalty, why forgiveness should not be absolute, the reply is that this would dishonor the law. Enough must be demanded to make the law respected by men and angels. If this has been done, no more need be required. We often find in history instances where great numbers of people have joined in some rebellion or riot, and have rendered themselves liable to the extreme penalty of the law. In such cases, if all were punished, a whole community might be depopulated, and yet if all were forgiven men might assume that mobs could gather and do violence with impunity. Consequently two or three of the ring-leaders are shot or hung or otherwise made an example. In this way enough is done to show that the law is not a dead letter. It may be said that this is illogical, and so it is. But the practice of the world often is illogical. It is illogical, if ten men or a hundred are guilty, to select two or three who alone are to be punished. Yet although in such cases the satisfaction has not been complete, the dignity of the law has been sustained. This theory of Grotius, known as the "governmental theory," is the more interesting because later we find it entering so largely into New England theology. Thus Edwards argues that God could not be just to himself unless there be an atonement which would lead to a repentance and humiliation and sorrow proportionate to the majesty insulted. The atonement could be dispensed with if this repentance could come from the heart of man, but that is impossible.¹ And Park says, that with-

¹ *Miscellaneous Observations on Important Doctrines*, "Of Satisfaction for Sin," §§ 1-3.

out the atonement God would be unjust to himself and to his law.¹

The change to this position of Grotius from that of Anselm is great. With Anselm God and his honor are all in all, and satisfaction is to be rendered in order that honor may not be withheld from God. With Grotius the transaction has taken place for the sake of the universe, that government and the respect for government may be maintained. Baur, whose history of the doctrine of the atonement² seems to me one of the most fascinating works on the history of theology ever written, argues that in taking this position Grotius has yielded the whole field to the Socinians. For they held that the effect of the death of Christ upon the believer was subjective and moral, and this is practically the ground taken by Grotius when he admits that the demand of the law is not fully met, and that the object of the atonement is to make men reverence the law. Foster, the translator of Grotius, replies to this criticism that it does not meet the case, because, he says, if there were but one sinner in the world, it would still be as important that something should be done to satisfy the law as though there were an infinite number of individuals.³ But to narrow the field in this way does not seem to me to affect the argument, or to remove Baur's objection. At the same time it must be granted that Baur does not do Grotius full justice. The atonement is required, not that God may seem just, but that he may be seen to be just. If it were only that he might seem just, the effect would be subjective, and Baur's criticism would be justified. But in so far as the transaction takes place in order that God may be seen to be just, the actual presence of a certain amount of objective justice is implied, and therefore in this aspect the atonement looks law-ward if not God-ward. Of the two elements in the manifestation of the divine justice, Baur recog-

¹ Introductory essay to *Discourses and Treatises* by Edwards, etc., pp. 444, 521, 156.

² F. C. Baur, *Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*.

³ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1879. Also *A Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ*, Andover, 1889, Translator's notes, pp. 300-301.

nizes the element of manifestation, but he fails to see that the very term "manifestation" implies that there is something to be manifested. Take the case of the rioters to which I have referred. When two or three out of all the number are selected for punishment, we do not say that this is done in order that the law may seem to be executed, but that it may be seen to be executed. Thus the law is really honored. If the men, instead of being put to death, were smuggled off into another country and then the announcement was made that all had been put to death, the law would seem to have been honored. But when the chosen men are put to death, then the law is seen to be honored, because up to a certain point real satisfaction has been rendered.

In order to criticise understandingly the various forms in which the doctrine of the Atonement is presented, one has to go behind them and consider a principle which all involve, the principle of vicarious suffering. I have already had occasion to refer to the distinction between real and formal vicarious suffering.¹ A further distinction must be made between the two kinds or degrees of formal vicarious suffering, the first where the guilty suffer for the guilty, as in the case of the rioters, and the second where the innocent are made to suffer for the guilty. A number of examples are given to illustrate this second kind of formal vicarious suffering, and to advocate its reasonableness. Not all of them apply accurately, but perhaps accuracy is not required in such a case. Thus there is the story of the king whose son had been sentenced to the loss of both his eyes. The king has one of his own eyes put out and one of his son's. Here the intent of the law was blindness, but no one was made blind. The best of these examples is a recent one,—the story of the way in which Mr. Alcott² undertook to punish the boys in his school at Concord. Mr. Alcott made the rule that if any boy did wrong, the boy should whip him. Here the law was justified, for there was no violation of it without a penalty. Obviously the experiment was not a safe one. Yet we must recognize the fact that under the circumstances there was a real power in this method of car-

¹ Pages 289-292.

² A. Bronson Alcott.

rying out the law by such a transfer of the punishment, and it is not an objection to it that the boy did suffer after all in seeing the master bear the punishment which he himself had deserved. It is sometimes said of the doctrine of the Atonement that in allowing the suffering of the innocent for the guilty it tends to make men selfish and at ease in their sin. This may be true in the case of mean natures, but in proportion as the heart is generous and gentle it would more naturally be conquered by the love which is thus manifested.

When we read the stories of the transference of suffering from the guilty to the innocent in the past, we can enter to a certain extent into the spirit of them, and we can admire the unselfishness that led to the sacrifice. But we should feel quite differently if such transference were to be attempted at the present day. If nowadays a criminal were to be condemned to death, and it should be proposed that his wife be allowed to suffer in his place, or if Lincoln, instead of being killed incidentally, had offered to die on condition that full amnesty should be given to the South, we should protest. We should say that the crime would not be atoned for but only increased by this sort of transference. The law of righteousness would not be vindicated but only more deeply violated. How do we explain this change of feeling?

We may be helped to understand it by Comte's theory of the human understanding.¹ According to this theory there are three stages in human history, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. In the theological stage all that takes place is explained as resulting from the activity of supernatural spirit. The metaphysical stage is not so clearly defined, but in general it may be said that it is the stage in which there is the recognition of something behind and beyond the physical form, an entity distinct from the thing itself. It is the stage of a scholastic realism. Such terms as "attraction" and "gravitation" are used as expressing some generalization, and not as suggesting the cause of the phenomena. In the third or positive stage the metaphysical entity is dropped; we have to do only with phe-

¹ *Positive Philosophy*, Book VI, Chap. VI.

nomena and do not go behind our experience. Now in the metaphysical stage sin and penalty are regarded as entities which may be separated from personality, and therefore it makes little difference in this stage of thought, so long as penalty is inflicted, whether or no the same person who has committed the sin also bears the penalty. But at the present time sin and penalty are regarded as personal, and the penalty must be inflicted not on *a* person but on *the* person who has deserved it. There is, however, one survival of the theory of sin as an entity. A fine may still be paid by an innocent man on behalf of a guilty man, and whenever this is done we have still the satisfaction of the law through a punishment for sin which is borne by some one other than the person who has been guilty of the sin; the sin and the penalty are separated from personality.

CHAPTER XXVI.

MODERN THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT: MCLEOD CAMPBELL AND DORNER; BUSHNELL AND NEWMAN SMYTH.—THE PAULINE VIEW.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY: DORNER AND SHEDD; THE ARGUMENT FROM THE NEW TESTAMENT.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION: DORNER AND RITSCHL.—THE NATURE OF JESUS AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT CONSIDERED AS THE ARRIVAL OF THE SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLE IN THE WORLD AT COMPLETE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

WHEN we turn to modern theories of the Atonement we find that the subject is approached from one or the other of two opposite points of view. According to the first view the work of Christ is accomplished through his identification with man; the second view emphasizes his identification with God. Of those who represent the first view, McLeod Campbell¹ takes as the basis of his theory that idea of freedom of the will as demanding a pre-existing state which to Edwards appeared to be a *reductio ad absurdum*.² According to Campbell there must be an *amen* from the heart of man to the condemnation of sin by God. No man could have this profound sense of the evil of sin. But Christ, identifying himself with man, can recognize fully the true nature of sin and utter the *amen* to God's condemnation, and thus he accomplishes for man the response that is required of him. A similar view is taken by Dorner.³ Christ so identifies himself with men through sympathy that he takes upon himself the sense of sin which should be theirs, and

¹ J. McLeod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement*.

² Page 215. Also C. C. Everett, *The Gospel of Paul*, pp. 90-91.

³ *System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II, pp. 650-652.

by his love includes all others in his act. As he cannot be thought of without man, so man cannot be thought of without him. Thus the penitence, if we may so speak, of Christ covers the sin of man.

According to both these writers Christ accomplishes his work through his humanity; identifying himself with man, he approaches God from the man-ward side. Of those who take the other view by which the identification of Christ with God is emphasized, Bushnell, in his *Vicarious Atonement*, advances a purely subjective theory which is akin to the Socinian view. Later, however, he felt the need of something more objective, and in *Forgiveness and the Law* he argues that the greatest love is called forth by suffering for the one loved, and that God so suffered in Christ that his love for man became such that he could forgive his sin. As I have said before, Bushnell is a great preacher, but as a theologian his method is uncertain. In this case, we feel that it must have been an absolutely profound love from the first that called forth the suffering, and therefore the love was the cause rather than the effect of the suffering. Newman Smyth, in *The Orthodoxy of Today* takes a view which is similar to that of Bushnell, so far as concerns the emphasis upon the approach from the God-ward side. But Smyth is more profound than Bushnell, and more in accord with the early view of the Atonement. God cannot forgive sin without suffering for it. Yet God cannot suffer in himself, but only in some outgoing of himself. The suffering is thus not something designed primarily for its effect upon the sinner, but necessary to God in order that he may forgive.

The two views as exemplified in Campbell and Dorner on the one hand, and on the other hand in Bushnell and Smyth, have nothing in common except that they complement each other. Both views suggest certain questions. Thus one may ask of Campbell and Dorner why it was necessary that a divine being should identify himself with man in order to respond to God's condemnation of sin. Why would not a sinless man be sufficient? If the reply is that only an infinite nature could thoroughly un-

derstand the infinitude of sin, the further difficulty arises that there are two standards for the measurement of sin. Which of these is to be used?—the infiniteness of God, against whom sin is committed, or the finiteness of man who commits the sin? On the other hand, if we turn to Bushnell and Smyth, we may question why there should have been any identification with man if all that was needed was that God should suffer, whether in himself or through some outgoing of himself.

In *The Pauline Theology* of Stevens an attempt is made to reconcile the two views, and to show the necessity of both the divine and the human elements. I will not dwell upon it, nor is it necessary to mention here other recent books in which the theory of the Atonement is discussed. They illustrate still further the fact that no one theory can claim the authority of the general consent of the Church. In all branches of the Church at present the feeling is common that there is no need of any precise theory,—that it is enough that the individual should feel that in some way Christ has done something which makes salvation possible. This position is not illogical. It puts faith in the person of Christ in place of faith in any special act, and this is a natural outgrowth from the theology of the school of Schleiermacher, in which the person of Jesus is the only distinct reality.

Of all the different writers no one makes any claim that his special views represent the teachings of the New Testament. In most cases little attention is paid to them.¹ Where there is any direct reference to them, the attempt is too often made to read into the words a meaning that shall support the theory which has been assumed. But as a rule each writer begins with the fact of the Atonement, and asks in what way the death of Christ could have made forgiveness easier. Then he seeks to devise a scheme which shall answer this question satisfactorily. If, how-

¹ An interesting example of this inattention occurs in the conflict between Bushnell's theory that the suffering of God called forth the love which made forgiveness possible, and the passage in the *Gospel according to John* (John, iii, 16) in which it is said that "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son."

ever, we turn to the New Testament, and especially to Paul's writings, we find that they present two aspects of the Atonement. The first is merely formal. It appears in passages like that in *Romans*, iii, where faith in Christ is declared to be sufficient for salvation. Under the second aspect we have to notice first the legal effect of Christ's work in the abrogation of the Hebrew law. The vastness of this change is difficult for us to conceive, but we have an illustration of the hold of the law upon the life of the people in the manner in which many at the present day still regard the Sabbath. Paul himself looked upon the Hebrew law as divinely given, and not to be broken through by any human will; if it was to be abrogated it must abrogate itself. Now Christ in the crucifixion suffered the extreme penalty of the law. He became accursed, and all who followed him shared his pollution. But this involved another step. Those who were thus accursed were freed from obedience to the law, as any exile is freed from obedience to the law of the nation that has driven him into exile. But in exile was found that which never had been found before,—freedom and satisfaction in Christ.

All this is developed very clearly in the letter to the Galatians. Here the statements in the third chapter should not be slurred over. Paul was an extremely logical writer, and to get at his thought one should take every statement as literally as possible. It is often said that Christ was crucified because he was accursed of God. But this is not Paul's position. According to Paul, Christ was accursed because he was crucified. The curse was not a curse against sin, but a legal, ceremonial curse, and its influence was ceremonial.¹ Why had Paul persecuted the Chris-

¹ Another illustration of the ceremonial aspect of the law and of the crucifixion in relation to it, is seen in the extension to the Gentiles through Christ's death of a common privilege with the Jews. In the letter to the Ephesians (*Eph.*, ii, 11-22) we are told that the "wall of partition," the "enmity," between Jew and Gentile had been the law. But Christ by his death had abolished this enmity, "that he might create in himself of the twain one new man, so making peace". It may be asked in this connection whether the withdrawal of the law does not imply changeableness in God. The reply would be that the law is honored in that it speaks the final word by which the separation between Jew and Gentile is ended, even though in this final word it puts an end to itself.

tians? He himself gives the reason. "Christ crucified, unto Jews a stumbling-block,"¹— a stumbling-block because "it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree."² To the Jew those who followed Christ were polluted equally with him by his crucifixion, and as a zealous Jew Paul did his utmost to drive them out of the Jewish church. Then when his conversion took place, when he believed that he had seen the glorified Christ, instead of simply admitting as some would have done that he had been mistaken, he followed the logic of his conviction; he saw that he had no place any longer with the Jews and followed Christ without the church; and then in the consciousness of his own freedom he used all his rabbinical skill to bring about the emancipation of others from the law, and to encourage them in the enjoyment of the Christian life. Not only does the law have no further claim upon the follower of Christ, but all former pains and penalties are wiped out.³ Thus remission of sins follows also upon the abrogation of the law; the banished citizen can suffer no further penalty for any offence, either past or future, under the law of the country that has exiled him. Furthermore, not merely the ceremonial law but all law as such is abrogated.⁴ This is only to be expected as a result of the mingling of ceremonial and moral transgression in the old legislation. But only the man who is in real relation with Christ, who really shares in his excommunication, is thus free; the man who is without the spirit of Christ is still under the law; only those are free who are fit for freedom. In other words, all real relations remain; it is the externals that are done away with. It has taken the world a great while to reach Paul's position of freedom.

All this legal effect of the Atonement, however, is only negative as compared with its spiritual effect. Although Paul lays so much stress upon the abrogation of the law, it is after all the new life that is of most importance to him. The legal aspect of Christ's work was temporary and special, the means by which the Jewish Christian was to be freed from the yoke of the law, and salvation

¹ *I Corinthians*, i, 23.

² *Galatians*, iii, 13.

³ *Colossians*, ii, 14.

⁴ *Romans*, vi, 1. *Galatians*, ii, 17.

made possible for the Gentile. But the power of the Christian life was permanent. In the statement of this positive faith it is only natural that the language of sacrifice should be employed freely. The stamp upon his life of the Hebrew ritual, and the impression made by the crucifixion of one whom he regarded as the Messiah, were blended in the thought of Paul, and it is not strange that this thought clothed itself so continually in sacrificial imagery. Furthermore, there is an identification of the believer with Christ which may be regarded either as mystical or only as the symbolical expression of strong emotion, but which in either case testifies to the reality and positiveness of the faith which thus found utterance. Thus we find Paul saying to the Romans, "if we died with Christ we believe that we shall also live with him,"¹ and "if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness."² Again, in the letter to the Galatians, he writes, "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me."³ "For ye died," he says to the Colossians, "and your life is hid with Christ in God,"⁴ while earlier in the same letter occurs that striking passage in which he speaks of filling up "that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ."⁵

In the *Epistle to the Hebrews* the reference to Melchizedek, if taken literally, is peculiarly beautiful and instructive. Melchizedek is described simply as a *novus homo*, a priest "without genealogy."⁶ The fact that this priest of nature blesses Abraham "that hath the promises," symbolizes the greatness of the spiritual relation of man to God as compared with the narrowness of the law. And this, the writer continues, "is yet more abundantly evident, if after the likeness of Melchizedek there ariseth another priest, who hath been made, not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life."⁷

Of the references to the Atonement in the Gospels, the larger part are only formal. Thus when Jesus says that "all things are

¹ *Romans*, vi, 8.

² *Romans*, viii, 10.

³ *Galatians*, ii, 20.

⁴ *Colossians*, iii, 3.

⁵ *Colossians*, i, 24.

⁶ *Hebrews*, vii, 3.

⁷ *Hebrews*, vii, 15, 16.

possible to him that believeth,"¹ he does not tell what is to be believed. The sick man must believe in his physician, but he must also have the physician's prescription. Now the prescription of Jesus, if I may use the figure, is found in the Sermon on the Mount and in the teaching of the fatherhood of God. The most striking passage in the Gospels is that in which Jesus is represented as speaking of the cup as "my blood of the covenant which is shed for many unto remission of sins."² It is possible that we have here a reference to the use of blood in covenants, common in ancient religions, as a guarantee of the seriousness and good faith with which the compact is made,³ and that the suggestion is that in the death of Christ a guarantee is offered of God's faithfulness. But the introduction of the second figure of the payment of a debt, in the words, "unto remission of sins," confuses this interpretation, while on the other hand, if the blood is shed in payment of debt, the whole reference to the Atonement becomes only formal. In view of the similarity to some of Paul's expressions, it may be that the passage is simply a reflection of Pauline thought.

One important element in the New Testament view of the Atonement should not be overlooked,—its intercessory character. Intercession belonged to the priestly office, and intercessory prayer is common with the apostles and the disciples. It is not strange, therefore, that it should be assumed that prayer on the part of Jesus would be especially efficacious.

As I have already said, no one theory of the Atonement can, strictly speaking, be considered orthodox. The theory of the Atonement depends largely upon the view that is taken of the Incarnation, and this in turn is bound up with the theory in regard to the Trinity. In the attempts to define or illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity the difficulty lies in the reconciliation of the one and the many. The doctrine has swung between what may be called a functional or psychological trinity on the

¹ *Mark*, ix, 23.

² *Matthew*, xxvi, 28.

³ *Genesis*, xv, 9. *Exodus*, xxiv. W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, IX.

one side and an apparent tritheism on the other. Sometimes the unity of the divine nature has absorbed its trinity, and again the unity has been lost in the trinity. Augustine discovered a manifestation of the Trinity wherever three elements are united in one essence. Thus in the outer life an illustration offered in body, sight and intention, and in the inner life in memory, self-knowledge or consciousness, and will or love. It should be noticed that these elements are suggested by Augustine only as an illustration of the Trinity. The Father is not merely as memory, or the Son merely self-recognition. Each element involves all three. But in the case of the Father the emphasis is on the first, and so on with the Son and the Holy Ghost. This is necessary in order that the separate personalities may not be lost in the unity of the divine nature. The distinction is important and should be borne in mind in comparing the view of Dorner with that of Augustine.

What Augustine used as an illustration Dorner uses as an explanation. The philosophical sense with Dorner is stronger than the historical, and his attempt to construct the Trinity is simply the attempt to construct personality.¹ God is absolute life, knowledge and goodness. Now wherever we find life, we find first the element of unity, then the element of differentiation, and then the element of integration. This appears even in the physical aspect of life, as when the tree differentiates itself into the various processes which in turn constitute the tree. In knowledge there are the subject and the object, and the recognition that these are one; there are the "I" and the "me" and the recognition of identity. In goodness there are necessity and freedom, and love uniting freedom and necessity. Under these different aspects we have the content of the triune personality of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Perhaps if Dorner had not been under the necessity of conforming to the order of the three persons of the Trinity, his statement of the ethical aspect might have been, freedom, necessity, and love rendering the necessity freedom. He seems to have given freedom the second place partly

¹ *System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, Vol. I, p. 404.

because of the doctrine which he had in mind, and partly because freedom implied a choice. In this construction of the Trinity there is the construction of every conscious spirit, the organization necessary to every complete consciousness. For in all conscious life there must be these three elements,—the great pulse beat of the world. If this is the doctrine of the Trinity, then every theist is a Trinitarian. But Dorner's statement does not satisfy the historical conception of the Trinity. Shedd has tried to do this in his *History of Christian Doctrine*.¹ With Shedd as with Augustine the three centres of consciousness in the Trinity are conceived as separate, whereas with Dorner the Son has no separate consciousness apart from the Father and the Spirit, or the Father or the Spirit, similarly, apart from the Son. Either theory presents difficulty. On the one hand it is hard to distinguish these three separate centres of consciousness and still maintain the conception of unity, and on the other hand it is equally difficult to accept Dorner as orthodox.

Historically the doctrine of the Trinity was developed from a scriptural basis. Although it is nowhere taught explicitly in the New Testament writings, those who hold it believe that it is taught implicitly. It grows out of a theory of the Incarnation by which the pre-existent Christ is exalted to an equality with God. Then since we have God the Father and Jesus Christ as God, since the Holy Spirit is spoken of in the same relation, and since the unity of the Godhead must still be recognized, there follows the doctrine of three Persons and one God. The course of reasoning, however, by which the Holy Spirit is included, would appear to cover other cases where some personality is spoken of in the same relation with the Son. Thus in the *Gospel according to John* there is the prayer that those who believe on Jesus "may be in us," "even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee";² and in the *Revelation of John* the saints are represented as singing "the song of Moses . . . and the song of the Lamb."³ I do not myself find in the New Testament writings taken as a whole the teaching that

¹ Vol. I, pp. 251 and 404.

² *John*, xvii, 20-23.

³ *Revelation*, xv, 3.

Christ is equal with God. He is exalted above humanity and his pre-existence is recognized, but throughout the different writings he seems to be spoken of as subordinate to God.¹ The *Gospel according to John* is especially interesting because it brings together the two extremes of New Testament teaching,—on the one hand the exaltation and mysticism in such phrases as “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father,”² and on the other hand the subordination in the words, “The Father is greater than I,”³ and again the blending of the two, as in the passage from the prayer of Jesus to which I have just referred.⁴ The nearest approach to the New Testament position, considered as a whole, in regard to the nature of Christ, is found in the Arian doctrine.

In its historical development the doctrine of the Incarnation has swung, as Baur says, between Docetism and Ebionitism, covering everything from the theory that the human aspect of Christ’s nature was only apparent to the view that his humanity was the essential thing. The difficulty has been to find the point of union between the divine and the human. In Christ, the God-man, the two are brought together; but they are still foreign to each other, the problem still remains. At the time of the Reformation the doctrine of the Incarnation in common with all other doctrines may be said to have reached the climax of its development, and we have the “*communicatio idiomatum*,” the attempt to weld together the various elements. This attempt has various forms. In the first the attributes of both the divine and the human natures are all applied to the one personality, Christ himself, in its entirety. In the second form one or the other of the two natures is spoken of as possessing the attributes of the personality as a whole; thus Christ died for us, and so we are to say that the Son of God died for us. In a third form we have the human nature with divine attributes,—that is to say, the active attributes, not those that are static, such as omniscience. Still a fourth form is possible, by which the divine nature might be spoken of

¹ *Mark*, xiii, 32. *I Corinthians*, iii, 23; viii, 6; xi, 3. *Hebrews*, i, 2

² *John*, xiv, 9.

³ *John*, xiv, 28.

⁴ *John*, xvii, 20-23.

as possessing human attributes; but this would be merely formal. In all this no real element of union appears. An external force is applied, through which the elements are, so to speak, clamped together. But there is no organic element of relation. The difficulty remains, that the divine is conceived as possessing nothing of the human, and the human as possessing nothing of the divine.

Dorner finds in the Incarnation the very crown of history. He seeks a point at which the divine and the human may unite, and finds it in the polar antitheses of the two natures, fulness and need, love and receptivity.¹ This solution, however, is largely formal. For in order to be assured that the human need is satisfied by the divine fulness, we demand that there shall be behind the antitheses some element of identity, and Dorner takes for granted a certain community which is not fully recognized. There are not two natures in Christ, Dorner says, but two elements in one nature, of which the "I," the consciousness, is the focus. It is like conscience in the individual life. Conscience, "the voice of God," does not exist as an element foreign to human nature, but is blended with other elements of the nature and focussed in the one *ego* of the consciousness. In using this illustration, however, Dorner leads one to question whether his position in regard to the nature of Christ might not be assumed as also true of every human soul. Dorner would admit this so far as regards the presence of the Holy Spirit; so far as the voice of conscience is made to serve as an illustration, the line of demarcation between the life of Christ and other lives is somewhat blurred. But Dorner insists that there is something very special in the life of Christ.

According to Ritschl the divinity of Christ appears in the fact that he overcame the world.² Otherwise Ritschl advances no theory in regard to Christ's nature, but simply recognizes in him the revelation or manifestation of God, and this is all that many writers of the present time insist upon.

In attempting now some more positive statement in regard to

¹ *System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II, pp. 406-411.

² *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung*, etc., Vol. III, p. 426 f.

the nature of Christ and the doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement, let us go back again to those *vorstellungen* to which we resorted in order to represent to ourselves the relation between the creation and the Creator.¹ According to two of these *vorstellungen*,—the relation of a child to its parent,² and the relation of body to soul,³—there is a certain supernatural or divine element in the world. We have recognized this in that principle of teleology which has prevailed all through the history of the world.⁴ Whatever guidance from without may be discovered in the development of this history, we have found it easier to regard it as essentially the result of the working of an inner principle, as a growth like the growth of a plant or an animal or a human life, so that the world may be considered as one great organism, with its various stages of development. In this development there is nothing external, in the sense that any results are dependent upon the chance relations of merely superficial elements. It is a development as orderly, and as truly involved in its beginning, as the development of the plant, but with this great difference, that when we come to man an element of freedom enters, in accordance with which it depends more or less upon man's will whether the development is to be checked or is still to advance, and, if it is to advance, whether with greater or with less rapidity.

The inner principle is at first unconscious of itself. At the very beginning there is what we should ordinarily call external material. Then comes the beginning of organic life,—not the beginning of life itself, for that first stage was the manifestation of life; from the first there was the “world-soul,” or whatever we may choose to call the inner, supernatural, divine element. Then with the organic life of the plant comes the organic life of the animal, and then the sensitive life of the animal, and then the conscious life of the animal and the man. Finally that conscious life of the man reaches its most complete self-consciousness and the most complete consciousness of its environment in Jesus. In Jesus this divine life that has been in the world comes to recognize itself as divine, and to look up and recognize in the fullest

¹ Chapter XIII.

² Page 120.

³ Page 119.

⁴ Pages 143–188.

and freest sense its divine source, not only as its source, but as the presence which from the beginning has been the helpful companion and guardian of its own divinity. In Jesus, God and the world become one as they had never been before. Furthermore Jesus did not stand wholly alone in this consciousness of self and of God. He is "the first of many brethren."¹ With him the whole race takes an upward step, so that we have the beginning of a new life in the world, a life animated by a higher consciousness and by a deeper impulse toward better things.

There is, then, a certain sense in which Jesus may be spoken of in a special manner as the Son of God. If the world may be regarded as in some sense the son of the Father, born of the divine life, and if up to the time of Jesus the world had not been fully conscious of this divine sonship, but first came to its full consciousness in him, so that he first stood in this absolute relation to God, then we may say of him in a special sense that he was the Son of God. In a similar way, using the term in the same large and general sense, we may also speak of the Holy Spirit. According to Hegel, it is a mistake to place the reality of the Holy Spirit in any relation of priority to its embodiment in human life or of separation from it. In Hegel's thought the Holy Spirit comes to the consciousness of itself in the Church. By the Holy Spirit and by the consciousness of it he would mean that which is in part expressed by the phrase, "Christian consciousness," the consciousness in the Church of the unity of its life.² The use of the term in such a sense is not wholly foreign to our use of the term "spirit." We are in the habit of using this term to represent life at a certain stage of consciousness. Thus we do not speak of the lower animals as possessing spirit in this sense. We use the term only when we reach human life, the special distinction of which is the consciousness of self. A spirit is that which is to a certain extent conscious of itself as an individual being. The Holy Spirit thus becomes that which in its perfect self-consciousness transcends itself, and finds that it is not merely an individual life, but a part in a larger, more com-

¹ *Romans*, viii, 29.

² *Werke*, Berlin, 1832, Vol. XII, pp. 257-288.

plete life, of which it is a manifestation. To use a very imperfect illustration, the difference is like that between a leaf conscious of itself only as a leaf,—supposing that we could give a leaf consciousness,—and that same leaf as it becomes conscious that it is part of the organism of the tree and feels within itself the common life of the whole tree even more than its own individual life. In the Holy Spirit we have the divine life manifesting itself in the soul not as over against the individual life, but as the greater fulness of that life itself. The individual life passes out from the little limits of its individuality and enters into the common life of the spiritual brotherhood of man and the sonship to God.

In the Bible there are three uses of the term "Spirit of God" or "Holy Spirit." The first of these is very general. According to it the spirit of God is spoken of as the animating source of all life; it is by God's spirit that men have understanding. A second use, peculiar to the New Testament, relates to the possession of the life by a constraining spiritual presence which manifests itself in special revelation and in special guidance. In the third use the term represents something that is less formal and more in accord with the natural life of the soul. Thus it is said that "the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace,"¹ etc., qualities which are simply the more perfect fruits of the tree of life, the result of the re-enforcement of the ordinary life of the soul through the fuller and freer development of the life of God within it. It is to this last use that the view of Hegel which I have been illustrating more nearly corresponds.

I have no disposition to insist upon scriptural authority for the use of these terms in the sense which I have just indicated, nor have I any special partiality for the use of the terms in any sense. Yet it is interesting and suggestive to see how naturally and easily the terminology of the early Church may be made to cover views not originally contemplated by it, but which have been reached in various ways through the natural development of thought. Furthermore, the use of these terms in such a sense

¹ *Galatians*, v, 22-23.

as that which I have suggested is at least as scriptural as the use which Dorner makes of them. For example, Dorner argues that the *Logos* had no consciousness apart from the Father and the Spirit prior to the moment of the Incarnation.¹ But this is not in accordance with the New Testament view. For if we hold that the New Testament teaches the pre-existence of Jesus, as it appears to do,—and as in my judgment it cannot be understood as not doing,—we must also hold that this pre-existence was conceived as a personal pre-existence in the ordinary sense of the term, a pre-existence in which there was the conscious surrender of a larger and more joyous life in order to become the savior of men. Therefore any statement in regard to the pre-existence of Jesus which does not involve the element of consciousness appears to me not to meet the exegetical requirements, and thus the theory of Dorner is no more scriptural than the theory which finds in the life of Jesus a fuller manifestation of the divine life which has been in the world all along.

All that we can say is that each age must use its own thought as best it can, and perhaps the most that can be expected is a union in sympathy and in general results. As the philosophy of one age cannot be that of another, so the thought of any given age cannot flow altogether naturally into all the forms of statement that have been used by former ages. The New Testament writers start from the philosophy of their day and use the terms that are offered to them. At the period in which they lived the monarchical idea was still supreme in the world, and men were judged more or less according to the outward dignity of their position. It was natural, therefore, that Jesus should be exalted as having a special place in the history and government and creation of the world. Nowadays we are reaching theoretically, although as yet not practically, the thought that honor does not depend upon external position. It is the spiritual life, the life of love and consecration, which alone is divine and wholly glorious. We recognize the supremacy which Jesus recognized, the supremacy of service, and we measure greatness

¹ *System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II, p. 419.

by the greatness of service consciously and gladly rendered. If, in place of the lofty dignities which the early Church delighted to bring to Jesus, we offer this higher honor, we may feel that we are still one in spirit with that early Church, no matter how much our forms of speech may differ. For the recognition of the spiritual greatness of Jesus was nothing foreign to the thought of the early writers,—it was fundamental with them; but they surrounded it and thought to exalt it by extraneous honor.

The breach which was left by the philosophy of Kant between man and his environment was filled by the philosophy of Hegel. That was a theoretical process. It is a practical process that we are now considering. In this coming of the divine life to consciousness in man Baur finds the real doctrine of the Atonement. Here, he says, is the objective element which the Church has sought. In the Incarnation something has actually been done.¹ So far merely as this is concerned I should agree with him. But it seems to me that Baur's thought, and the thought of Hegel as represented by Baur, is not complete. It appears to imply only the intellectual recognition of the fact. Man has learned at last that his life is one with the life of God. He has lost the sense of strangeness toward God and has recognized himself as God's child. This merely intellectual recognition, however, seems to me to represent only a part of the work of Jesus. And not only so, but as a part is seen imperfectly always when taken thus separately without the whole, the intellectual discovery itself is not fully represented by such a statement. The phrase in the *Gospel according to John* expresses the full thought more truly,—“as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God.”² The gospel of Jesus is not merely the proclamation, “You are the sons of God,” but rather the summons to become the sons of God. Or if we accept his message as a declaration it is a declaration of potentiality rather than of actuality; man is *potentially* the son of God.

¹ *Vorlesungen über die Christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. III, p. 565 f.
Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung, p. 688 f.

² *John*, i, 12.

It is true that this potentiality represents an actuality. Man could not be potentially a son of God, in the sense in which I am using the term, unless he was actually a son of God. On the one hand man must have that relation to God which makes the potentiality real, there must be in him some germ of the divine life; and on the other hand God must be conceived as willing to receive man, and as occupying toward him a parental relation. Yet these two factors, the germ of the higher life within, and the waiting love of the divine life behind and above, only represent the possibility by which man, through the development of the principle within him, may enter upon the supreme life and claim his inheritance. Liberalism in religion, like liberalism in politics, often makes a profound mistake in resting in the declaration of fact instead of going on to utter the summons to that which is possible. The demagogue proclaims that all men are born free and equal. But the real function of democracy is not to produce in men this sense of equality or supremacy, but to arouse them to the possibility that is before them. "It is possible for you," it tells them, "to accomplish a life that shall be the equal of any life. You are called to the highest, and there is no external obstacle that shall keep you from the highest." Democracy should be a levelling upward and not a levelling downward. In a similar way liberalism in religion does not fulfil its function simply by the indiscriminate preaching of this absolute relation between man and God. It must indeed recognize those two factors of the germ of the highest life within and the divine fatherhood whose love extends to all. But this is incomplete, and the result will be very incomplete, unless the soul is stimulated to fulfil the potentiality that is involved, and to heed the Father's call.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CHRISTIANITY AS THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION.—THE THREE IDEAS OF THE REASON THE TEST OF ABSOLUTE RELIGION.—CHRISTIANITY AND UNITY.—CHRISTIANITY AND GOODNESS.—CHRISTIANITY AND BEAUTY.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE NEEDS OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND THE HEART.—THE TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.—CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN THOUGHT.

APART from all technical discussion, and considering the work of Christ and the nature of Christianity in themselves, are we to say that Christianity is the absolute religion? The question presents itself under two aspects, one theoretical, the other practical. Under the first of these I am going to offer two prepositions: first, that Christianity is a religion more perfect than any other that is known to us, and second, that as a religion it can never be surpassed. In a certain sense the first of these propositions is not essential to the thesis that Christianity is the absolute religion. For we can conceive it possible that this absolute religion might have presented itself under different forms, starting from different centres, so that we should find in various parts of the world a number of religions, each of which should embody the absolute ideal of religion and each be as perfect as another, and thus it would be a matter of accident or choice whether one form or another were accepted. These different forms might coalesce, whether under a name already existing as applied to one of them, or under some new name; or since the religions were all at heart identical and were recognized as such, the need of any common name might not be felt. This is all conceivable. Yet as students of history we are obliged to recognize the difference between the various religions, and to compare

them with one another according to the degree of perfection or imperfection that we find in them.

The question has been raised whether such comparisons do not imply a certain provincialism in those who undertake them,—whether the broader course is not simply to take the form of religion most natural to us and make the best of it that we can. It is true that there is a provincial way of judging others. But we must recognize the fact that there is an absolute standard for religion as there is for morality, and that because it is possible to form a judgment from a provincial point of view it does not follow that it is impossible for one to make his comparison by the absolute standard. I may visit Paris and learn much, and have my views greatly broadened; but it does not follow that I am to regard the laxity of the ordinary Parisian attitude in regard to the marriage relation as equally estimable with the more careful regard in which that relation is held by certain other peoples. The shrinking from emphasis, from the recognition of the real perspective in things, is one of the failings of our time. If in studying the various forms of religion we regard them simply as so many manifestations of the religious feeling, we shall only make a mush of the whole examination; we shall have lost the delicacy and accuracy which belong to any true historical study. For religions do differ among themselves; they differ in the emphasis that is placed upon the various aspects of the religious life.

Yet it is true that we may easily be prejudiced in our judgment of Christianity. For it is hard to subordinate our associations with the forms of a religion into which we are born. Either we may err from too great sympathy with those forms, or in the effort not to let such sympathy interfere with our judgment we may fail to appreciate them at their full value; in the desire to stand erect men sometimes bend backward. Any test, therefore, by which we are to determine whether Christianity is absolute as compared with other religions, must be objective, and the only objective test that we can use is the psychological test. The absolute religion must satisfy the whole nature of man,—his understanding, his affections and his will. It must cover perfectly the

psychological scheme of life, the three ideas of the reason, unity, goodness and beauty, just as without religion those psychological elements could not obtain full and free manifestation. This is the test which must be applied to Christianity. How far does Christianity adapt itself to these psychological elements, these fundamental facts of human nature?

First of all, then, no religion can meet what is required in the first idea of the reason which is not theoretically or practically a monotheism. Now Christianity is monotheistic; its God is one, and absolute; the three Persons of the Trinitarian Christian are still one God. It may be said that in its earliest form Christianity did not recognize a unity, but rather a divided universe, a dualism such as appears in the Mazdean religion. But if the fundamental principle is found, we need not be disturbed if it is not at once fully carried out, and the devil of Christianity was a created being, and a being that was to be overcome. The unity of God was to reinforce itself, on the one hand by love, as men should voluntarily yield themselves, and on the other hand by power, through the subjugation of all elements foreign to itself. The closing words of the parable of the judgment between the sheep and the goats¹ may seem to contradict this. But we must bear in mind both that it is a parable, and also that the eschatological utterances attributed to Jesus reflect the current thought of the time. Paul takes another view when he writes to the Romans "that a hardening in part hath befallen Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in; and so all Israel shall be saved."²

There is a unity, however, more profound than the mere monotheism of a religion, the unity which consists in the interpenetration of the finite by the infinite spirit. This mystical element which is so essential to all deeper forms of religious life and thought is central and fundamental in Christianity. It is found in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the assumption that a way is open between the finite and the infinite by which the infinite life may become one with the finite, and the finite, not only through obedience but by interpenetration, may become one with the infinite. This

¹ *Matthew*, xxv, 46.

² *Romans*, xi, 25, 26.

doctrine finds expression in Christianity from the first. It appears in such passages in the New Testament as the familiar words of Paul on Mars Hill, "for in him we live, and move, and have our being,"¹ or those in the *Epistle to the Ephesians*, "one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all,"² and again, in the *First Epistle of John*, "God is love; and he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God abideth in him."³ Christianity in its beginnings does not give a philosophy of the world, but we find in it the elements which may expand into such a philosophy. In the Mazdean belief there is no similar element of mysticism. Brahmanism does recognize the unity of the spirit, but it is to be attained not through manifestation in the finite but by withdrawal from the finite. It is true that in Christianity asceticism has at times laid stress upon withdrawal from the world as helpful or necessary to the attainment of the spiritual life, but this aspect of Christianity has been partial and temporary. Self-denial is characteristic of Christianity, but it is self-denial not for its own sake but as a means to a greater end.

We find unity again in still another form when we proceed to ask how far the requirements of the second idea of the reason are fulfilled in Christianity. For a fundamental characteristic of Christianity is the absolute blending of religion and morality; the religious ideal is the ethical ideal. Now a union between religion and morality may be brought about by causing religion to swallow up morality, so that a man is regarded as moral if he fulfils the formal requirements of his church. Or religion may be swallowed up in morality, and the effort to promote the good of society held to be all that constitutes a man a religious person. But in the coalescence of religion and morality in Christianity neither sacrifices anything of its real nature. Both remain, not as separate elements, but rather as different aspects of the same thing. It is this which makes possible the larger view by which religion may be regarded as including the whole of life. Not that all of life is religious; it was not George Herbert's thought that every one "who sweeps a room" is performing a religious act.

¹ *Acts*, xvii, 28.

² *Ephesians*, iv, 6.

³ *I John*, iv, 16.

But the various relations of life which call for the activity of men are all forms which may be filled with the religious content. They are all instruments which the religious life may use. Morality becomes glorified by religion, and religion is made concrete and vital by morality. God is regarded as the absolutely good, and the goodness of God is something that may be made the ideal of human life,—“Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”¹ It is said that the word “perfect” in this passage is to be taken in a special sense, as applying simply to the equal manifestation of love to all alike, but even with this limitation we still have the divine set before us as the ideal of the human.

The blending of the two elements appears conspicuously in the life of Jesus, and in all his teaching. We find in Jesus, on the one hand the loftiness of thought, the mystical sense, which is so often associated with separation from the world, and on the other hand a practicalness of life, a continuous relationship with others. The two are not separated one from the other, but are only different aspects of the same life. Of course one aspect may be emphasized sometimes more than the other; Jesus may withdraw to the mountain or the wilderness for prayer and communion. But this is no more than to say that any one who is engaged in the activities of the world must pause, if only to take food and sleep and refresh the bodily strength. The spirit as well as the body must have its nutriment, and just as the pause in any busy life makes no break in it but rather is the condition of its continued activity, so these pauses for spiritual refreshment in the life of Jesus are only a condition necessary to its continuance. We hear it said sometimes by those who emphasize the ethical aspect of life that the Sermon on the Mount suffices for them, with the implication that the Sermon on the Mount is simply ethical. But in reality it is saturated with religion. There is hardly a phrase that does not point to God. It is like a road that runs along by the sea, on which every now and then, through openings among the trees, we look out upon the ocean. “Blessed are the pure in heart,”—here is ethics; but Jesus adds, “for they

¹ *Matthew*, v, 48.

shall see God," and the precept is given its divine aspect. "Blessed are the peacemakers,"—yes, "for they shall be called sons of God."

I have spoken of the two elements as blending. They blend so completely that we cannot separate them. It has been brought forward as a great discovery by some writers of comparatively recent days that the lofty attributes ascribed to God are human attributes, that men are worshipping in God simply that which is most excellent in humanity, and that in serving God they are serving only that which is best in the life of men. But the discovery is not new. It dates back to Jesus himself. He set the thought of the life of God as the ideal for the life of men, and placed the service of God in the service of men. This is precisely the result which we should expect to find, if we assume a community of nature between God and man. Morality under this aspect receives its perfect development. Through this relation between morality and religion it is open to morality to transcend itself and become love. Minute regulations of law and obedience give place to an animating spirit. The individual lives the life of righteousness not under compulsion or through the sense of duty but from his own desire. Morality has ceased, but only because it has been raised to a higher power. Goodness has become "bonus et plus quam bonus."

Now if we compare other religions with Christianity in this respect, we find either that forms, more or less arbitrary and technical, take the place of the spiritual element, or if the forms are less conspicuous the inspiring principle still is not present as in Christianity. Thus the Chinese religion is wholly lacking in the mystical element. The sublime thought of God which appears in the Mazdean and Hebrew religions is in both shut in by a complex ceremonial which binds the believer at every moment. If the typical Buddhist were to attain his ideal the life of the world would cease, whereas if all men were typical Christians the life of the world would continue, growing better and better. Buddhism is essentially the incarnation of pessimism. To the Christian the good in civilization has nothing in it which Chris-

tianity cannot inspire yet further, and the evils of civilization persist only because true Christianity is still so imperfectly practised.

As compared with other religions, then, Christianity presents on the one hand greater freedom from external, restraining forms, and on the other hand a greater intensity of spiritual life,—a spiritual life which is at one with the ethical life. Yet precepts for conduct are given in the New Testament, and is not the morality conveyed in them imperfect? Are the passive virtues which they inculcate real? Are not peacemaking and long-suffering and gentleness carried too far? Is not the charity of the New Testament a wasteful almsgiving? Nietzsche says that the Christian virtues are those of slaves, and that true virtue appears in manliness and self-assertion. But the Jews were slaves, and from the heart of Judaism came the teaching which found the ideal of conduct in a slave's virtues. It was by the irony of history that the Jews cast out their own teacher.¹ That Nietzsche should write in this strain is not remarkable. But what is of more interest to us is that there is a cult which follows him; there are many whose feeling he expresses. Furthermore, if we consider these virtues in the abstract, such criticism is just. They find their place only as they are related to something higher and better than themselves. There are two elements in New Testament morality, on the one hand these passive virtues, and on the other hand service. Taken apart from service the passive virtues have not a high value, for if a man has only himself to care for, he may as well assert himself. But when one's object in life is the service of others that is inspired by love, self-assertion becomes petty; one has something more important to do than to stand up for little individual rights or to avenge little personal insults. Thus the passive virtues find their proper background in the larger interests of Christianity. The question as to charity in the New Testament I shall consider a little later in another connection.²

¹ *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Der Wille zur Macht* (Werke, Leipzig, 1901, Vol. XV), pp. 105-159.

² Page 350.

While goodness is thus supreme in Christianity, it is not the only thing that is insisted upon. The whole nature is satisfied. In the blending of the mystical, spiritual element with morality the requirements of the third idea of the reason are fulfilled, and we have the possibility of beauty. For beauty is the manifestation of the ideal in the real,¹ and if the life of the world is made the manifestation of the divine life, then it becomes beautiful. I need not dwell here upon the recognition of beauty which appears from time to time in the New Testament,—the reference of Jesus to the lilies of the field, his use of the child's nature, in its spontaneousness and freedom, to symbolize the religious life. These are after all only incidents. Beauty is fulfilled in Christianity because through the presence of the Holy Spirit the ideal life, the divine life, is manifested in the life of man. And if we turn from the positive to the negative aspect, suffering is no longer a discord in the harmony of life, according to the Christian view, but is transmuted and becomes itself an element in that harmony; the Cross is glorified. As some one has said, when men see in some countenance an expression of peculiar beauty they ask, "What has this life suffered?" for it is the victory in and through suffering which brings such transformation and illumination. It is true that Christianity brought with it in its earlier development a reaction against outward beauty, and that such beauty was felt to be a temptation to men to sin. But this was only natural. For the first battle of Christianity was an ethical and spiritual one, and beauty ministered to pagan religions. Still later the Christian turned his back upon the outward world altogether, with all that belonged to it. But this separation of the spiritual from the worldly had its value in emphasizing the supremacy of the spiritual life, so that when the spiritual and the worldly should be again united, the spiritual should use the worldly and not be used by it. When the time of that reunion came, the Church called forth a glory of outward beauty in art beyond all that ever before had been accomplished. For the Greek ideal of beauty had over-emphasized the bodily life, but Christian art embodied the highest ideal of the spiritual.

¹ Page 61.

Apart, however, from all question of outward beauty no other form of religion fulfils so completely the requirements of the third idea of the reason. The recognition of beauty is not found in the Mazdean religion. Buddhism recognizes the divine life in the world, and the world as in a certain sense part of the divine life; but the world is still unreal, a delusion, in which beauty can have little place. The religion of the Greeks presents beauty as its most characteristic element. Indeed, the Greek religion emphasizes too soon the element of beauty. For goodness should take precedence of beauty, and the ethical element in the religion of the Greeks is at the minimum. But even so, beauty is less fundamental in the Greek religion than in Christianity, for instead of the sense of an absolute divine unity there is polytheism, and suffering remains unreconciled with the harmony of life. It is true that among later minds a loftier religion is revealed; but even with Plato the idea of God is less definitely wrought out than the Christian conception, and there is far less place for personal piety.

When I said that in Christianity the whole nature is satisfied, I had first of all in mind the requirements of unity, goodness and beauty. But Christianity also has a place for the understanding, the power of analysis or differentiation, as contrasted with the reason, the power by which the unity of life is recognized. For, unlike Brahmanism, it does not sink everything in the first idea of the reason; the individual has his place. The infinite spirit is in the finite, but every human life preserves its individuality as a single manifestation of the infinite life. The needs of the heart, too, are met by Christianity with a fulness which all admit. It is a religion of the love of God toward man. The personal affections may sometimes be subordinated, as when Jesus tells the disciples that "he that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me,"¹ but only that larger relations may be emphasized. And in no other religion has the hope of immortality so large a place, with all that such a hope means for human affections.

I have considered thus far the first of the two propositions

¹ *Matthew, x, 37.*

which I presented under the theoretical aspect of the question whether Christianity is to be regarded as the absolute religion. We turn now to the second proposition, that as a religion Christianity can never be surpassed. More hesitation may be felt in accepting this second proposition. It may be said that we are here putting a limit to progress. What right have we, it may be asked, to assume that the point that has been reached in Christianity is a final point? We admit the danger of such a mistake, and we need to understand clearly what we mean when we say that Christianity cannot be surpassed. I do not understand this proposition as at all setting a limit to progress, for we must all see both the necessity and the possibility of a measureless progress. I am only recognizing the nature of this progress. That which cannot be surpassed is the *nature* of Christianity, or, in other words, while the process by which its outline is to be filled may go on indefinitely, the outline itself will remain. In all branches of study we find something which we do not hesitate to regard as fixed. Who expects that the law of gravitation is ever to be superseded? We may come to understand it better, and the field of its application may be vastly widened, for we have thus far applied it only to a little group of worlds, and here is a whole universe before us! But the most skeptical mind has no doubt that if we could reach the farthest world, we should still find the manifestation of this law. Yet who would maintain that in affirming its finality we were setting a limit to the progress of science? Rather, the fact that certain fixed points have been reached is that which makes the progress of science possible. And if this is true of science, why should we not expect to find it true of the spiritual life as well? If we assume that this proposition in regard to Christianity is true, then instead of checking progress in religion either it or something akin to it is needed to make religious progress possible. Besides, there is this great difference between a physical law like that of Newton and the principle of Christianity, that whereas the law of gravitation is based only on induction, the principle of Christianity, the principle on which I have rested this proposition, is based

on a deductive process; it is the result of the analysis of the human soul. For we have found it possible to analyze the factors that enter into the spiritual life. We have learned what methods of activity are open to the spirit. If, therefore, we have a form of religion which satisfies these elements of the spiritual nature, we may be very sure that until new elements are discovered such a form of religion cannot be surpassed.

This does not imply that the world will always be religious. The thought of man may drift away from religion. Of course, if men were to give up the thought of God, they would be giving up one of the fundamental conceptions of Christianity; a religion of humanity would necessarily be quite different from Christianity. But in all such changes religion has become less intense. Positivism, for instance, is less intense than Christianity. If the world were to pass from Christianity to a religion of humanity, it would be because it was passing out from the focus of religion. The thought of God, the spiritual life which is in and over all things, from which and through which and to which are all things, is the culminating thought of religion, and any change in which men pass away from this central position will be a lessening of religion. Therefore it cannot be urged that men may advance beyond Christianity, for such a movement would mean only a lessened intensity in religion. At least this would be true so long as man continued to be man. There is the *a priori* possibility that man may develop new faculties, new ideas of the reason, a new power that shall be as high above the reason as the reason is above the understanding. But in such a case man would cease to be man and become a new creation, and we have already found reason to assume that man can never thus out-grow himself or be outstripped upon the earth as he has outstripped all other creatures.¹ We based our assumption on two considerations. On the one hand we saw that since man is a tool-using creature with all the powers of nature more and more at his command, any new creation in order to surpass him physically must be swifter than steam or electricity, and stronger than all the forces of nature that man can use. On the other hand

¹ Page 207.

we found in man intellectually and spiritually the capacity for infinite progress without change of nature; we found in memory the power of human thought to take up and preserve the results of past achievement and make them the starting-point for new achievement. Furthermore, so far as concerns any need of new faculties, we have in man's nature as we have already analyzed it, the simplicity of perception, the differentiation of the understanding, the higher unity of the reason. This higher unity passes through the three stages of truth, or that which is, of goodness, or that which ought to be, and of beauty, or that which is as it ought to be. We can conceive of no progress which would not be related to these elements or principles, or which would not be covered by them.

There are still certain other qualifications which must be recognized. In saying that Christianity is the absolute religion, we do not say that it is perfect. All that we have said is that it presents the sphere, it lays down the limits, within which development and progress are to take place, just as in the law of gravitation are laid down the limits within which the study of the heavenly bodies is to be pursued. Christianity is not perfect, but it contains within itself the possibility of an infinite development, which must, however, take place along the lines and in the direction that are indicated by it. We do not even say that Christianity is perfect as regards the laying down of its general principles. In studying any religion we have to consider, on the one hand the highest point that is reached in the statement of it, and on the other hand its general drift. If these two coincide, if the general drift of the religion is in the direction of the highest point that it has reached, then we may consider this highest point truly representative of the religion. If the two elements do not coincide, if the general drift is toward a lower level than the highest point that appears, then we are left in doubt. For the question arises in such a case whether this highest point may not be only an accident rather than representative of the essential spirit of the religion as a whole. In estimating the character of Buddhism one does not make much account of the element of trance, because it

is easily seen that this element is foreign to the general drift of the religion, something which has been taken up into it from other sources and for which it can hardly be considered responsible. Similarly, the proposition that Christianity is the absolute religion does not compel us to insist that every statement in the New Testament, or everything that is put into the lips of Jesus, shall be fully in accord with what we may recognize today as essential to absolute religion, or that all the utterances of the New Testament shall stand upon the same level. It is sufficient for our purpose that the general drift of the teaching of the New Testament and the highest point that is reached in it coincide, and that these elements represent that which we must regard as the absolute religion. So far as the general drift is concerned, there is great danger in attempting to judge any teacher by isolated passages; it is unsafe to insist that any teacher must always have been absolutely true to his highest thought. In saying this I am not suggesting difficulties as actually presented in Christianity, but am only defending the position that we have taken against such criticism as might be made upon it. But suppose a mathematician to discover and announce some fundamental principle in mathematics, and suppose that this same mathematician now and then makes an error in the application of his principle; the truth of the principle would remain, and it would be by his discovery and announcement of the principle that he himself would be judged. Galileo on occasion may have been for the moment false to himself and to the truth which he had discovered, but he could not take back what he had given to the world, and he retains the glory of his great discovery. Furthermore, in the case of the New Testament we have to recognize the looseness and unscientific character of the record, and the difficulty in affirming in regard to any single passage taken by itself that the language was actually that which was used by Jesus. Especially in any statement which is in opposition to the general teaching of Jesus would the possibility of mistake be greater. A blundering record would be more likely to contain statements below the standard of the teacher than anything that was above that stand-

ard; the phraseology of the common thought of the time would be more likely to creep into the record than the utterances of a loftier thought. We see in the Gospel narratives how often the disciples of Jesus misunderstood him, and how many times he had to explain and to remonstrate. I know that such a method of criticism as this is loose and dangerous. All that I insist upon is that so far as the general drift of the teaching of Jesus is concerned there can be absolutely no doubt. Even if the authority of the Gospels as a historical record were destroyed, and there remained of the picture only the dust of the canvas, still the image that would be left upon this dust is unmistakable; even Strauss admits that the kernel of phrases in the Sermon on the Mount must be genuine.¹ I am not affirming the results of negative criticism. I am simply recognizing the possibility of all that such criticism can accomplish. Granting, then, to negative criticism its fullest possible swing, there can be no doubt either in regard to the general teaching of Jesus or in regard to the type of the life of Jesus.

Still another difficulty appears in the danger of misinterpretation. This danger is one into which the disciples, as I have just said, fell repeatedly. It is a danger which is attendant upon the interpretation of the thought of any speaker or writer, especially when he makes use of figurative forms of expression to any extent. In the study of Plato, for instance, how difficult it is to determine in every case what is only a figure and what Plato intends to have taken as literal fact. This difficulty has been continually a source of error or uncertainty in getting at the meaning of the New Testament. Thus when Jesus says, "This is my body,"² does he mean that the words shall be taken literally or figuratively? The Catholic replies "literally," the Protestant, "figuratively." There are a number of other passages of which the interpretation is similarly doubtful. What meaning, for instance, is to be given to the word "eternal"? But I will not dwell longer upon this. I will simply repeat that such difficulties do not affect

¹ *The Life of Jesus*, Trans. of M. Evans, Part II, Chap. VI.

² *Matthew*, xxvi, 27.

the position that we have taken. There is no question as to the general drift of the New Testament teaching, or any doubt that it is in the direction of the highest point that is attained.

Suppose, however, we are led to conclude that it is a mistake to assume in Christianity a supernatural element and to ascribe to Jesus a supernatural lordship, and yet find ourselves obliged to recognize in the teaching of Jesus and in the New Testament generally this assumption of the supernatural element. Suppose that we have to ask ourselves which element is more important in historical Christianity, the element of supernatural authority, or the content, the truth of absolute religion, and whether it is possible to separate the two. These questions, with others of a similar sort, are not for us to discuss at any length at present. I refer to them only that I may ask how they would affect the central position that we have taken in regard to Christianity as the absolute religion. Now, whatever we may think in regard to the supernatural element in the teaching of Jesus, we find it always subordinated to the content of the teaching. Jesus himself is constantly pointing from the form to the content, and the words, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven,"¹ are representative of the aspect in this respect of all his teaching. Whatever view we may take of New Testament Christianity and the teaching of Jesus, we should make a mistake if we emphasized the form instead of the content, if we made the question of the supernatural element as important as the substance of the teaching; and supposing that we rejected the supernatural element, we should make a great mistake if we assumed that because this element had lost its hold upon us, we must also give up Christianity itself. It seems to me that this is brought out most strikingly in that difficult passage in which Jesus is represented as declaring that every sin shall be forgiven except the sin against the Spirit.² Here the Son is distinctly subordinated to the Holy Spirit as that principle of spirit-

¹ *Matthew*, vii, 21.

² *Matthew*, xii, 31-32.

ual union and fellowship in which is found the absolute content of Christianity.

There is another point of view, however, from which the proposition that Christianity is the absolute religion may be considered. It may be urged that certain advances have been made by which the nature of Christianity has been transformed, and that thus we have reached a religion which may still call itself Christianity, but which in reality is more complete than Christianity. Of these advances, the first is theoretical and has to do with the nature of our belief in God, involving as it does the relation of law to love. The second is ethical, and involves the relation of political economy to charity. It is said that whereas the New Testament recognizes the absoluteness of the divine love, science has taught us to recognize only law, and not to expect longer any interference in the order of the universe; and whereas Jesus taught an absolute charity, science has so modified our view of our relation to others that the charity of the New Testament is criticised as promiscuous and wasteful and demoralizing. Now it seems to me that in both cases we have in the teaching of Jesus that which is essentially religious, and in the elements which constitute the changes that have taken place that which is not absolutely religious. In both cases the changes have been simply in the forms under which the religious principle manifests itself. For we may have a most intense form of religion which recognizes the absoluteness of the divine love, with little thought of law or any form of limitation, simply regarding God as one who loves his children and watches over them, blessing or punishing them according to their deserts and needs, and the principle of love in such a religion remains unchanged when we come to consider it as working within the limits or under the forms of law; if we have the principle of absolute love, with or without the addition of law, we have religion. But in a world of law alone there would be no place for religion except as there should be discovered behind the law, and working in and through the law, the presence of divine love. The recognition of law simply modifies the external form of religion and not its essential principles. The manner in which the

religion of the New Testament has taken possession of law is only another illustration of what I have said of the infinite possibilities of growth within the outlines of absolute religion. Furthermore it is to be noticed that we find in the teachings of Jesus himself at least the beginnings of the recognition of the law through which the divine love manifests itself. "If it be possible," he is represented as praying, "let this cup pass away from me."¹ He recognizes a limit which his prayer may not transcend. "First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear."² In the method which he here uses to illustrate the development of the spiritual life is the recognition of order. The influence of his teaching in the world was to be in accordance with this principle of gradual growth. He had no expectation of a sudden transformation of the world. Again, "the kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven."³ Here is the germ of the whole philosophy of history, in his perception that the true nature of his teaching would be almost lost from sight, and yet would retain its power and by degrees slowly exert its influence upon the world.

What I have said of the relation of law to love is no less true of the relation of political economy to charity. Political economy by itself has no ethical value whatever; it is only when it is animated by charity that it has ethical value. Charity asks, "How can we best help men?" With no knowledge of political economy the answer is, "Take your money and give it to the poor." But political economy says, "In that way you will only injure them; the way to help men is to lead them to help themselves." Does the different view, the different method, change at all the nature of charity itself, the nature of love? Does the mother who brings up her child with wisest discipline love her child less than the mother who allows her child to go unrestrained? Does not rather the thoughtful, careful mother love the more truly of the two? In all charity the fundamental principle is love, with the desire to serve, and this desire to serve should also be a desire to find the best way in which to serve. It is not a question of charity over against the methods which science teaches us are wise, of love

¹ *Matthew*, xxvi, 39.

² *Mark*, iv, 28.

³ *Matthew*, xiii, 33.

over against machinery. Just as the religion of the New Testament has taken possession of law, so the charity that Jesus taught takes and uses the machinery of the present day. Here again we have in the New Testament a glimpse of the modern view. In the words "If any will not work, neither let him eat,"¹ there is the spirit of modern political economy, however isolated at the time.²

¹ *II Thessalonians*, iii, 10.

² C. C. Everett, *Essays Theological and Literary*, "The Historic and the Ideal Christ."

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHRISTIANITY AS THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION: THE PRACTICAL ASPECT.—THE PRECEPTS OF CHRISTIANITY GENERAL AND INTUITIVE.—THE TEACHING OF CHRISTIANITY EMBODIED IN THE PERSONALITY OF JESUS: THE LIFE OF JESUS AN IDEAL FOR ALL LIVES: HIS SINLESSNESS: THE CHARACTER OF HIS LIFE UNIVERSAL.—THE INSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH.

I PASS now to the practical aspect of the question whether Christianity is the absolute religion. I shall consider its power as a historical religion, controlling the world as well as the individual, and I shall examine this power first in the form of the teachings of Christianity, second in the life and personality of its founder, and finally in the institution of the Church. First, then, as regards its teachings, it is easy to see that if Christianity is to be regarded as a universal religion the form of its original announcement must be of a nature to adapt it to this use. We find this to be the case both as regards the teaching of the New Testament in general and especially as regards the teaching of Jesus. The precepts are general in their form, and intuitional in their substance. Even the special character of the occasions upon which the teaching of Jesus, and to a large extent the teaching of the New Testament generally, is based, gives rise as a rule to universal principles. The teaching does not content itself with directing what shall be done in any particular case. It is a wonderful characteristic, not only of the New Testament but to a greater or less degree of the whole Bible, that no matter how trivial the starting-point of the immediate and special theme may seem to be, we soon pass out into the field of the universal. We find great ideas opening before us that are capable of universal application.

Furthermore, not only is the teaching general, but it is intuitive rather than argumentative. Jesus does sometimes use argument, but its form is simply that of an appeal to the intuition. "What man is there of you," he asks, "who, if his son shall ask him for a loaf, will give him a stone? . . . If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?"¹ The form of reasoning is almost always less permanent than the results of reasoning. For argument is usually only the means of justifying that which is seen by intuition to be the truth, and since it depends for its starting-point upon the peculiarities of the individual and his environment, it must vary from age to age. Except in the most abstract sciences a different route must be taken today, in order to arrive at certain results, from the route travelled in former years. The intellectual habit changes, and so any form of reasoning soon becomes old-fashioned. But intuition endures. The poetry of Greece is fresh today. So is the idealism of Plato, although his machinery has lost much of its power. The arguments of Paul have bewildered the world quite as much as they have instructed it, whereas the intuitive passages in his letters, such as the thirteenth chapter of the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, are as living today as when they were first written. The preponderance, therefore, of the intuitional utterance of truth in the New Testament teaching goes far to establish its universal character.

But if the power of Christianity is seen in the form of its earliest teaching, it appears still more in the embodiment of this teaching in the personality of Jesus. The world is always more interested in persons than in systems, and in other ways also the embodiment of an ideal in a personality carries with it certain advantages. The various aspects of an ideal which are often so difficult to describe, and between which it is sometimes not easy to preserve a balance, are united vitally when embodied in a single life, and sympathy with the personality as a whole leads where reason would have failed. Thus in the teaching of Jesus the injunction to meekness and the denunciation of the Pharisees might

¹ *Matthew*, vii, 9-11.

seem irreconcilable apart from his personality. But as it is, they are simply two poles of a single nature, and neither stands alone. Besides this, with the embodiment of the teaching in a life, there enters the power of love, the sense of personal relation and of loyalty.

But just what place does Jesus actually fill? First, then, his life furnishes an ideal for all lives. In saying this I do not mean to affirm the sinlessness of Jesus. It does not concern our present purpose either to affirm or to deny it. Our present aim is not theoretical but practical. A rule is given us that we may measure with it and draw our line by it. We do not examine it under a microscope to see whether its edge is rough or not. And for a life we have no microscope. If the question as to the sinlessness of Jesus is raised, we are forced to recognize how very little we know about his life. One or two statements, which perhaps are to be regarded as more or less legendary, about his childhood, and then a few great utterances, a very few of his interviews with the world about him, and then the account of his death,—how little it all is! The four Gospels to some extent repeat the same story, and how brief it is and at the same time how diffused! Certainly the story does not afford ground to affirm the sinlessness of Jesus. In what is recorded we may indeed find no sin, but we have to remember how very little is recorded. The incidents which have troubled the world at all in regard to this aspect of the life of Jesus are for the most part superficial, and either have been misunderstood or else may be regarded as at least to some extent legendary. Perhaps the most troublesome passage is the account of the cursing of the fig tree, a story which may have arisen from a parable.¹ Another passage is the story of how he drove the traders from the Temple.² If, however, the authority of Meyer is to be trusted, it was only the sheep and oxen that were driven out, while he spoke to those who sold doves. As regards the indignant utterances against

¹ *Matthew*, xxi, 19; *Mark*, xi, 12–14, 20–24; *Luke*, xxi, 29–33.

² *Matthew*, xxi, 12; *Mark*, xi, 15; *Luke*, xix, 45.

the scribes and Pharisees, so far from being a cloud upon the character of Jesus we may feel that they are characteristic of one of the most glorious aspects of it. For a moral character that is incapable of ethical wrath is imperfect. Jesus meets injustice toward himself with absolute gentleness and meekness and forgiveness, but harshness and injustice toward the humble of this world call out in him a holy indignation which we cannot too much admire.

When all is said, however, the belief that anyone may have in the absolute sinlessness of his life must be a matter of faith rather than of demonstration. It must be based upon general principles rather than upon the specific details that are presented to us. Thus the belief in the absolute divinity of Jesus involves the belief in his sinlessness, whereas a belief in his entire humanity affords less ground for any dogmatic affirmation in regard to it. It is true that we find in the New Testament the statement that he was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin."¹ But it would be a mistake to regard this and similar passages as the utterance of anything like dogma. The writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* may have had in mind simply the thought that Jesus was subject to the temptations to which all men are subject and that he withstood them. On the other hand it would be equally a mistake to consider the reply of Jesus to the young lawyer, "why callest thou me good? none is good save one, even God,"² as involving dogma in the opposite direction. Rather an utterance like this may perhaps raise our conception of the character of Jesus to a greater height than if he had claimed for himself absolute goodness. No, our answer to this question will depend, as I have said, upon general principles. It will depend largely upon our view of the nature of Christ, and it will depend also upon our theory in regard to sin. If we believe that sin is inherent in all life except the Infinite Life, then unless we regard Jesus as himself the Infinite Life, we should find sin in him. On the other hand if we regard sin as the failure to fulfil the calling that is impressed upon one's nature, then we should find in him

¹ *Hebrews*, iv, 15.

² *Mark*, x, 18.

no sin, for he met the summons which called him, and fulfilled the duty that was laid upon him. Here, as elsewhere in regard to matters that are beyond the reach of positive knowledge, I will not venture a statement. All that I wish to say is that when I speak of the life of Jesus as furnishing an ideal to which all lives may seek to conform, I do not want to have this proposition encumbered by such questions as whether his character was or was not without any trace of sin. Questions of this kind have been far too prominent in the study of the life and work of Jesus. They have arisen, on all sides, out of a mistaken emphasis. Jesus comes to bring the world salvation, and the world begins at once to ask what he is, and what is his rank, and so on. When we consider what it is that he came to do, such questions are in comparison frivolous. Two questions only in regard to him are of prime importance. First, of what kind is the authority with which he spoke? what is behind him? of what is his life the manifestation? And second, what is the special help that he brings to us? The question is not, what honor is to be paid to Jesus, but what is the service which he came to render. For the highest honor, and the only honor which he would desire, is, so far as we are concerned, obedience, and so far as regards himself, the power to serve.

Not that all these other questions are to be ruled out altogether. The question, for instance, as to the honor that is to be paid to Jesus is most interesting when subordinated to these questions of first importance. The difficulty is that the questions which should have been kept secondary too often have been made primary, and the strife, such as that in regard to the duty or the humanity of Jesus, has obscured the great questions which deal with his absolute relations and with the practical aspect of his life. If we had really reached his own point of view, the question as to the honor and rank that belong to him and the question as to the power of service that was in him would flow together, and the real honor that belongs to him would be found, as I have just suggested, in the nature of his service to man. "Whosoever would be first among you, shall be servant of all."¹ That was

the rule which he bade his disciples apply to one another, and it is the rule which he would apply to himself. The world has been slowly growing to recognize the divinity of service. No doubt we fail as yet to realize its meaning profoundly in our hearts, but its phraseology has become easy to us, and we perceive, intellectually at least, the absolute truth that the only real glory in the world and the only divinity that can be manifested in the world are the glory and the divinity of loving, self-forgetful service.

The power of the life of Jesus as an ideal rests in part upon the fact that like his teaching the character of his life was universal. We often lament that we cannot form a more distinct picture of his life in its details. But I am inclined to think that for the success of his work it is better so. For the very fact that the details are so obscure only forces into more distinct relief the universal elements and makes them easier of general application. We do not have to disentangle the great utterances and acts of Jesus from a mass of special occasions and special aims. They stand out already disentangled and clear, in all the grandeur of their universality, and with all the practicalness that arises from universality, and thus we have in the story of the life of Jesus the picture of absolute self-sacrifice, with just enough detail to make that sacrifice vivid and impressive, but with not so much as to give it a particular or individual aspect. The cross, as the symbol of the life and death of Christ, becomes a universal symbol.

I have spoken of the difficulty in preserving the balance between the various aspects of an ideal. If we try to make a statement in regard to the Christian life in which its qualities shall be balanced one over against another, what a difficult task it is! In fact we cannot balance the Christian qualities. We have to say simply that there must be enough of gentleness and enough of firmness, enough of love and enough of condemnation, enough of contemplation and enough of activity, enough of devotion and enough of practicalness, and so on. The difficulty is one which appears in connection with all moral precepts. Virtue, we are told, is a mean, it is a matter of proportion. But proportion is

something which cannot be accurately defined beforehand. When we fully appreciate this difficulty in defining qualities, we realize what power there may be in this respect in an embodiment of the ideal of the Christian life in which the various qualities blend in a perfect unity, an embodiment in which we can find an example of that which we could not have reached through any process of *a priori* reasoning. When we ask ourselves what this ideal means in general, we reply that it means spirituality as against materialism, love as against selfishness. It means the embodiment of a reasonable self-sacrifice. It would be a happy thing if the term "Christianity" could be used in relation to this ideal. A man doubts whether he is a Christian or not, and we doubt with him. But true Christianity is simply conformity to this ideal. However confidently a man may apply the term "Christian" to himself in relation to the dogmatic statements which have served so largely to give content to the term, we can understand with what hesitation he would use the term of his own life in relation to this sublime ideal. But we recognize the fitness of the life of Jesus to become such an ideal. So far as we can know it and understand it, not only does it conform perfectly to our highest thought but it has been to a great extent the source from which our highest thought has sprung.

There is still another point of view from which we may regard the inspiration that comes from an ideal. A soldier may fight well without a standard, but he will fight better with one. Men need some outward symbol of that to which they devote themselves. This symbol may be nothing in itself, but even so we know what its power may be,—we know what the power of the Roman eagles was. Now in the standard which Christianity has adopted, the standard of the cross, we have not a mere arbitrary symbol but one which actually embodies that for which the Christian is striving. The life of Jesus is not only formally but really the standard of the Christian. This would be true even if we did not believe the story of his life. The picture that is drawn for us would still give the ideal of the Christian life, together with the power that flows from it. But new power is added when we consider

that this life is not merely a picture but a reality, that it was actually lived upon the earth, and that the thought of Jesus represents not only the ideal of the true life but an ideal which has been at least practically fulfilled. The attraction of a personality in which the highest thought and faith are thus embodied will naturally affect men more or less powerfully according to the different nature of different minds, and perhaps also according to the view that one holds in regard to the nature of Jesus. If one believes that Christ is very God, the object of absolute worship, however much we may differ from his view, we must still recognize the fact that the worship which is thus offered is real; it is a worship brought to that which is really above the individual who brings it, and it is the power of the real life of Jesus that is worshipped. Again, one may take a somewhat different view, and instead of emphasizing the worshipful aspect of the nature of Jesus, may dwell rather upon the thought of his sympathetic presence as still in living relation with his Church. He may think thus of the disciple as still in personal relation with his Master, so that as his love goes out personally to the living personality of Jesus, so the love of Jesus flows back personally to him, and the spiritual presence of Jesus is felt by the disciple as a living reality in all the crises of his life. Here we have in what is perhaps its most intense form the power that may come from the embodiment of the Christian ideal in the personality of Jesus. Or, again, one may have simply a reverential memory and love, as toward a life which has been lived upon the earth, but which, although one may believe that it still exists, is now felt to be less nearly and personally related to the individual. As one looks back in this way, he realizes freshly the beauty of the presence of Jesus upon the earth, and the greatness of the blessings that have flowed from him. Whatever, then, the view we take of the nature of Jesus, in every case we find this power in his personality and in the fact that his life is the embodiment of the highest teaching.

Here, however, a question arises. May there not be other lives as good as the life of Jesus? and if there is this possibility, why

exalt his life as thus absolutely pre-eminent? This question is of a sort to which I have been obliged to refer already a number of times, questions which propose theoretical difficulties in the way of our most satisfactory results. We have to consider them in order to see what remains if we grant them their fullest possible sweep. In this case the position that we have taken does not require us to determine by any *a priori* reasoning whether there are now or can be in the future lives as good as the life of Jesus. The historical view is all that here concerns us. From the historical standpoint we can say with confidence that no life and personality can ever take the place of the personality and life of Jesus. For if we have in Christianity the highest possible religious teaching, then the beginning of Christianity will always have a central place in the life of the world, and the founder of Christianity will fill a place in the hearts and lives of men such as can never be filled by any one else. We tend always to associate the teaching of any individual with his personality whenever any ground is offered for such association. How easily the people of a parish think of their minister as good above all others in the community! In reality there may be many who are as good as he, or better; but the people are so accustomed to hear him utter lofty thoughts, and his life so far as they can know it appears to be so good, that the fact that he is the one to utter great truths leads them to regard his life as in some special manner representative of them. Emerson may not have been any more truly independent and self-reliant than many of his neighbors; but because individuality was the central principle of Emerson's thought, and his presentation of it made an epoch in many lives, and because his life sufficiently conformed to what he taught, the very thought of him has come to be associated with the ideal that he had in mind. History is full of similar instances. Now if religion and morality are the most important, the most essential elements of life, then he who has done most to establish the highest form of both has a place which must always remain the highest, and in Jesus we have the most authoritative and most central utterance of the highest truth, associated with a life of complete self-sacrifice and devotion embodying the spirit

of his teaching. Of course there is a certain sense in which every life is important, and the function of one as essential as the function of another; in a certain sense the private soldier is as necessary as the general, and the hod-carrier as necessary as the architect. Yet in all relations the highest position is given to the most central and most commanding figure, and whatever theories we may entertain in regard to the comparative excellence of other lives, the position of Jesus historically will remain central and supreme, for the reason that his leadership rests simply on the fact that he actually leads. Here, as at other points in the examination that we have been making, I have purposely brought down our assumptions to a minimum in order that we may see what remains from the more limited point of view. In proportion as any may find it possible to raise their assumptions above this minimum, all that I have said will only become more emphatic. It remains emphatic, even with the lowest assumptions that are justified by historical truth.

We have seen that the element of a life which is the incarnation of the spirit of the religion, and which has been the medium through which has come the central utterance of its teachings, is a necessity to the absolute religion. This element Christianity possesses in common with Buddhism. But there is this difference, that whereas the life of Jesus is the embodiment of his teaching, the life of Buddha, in so far as it represents the element of service without hope of gain, goes far beyond that which is required by his teachings. The life of Buddha, however, like his teachings, is deficient both as regards the purely religious element and also in the direction of a healthy relation with the world. For Buddha taught the reality of no divine being higher than man, and he summoned his followers to a life of seclusion supported by the alms of others.

When we turn to the third factor in the power of Christianity, the institution of the Church, we have to recognize the embodiment of the early teaching in the life of Jesus as the vital element in the history of the Church from the beginning. We are apt to dwell chiefly upon the more formal, external manifestations of the

life of the Church, in the proceedings of councils and in the doings of bishops and popes and kings. All these represent the points at which the Church has come in contact with the world and has been invaded by it, and naturally enough this outward history has been full of worldliness and pride and hypocrisy and persecution. But we must not forget that behind and beneath these external manifestations, these official lives have been the lives of the countless men and women who after all have really constituted the Church and who to greater or less extent have all been inspired by the teachings and the life of Jesus. When we seek to account for the influence which the Church has had in moulding institutions and shaping civilizations, we are not to look at the external forms; we are to see the power of the Christian life and teaching working silently through all like the leaven hid in the three measures of meal. It shows the wonderful vitality and recuperative power of Christianity that these inner, spiritual forces should have held their own to such a large extent in the midst of all the corruption that surrounded them, and should at last have cast it off and emerged in something of their original purity.

The fact that the Church is an institution is no doubt the source of much of the corruption that has accompanied it. For if it were not an institution worldliness would have found little room; the worldliness has entered through the struggles of those who had charge of the institution to give it supremacy from the worldly point of view. Yet if the Church had possessed no organization, we may question whether the teachings of Jesus would have accomplished anything like the results that have been actually achieved. If the institutional aspect of the Church has opened the way for many of the imperfections which have been the reproach of Christianity, it has been at the same time a great power for the spread of Christian faith. In all the great religions of the world we have to recognize the power that there is in some sort of organization. There is always the danger that the organization may overpower the inner spirit, but this is a danger which belongs to life. You may remember the choice which, according

to the Mazdean story, was offered to the Fravashis. They were asked whether they would live in peace and quiet as spirits, or would enter bodies and share in the conflict with the world and suffer from all the ills that might result, in the hope of contributing toward the triumph of the powers of good; and they decided to enter bodies, and run the risk of all the imperfection and suffering incidental to them, that so they might have part in the great struggle of life. We may imagine that a choice like this is offered to the spirit that is to enter into one or another of the religions of the world,—that Christianity, for instance, was asked, “Will you remain pure but to a large extent powerless, or will you take to yourself a body, with all the dangers and imperfections that may attend it, that thereby you may become a more efficient instrument in overcoming the powers of ignorance and sin?” We should feel sure that the decision would have been the same as that of the Fravashis. The teachings of Socrates have been an inspiration to many minds, but in the absence of any organization to cherish them and spread them, they have had comparatively little general influence upon the history of the world. It is true that various philosophers have had their schools, but their purpose has been mainly to furnish opportunity for intellectual discipline. The great religions have profited by the power that organization brings, and in the case of Christianity the power of organization is added to the power of those other elements that are essential to the absolute religion.

But if there is to be an organization, it must be truly an organization; it must be an organism, it must have organs; there must be some form. The very simple rites which Christianity adopted have no doubt been the source of much of that external element which follows upon organization. As we look back, it seems as though the early Church, whose outward form was at first so simple, had by a sort of instinct gathered itself into a firmer and more complete organization, and taken on a more earthly form, that thus it might have strength to press through the difficulties with which it had to contend. I shall find occasion later to speak of the rites of the Church in some detail. I have

referred to them here only to emphasize the gain that has come to Christianity through the possession of these forms.

The question may arise at this point whether there is not a difference between *an* absolute religion and *the* absolute religion. Is it not possible that another religion may be developed independently which shall rival Christianity in the world, if it does not supplant it? But where is such a religion to come from? We cannot look to the barbarian world for its discovery any more than we should expect from the barbarian world the discovery of the law of gravitation; and when we turn to the world of civilization there is no community within it which has not already some knowledge of Christianity, so that it becomes increasingly difficult to determine how far this or that development in religion may be the result of the influence of Christianity. Thus we find Hindu teachers who do not call themselves Christians but yet teach a doctrine which is an approach to Christianity. There is today a convergence of the world in regard to religion, a nearer approach to a common sympathy. No doubt other forms of religion may retain their names at the same time that they appropriate much of the spirit of Christianity. But the position of Christianity as central cannot be relinquished. Its name may not be assumed, but its power must be recognized everywhere.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE DIVINE APPOINTMENT OF JESUS.—HIS DIVINITY.—MIRACLES: THEIR A PRIORI POSSIBILITY OR IMPOSSIBILITY.—THE VALUE OF MIRACLES: THE VALUE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT; THEIR VALUE IN THEMSELVES.—THE QUESTION AS TO THE ACTUAL OCCURRENCE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT MIRACLES.

THERE are certain special questions in regard to Jesus Christ and Christianity which have entered largely into theological discussion. The first of these concerns the divine appointment of Jesus. Was he divinely appointed to his work? Hase, in the beginning of his *Geschichte Jesu* recognizes three elements as entering into every individual life,—the divine purpose in the life, the free action of the individual by which he conforms more or less perfectly to this purpose, and the environment which is acted upon by the individual and in turn reacts upon his activity. These are elements which anyone who believes in a divine providence or a teleological principle in the world, must recognize as entering into every life. Every life has its purpose, and, if we accept any thought of a guiding spiritual principle, its divine purpose. But how are we to know what this purpose is? Theologians have sometimes made the mistake of attempting as it were to enter into the divine councils, determining what must have been decided in them, and then discovering in the world the actualization of this decision. It is impossible to do this. We can know what the divine purpose is only as we find it manifested in the world, or, in other words, as we bring together all the indications that we perceive of such manifestation both in the world without and in the world within,—the high ideas and the lofty aspirations which we consider most divine, whether in

the inner or in the outer life. That is, we learn the divine purpose from the divine accomplishment, recognizing that this result must be modified somewhat by our own self-consciousness. In considering the divine accomplishments, however, we have to distinguish between those elements which belong to the ideal world, and those which are foreign to it and opposed to it. We may consider all lives as in a certain sense instruments of the divine purpose, and yet recognize that they accomplish the divine work more or less completely according as they conform more or less closely to the ideal standard.

Now if we recognize the presence of a divine purpose in any single aspect of the life of the world we must recognize it here in this field of religion and morality which we are now considering. Here in the teaching and the life of Jesus we reach a point at which the highest truth in regard to God and man not only finds utterance, but is embodied in such a form as to possess the greatest possible working power. If there is a guiding providence in the world at all, it must certainly be recognized in this great and central moment in the world's history. Or if we prefer to speak less theologically, then we must recognize in the life and teaching of Jesus the point of completion toward which that teleological principle which has been working all through the history of the world has tended from the first. Almost anything else we might consider accidental, but when in the working of the teleological principle a great result like this emerges, we cannot find in it an accident. In the work of the sculptor the grain or the color of the marble may be accidental, it may be an accident that he is working with this or that special tool; but it is not accident when the form which the sculptor is trying to portray begins to show itself.

It may be asked why we should insist upon this here in the field of religion more than anywhere else. All the other highest results of thought and life are also embodied in some movement, like the art of Greece or the law of Rome. Why emphasize this movement among all the rest? Why not recognize the presence of the divine purpose equally in other great discoverers?

in the masters of science and literature? in Dante? in Shakespeare? in Euclid? But geometry can be studied equally well with or without a sense of the divine appointment of Euclid. It is a different matter when the teacher in question is a teacher of religion, the relation of man to God and of God to man. It is of greater interest to know whether the message of such a teacher comes from God or not. Jesus teaches the presence of a loving Father. It is essential to our thought of such a Father that he should in some way manifest himself to his children; the loving God must be the self-manifesting God. If we imagine a child who has always supposed himself to be an orphan and to whom there comes a messenger telling him that he is not an orphan, that he has a father whose thought and care for him are constant, one of the first questions that we should expect from the child would be, "Did he send you?" If the child found that the father was taking no measures to bring the child into actual relations with himself, the child would be apt to think that the messenger either was without authority or had greatly exaggerated the love of which he spoke. The teaching of Jesus, therefore, requires the person of Jesus. His own relation to God is an essential part of his teaching, and if his life has no such relation to the infinite life, his teaching loses the very heart of its significance. The various religions of the world represent not only the efforts of men to reach God but also the self-manifestation of God to men. All religions show these two aspects of the movement of the spiritual life. In all God reveals himself to man according as man is able to receive the revelation, and the difference in this respect between other religions and Christianity is a difference in degree. In Christianity the two movements, the movement from man to God and the movement from God to man, appear in a completeness that is found nowhere else. The aspiration and striving of the individual soul toward God open the life of man to receive the fullest possible manifestation of the divine presence.

How are we to measure the position of Jesus in the world? We have to recognize the fact that he occupies the highest place

in history. In saying this we assume that the religious and moral needs of the soul are the highest needs in the world, and that the work of satisfying these needs is the highest that can be placed in the hands of anyone. We recognize the importance of any and all work for the well-being of man, but the chief value of all other work is after all as a means to the accomplishment of this highest task. For all other work has to do with the maintenance of life, with comfort, with ease of communication, and so on, but man lives in order that he may fulfil his true end, and that end is spiritual. The world of mechanical inventions is simply the stage upon which the highest life may be lived, and we can feel only a certain contempt for the machinery of life if it is unaccompanied by life itself; we can understand Emerson's criticism upon the modern world of conveniences when he says that

"Things are in the saddle
And ride mankind."

If the life of Jesus, therefore, marks the beginning for the world of the highest spiritual consciousness, if through his teaching and the embodiment of that teaching in his life men are enabled to enter into the highest relation with God, then we must recognize his work and his position in the world as the highest. If his name has become the symbol of the greatest realities of life, then from this point of view at least we need not hesitate to speak of his name as "above every name."²

Is Jesus to be considered divine? In answering this question we are embarrassed by the extremely different senses in which the word may be used. We hesitate to use it at all for fear that we may be misunderstood in that in which we would have our meaning most clear. If we say that Jesus is divine, we may be understood to mean that he was the absolute God come down to earth. Yet to say that he is not divine would invite a misunderstanding more disastrous than the first. For the question in the first case concerns personal relations, and however great

¹ *Ode, inscribed to W. H. Channing.*

² *Philippians*, ii, 9.

the importance that we may attach to the right adjustment of the relations between divine and human personalities, certainly the divine substance, that which is in itself divine, is more important still. The person who says that he does not believe in God but yet devotes his life to righteousness, is surely nearer to God than one who says, "Yes, I believe in God," but shows no concern for that which is in itself divine. Therefore the denial of the divineness of Jesus involves a greater peril than any misapprehension that may arise from the affirmation of it. To define our use of the term, however, more closely, we may speak of Jesus as divine if we mean by divinity nothing that is foreign to humanity. We have recognized a divine principle as working in the world from the beginning. We have spoken of it as derived from the life of God. Our method of speech is clumsy, but the inadequacy of our terms must not lead us to lose sight of the fact. This divine principle in the world manifests itself more and more until at last it comes to the full consciousness of itself in the life and teaching of Jesus. It is in this derivative sense that Jesus may be regarded as divine. We may use the term "divine" freely in regard to him so far as we understand it as implying the relation of *sonship*. His divinity is not that of one who has come down from above; it is that of the life in which the divine element that has been working in the world comes at last to its consummation and reaches the point at which the doors open between the lower and the higher, so that the divine life flows freely downward and the human life upward, and the divine and the human mingle. Jesus identifies himself with his followers; "my Father and your Father," the writer of the *Gospel according to John* represents him as saying, "and my God and your God,"¹ and again, "that they also may be in us, even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee."² In this sense we may say that Jesus is divine through the very perfection of his humanity, for the ideal of human nature is the fulfilment in it of the divine element.

The "double nature" of Christ is often spoken of. One of

¹ *John*, xx, 17.

² *John*, xvii, 21.

the great difficulties with theologians in discussing the doctrine of the incarnation has been to discover the point of union between the divine and the human. The incarnation in Christ was designed to bring them together. But the division remained as real, the two elements were still as distinct and separate, in the God-man, as they had been in the world before; the solvent had not been found. The view that we have taken, however, furnishes the solvent. There is a divine element in humanity which only needs fulness of development and freedom of manifestation to become wholly conscious of itself. The human and the divine can blend because they are not foreign to each other. From this point of view that which distinguishes Jesus from others is the singleness of his nature and not its twofold character. Rather it is we who have the double nature. If we recognize the individual and the universal as the two elements that enter into life, it is in ourselves that they are found in collision, standing each over against the other; it is in our lives that the contest is carried on which Paul pictures so vividly, between the law of God after the inward man and the law that is in the members.¹ In so far as Jesus transcends ordinary humanity it is by the singleness of his nature, by the fact that in him these two elements, hitherto kept apart only by the imperfection of the development of human life, have at last come together. Enough trace of them remains in him for us to recognize their presence, and to see that the reconciliation between them is not mechanical but spiritual and voluntary; enough of the lower element is left to surrender itself freely to the higher. "If it be possible, let this cup pass away from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt."² Here is the perfect blending, the full unity, and yet the result is not mechanical but free and living. When we say that Jesus is divine, if we open the question merely to fix the place of an individual life in history and to decide what terms we may apply to it, our discussion will be of comparatively slight importance. But if we mean that as we contemplate the life and character of Jesus we are in a certain sense brought into the divine presence, if we

¹ *Romans*, vii, 15-25.

² *Matthew*, xxvi, 39.

mean that the love and spiritual life and power which Jesus reveals are the truest manifestation of God that has been given to men, then the discussion becomes one of the most profound and important in which we can engage.

The question whether Jesus was a worker of miracles is one which to many minds has assumed much importance. It is a difficult question. As I have said before, we find it comparatively easy to discuss abstract relations, but as we approach concreteness difficulties increase at every step. This question in regard to miracles may be divided into three questions: first, are miracles *a priori* possible? second, if we grant that they are possible, what is their value? and third, are the miracles recounted in the New Testament writings to be regarded as facts?

The question as to the *a priori* possibility of miracles is perhaps more strictly a question as to their *a priori* impossibility. That is to say, is there any *a priori* ground for assuming in advance that a miracle is impossible? In answering this question, the position of Hume is the most important of any that we have to consider, for his statement in regard to miracles is the classical one.¹ I presume that his position in general is already familiar to you. It is not that the miraculous is impossible, but that no evidence could force us to believe in the miraculous. For our belief depends upon our experience, and whereas we have experience that men may be deceived, the miracle is by its very nature contrary to our experience. Therefore when we are told of some miracle, we find it easier to believe that the narrator of the story deceives or has been deceived than that the story is true. Hume recognizes only one condition under which this would not hold,—in cases where the assumption that the narrator could either deceive or be deceived would be as contrary to our experience as the assumption that the story is true. Here we should have a balance of improbabilities, with the miracle still not proved. Or, to state the same thing more concretely, let us suppose that certain persons in whom we have the most absolute confidence tell us that they have seen with their own eyes and

¹ *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 181.

felt with their own hands these things that are considered miraculous, but suppose the things themselves contrary to our own experience. In a case like this we could not believe that men such as we know these men to be could either deceive or be deceived, and yet our experience forbids us to believe that such things could have happened. Consequently, we remain undecided.

Mozley has replied to Hume's position by saying that although it is right in principle, it is not right in application.¹ He agrees with Hume that it is impossible by any logical procedure to justify the results of induction. We are here using the term "induction" in its ordinary sense, as describing the process by which we arrive at a result which is broader than the data that we have examined. Thus we have studied the movements of only a very few worlds, and yet we have assumed that all worlds are subject to the law of gravitation. But if we knew all the effects that have taken place in the history of the universe up to the present moment, these would furnish no reason that we could justify logically why we should expect similar effects to occur under similar conditions in the next moment. Hume recognized this difficulty, and insisted that belief is merely the result of a habit of the mind by which we are led to expect that events which ordinarily in our experience have been connected will be connected always; so that when one of the elements in such a relation occurs, the other element or elements associated with it are called up in our minds so vividly that we naturally look for their occurrence also.

So far as any strictly logical relation is concerned, both Hume and Mozley are right. But when Mozley concludes that no argument from experience can render any event *a priori* impossible, he overlooks the fact that we do place confidence in induction, and cannot help doing so. The question as to the logical justification of our confidence is one thing; the fact of this confidence is quite another thing. The lack of logical justification for our faith in induction is a reason, not for abandoning it, but rather for asking what the foundation is upon which it rests.

¹ J. B. Mozley, *Eight Lectures on Miracles*, pp. 33-61. C. C. Everett, *Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 157.

When, therefore, Mozley assumes as a result of his argument that faith in induction is not to be regarded, he is going beyond what is justified by his own premises. In fact, his argument works against himself, for if it takes away any reason for not believing in the miraculous it takes away equally any reason why one should believe in it. For whatever belief we may have in miracles is based upon the fact that according to our experience the testimony of men is to be accepted under certain circumstances. If we deny all validity to experience we cut away the foundation not only from the position of our opponents but also from our own position, and the whole matter is thus left hanging in the air, and belief or disbelief becomes a matter simply of caprice.

The only reply to Hume is the recognition that there is a degree of testimony which will compel us to believe almost anything. Science itself justifies this assumption. The fundamental datum of science is that there is a tendency in nature always to produce like results under like circumstances. This may remain true. But another more superficial, more general assumption of science is that the world has on the whole gone on in the past as it is going on today. We find, however, certain points in the history of the world at which all previous experience is set at naught. Imagine a spectator watching the course of things upon the earth from the first and reasoning upon them as we reason upon them today. From time to time he would find results that were absolutely opposed to any that he had met before. These fresh starting points, these "nodes," are scattered along all through the history of the world. The first is formed by the beginning of life upon the earth; the second that is of enough importance for us to distinguish today marks a still greater change, the introduction of sensation; the third marks the coming of distinct consciousness. We might go on in this way from consciousness to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness to abstract thought. For convenience, however, we may mark three stages as more important than any others: the first, that of merely physical relation; the second, that of vital, organic relation; the third, the stage in which the great element of subjectivity appears, the absolute opposite

of anything that had been present in the world before. These results we accept at the hands of science, although each in turn contradicts all previous experience. Furthermore, we accept them from science as from a wholly irresponsible authority. That is to say, it is impossible for science to verify them. Science tells us that at one time the world was simply a molten, fiery mass, and that out of this mass appeared organic life. Indeed, that extreme form of science which refuses to recognize anything higher than physical relations insists that by its very nature matter itself at a certain point or under certain circumstances tends to assume the form of organic life. All this is entirely unverified. With all its efforts science has been unable to demonstrate the fact that the development of organic life out of inorganic life is possible. The only experiments that have been tried with any appearance of success have been made with a solution of organic matter. If any attempt to produce organic matter from matter wholly inorganic has been made, it has never, so far as I am aware, entered into the discussion. Spencer goes so far as to say that even if such experiments were successful, and certain creatures which stand low down in the scale were thus produced by spontaneous generation, we should still have no light upon the great question of the origin of life upon the earth; for these creatures, however humble in their scale, would all be vastly complicated in comparison with what must have been the first appearance of organic life in the world.¹ In all these questions, therefore, we have at the hands of science statements and beliefs which accept as facts results which at certain periods of the world's history would have been absolutely contrary to all previous experience, and which at the present day cannot be verified in the sense that they can be repeated.

Now it is entirely possible to affirm, with some extreme defenders of miracles, that the life of Jesus and the introduction of Christianity into the world constituted such a node. Here, it may be said, is a point at which, so far as certain facts are concerned, previous experience counts for nothing. There is nothing in the

¹ *The Principles of Biology*, Vol. I, Appendix.

a priori view, or practically in any view, of the history of the world, which would lead us to deny in advance that such a node might occur at which there would be this further step upward. And if we have thus a fresh node in the history of the world, we have no reason to expect that our previous experience will not be contradicted; science has no right to assume in advance that such a contradiction is impossible. Of course science would reply—that is, the science which denies the influence of anything higher than physical relations—“This needs verification. Repeat these experiences and we will believe them. Show us your miracles today and we will accept them.” But the believer in miracles might answer, “Do you repeat the experience of the development of organic life from inorganic matter, the development of the conscious out of the unconscious, and we will accept your results.” This of course cannot be done, and the question therefore becomes a question of evidence. According to a theory that is often held by those who believe in miracles, the repetition of a miracle would be contrary to its very nature; a miracle continually repeated would cease to be a miracle. When life first entered the world, or when consciousness was first introduced, we can conceive it possible that circumstances may have attended the change which have never since occurred again. And just as spontaneous generation, for example, has not occurred again because it has not been needed again, so the circumstances which were required by the introduction of Christianity have never been needed since and therefore have never occurred again.

We are safe, then, in saying that science can furnish no reason for affirming that miracles are *a priori* impossible. The real difficulty, the real conflict, is not with physical science, but with the science of history. It is a difficulty of proof. The question returns to the point which Hume insisted upon: it passes from the *a priori* possibility or impossibility of the miracle itself to the *a priori* impossibility of proof. The difficulty in regard to history is that we find by experience that evidence as to the miraculous is easily procured, and that in general it carries very little weight.

It was this which led Hume to take the position that he did. He was travelling on the Continent and came upon accounts of miracles which seemed to be thoroughly well authenticated by testimony which in regard to anything else he would have accepted without question. As it was, however, this testimony made not the slightest impression upon him. He asked himself why it did not, and in working out an answer reached the result that we have been considering. Thus his examination was begun and carried through, not with any polemical purpose, but in order to solve a difficulty that had arisen in his own thought.

With the Protestant Church the tendency has been to deny all miracles except those that are recorded in the Old Testament and those that were performed by Jesus and his immediate followers. All other stories of the miraculous it has set down as the result either of fraud or of superstition. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, recognizes a continuance of miracles in every period of the history of the Church down to the present day. Therefore it is not disturbed by the difficulty which Hume encountered and which presents itself to almost every Protestant mind; it accepts a story of the miraculous about as easily as it accepts the story of anything else. For anything that we regard as *a priori* possible and as in itself not extremely unusual, we are ready to accept on very slight evidence. There is thus a great difference between the Protestant position in regard to miracles and the Catholic position. The miracle means much more to the Protestant than to the Catholic, but the proof of the miracle is much easier for the Catholic than for the Protestant. The Protestant, so to speak, plays for higher stakes, and therefore the danger of losing is just so much increased.

Perhaps we may say in regard to this question of miracles in general, that the influence of science, whether physical science or the science of history, is felt chiefly as it affects our habits of thought. It becomes a habit with us to expect regularity in the processes of the world, and to look for external and physical causes. Consequently we are a little startled when anything comes to introduce what appears to be irregularity or to suggest the presence

of some element other than the physical. There is that wonderful something which we call "the spirit of the age," according to which we accept at one period almost without proof what it would be impossible to prove to another age, and again with as little definite reason deny that which another age might easily accept. It is not that one age necessarily knows more about the matter than another, but only that a certain habit of thought is characteristic of each age and works in and through all the processes of its thought. It is fortunate that this is so, for it is because the world does not have to start afresh from the beginning with each new period, but accepts certain habits and results as established, that advance is possible. Yet there is this difficulty, incidentally, that each age in turn tends to regard its own spirit as final, and so measures the possibilities of human thought and experience by tests which have no absolute validity and may disappear with the age that has applied them. Therefore in any fundamental examination, while we recognize that the spirit of the age will enter largely into our discussion, we must try at the same time to go behind it.

If we look more carefully at this question as to scientific thought in relation to the belief in miracles, we recognize three realms with which science has more or less to do. First, there is the realm of purely physical relations. This is fairly well understood from the point of view of science. Second, there is the world of life, of organism. The step from one world to another science knows nothing about. Spencer indeed attempts to indicate the nature of the transition, but we cannot consider his effort successful. When, however, the world of organic relations is once entered, science feels very much at home. But it is not master of the situation. For in regard to the vital element itself science admits that it knows little. It attempts to reduce all vital processes to chemical processes, and such indeed they are to a great extent. But as Lewes insists,¹ the processes that go on inside the body are not the same as the processes that take place outside the body, because the conditions are different. In this difference in the conditions is the very heart of the problem. What are these

¹ *Physical Basis of Mind*, Problem I, Chap. I.

different conditions under which chemical processes inside the body lead to results which are never produced by similar processes outside the body?

The third realm with which science has to do is that of psycho-physical relations. I might perhaps have said the realm of psychology, but psychology is usually given over by science to philosophy; I do not understand the brain any better because I have analyzed it, but I do understand it much better when I know what its connection is with thought; thus a difference in terms which might appear to be of little importance really involves a fundamental difference of view. The psycho-physical realm is one of which science has comparatively little knowledge. It covers the border line between the physical and the psychical and includes many relations between mind and mind, and between the mind and external phenomena, about which science knows little. Formerly science contented itself with a wholesale denial of numerous relations of this kind which now it begins to consider worthy of investigation. It is to this comparatively unexplored region of psychical-physiology that miracles belong, the realm of the relation between mind and matter. This is true if we regard them from the point of view of the mere student of phenomena, and it is no less true if we assume for them the highest possible religious significance; from the religious point of view, they are still the expression of the relation of spirit to matter. As regards the knowledge possessed by science, this psycho-physical world is like the world of meteorology. Of this also science knows little. For the test of scientific knowledge is the power to predict, and this exists in meteorology to only a slight extent. If the observer sees that a wave of heat or cold is within a day's journey of us, so to speak, he can tell us that it will be upon us tomorrow, and that is about all. Yet meteorology is much more of a science than the study of this realm that lies on the borders of the material and the spiritual worlds.

To sum up, then, in a few words, our whole discussion of the question as to the *a priori* possibility of miracles, we must conclude that they are not *a priori* impossible. Neither are they a

priori incredible, for we accept again and again at the hands of science statements of relation which are utterly contrary to our previous experience.

We have next to ask what is the value of miracles. What value is attributed to them in the New Testament? What value have they in themselves? In the Gospels we find the fact of the miracles taken for granted; the stories in regard to them are told as naturally as any other stories. But what did Jesus think of them? How important did he consider them? We find that, so far as we can judge, he ascribed very little importance to them. According to the story of his life he had this miraculous power just as he had other powers, and used it as he used his other powers. The fundamental value which he appears to have attached to his miraculous power was that it enabled him to relieve suffering and to comfort sorrowing hearts. So far as they might serve to support his teaching or authenticate his authority, he seems to have regarded them as of little importance. Indeed, if there was anything which he appears to have wished especially to avoid, it was a reputation for wonder-working. When he heals a man he tells him to say nothing about it. When Nicodemus, impressed by the miracles, comes to Jesus saying "We know that thou art . . . come from God: for no man can do these signs that thou doest, except God be with him," Jesus replies, "Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God."¹ Any authority from miracles is swept aside, and the whole emphasis is laid upon the spiritual relation to God. When Jesus does appeal to the miracles in support of his teaching, it is as a last resort. "Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me: or else believe me for the very works' sake";² if you cannot see the divine element in my life, he says to the disciples, then you must accept what I am trying to teach you because of the miracles. The most distinct appeal to the miracles occurs in the denunciation of Chorazin and Bethsaida, when he cries out that if the mighty works which had been done in them had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago.³ But here

¹ *John*, iii, 1-3.

² *John*, xiv, 11.

³ *Matthew*, xi, 13. *Luke*, x, 13.

again his words are in the nature of a last resort; it is the extreme condemnation of Chorazin and Bethsaida that they would not believe even the testimony of the miracles. We are told that Jesus "did not many works" in Nazareth "because of their unbelief."¹ But if the miracles were to be regarded primarily as a basis for belief, one might suppose that this would have been just the sort of place in which he would most surely multiply them. We find, therefore, that although now and then Jesus appeals to the miracle as to the lowest kind of testimony, that which he desires always first of all is a recognition of the more profound and lofty proof that he offers. Furthermore, the miracles are performed as quietly as possible, and not in order to create faith but where faith already exists. There is one passage which seems to stand apart. When the Pharisees and Sadducees ask Jesus for a "sign from heaven," he points to "the signs of the times." "Ye know how to discern the face of the heaven," he tells them; "but ye cannot discern the signs of the times. An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign," he adds, "and there shall no sign be given unto it but the sign of Jonah."² It is interesting to notice that Strauss calls special attention to this passage and finds in it a fragment of the original story of the life of Jesus as it was given before the element of the miraculous began to enter.³

When we turn to the other New Testament writings we find a different view of miracles. Peter is represented as speaking of Jesus as "a man approved of God unto you by mighty works and wonders and signs,"⁴ and Paul writes similarly of himself, reminding the Corinthians how "the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, by signs and wonders and mighty works."⁵ The emphasis is entirely different from that of Jesus, and must be regarded as indicating how distinctly lower

¹ *Matthew*, xiii, 58.

² *Matthew*, xvi, 1-4. *Mark*, viii, 11, 12. *Luke*, xi, 29, 30.

³ *Life of Jesus*, Trans. of M. Evans, p. 428.

⁴ *Acts*, ii, 22.

⁵ *II Corinthians*, xii, 12.

was the position of the apostles in regard to the consciousness of spiritual truth. They do not reach that clearness of vision which we find in Jesus.

We have seen what value is attributable to miracles in the New Testament. What value have they, considered in themselves? There are two aspects of their possible worth; they may be regarded as furnishing evidence of spiritual truth either indirectly or directly. Indirectly a miracle may suggest the exaltation of the person who performs it. We see his superiority in this respect and infer that he may be similarly superior in other respects; we conclude, therefore, that he is to be trusted as having in general a wider outlook and greater powers than we possess. At first thought this process of reasoning might seem to be natural and safe. But there is a difficulty. For take the relation between the white man and the savage. The white man comes with his gun and his cannon and all the other appliances of his civilization, and the savage, recognizing the various ways in which the white man is thus his superior, thinks that he must be as wise and good as he is powerful,—that he is some divinity that has come down to him. But presently he finds that although the white man has introduced much that is good he has also brought with him much that is evil; he has proved not to be the divine being that those wonderful powers seemed at first to indicate.

Again, the miracle may serve indirectly to authenticate the authority with which the person speaks who has performed the miracle. He performs some supernatural act through what he may believe to be the working within him of a divine power, and he may himself believe, and may lead others to believe, that this is the sign of his authority, and that one who can perform such works must be speaking by the authority of God himself. But here once more a difficulty arises, in the fact that the laws by which the world is governed and by which man is brought into relation with the world, are still so imperfectly understood. In a realm of such relations, the laws of which are not fully understood, any result may appear under certain conditions to be miraculous. Thus the savage sees in an eclipse a monster that

devours the sun. He shouts and beats his tom-tom, and the monster is driven away. At any rate the eclipse ceases, and the sun shines as before; and as the savage always raises the outcry whenever the eclipse comes, and as the eclipse always passes, it is only natural that he should conclude that it is because of his effort that it has gone. But Columbus foresaw an eclipse and told the savages that unless they brought him food within a certain time he would blot out the sun forever. When the time arrived and the sun began to darken, the savages brought the food. Here are two different types, on the one hand the type of those cases in which the persons who profess to accomplish the miracle are themselves deceived, and on the other the type of the cases in which natural powers are used with the full knowledge that they represent natural laws. The first type is of more importance than is sometimes supposed. For it is a mistake to think that the accomplishment of miracles by natural means is in all cases for the purpose of deception. The person who performs the miracle may himself connect the result with something which appears to him to be the cause when really it is not the cause. The deceit that has been charged against the priesthood at certain periods no doubt was often a self-deceit.

Sometimes in considering the question of spiritualistic phenomena, I have puzzled myself by asking whether there is any test by which the reality of such appearances can be proved beyond question. We recognize the possibility of clairvoyance, of optical delusion, of the action of one mind upon another in such a way that the optical delusion of one may be shared by the other, and we recognize also the possibility of jugglery or of fraud. The more we consider these possibilities, the greater the difficulty becomes of finding any absolute test by which to judge the phenomena. It is an interesting question, also, whether the possession of miraculous powers, if granted, would raise the individual who possessed them in our estimate of him as a teacher or guide of life. The question is one which each may answer for himself. I am inclined to think that our estimate would depend very much upon accompanying circumstances and upon

the general impression that we had received in regard to the character and purpose of the individual himself.

The indirect evidence of spiritual truth which a miracle may furnish depends upon the form of the miracle, the way in which it is performed. Its direct evidence depends upon its content, upon the nature of the transaction itself and of that which it involves. This content of the miracle is of two kinds, special and general. The most prominent example of special content appears in the resurrection of Jesus. Of this I shall speak more fully later.¹ I refer to it here simply as an illustration of what is involved in the special content of a miracle as the direct evidence of spiritual truth. The miracle of the resurrection of Jesus, then, does not involve as its content the immortality of all men, nor the existence in every man of an immortal element; for the circumstances in the case are all of so special a nature that the life after death may also be a special circumstance. The special content of this miracle is the possibility of life after death; if there is a realm of spiritual existence which is independent of bodily existence, the fact that a single individual is known to have entered this realm would take away any inherent impossibility that others also may enter it. So far as the general content of the miracle is concerned, we must regard it as a manifestation of some higher law with which we had not been familiar previously, and not as the special act of a supernatural being. For even if it be the special act of a supernatural being, that very fact reveals to us primarily the law that a supernatural being may thus strike into the common course of things upon the earth and change the usual relations. So that even if we regard the miracle as a most special act of divine will, there still remains the absolute importance of the law behind the special act. We still must recognize a relation between the world and God which makes such interference possible.

This relation, this law, is that of the supremacy of spirit over matter. We know something of this supremacy through what we can see of the relation between consciousness and the bodily organism. The miracle would illustrate it more directly. If

¹ Page 466.

by the will of any spiritual being, whether high or low, the sun could be made to stand still, or the sick be made well, or any other of the physical laws of nature be similarly suspended, we should thus have brought before us most distinctly the fact of the dependence of the material universe upon a spiritual universe. It is true that this evidence would be of the very lowest kind, and of a kind that we ought not to need. We ought to be able by our own intuition to recognize the nobility of spirit as compared with matter, to see that the higher elements of the spiritual and moral life are divine, and that they are supreme over any of the lower elements of life that depend upon material conditions. Anyone who does recognize the supremacy of spirit thus intuitively could not be helped by all the miracles in the world, for they would not bring him any nearer to the full perception of the glory and dignity and divinity of the spiritual life; he would see in them merely another manifestation of a force with which he was already familiar through other channels. Yet we can conceive that to certain minds such a display of the power of the spirit in the material world might sometimes be helpful. It might give to the spiritual life an emphasis, a predominance, by which a person's attention would be caught and held so that he would be led to perceive its divineness more clearly than might otherwise have been possible. He might be helped to feel that the principle which perhaps he had recognized as *de jure* supreme in the world was also supreme *de facto*.

An interesting illustration of this may be found in Kant's *Critique*. In what he has to say of God and immortality he speaks of the impossibility of really yielding ourselves to the power of the spiritual life unless we see that the world itself is subject to it. If nothing came of righteousness in the world of facts, he says in substance, if happiness were not apportioned to desert, the moral life itself could not compel our full allegiance.¹ Here is the testimony of one of the greatest thinkers of the world, who felt perhaps more than any other, certainly more than most others, the sublimity of the moral law,—here is his testimony that the

¹ Trans. by F. Max Müller, 1881, Vol. II, pp. 690-703.

moral law itself wins allegiance by showing that the world of facts is subject to it. We may admit that Kant was in a sense driven to this by the exigencies of his argument. Yet we cannot help giving a good deal of weight to the fact that such a mind as this was helped in its reverence for righteousness by seeing the supremacy of righteousness in the world of experience. We feel that if this was the case with a man like Kant it must naturally be still more so with the average man.

If we regard miracles in this way as illustrating the supremacy of spirit over matter, we see that the miracles recorded in the New Testament do not stand absolutely alone. We find that there is a whole world of phenomena that may be in a certain sense or in a certain degree of a kindred nature. I have already referred to the phenomena of clairvoyance, mind-reading, and the like, which science is beginning to recognize but for which as yet it has found no test. These are ordinarily manifested in an abnormal development of human nature, and to compare them with the New Testament miracles may appear at first sight to degrade the miracles. But let us consider the matter from the highest standpoint. Jesus moved in a physical world and made use of the physical relations of life. His body was supported by food; he made use of the ordinary material appliances of the time; he used ordinary speech. These ordinary physical relations and activities he inspired with new meaning, manifesting through them a certain divine spirit. All this we recognize as not at all degrading to his earthly life, whatever the exaltation that we may ascribe to him before or after. Now if we suppose that there is above this world of ordinary material relations another world of relations of which we have only glimpses now and then, but which does exist and which involves forces that do manifest themselves occasionally under varying circumstances, then we may suppose that Jesus used the relations of this other world just as he used the relations of the physical world.

I said that such phenomena are usually manifested in some abnormal development of human nature. It often happens that the person who has clairvoyant power or who professes to be a

medium, whatever the term may mean, loses the power with some change in health; not infrequently power of this sort manifests itself in a low state of the physical condition, and passes away as that condition is restored. This is not absolutely and invariably the case. Whatever view we take, so much that is contradictory is connected with the question that no data are to be had for a scientific statement. There may be mediums who are in good health, and there may be persons who are in other respects healthy and abnormal only in this particular direction; I have in mind as I speak one or two mediums who are healthy persons, but they are for certain other reasons regarded as frauds. I do not mean to say that there is any absolute connection between the manifestation of these vague forces and the ill health of the persons through whom the manifestation takes place, but they often occur together. Certainly these powers frequently appear in connection with a low moral development, and in general we recognize their abnormal character. Thus the clairvoyant must as a rule be taken out of the world of life. He loses the highest gifts that belong to him as man, and sinks down into the common material of undeveloped thought. Nevertheless we may at least conceive the possibility of a normal development of life so complete and perfect that these relations also shall have their place in it. It may be that in abnormal humanity we have a hint of relations which after all find their true place in the absolutely normal life. Of course this is mere conjecture. Yet it may illustrate one positive aspect of the discussion, namely, that these phenomena are not to be dismissed as wholly unnatural and improbable, or as wholly without any relation to the higher development of the spiritual life.

Possibly our greatest interest in this question, so far as the stories of the New Testament miracles are concerned, relates to our satisfaction in reading the Gospels. Many of the loftiest words of Jesus seem to be so closely connected with some miraculous event that if the miraculous element is taken away there appears to be danger that much of the higher, spiritual element will also be taken. In regard to this Strauss makes a suggestion

which may be helpful,—that sometimes a saying may have suggested the incident which appears in the story of the life as a framework for the saying.¹ According to this view, as the great words of Jesus were handed down at first by oral tradition, and passed from mouth to mouth, the constructive tendency, the myth-making tendency, of the human mind, would by degrees in all honesty and good faith suggest the circumstances under which these words must originally have been spoken.

This, however, brings us to our third question. Did the miracles as they are recorded in the New Testament actually occur? Let me say at once that the discussion of this question belongs properly to another department, that of New Testament study and the evidences of the genuineness of the Gospels. Up to this point we have been moving wholly in the realm of theory, asking only what might have been and the meaning of what might have been, but now the question is whether certain events which are said to have taken place really did take place. In answering our first question, we tried to remove all antecedent impossibility of the occurrence of the miracles. This third question brings us to the domain of history, and the answer to it must come not through any theoretical considerations but by historical study. There are one or two suggestions, however, which may be made here without trespassing far upon the field of others. First of all, then, we must recognize the fact that in general the narrative in the Gospels is unquestionably faulty; that on the whole the materials were gathered in an uncritical manner, and at a time considerably removed from the period in which the events occurred. We should therefore find it difficult to lay the finger on any one event and say that it must certainly have taken place. On the other hand, there is no story of the life of Jesus that does not involve in some degree a miraculous element. The two elements, the spiritual and the miraculous, appear to be blended in all the glimpses that we gather, unless we accept the suggestion of Strauss to which I have referred, that there was an earlier story of the life into which the element of the miraculous had

¹ *Life of Jesus*, Trans. of M. Evans, p. 600.

not as yet entered, and that here and there we are given hints of this earlier story in the later narratives that have come down to us.¹ However this may be, we have also to recognize, secondly, that there are in the New Testament certain statements in regard to miracles which rest upon an authority that is known to us. The differences of opinion in regard to the authenticity and genuineness of the Gospels do not extend to the principal letters of Paul, and we find in them definite reference by the apostle not only to miracles in general but especially to miracles which he himself has performed. The author of *Supernatural Religion* states that no testimony to a miracle is found to be given by the author of the miracle himself.² It is true that we do not find Paul saying "I performed this wonderful work," but in both the letter to the church at Rome and the second letter to the Corinthians we do find him claiming that he has performed the "wonders and mighty works" which constitute "the signs of an apostle."³ Here we have the direct testimony of Paul, in documents which it is generally agreed are genuine, that he himself had performed works of the sort that we call miraculous; and elsewhere, as in his first letter to the Corinthians⁴ he refers to such works as habitually performed by the apostles. In what Paul says there is no direct testimony as to whether Jesus also performed works of this kind, but if we accept Paul's statement in regard to his own works, we may admit the probability that works of a similar kind occurred to a greater or less extent in the ministry of Jesus.

I suppose that very few at the present day would regard miracles under any aspect as wholly apart from law. Even if they are considered as the interference, in the most extreme sense, of a divine power with the course of nature, the manifestation of a single, separate act of the divine will, few if any would insist that such interference is mere caprice. Some rationality would

¹ Page 380.

² W. R. Cassels, *Supernatural Religion*, Vol. I, p. 200 f., Vol. III, p. 325.

³ *Romans*, xv, 18, 19. *II Corinthians*, xii, 12.

⁴ *I Corinthians*, xii, 9, 10.

be recognized,—something which could be formulated into a general principle. It might be the principle that when in the development of the world a certain crisis is reached, such interference follows. But without rising to these heights of speculation, we may recognize in the miraculous, in so far as we admit that it exists, the working of the higher, spiritual principle within the world of material relations.

In speaking of the actual occurrence of miracles, one is tempted to try to draw a line between one miracle or class of miracles and another as regards their probability. We may go a little way in such an attempt, but it is likely to end in purely arbitrary distinctions. The worst possible method of explaining the stories of the miracles, it seems to me, is the so-called naturalistic or rationalistic method. According to this method, the stories which appear to contain accounts of miracles are accepted as literal facts, but they are explained in accordance with the ordinary processes of nature. Thus the story of the feeding of the multitude¹ is explained by the supposition that when Jesus saw that the people were hungry and encouraged his disciples to bring out their little stores, others who saw what they were doing followed their examples, and then others still, and thus the hunger of the multitude was satisfied. So in the story of the healing of the demoniac boy after the transfiguration of Jesus, the words, "This kind can come out by nothing, save by prayer and fasting,"² are explained as intended to teach that a special physical and spiritual regimen was necessary in order to effect such cures. Suppositions of this sort are fruitless. It is better to sweep the whole account away than to try to explain these stories and reason the very heart and essence out of them by such processes. This "naturalistic" method furnishes another illustration of the depth to which the loftiest teaching may fall. It all grew out of the Kantian doctrine that nothing enters into religion except that which has a purely ethical relation.

¹ *Matthew*, xiv, 14-21. *Mark*, vi, 34-44. *Luke*, ix, 12-17. *John*, vi, 1-14.

² *Mark*, ix, 14-29.

Since one can serve God only by righteousness and has no relation to God except as the administrator of the moral law, nothing must be allowed to remain in the New Testament that does not correspond with this. We can only compare the efforts that have resulted with Matthew Arnold's attempt to find in the Jahweh of the Old Testament simply "the Eternal Power not ourselves, that makes for righteousness."

CHAPTER XXX.

THE USE OF THE NAME “CHRIST”: THE QUESTION WHETHER JESUS HIMSELF CLAIMED THE TITLE OF MESSIAH.—THE USE OF THE NAMES “CHRISTIAN” AND “CHRISTIANITY”: THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE LEADERSHIP OF JESUS.—FREE RELIGION.—THE RELATION OF OTHER RELIGIONS TO CHRISTIANITY.—THE QUALE OF CHRISTIANITY.—THE FIFTH DEFINITION OF RELIGION.

THE question whether the name “Christ” ought to be used is for us comparatively unimportant, although some of the discussion of our time has given it a certain prominence. It is to be said first of all that this name like other names is a matter of history. It is the name which has been applied to Jesus of Nazareth and by the process of historical development has come to belong to him. Individually we may prefer another name. We may prefer the name “Jesus” as representing the personality of the life as “Christ” represents its official relation. It may seem to us that whereas the name “Jesus” has a certain tenderness and carries with it the sense of personal relation, the name “Christ” tends rather to lift the life to which it is applied out of the simple, human relationships. Furthermore we may feel that the name “Christ” looks backward as well as forward, and suggests the Jewish traditions.

Yet the name has its own very important signification which is not to be disregarded. For when we look at the matter less superficially, we have to ask whether there is in the nature of things any inherent reason why the name “Christ” should not be applied to Jesus. It is frequently said that since the contemporaries of Jesus were expecting a Messiah who should come as a temporal ruler and exalt the Jewish nation to the supremacy in the world which they believed to be their due, and since Jesus

fulfilled no such function as this, it is therefore a dishonest use of terms to speak of him as "Christ." By what right, however, is the usage of the contemporaries of Jesus, or of those who were his predecessors for a limited period, to be taken as the standard in determining the meaning of the term? It is a term of national significance and must be interpreted in the light of the national history as a whole rather than by the understanding of it in any single period. As we look back through the Hebrew scriptures we find in the earlier references to the Messianic expectation something very different from the narrow view that became current in later Jewish history. If we may accept the view so generally held, that the Messianic expectation appears in the story of Abraham,¹ then both in the story itself and in the various references to it we have an outlook that is large and unconditioned. The argument which Paul rests upon the story² may seem to us fantastic, but nevertheless it has a fundamental meaning in this aspect. Paul argues that since the promise to Abraham was given before the law and even before the establishment of Jewish nationality, it was to be fulfilled outside of the law and outside of the mere nationality, and he urges that later enactments cannot annul or contradict the breadth of the earlier promise.

Paul's argument, however, is open to criticism. Without giving it too much weight, and without confining ourselves to single passages which may be of doubtful interpretation, we have to ask what were the dominating thoughts of the Hebrew people throughout their history as it finds expression in their scriptures. One was the thought of God, the other that of the Hebrew nationality. These two elements were often in conflict, but on the whole they moved forward together with a certain harmony. As we compare them, which was the more fundamental and essential in the Jewish mind? Did God exist for the sake of the Hebrew people, or did the Hebrew people exist as a nationality to carry out the will of God? I am not asking the question in regard to the fact as we might look at it. I am only asking what was the relation between the two elements from the Hebrew point of view,

¹ *Genesis*, xii, 3, xxii, 18.

² *Romans*, iv.

and I think that we need not hesitate to say that in the Hebrew thought the nationality existed in order to carry out the will of God. We find that the greatest promises are made to the Hebrew people, but we also find that every promise is conditional, and furthermore that there are threatenings which are as intense as the promises. So long as the nation is obedient and true, and does the will of God, so long shall the people be his people; but if the nation ceases to yield itself to be the instrument of God, then it will be itself forsaken by him. That is the teaching throughout the Old Testament scriptures in regard to the relation between the Hebrew people and God. If this is recognized, we may go a step further and find in the Christ the flowering or completion of this whole development. If heretofore in the development the universal or divine element rather than the national element has been the essential element, then we should expect to find that in the Christ the divine rather than the national element would be similarly predominant. But if the national element is thus subordinate in the Christ idea, the Messianic idea, when considered as representing the general trend of Hebrew thought throughout the history of the nation as a whole, then the fact that the coming of Jesus was not a national triumph need not disturb us or prevent us from speaking of him as Christ.

This theory finds confirmation or illustration in the Christian use of Hebrew scriptures and forms and customs. The Hebrew scriptures are read in Christian pulpits and together with the peculiarly Christian scriptures form the sacred book of the Christian. The God of the Hebrews is worshipped by Christians under the names by which the Hebrews worshipped him; Christians accept literally the great phrases of the Hebrews in regard to God, as Creator and Lord of all. The sacred day of the Hebrews is kept by Christians; that is to say, a "seventh day" is observed, and, to a very large extent, in obedience to the Hebrew law. Thus we have many of the essential elements of the religious life of the Hebrews made universal in Christianity. We must recognize, however, that all fulfilment is larger than the hope; the future is necessarily foreign to the experience of men, and can be pictured

by them only in the terms which are familiar to them. Still we recognize the early hope as prophetic even although the fulfilment so far surpasses it. Thus we know perfectly well that Columbus did not undertake to discover a new world, but was simply trying to find a new way around to the other side of the old world; he did not know that he had discovered another continent. Yet because he accepted the best thought and learning of his time, and acted upon them, we applaud him as the discoverer of the new world and give him praise for the results, although they were so different from what he thought and planned. Luther by no means undertook to found a new division in the Church when he set out to reform the methods of the established faith. The Pilgrims came to this country to escape the interference of those from whom they differed, but we regard them as the founders of our religious freedom. The discoveries of science are largely accidental; yet when such discoveries lie in the direction in which the individual scientist was looking, when the accident has found him ready, we give him the credit of the result, no matter how much greater it may prove than anything that he had foreseen. Or take the thought of immortality. If we try to picture to ourselves the larger life, we know that any image that we can form of it must be incorrect, and that when it comes we shall find it very different from what we dream. Yet we do not doubt that our dream is a prophecy, and that the larger life, although beyond what eye hath seen or ear heard, shall still be the fulfilment of the life that now is. Suppose the bud were to dream of the coming flower; the flower is beyond the power of the bud to anticipate, and yet it is the fulfilment of the bud. Christianity was such a flowering of the Jewish life, and however different the Christ was in his actual coming from the expectation in regard to him, he may none the less be accepted as its fulfilment. It seems to me that this is true whatever the attitude that we take in regard to Jewish history. We may regard the Messianic anticipation strictly as prophecy, or we may think of it only as the dream of the people. But in either case, if we take the larger view that I have indicated, the use of the term "Christ" is justified.

Did Jesus himself claim the title during his life? Martineau's discussion of this question¹ is profound, but he is not always happy in his exegesis. He finds in the charge of Jesus to the disciples “that they should tell no man that he was the Christ”² a denial of the Messiahship. There is here, it is true, this aspect of the case, that since according to the account in *Matthew* and *Luke* Jesus up to that time had not been known as the Messiah and then charged the disciples that they should not make his Messiahship known, it is possible that the story is one of later growth, intended to explain why Jesus was not recognized as the Messiah during his own lifetime. The prediction of the coming of the Son of man before the disciples shall have gone through the cities of Israel³ may be an acknowledgment of the Messiahship, unless we assume that the prediction is simply a remnant of the earlier belief in the coming of the Messiah, and that Jesus is preaching that coming just as John had been preaching it. Romanes thinks that the belief in the resurrection of Jesus led his followers to assume that he was the Messiah. Over against all this, however, the inscription on the cross, “The King of the Jews,” indicates that there had been the acceptance of the Messiahship during the life of Jesus, that he had recognized himself as the Messiah and had been so recognized by his followers. This inscription is found in all four of the Gospels,⁴ and is one of the earliest of the traditions.

It might be supposed that if the term “Christ” may be used, the terms “Christian” and “Christianity” also may be taken for granted, and *vice versa*. But there are some who do not assent to this. All agree that “Christian” and “Christianity” are historical terms; the question is, to what period of belief shall they be applied? It has been urged that medieval Christianity is the real Christianity, not because this was more in accord with the teaching of Jesus, but because it was the historical form which Christianity assumed and under which Christianity became an

¹ *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, Book IV, Chap. II.

² *Matthew*, xvi, 20. *Luke*, ix, 21.

³ *Matthew*, x, 23.

⁴ *Matthew*, xxvii, 37. *Mark*, xv, 26. *Luke*, xxiii, 38. *John*, xix, 19.

organized power in the world. Those who take this view would have the broader forms of the Christianity of today spoken of as Neo-Christianity, just as the later school of Platonists was called Neo-Platonism. The suggestion, however, is not a happy one. For whereas the term “Neo-Platonism” has a definite meaning in the history of philosophy, the term “Neo-Christianity” can have no such definite meaning in the history of Christianity, but must always be a movable term. Medieval Christianity itself was Neo-Christian as compared with earlier forms, and if that which it is now proposed to call Neo-Christianity were to hold its own long enough to have a historical existence equivalent to the existence of what is now called Christianity, then through its very survival it would come to be known itself as Christianity, and the term “Neo-Christianity” would be applied to some yet newer form. The term “Neo-Christianity” would thus be continually pushed forward until its content would be as various as that of the term “Christianity” itself. No, the historic sense has judged rightly in giving the one name to the entire movement which began with Jesus and his apostles, however great the changes that have taken place in the course of its development. For there is, if nothing more, a certain sequence or current, which justifies the use of the same term throughout. It is like the course of a great river. A slender stream at first, how vast it is as it approaches the sea! Other rivers have poured themselves into it and have become lost in it, and still we call it by the same name that it bears at its source. Men may object, “It is not the same stream here that it was there! See how impure it has become! See how much there is in it now that does not belong to the original stream!” But still we recognize the one course throughout, and we feel that the one name is rightly given to the whole. In a wholly similar way, the history of Christianity is a single movement, the out-growth of a single impulse. External influences have more or less modified it, the philosophies and sciences of the world have contributed to it, the working of man’s reason has broadened or deepened it. But still it is the same stream, and may bear throughout its course the same name.

We may go deeper. There are certain elements which have been the same in all periods of Christian history. The impulse that came from Jesus to human faith and human brotherhood we find effective throughout. As I have already said, we are not to look for this in external forms, in that outer region in which Christianity became turbid through its contact with the world around it; we are not to look for it in creeds and in official lives and in ecclesiastical conditions. We are to look for it in the inner life, in the love and the self-sacrifice which manifest themselves under all these outward forms. It is here that in spite of much error and crudity of thought and sinfulness we find embodied in greater or in less degree the fundamental principles of Christianity, and it is to these fundamental principles that we refer when we speak of Christianity, rather than to the over-shadowing ecclesiastical structure. Thus in the profounder aspect of Christianity as well as from the outward, ecclesiastical point of view, we see the propriety of carrying on the name "Christianity" to all the larger results of the later growth. It would seem to be especially unfortunate to choose the present time in which to give up the name just when Christianity is beginning to have more of the spiritual significance that from the teaching of Jesus himself so essentially belongs to it. There is a great deal in the mere momentum of history, and when we find that a mighty current is tending more than ever before in the direction in which we wish to move, and in which we desire that the world shall move, it would seem not to be the best time to dig our little canal in order to start an independent movement of our own.

There is an objection, however, of a different kind, which perhaps is more generally felt than this which we have just been considering. Does not the use of the name "Christian" imply a certain servitude? Does it not imply the recognition of Jesus as a master, and does not this involve an intellectual submission, a limitation of our freedom of thought? But it must be remembered that Christianity is not primarily or fundamentally an intellectual system. It does not mean a dogma. What it does mean is the power of the spiritual life. It may be said that when

Paul writes “though we, or an angel from heaven should preach unto you any other gospel . . . let him be anathema,”¹ he is laying down a dogma which must be accepted on pain of expulsion, or of whatever is meant by the word “anathema.” But Paul is here opposing the teaching which would make obedience to the Jewish ritual essential to Christianity. Instead of laying down a dogma, he is in reality protesting against the limitation from any dogma. He is protesting in behalf of liberty, of absolute liberty. Of course the spiritual life implies a certain belief; it demands for its complete development the belief in God. Jesus, in bringing fresh inspiration to the spiritual life, insisted upon a higher conception of God and of man’s relation to him than had ever been recognized before. In this sense it is true that we have a doctrine or dogma underlying Christianity. But those who would shrink even from such recognition as this, who would urge the necessity of absolute freedom of thought and insist upon the ethical theory of life, forget that there is nothing so dogmatic and uncompromising as ethics. Ethics demands absolutely that what is right shall be seen to be right. Our morning papers contain a protest from the Mormon leaders insisting upon the right of liberty in regard to the question as to a plurality of wives. In almost any other aspect of life a protest that urged the right of liberty would meet with some sort of response in the hearts of the people. But the people recognize the fact that when a fundamental principle of morals is involved the principle of liberty does not apply. In matters of belief ethics is as absolute as religion. Furthermore, when we speak of freedom of thought in regard to matters of fundamental belief, we recognize or ought to recognize the fact that the highest life is impossible without certain beliefs. The highest moral life is impossible without a belief in some principle of right, and the highest religious life is impossible without some belief in God; the very highest religious life demands the highest belief in regard to God. Yet while Christianity thus of necessity recognizes divine reality as the object of belief, that belief is embodied in the heart and in the life. Jesus brings a higher, nearer belief in God. But he does not

¹ *Galatians*, i, 9.

insist upon belief; he takes belief for granted. "Ye believe in God," he is represented as saying, "believe also in me."¹ Or again, "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."² He does not argue that there is the Father who is good and perfect, but he emphasizes the power of that spiritual life which blends ethics and religion in inseparable union.

There may be a certain grandeur in the protest against leadership considered simply as leadership and as implying absolute allegiance from those who follow. But there is surely something petty in the protest against leadership when it demands activity and the development of the powers of life itself. In any great crises there are always enough to protest against such leadership and to stand back and criticise. But when there is some one who is leading in the direction which we recognize as that in which we and all the world ought to move, it seems to be mere folly to draw back and raise questions as to the propriety of such leadership. We might well question if we found that the leader was going wrong, or that there was another in advance of him. We might question if we should find, any of us, that we were ourselves in advance. But the protest is hardly justified when it comes from the ranks, from those who are still far from the position to which the leader would draw us on. I have spoken of the great power in the mere momentum of the history of Christianity. This momentum has been gained by the force of Christianity itself and by the leadership of Jesus. There is a profound truth in that parable of the vine which Jesus uses; mere individual effort can accomplish little as compared with what might result if the individual effort were joined to the great movement which is bearing society along with it. If we are to seek for the justification of the leadership of Jesus, we must look primarily, as I have already said, to the fact that he leads. For in any great conflict like this between right and wrong, between the spiritual and the material, the fact that any one leads is the real justification of his leadership. In the story of the battle of Lake Regillus, when the twin gods came to lead the Roman hosts to victory, their divinity was recognized

¹ *John*, xiv, 1.

² *Matthew*, v, 48.

not because of any marvel or splendor that accompanied them, but because they pressed forward against the enemy and the Romans followed them and won the battle.

It is sometimes urged, as still another difficulty in accepting the leadership of Jesus, that accident had so large a part in giving him his position in history.¹ Thus there was the belief in his speedy second coming, which inspired the early Church and sustained it in the midst of its trials. Such accidents no doubt did enter very largely into the life of Christianity and aided in its triumph. Suppose that we start with all this. What of it? Is there any leadership into which accident does not enter? How many accidents entered into the career of Lincoln! How many knew him when he was nominated for the presidency? Would he have been nominated if he had been known? Among the thousand and one elements that contributed to his nomination and election was the fact that the country did not dream how large-hearted and large-minded a man he was. And history is full of examples of this kind. But this does not detract from the work that is accomplished. The true leader is he who can make use of these accidents and so prove his right to the position to which they have brought him.

Of course I am speaking most superficially in using the term “accident” in this way, for we have already recognized the working of the great principle of teleology toward precisely this result that we have been considering. But looking at the question merely from the outside, we still are justified in urging that accidental circumstances are nothing in comparison with the fact that the leader who is thus brought forward shows the right and the power to lead. As I have said before in another connection,² the only cause for which anyone need hesitate to take the name “Christian” would be the doubt whether he was worthy to bear it. It stands for the ideal of the spiritual life, and to take and bear it implies that one has felt the power of that life.

It may be that what I have already said makes it unnecessary

¹ Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chaps. XV, XVI.

² Page 358.

to dwell at any length upon what is known as *free religion*. Yet there are one or two matters of which I wish to speak in this connection, even at the risk of some repetition. I refer to free religion by name, because the name is that which is most distinctive. I suppose *free religion* means fundamentally *uncombined* religion. The term may best be explained by a chemical analogy. Free oxygen is oxygen which is wholly uncombined; usually oxygen is found in union with other elements, and free oxygen is obtained for the most part by artificial chemical processes. Now to a certain extent religion may be said to resemble oxygen in that there is the pure religious element, the fundamental religious principle, which, however, is found in history combined with other elements and forming thus the various historical religions which we know as Buddhism, Parseeism, Christianity, etc. By free religion, therefore, following the analogy, we should understand the religious principle separated from the elements with which it is combined in these various religions, and taken for what it is in itself. The principle of free religion as thus understood is of fundamental importance, and the members of the different religious bodies of the world may unite with great advantage in comparing notes with one another and recognizing what they have in common. Yet the attempt to reach the general principle of religion by mere analysis is not one, it seems to me, that holds out to us the highest hope of great accomplishment. For as I have already suggested¹ the religions of the world are to a large extent complementary to one another, and if we try to take from each that which is common to all, the result may be rather meagre. We are rather to take the principle which each religion insists upon as most fundamental and add it to our general conception of religion. Any attempt to arrive at what is common to all the different religions must be like Spencer's compromise between science and religion which left in his hands only the empty form of his *Unknowable*.² In that case we saw that the true compromise was to be reached not by a process of abstraction but by a process of concretion, and here in a similar

¹Page 86.

²Chapter I.

way we must ask of each religion what is most concrete in it and thus obtain its most real contribution to our religious thought.

Practically speaking, the theory of free religion tends to put all religions on a level. As I have said before,¹ there is no *a priori* reason why this should not be done. There is no reason why we should say in advance that any one religion would be superior to any other, and in a comparative study of the different religions we must take it for granted at the outset that the contribution of one is as likely to be important as the contribution of another. But from the *a posteriori* point of view we find that all religions are not upon a level. It is doubtful whether anyone would claim that the religion of a savage which consisted in a dread of disembodied spirits and the desire to propitiate them, was on an equality with the Mazdean religion, with its recognition of one divine being, the absolute Creator and the absolute Good. If, then, as we study the various religions, we find that there is a difference in the importance of the contributions which they severally have to make, our *a priori* assumption of an equality among them goes for nothing, and we must ask ourselves what it is in which religions differ and whether there is any which is superior to all as truly, if not to so great a degree, as the Mazdean religion is superior to the religion of the savage. In answer to these questions we have found that Christianity does stand higher than any other religion. Not only is its own especial contribution the most important, but there is in it a place for what is most essential in each of the other great religions. Freedom of religion, embracing all religions, is too vague. It suggests no aim, no ideal. Freedom in itself is the emptiest of categories; it must serve always as the basis for some accomplishment. Free religion lacks the emphasis which is needed as a stimulus to the spiritual life. Such emphasis may indeed be harmful if it is not absolutely true. But we have seen that the emphasis of Christianity is true. It rests upon that which is most precious and essential in all religion. When, therefore, we use the term "Christianity" we use a term which represents that which is at the same time absolute and

¹ Page 884.

definite. It is absolute because it is the highest ideal, and it is definite because that highest ideal is a real ideal.

I have already touched on the objection which is sometimes made to the use of the term "Christianity," that other religions in their later results stand as high as the highest teachings of Christianity.¹ These later developments in other religions have been confessedly an outgrowth of the influence of Christianity. The question in regard to them is whether the blending of the thought of other religions with Christian thought has added anything for which Christianity has no place or of which it does not offer the germ. Thus all that the later Hindu thought might be expected to add would be the mystical doctrine of the presence of God in nature; but Christianity finds place for this both in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and in the express teachings of Paul. What is true here is equally true in other directions. Indeed it is impossible that the results which Christianity has reached should be reproduced by any independent historical process. I need not repeat what I have already said in regard to this. I will only remind you that throughout the whole of our discussion as to the absoluteness of Christianity in its practical aspect we have confined ourselves to the examination of facts as history presents them to us. The results which we have reached seem to me to flow naturally and necessarily from these facts. They are of course open to examination and criticism and refutation. All that I urge is that in any examination of them the facts upon which they are based should not be ignored.

It is an interesting question whether other forms of religion as they develop into the fulness of Christianity should take the Christian name. At first thought it would seem more appropriate that those who have received the highest religious truth through the instrumentality of Jesus should accept the name of the religion of which he is the founder. Yet the question is after all not unlike Peter's question when he asked, "And what shall this man do?"² You will remember that Jesus called Peter back to his own duty, and for us the essential question is as to our own

¹ Page 364.

² *John*, xxi, 21.

Christianity. Certainly the name is far less important than the thing itself, and no reasoning which leaves the whole matter open and free to others ought to affect our own relation to Christianity so long as we find in it the highest inspiration. There are two courses either of which is *a priori* possible. One would be the parallel movement of the various religions along distinct lines but with a certain harmony between them. The other would be the centering of all religions in a unity which should result from influences extending from the single point at which the highest spiritual truth was first attained. No doubt the result in the second case would be the more organic. But the question is one which we can only wait for time to answer.

What is the *quale* of Christianity?¹ What is it that makes Christianity what it is? Several answers have been given. The first, and one in which very many have agreed, is that the essential thing is an act,—the great act of vicarious sacrifice, through which Jesus took upon himself the sin of the world and suffered the punishment of it. The second answer is that feeling is the essential element, not feeling in the sense in which Schleiermacher uses it, but the enthusiasm for humanity which we find insisted upon in such works as *Ecce Homo*. The third answer, that the distinguishing feature of Christianity is the belief in the doctrine of immortality, is given by many who no longer hold to the first answer, and who dwell upon this in the search for some element that shall mark Christianity as distinct from all other religions. The fourth answer insists upon the ethical teaching of Jesus, and especially upon certain scattered commands which, it is claimed, are higher than any precepts that are to be found elsewhere.

It seems to me unnecessary to dwell upon these answers at any length. It is enough to say that a certain enthusiasm for humanity is found in greater or less degree in all the missionary religions, as in Buddhism, for example. The belief in immortality is almost as wide-spread as the human race itself. Some would say that what is essential to Christianity is the belief in immortal-

¹ C. C. Everett, *Essays Theological and Literary*, "The Distinctive Mark of Christianity."

ity as based upon the belief in the resurrection of Jesus. Their emphasis, however, is quite different from that of Paul; Paul believed in immortality before his conversion to Christianity; to him the resurrection of Jesus was important as the completion of the work of atonement. Of the substance of the first answer I have already spoken at length.¹ As regards the fourth answer, there is hardly any precept in the New Testament which cannot be matched with greater or less completeness with maxims from other religions. I say with greater or less completeness, for I do not wish to be dogmatic on either side. All that I wish to suggest is that the discussion may easily become somewhat petty if we try to take this and that precept and weigh them to see whether one is fully equal to the other.

In my own thought the specialty of Christianity consists in its lack of specialty, in the lifting of the whole plane of thought and life. Let me illustrate this in the different elements that have been emphasized as essential in the answers which we have just considered. According to the first answer the essential element is the act of vicarious sacrifice. Now if the conclusion to which we came in our discussion of the Atonement is correct, that in the Atonement we have the union of the human and the divine, and the beginning of a new and diviner life upon the earth, then this act precisely corresponds to the definition of the special characteristic of Christianity which I have used,—the lifting of the whole plane of life. For it is life in its completeness which manifests the results of the Atonement.

The element which was emphasized in the second answer, the enthusiasm for humanity, lacks definiteness of meaning when it is taken by itself. Such enthusiasm may be only the enthusiasm for what appears to us to be the most intelligent animal in the world, the animal that can accomplish most for himself; we look upon all that men have done in the way of personal advancement, and the advancement of civilization if you will, and we say, "How great and glorious a being is man!" But to have the true enthusiasm for humanity we must have the true ideal of humanity,

¹ Pages 301-323, 327-333.

and that is what Christianity presents to us. Through Christianity we recognize all that is highest in man's nature, and our enthusiasm for humanity thus becomes an enthusiasm for man as a being capable of the highest moral and spiritual perfection. Here again, therefore, we find that the specialty involves the absence of specialty. It involves the fulness of humanity in its highest aspect, the fulness of the spiritual life of man.

The third answer insists upon the doctrine of immortality as the distinguishing mark of Christianity. I have reminded you that this belief in immortality is common to many religions. Yet, after all, how different it is in Christian thought from what we find it elsewhere! The thought of immortality with the Greeks and Romans was helpful. It broke down to some extent the wall which otherwise would have shut in the individual spirit, and gave an outlook into something beyond. But except for such rare moments of exaltation as came now and then into the thought of a Plato or a Cicero, it remained vague and negative and comparatively barren. In other religions the thought of immortality was for the most part either the anticipation of a sensuous paradise or, as among the Chinese, the maintenance in heaven of relations that had already existed upon the earth. But in Christianity the thought of the life hereafter is lifted at the same time with the conception of the truer life of man upon the earth. The thought of the infinite contemplation of the celestial vision, the thought of the union more and more perfect with the infinite divine spirit, the thought of an infinite power of service—in a word all that development of the thought of the spiritual life hereafter which follows from the content of Christianity as it is recognized in the earthly life—gives to the belief in immortality a fulness and meaning such as are found nowhere else. Even in the Parsee belief, which is perhaps the highest of any among religions other than Christianity, the future life is conceived as at a standstill; all are to be either fifteen years of age or forty years, either in the perfection of youth or in the perfection of manhood; there is little place for aspiration or advance, and largely because of the lack of that mystical element which in Christianity is so strong, and

which furnishes that outlook into an infinite advance in the higher life which characterizes the Christian belief. Thus we have here still another illustration of the way in which any one element of belief is enlarged and lifted in Christian thought through the elevation of the whole plane of the spiritual life.

It is the same when we turn to the ethical teaching of Jesus. There has been something humiliating in the sort of strife into which men have entered over the question whether the precepts of Jesus are or are not higher than the similar teaching to be found in other religions. This strife has been pushed so far that some who have engaged in it have been tempted to try, on the one hand, to undervalue the teachings of other religions, and then again, on the other hand, to detract from the loftiness of the precepts of Jesus. From time to time something like a sense of relief has manifested itself on the one side or on the other when some imperfection has been discovered. This sort of partisanship which enters thus into the discussion of the loftiest themes is sometimes disheartening. Humanity is not so rich that it can afford to do anything but rejoice over whatever can be found in the world of that which is best in life. We need not ask whether in this or that point of its teaching Christianity is or is not equalled elsewhere. Here as in other respects it is the completeness of Christianity that is its glory, and we cannot help seeing for ourselves that in this completeness it is unequalled.

The course of our examination has been marked thus far by successive definitions of religion. Beginning with the most abstract and inclusive definition,¹ we have passed to definitions which were more typical at the same time that they retained in some degree the inclusive element of the first definition.² We now reach the fifth of these definitions by introducing the element of Christianity. We retain the breadth of the base that we have already found but add the element which marks the highest form that religion has assumed. It is like the definition of life itself,

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 51.

² *The Psychological Elements*, pp. 88, 208. *Theism*, p. 55.

which must be such at the outset as to include the lowest forms, but gains in completeness as we are able to add that which shall cover higher and higher developments and finally the culmination in humanity as the highest type of all. According to this fifth definition, then, **RELIGION IS THE FEELING TOWARD A SPIRITUAL PRESENCE MANIFESTING ITSELF IN TRUTH, GOODNESS AND BEAUTY, ESPECIALLY AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS.**

CHAPTER XXXI.

REVELATION.—REVELATION AS INSPIRATION.—REVELATION IN NATURE.

Now that we have thus recognized the fact of Christianity, we have further to recognize certain elements which distinguish it. First of all, then, we have to consider Christianity as a *revealed religion*.

Revelation involves two elements, the one objective and the other subjective. The first of these, *inspiration*, I have called the objective element, because it indicates the objective presence of some higher power. *Faith*, the second of the two elements, I have called the subjective element, because faith is the subjective condition both of inspiration itself and of the reception of the results of inspiration. I will speak first, then, of inspiration, and more especially of inspiration with reference to the Bible. Considering the matter somewhat externally at the outset, we recognize that there are a great many different views of inspiration, ranging from the strictly mechanical view at one extreme to what may be called the vital view at the opposite extreme. Of the views that are more or less mechanical there is first of all the theory of literal inspiration, according to which every word and every letter of the Bible is inspired. Then there is the view which abandons the theory of literal inspiration, but insists that all statements of fact are inspired and must be implicitly accepted. Still a third view gives up this second theory, but urges that all the statements which have to do with ethical or religious facts are to be accepted as true.

I do not propose to discuss these views at any length. So far as the theory of literal inspiration is concerned, it is shattered, of course, by any imperfection of grammar or any other defect of the sort that may occur in the writings. One cannot help

recalling Emerson's reply to the poet who thought himself "divinely inspired": "At least the Spirit would use good grammar." As regards the view by which all statements of fact are to be accepted, a single example will serve as well as a thousand. In his denunciation of the scribes and Pharisees Jesus is represented as referring to the murder of "Zachariah, son of Barachiah"¹ when in reality it was another Zachariah who was murdered. Commentators have shown considerable ingenuity in trying to meet this criticism, but I think that all fair-minded scholars of the present day recognize the difficulty. Of course the matter is in itself of very little importance and would not be worth mention if it were not that in the face of the assumptions made by those who support this view of inspiration the slightest instance to the contrary becomes important. Finally, as opposed to the view by which all statements are to be accepted which have to do with ethical or religious facts, we have the imprecatory psalms. On this whole question Professor Ladd's *Doctrine of the Sacred Scriptures* is of great importance, and Lee's *Inspiration of Holy Scripture* is a wholesome book.

But suppose that such contradictory instances as these to which I have referred did not exist. Even then how could absolute inerrancy be proved? Suppose, for example, that we recognize the New Testament writers as infallible. How do we know that we have their exact words? We can only trust to the efforts of the scholars, and how almost fearfully important their minute and careful study becomes, if the result is to determine our acceptance or rejection of that which claims to be some definite and final statement of divine truth. Then there is the question of interpretation. How far are we to read between the lines? And what is figurative, and what is literal? Are we to insist with the Romanist that the words, "this is my body,"² are to be accepted literally, or shall we agree with the Protestant that they are figurative?

Furthermore, is there any reason why we should assume for the Bible an infallible authority? The Bible itself makes no

¹ *Matthew*, xxiii, 35.

² *Matthew*, xxvi, 27.

such claim. A famous passage in the *Second Epistle to Timothy* has often been quoted in this connection. But the revised translation destroys the point of the application, and in any case the passage of course refers only to the Old Testament writings. Speakers and writers do indeed claim divine authority, but it is for what they say and not for themselves. I have had occasion before² to refer to the passage in the *Epistle to the Galatians* in which Paul prays that whoever preaches a different gospel from that which he had preached may be anathema,³ and we have seen that what he is here asserting is not some dogma but the principle of freedom. In this passage he is not claiming any formal authority and still less infallibility; he is simply sure in regard to what he is saying. There is a great difference between a man's confidence in the truth of what he says and the claim that what he says shall be accepted as true without question.

It is sometimes said that the Bible acquaints us with facts of which otherwise we should have had no knowledge. But we have no test by which we can be assured that these facts might not have become known through other channels. So we come at last simply to the recognition of the beauty and grandeur of the result itself, as something that is nowhere else equalled. But however helpful this may be to the individual, it does not serve as a basis for dogmatic assertion. There is a highest everywhere, but who knows the limit to what human powers themselves may attain. And then at the heart of all we reach the test of spiritual recognition. Here is something that is really vital. But it refers to the content of inspiration and not to its form. It can hardly be used dogmatically. For there is a difference in vision, and if you do not see what I see, I may say that it is because you are carnal, or you may make a similar answer to me if it is I who cannot see what you see. Therefore the recognition which is to serve as a test must be the individual recognition of whatever person has reached the highest spiritual development, if we can determine who that person is. That is to say, if the person of highest spiritual development in the period since the

¹ *II Timothy*, iii, 16.

² Page 398.

³ *Galatians*, i, 9.

beginnings of Christianity should say that he finds in Christianity the loftiest teaching that the world has seen, his authority would outweigh that of all other persons. But then we should have to apply to him the very same test that we are applying to this whole question. How are we to know that his spiritual development is the highest? Here are people at the present day who tell us that what we call spiritual development is a mistake, that we cannot get behind phenomena, or cannot rise above the world of matter, and that those who claim any relation to the infinite and to a spiritual universe are mere dreamers. What can we say to such people that will convince them of error? If we appeal to the magnificent content of the New Testament teaching itself, or to the testimony which has been borne to that teaching by the most spiritual-minded of all later times, his answer will remain the same; he will say as before, that we in our day have passed beyond all this, and have reached the final epoch of more positive science.

Yet, after all, this is the only result that we can reach. This method is the one that we have used before, and the one which in all the higher relations of the soul we cannot escape using. How are we to *prove* the supremacy of Shakespeare, or Raphael, or Angelo? We cannot prove it. We can only point to a picture and say, "This is beautiful." If the man cannot see its beauty for himself and has no confidence in our opinion, what are we going to do about it? The highest life, whether in relation to truth or goodness or beauty, or to religion itself, must be dogmatic. It must rest finally in a position which cannot be proved but can only be spiritually discerned. Even in logic some basis has to be assumed. If a person accepts your fundamental proposition, then you can use your logic to show that some other statement is in accord with it, but if he does not accept the fundamental proposition, how are you to prove to him the truth of your result? The fact is, doubtless for good, that we are left without those convenient external methods, those visible means of proof, which we sometimes think might be so helpful. In our garden we may bind the branches of our vine to trellises

and train it just where it should go. But there is no such trellis for the spiritual life, no such support or bondage for its branches. The soul is placed in the world, it is surrounded by the highest influences, it has open to it the inspiration of the highest life, and it is told to grow. If it follows its highest nature, it does grow, until at last it recognizes more and more perfectly the ideals that are set before it, and is able to say, "This is divine! This is the true life!" But a result like this cannot be proved to another except as his development is so far similar that he can accept the principles on which it rests. This might seem to leave the whole matter hopeless. But we have to recognize the fact that no normal nature is wholly without these higher elements, and therefore an appeal can be made to every nature in the confidence that either awake or asleep some element is there which can respond.

If now we are to attempt a positive statement of the doctrine of inspiration, we must begin with that divine principle which we have already recognized as working in the world from the beginning, at first unconscious of itself, but gaining in definiteness and strength until at last it comes to recognize itself, and enters into communion with the absolute divine life from which it came. Meanwhile that absolute divine life has been an ever-present factor in the process of development, drawing the human soul nearer to itself and responding to its aspiration. The divine principle in the world has not been left solitary like an orphan, parentless and alone, but rather has developed its strength like the child who grows in the presence and support of its father's love. How or why the Jewish people should have come to be the stalk on which the consummate flower of Christianity was to blossom is not for us to say. We can only recognize the fact. All religions are manifestations of the divine power and life. No one of them can be considered purely human, however dim and uncertain the divine element may appear. But in the comparative study of religions one cannot help noticing how many religions, after they have reached a certain height, begin to decline. The Chinese religion is already at its highest when it

first becomes known to us historically and then becomes more and more unspiritualized. Twice the Vedic religion seems to be on the very point of becoming a complete religion; but after Brahma there is the return to Indra again, and the later theism with its utterances of lofty spiritual promise sinks into pantheism. In the Hebrew religion, on the other hand, there is development up to the point at which it blossoms into the larger thought of Jesus.

Two elements declared themselves at a comparatively early period in the history of the Hebrew religion which, although at first they sustained themselves with difficulty, were of the greatest advantage in all the later development,—the recognition of monotheism, and the fact that all images were forbidden. Here is a beginning from which an indefinite advance becomes possible; it is for religion what the beginning of the power to think in concepts is for human life. Take for instance the Hebrew psalms. At first sight some of the Assyrian psalms seem in their form to suggest a comparison with them. But on examination we find that the Assyrian psalms bring us into a region of polytheism, together with physical images of the gods, whereas the Hebrew psalms, in spite of certain false conceptions that are contained in them, have on the whole a universal character which fits them for use as the expression of a higher spiritual development. The same sort of difficulty that we meet in the Assyrian psalms presented itself to the Greek philosophers in their attempts to lift the popular thought to their own higher standards; thus the term "Zeus" was so entangled with polytheistic and mythological ideas that it could hardly be understood aright by the common people when used in any higher relation.

It may seem as though in some respects the Mazdean religion would have been a more natural channel than the Hebrew by which the spiritual principle in the world should reach its full manifestation. But in the Hebrew religion there are glimpses of a tenderness of relation which are hardly to be found in the Mazdean religion, the beginning of the recognition of the relation of the earthly child to its heavenly father. This may be said,

however,—that it is one of the striking facts of history that these two religions, the Hebrew and the Mazdean, with an insight into the being of God and the divine holiness such as we find nowhere else, should have to a certain extent coalesced in the production of Christianity. I know very well that “coalescence” may be too strong a term. Still some of us have seen¹ how the Mazdean religion, more than any other element outside the Hebrew religion, contributed to this result that we are considering. So that it may at least be said that in Christianity as it originally appeared we have the results of the two best stocks, the two highest forms of religious development. Throughout its history Christianity has received contributions from the most complete thought of other peoples; Greek philosophy and Roman polity have had each a part in its inner and outer development. Yet, when all is said, the Hebrew religion must still be considered as in a very special sense the source of Christianity. Whatever the help that came from other religions, it was chiefly as an outgrowth of all that had preceded in the Hebrew religion that the final blossoming came.

Now the Old Testament is the history of the growth of the Hebrew people and the Hebrew religion. Its great power consists in these two facts, that it gives us not infrequent glimpses of the higher spiritual truth, and that we have in it the story of the development of a national life which was finally to result in the most complete form of religious expression. We see, therefore, how it is possible for those who recognize both the presence of errors in the Old Testament and the miscellaneous character of its contents still to hold that in a very special degree and manner it is inspired. Indeed, those who take this view would say that the belief in the absolute inerrancy of the Bible often blinds one to what is strongest and most beautiful in some of the writings that are contained in it; thus the Book of Jonah now too often suggests a smile when it ought to call forth only admiration.

When we include the New Testament and consider the Bible

¹ In Dr. Everett's course in the comparative study of religions.

as a whole, I may repeat what I said before in a similar connection,¹ namely, that the first utterance of a great intuitive truth has a power far greater than that of any truth which is based on demonstration. Perhaps you remember the counsel that was given a judge, never to offer reasons for his decisions, because while the decisions would very likely be right the reasons would probably be wrong! This is eminently the case with all higher results as we find them declared in history. Where men have been given sublime insights, the arguments by which they attempt to support them as a rule soon become inadequate, whereas the insights themselves still maintain their power over the world. Almost every great system of thought has left an impression of this kind, the results of some profound insight, while the technicality of the philosophy has become obsolete. Thus the systems of both Kant and Hegel have a power far beyond any that either might possess through the apprehension of its technicalities; each has introduced a new point of view, a new aspect of truth, which is to a large extent independent of the special form that it has assumed in the development of the system.

Furthermore a book, or a collection of books, which is thus constituted, which contains teachings in which the highest spiritual truth is presented under an intuitive form, will gain in sacredness with use. As each generation employs certain forms of speech as sacred, those forms are given a new sanctity. The forms of speech that we have heard in our childhood have a power which very few that are acquired later can ever have, and this power only increases as we recognize the associations which all through a long past have been gathering about these same forms of speech. Take the *Psalms*, for instance. They have their original sanctity, and they have that added sanctity which comes from their use through long ages in the most exalted and most profound moments both of individual and of national life. In reading that passage in the book of *The Revelation* in which the golden vials or bowls full of incense are spoken of, "which are the prayers of the saints,"² I have sometimes thought that certain of the more

¹ Page 353.

² *Revelation*, v, 9.

sacred psalms might very well figure as these golden bowls, so often have they been the vessels that have carried the prayers of the saints to heaven, and so continually has new fragrance been gathered to them as to so many censers with every added generation. What is true of the *Psalms* is similarly true in greater or less degree of the Bible generally. We find in it the elements of our religion presented in a form which is not absolutely perfect or absolutely free from admixture with foreign elements, but is such as to fit them for universal use; and to the original power of the various writings themselves is added the element of long association.

There are four views that may be held in regard to the inspiration of the Bible in general. According to the first, the Bible is the only book that is to be regarded as inspired. This is the view which, more or less clearly held, has been most common in the history of the Church. "Inspired writers" are the writers of the different portions of the Bible as compared with all other writers. The most secular passages of the Bible are "inspired," the most spiritual utterances of men whose words are not recorded in the Bible are "uninspired." If a certain kind of inspiration is granted to other writings, yet the inspiration of the Bible is of so different a sort that it is still regarded as *par excellence* the one inspired book. This view may be productive of much good. It is a great point gained to recognize a single book as inspired, or even a single sentence, provided that sentence is the utterance of some lofty truth. For there is here at least a starting-point for a conception of God as not only manifested from without but as speaking to us from within. But the view has its disadvantages. There is first of all the danger in thus exalting the thought of the Bible writers, that our estimate of other thought may be lowered. It is like that regard for the Sabbath which causes all other days to be considered profane. But the sanctity of the seventh day should be of a sort that would make all days more sacred, and the conception that we have of the inspiration of the Bible should lift rather than degrade our estimate of other literature. On the other hand, there is also the danger in this

view that the lower standards found in certain portions may become standards for the whole of life. Thus the Puritans, in dealing with those whom they considered heretics, applied the stern maxims of the Old Testament against Gentiles to the circumstances of their own times, while later on the polygamous ideas of the Mormons found a precedent in the practice of the patriarchs, and slaveholding in customs taken for granted by the writers of the New Testament.

Yet if there are dangers in this view as compared with a larger and freer conception, it is infinitely truer and higher than the view which finds no inspiration at all in the world, either in the Bible or in anything else; one sacred book, or one sacred day, is infinitely better than none. This second view would leave the world wholly apart from the life of God. In the controversies of our day this aspect of the case is sometimes overlooked, and the assumption of the special inspiration of the Bible is regarded as though it were in itself an evil, whereas, broadly considered, it is in itself a good.

At the other extreme from the view that recognizes no inspiration anywhere is the view which finds equal inspiration everywhere, in all kinds of life; Shakespeare and Paul are equally inspired, all human life is divine, every occupation is holy. My statement of this view may seem extravagant, but I think I have not exaggerated a fashion of speech with which we all are more or less familiar. One can only say of this view that if it is seriously held it contradicts our common sense. We know very well that some occupations are unholy, and there is much honorable business which still is not holy. There is of course a certain holiness in honesty and care and accuracy, but there is a higher holiness in the devotion to some noble aim, in love, in philanthropy. The sort of holiness which those who hold this view would have us find everywhere must be regarded as a possibility rather than as actually existing. It is true that there is nothing which is in itself right that may not be done in the highest spirit, but to say this is not at all the same as to say that all life is holy. It is a glorious thing for men to feel that their lives open upon the highest, but it

is perilous to make men suppose that their lives are already at their highest.

Furthermore, while the divine life does manifest itself everywhere, there is a difference of nature between the kinds of manifestation. Here we come to the fourth view of inspiration. All forms of life, both active and intellectual, result from a certain kind of inspiration. But that which inspires them is not necessarily what we know as the *holy* spirit; the inspiration that comes from the consciousness of one's relation to God is of a very different kind. Grant that Shakespeare was as much inspired as Paul in degree. His inspiration was still wholly different in kind, and between the two kinds there can be no comparison. For the inspiration through which utterance is given to life itself cannot be reduced to a level with the inspiration by which life is only pictured, however perfect the picture may be. Shakespeare gives us an image of the world, and we rejoice in the picture; he creates a new world, and we delight in his creation. Yet except as the characters whom he depicts have more wit and genius than the men and women whom we ordinarily meet, the world that he gives us is like that which we see every day. Therein lies its glory. But Paul introduces into the world a power that is to transform it; he brings us into direct relation with the ethical and spiritual nature of God and man.

Of the Bible in relation to other literature we may say that it embodies the highest expression of religious faith that has been reached independently, that is, without the aid of the Bible itself. The world at large obtains its knowledge of the scriptures of other religions by selection, but the complete Bible is in every man's hand. Thus the best of other sacred literature is set over against the Bible as a whole. But to compare other scriptures with the Bible in this way is like comparing a glass of filtered water with the natural stream that flows by our door. Either all should be considered in their entirety, or else the comparison should be between selections made similarly from all. No absolute distinction can be made between the inspiration of the Bible and the inspiration of other sacred books except this distinction of which

I have just spoken. We find in the Bible that form of inspiration which has resulted in lives of the highest spiritual nature and in the presentation of a religious ideal that can never be surpassed. If this culmination of religious truth and life in the Bible is what is meant by perfect or absolute inspiration, the term may be used, though only at the risk that its meaning may be understood in some different sense. If we ask ourselves how all this applies to the teaching of Jesus himself, our answer has to be of a similar kind. In the life and teachings of Jesus is found the culmination of that general religious life the development of which is embodied in the Bible.

To any question as to the laws of inspiration it is hazardous to reply. So far as it applies to the spiritual life Jesus compares it to the wind. "The wind bloweth where it listeth."¹ The process by which the spirit manifests itself is incalculable; it is impossible to predict what the nature of its manifestation may be, or when or where it will take place. We can only say with Emerson that

"There are open hours
When the God's will sallies free
And the dull idiot might see."²

There are certain students of history of the present day who undertake to explain all these matters. They attempt to construct the hero or the genius out of the common elements of his time, and they make of this common clay a very good image. All that is missing is the inspiration which made the great thinker or the great poet or the great leader just what he was. For there is the inspiration of genius, as there is the inspiration of the spiritual life, and they are akin in this, that each follows its own laws. The wind does indeed blow "where it listeth." Yet the wind has its laws; there is nothing that is more regular. Of the nature of those laws we know little; the meteorology of the winds is hardly yet a science. But if we are so slow to comprehend this meteorology of the earth, how shall we understand the meteorology of the spiritual life?

¹ *John*, iii, 8.

² *Merlin*.

Back of all inspiration, however, is revelation. What is the revelation of God? Where are we to find it? What does it mean? The universe is the revelation of God. Spencer speaks of the universe as the manifestation of the Unknowable. But a manifestation which leaves that which is to be manifested unknown and unknowable is no manifestation. A power that is unknowable can be only that power in its abstraction, apart from the universe. A manifestation of the power in the universe must be a revelation of it. It is thus that God is revealed through the manifestation of him in the universe. The complete revelation of him would be the completed universe, quantitatively, organically, spiritually. Everything is in some sense a manifestation and therefore a revelation of God, but each thing by itself is more or less unintelligible and misleading. For revelation does not exist outside of experience, and for a complete revelation there must be a complete experience. If we take evil by itself we can find in it no revelation of the divine, but in the universe as a whole evil is seen to be a part in the complete manifestation, the absolute revelation.

There are stages or concentric circles in this revelation, each of which is true so far as it goes. Each sphere is partial, and that which is incidental to it may mislead, but so far as the sphere goes it is true. A man's life has spheres which may be contradictory to one another. A man may be honest in business but dishonest in politics, or he may shrink in horror at the thought of shooting another and yet join without hesitation in urging on a war. There are inconsistencies in individual human life. But the universe is a unit, whose circles are concentric, corresponding to one another and forming parts in one great whole. Any one circle considered by itself carries with it a certain falsity, not because it is itself untrue, and not because there is any absolute contradiction between it and other spheres, but because the truth of each sphere or circle needs for its completion a complementary truth. Take for instance the revelation of God in nature. It has been dealt with hardly by some of the theologians, who have pictured "the God of nature" as stern and pitiless, presenting in contrast the infinite

tenderness that is manifested in the revelation of Jesus. But the aspect of revelation which is offered in the physical world should not be set aside or misinterpreted. Nature by itself is not to be regarded as in any complete sense a revelation of God. It is first of all a revelation of God's *power* as it is manifested in the universe. Suppose that a rock were to form an idea of the power that was manifested in itself. It would conceive of that power as a mighty rock; it would see God in its own image. As conceived thus in the image of the physical world in general, God would be a being uniform and without caprice. This conception of permanence and regularity in that which governs the world is fundamental in our thought of God. "The Lord is my rock,"¹ we cry with the Psalmist. The power that is thus conceived is not yet a power working for good, but it is a power which can be absolutely depended upon, and this element of trustworthiness is a very important element of revelation. The discipline which it implies is essential to the full development of human life. Men outgrow caprice as they themselves become orderly through living in an orderly universe, and this discipline of orderliness leads also to a discipline of strength. Men adapt themselves to the order that governs the world about them; they learn that they must take things as they are and as they come, they learn that they must reap as they sow. Thus by their obedience they learn to command, and strength results that could not have been found in a capricious universe. The revelation in nature, therefore, brings trust, and the discipline of orderliness, and the discipline of strength.

Mill has suggested² that goodness cannot be manifested in the natural world. But goodness can be manifested on the basis which the natural world affords. For good is first that by which all may be made happy and secondly that by which all may be made good, that by which character may be developed. The process which leads to the second result is not always that which leads to the first. The physical world is unfeeling, as Mill says; like the government which commands on its own behalf that

¹ *Psalm*, xviii, 2, etc.

² *Essays on Religion*, "Nature."

which may not be permitted to the individual, the physical world maintains itself at whatever cost. But this characteristic of the physical world, as we have just seen, is essential to the best discipline of man, and thus there appears in it an element of goodness. The revelation of God is imperfect and needs that which shall complete it, but so far as it goes it is true.

Still another element appears in the revelation in the natural world, the clement of beauty. The world does not need flowers or animal life to be beautiful; it has the grandeur of the sea and the mountains, the glory of the sunsets. There may be sternness in certain elements, but there is harmony between them, and in this harmony, as well as in the sublimity of the physical world, there is the hint of the higher revelation that is to come. Perhaps that which is most marked in the physical world is its sublimity. It is an element that is too easily lost out of the religious life. We emphasize certain aspects of the fatherhood of God in such a way that we blind ourselves to other elements of his being. The term "fatherhood" does indeed represent that which is highest in our conception of God, but it should be regarded as a culmination of his whole being and not as something which may be kept apart by itself. When it is kept apart it too often carries with it a thought which takes from the nature of God something of its strength. In attributing to God *love* as that which marks our highest thought of him, we too often forget the sublimity and law and absoluteness by which love should be accompanied. Religion should bring comfort, but it should also strengthen, and of the two strength is more important than comfort, for the truest comfort of religion is in the strength it brings.

The next stage of revelation in nature is *life*. If a tree were to form its idea of God, God would be a mighty tree. The life of the physical world, apart from man, would not reveal God as spirit; the physical world in itself declares pantheism and not theism; the idea of the tree would be imperfect. Yet so far as the idea of the tree went it would be true. God is the absolute life of the world. Here enters the principle of teleology. The materialistic view regards the world as something static, a play

of forces forever on the same plane. With the world regarded as a great organism moving toward a definite result there comes the revelation of life, and of a life which is more than a cycle of change in which there is no progress; this life that is manifested in nature is like a spiral in which any point as it swings around the circle is found each time higher than it was before. There is no dead matter any longer. Matter is living, and a part of the universal life. Viewed thus, the physical world is a true revelation of God as Life. In this relation also, as well as in the others that we have considered, the revelation brings its lesson for man. Man must first of all *live*. He may not remain stationary. He must share in this progressive life of the world and enlarge together with it. He must be that which he was created to be, a *living* soul.

In the contrasts that have been drawn between "nature" and "grace," or between "nature" and "revelation," man appears to have been regarded often as in some way apart from both nature and revelation, a personality *to* whom revelation is made. It is true in a certain sense that revelation is made to man. Yet man is himself a part of nature, and the most important part, and the revelation that is *in* him must not be neglected for the revelation to him.¹ Man is the culmination of all the processes of nature, and to speak of the revelation in nature and leave out the revelation in human nature is to present only half the story. For however important are the permanence and regularity in the forces of nature as a revelation of God, however important may be the revelation of him in the sublime beauty of the natural world and in the general manifestation of life, still more important is the revelation in the sympathy and love and thought and aspiration and consecration of human life. This revelation that comes through human nature is higher than that which offers itself in the physical world below man, simply because man is the consummation of the lower processes. If we are to find anywhere the key to the mystery of life, we must look for it at the highest point in its development rather than at the lowest. There is no

¹ C. C. Everett, *Essays Theological and Literary*, "Reason in Religion."

greater mistake than that which is made so commonly nowadays, of explaining everything from below upward instead of from above downward. It is as though we were to explain the man by the infant, and say of man that he is an advanced infant instead of saying of the infant that it is an incipient man. Furthermore, the revelation in man is also higher for the reason that it is clearer and more distinct. While we receive from the external world the fundamental revelations of permanence and order and sublimity which are essential to our thought of God, still the lower forces of nature are in themselves unconscious, and we cannot go behind them except as the light of consciousness enables us. But there is no mistaking the voices of the revelation in human nature, those voices of tenderness and love and consecration to righteousness.

It is interesting to notice how often we criticise the course of things in nature and in history as though we were outside of them. We need to ask who we are, or what it is in us that makes these criticisms. Is it a power, a life, that comes from some system foreign to this world and is justified in criticising what it finds? We have to remember that the nature which criticises is a manifestation of the nature which created the order that is criticised.¹ There is but one controlling principle in nature, and since this power to criticise, to apply to outward things the test of high ideals, represents the loftiest and clearest revelation of this principle, it is more to be accepted than any other, only not as apart from outward processes but as complemental to them.

In attempting to understand the universe we have no right to assume the lower and leave out the higher aspects. When we consider the infinite vastness and complexity of the universe and the mystery of it, perhaps we may be willing to admit that the glimpses which the highest forms of human nature afford of a wise and tender power, a personal interest, working through all, are as much as we could reasonably expect. Who can understand and explain even a bit of intricate machinery, unless he is himself a trained mechanic? A curious illustration of the

¹ C. C. Everett, *Essays Theological and Literary*, "Reason in Religion."

mistakes that are made in this direction may be found in Spencer's *First Principles*,¹ where he is criticising the theologians who attempt to explain the processes of nature, presumably with special reference to Martineau. Compared with these critics, Spencer says, Alfonso of Castile was modesty itself. It was Alfonso, you will remember, who said that if he had been consulted in the making of the worlds he could have suggested a much better way. What makes the illustration so interesting is that we now see that Alfonso was right. He was applying an ideal of reason to the universe as it was then understood, and this universe did not conform to his ideal; with its system of cycles and epicycles it was too complicated; he could have suggested a much simpler system. In reality it was not the universe itself that he was criticising, but the imperfect representation of it that men had made. He applied an ideal of reason, and the ideal justified itself, for it proved to be that in accordance with which the world was really governed. Now this is what takes place whenever we apply the ideals of reason to the history of the world, and especially the ideal of infinite goodness. At first thought such attempts may seem to be audacious and wholly out of place. Yet it is precisely in these fundamental ideals of the soul that we have the highest revelation of the power that is working in and through all things. The power that criticises is of the power that creates and guides. There can be no breach in the universe; there can be only one principle, and this principle we must understand as we can. It seems to me that from any reasonable point of view, when we cannot reconcile the ideal and the actual, we should recognize the ideal as the higher manifestation and use it in the attempt to explain the lower manifestation. Then if we find that we cannot wholly explain the lower by the higher, and must lay our emphasis upon one rather than the other, let that emphasis be upon the higher.

According to the view that we have taken, it is the highest point of this revelation in nature that is found in Christianity and the Bible. The highest type of Christianity does not go

¹ *First Principles*, Part I, Chap. V.

beyond this point, and if we look more closely we see that it cannot. For the highest revelation of Christianity is contained in that most familiar word of our human speech, "father," and in the intensifying of the human instinct of love. As the discovery of Newton lay in the application to the universe of a law of the common phenomena of life, so Christianity takes the experience of human nature expressed in the word "father" and applies it to the thought of God. At the same time Jesus does not use this experience in its crude form. In this sense the revelation in his life and teaching was greater than the meaning which any words that he used brought to him. For they could not in themselves carry a meaning beyond the experience of the past, whereas his own spiritual life was beyond that experience. It was a new experience that he added, although one to which the experience of the past had led the way.

CHAPTER XXXII.

FAITH.—FAITH A FORM OF BELIEF.—ITS POSTULATE OF GOD AND IMMORTALITY.—HELPS TO FAITH.—DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF FAITH.—THE SUMMUM BONUM.—PROVIDENCE AS THE OBJECT OF FAITH.

OF the two elements involved in revelation¹ we have considered only the first, the element of inspiration. The second element is faith. If faith is not absolutely necessary for the reception of inspiration, it certainly is necessary for its utilization, for inspiration would come and go without result unless there were a faith to make the inspiration a principle of life. The word "faith" is used in two senses, the one complementary to the other. It means on the one hand *fidelity*, that which can be trusted, and on the other hand *confidence*, that which trusts, confidence implying fidelity. In considering the place of faith in religion, faith as confidence, or trust, is the more fundamental. For not only does trust imply fidelity in that which is trusted, but it is itself a source of fidelity; one can hardly be faithful to any principle unless he trusts it; if he is faithful to his word, it is because he trusts the divinity of truth. In our present discussion, therefore, we may set aside the use of the term in its first sense, now that we have recognized it. There is a use common in theological writings by which "faith" represents the mystical apprehension or appropriation to one's self of that which is believed. In this use the word tends to lose any definiteness of meaning and to become synonymous with almost the whole of religion. It is better to hold to its usual distinct meaning.

Faith, then, is a certain kind of belief. It is a specific under a generic term. Not all belief is faith, but faith implies some degree of belief. But what is belief? Belief is that which holds

good where there is no absolute demonstration. No one would say that he believed that two and two make four. That is something which we know, and where knowledge begins belief stops. There is of course a sense in which we believe that two and two make four, but in ordinary speech we do not use the term of that which has been demonstrated. Therefore faith, since it is a form of belief, exists where no demonstration has been possible. But as a specific form of belief it implies that the object of belief is desirable. Thus we may speak of it as confidence or trust. It is "the assurance of" (or "the giving substance to") "things hoped for."¹

It is very important to recognize both of these elements in faith, that which it has in common with all belief, and that which distinguishes it. Otherwise we may be led into a good deal of difficulty and doubt. Take, for instance, religious faith generally. Faith exists where there is no demonstration. But precisely here the difficulty enters which has troubled so many in regard to religious faith. Since it cannot be made a matter of demonstration, they say, they cannot hold to it. The question between religion and non-religion thus becomes really the question whether one will or will not have faith. But in this relation the term "faith" has been used to cover all sorts of inconsistencies and weaknesses. The believer in some contradictory dogma or some extravagant assertion of fact cries out, "You must have faith." Properly defined, however, faith can cover first of all only that which is to be hoped for. Other things may be matters of belief but not of faith. Thus one may believe the doctrine of total depravity; when I say that it cannot be a matter of faith, I do not deny the truth of the doctrine; I only say that if it is believed, faith is not the term that should be applied to it. On the other hand the doctrine of human perfectibility would be a matter of faith, as that which is above all things desirable; but this is not to say that the doctrine of human perfectibility is true, but only to define the use of the term "faith." Furthermore, in the second place, we must discard as far as possible, in relation to faith, whatever lies outside the fundamental elements of the spiritual life.

¹ *Hebrews*, xi, 1.

The difficulty with many kinds of so-called faith is that they are so superficial; they have nothing to do with confidence in the absoluteness of truth and goodness and beauty, but only with this or that man's thought or act or assertion.

I have said that faith is confidence or trust. It is a form of loyalty. A man has faith in the father or mother whom he loves; if a charge is brought against them he indignantly denies it; it may be that he cannot disprove it, but he does not and will not believe it; his faith in his parents cannot justify itself by demonstration, but his loyalty goes out to them instinctively. All such faith as this that is based upon our conception of an individual life may be deceived, and one of the most terrible things that can happen to a young man is to discover that the father or mother whom he has venerated as the incarnation of virtue is soiled with sin and is not worthy of his reverence. Absolute faith is that which goes behind all individual and finite forms. When one finds that his faith, his confidence, in human life is disappointing him, there still remains for him the motherhood of nature, the fatherhood of God. The faith which manifests itself in these special forms, toward special individuals, simply indicates the tendency in the human mind to an absolute faith which reaches out beyond all individual and finite things and affirms that there is in the universe something that is worthy of confidence. Of course the impulse to trust individuals is desirable. The cynic who takes it for granted that no confidence is to be placed in man or woman is apt to have little confidence in the soundness of the universe itself, just as the life which lacks the absolute faith is less likely to have faith in individuals. Yet it should always be borne in mind that the shattering of the finite form to which faith has clung is not one with the destruction of the absolute object of faith itself.

Absolute faith postulates that without which the world would be a failure. The only argument that the mind has to offer is precisely this. "If this were not so," it urges, "if my faith were without a basis, then the world would be a failure." If it is asked why the world should not be a failure, it can only reply,

"I cannot believe otherwise." It feels that such faith is essential to the highest life of the soul, and therefore it must hold it. This is the position of Kant, although his statement is in a more abstract form than the statements which are ordinarily given. It is in the very necessity of the nature of the soul, Kant declares, that it should fulfil righteousness; but it cannot fulfil righteousness unless there be a God and an eternity; therefore it has a right to assume God and immortality. It is an entire misunderstanding of Kant's statement to suppose that he intends it as any sort of proof. It is not a proof but a postulate. It is often said that faith may be and is an act of will, that a man can determine to what world he will belong. Fichte urges this as fundamental, and Professor James takes a similar position. Will is here regarded in two aspects, as the tendency of the nature, and as the voluntary act. The Ritschlians also recognize this. Man affirms his relation to the spiritual world, and chooses the banner under which he will think and work. Faith thus consists in voluntarily allying one's self with that which is highest and best.

It is true that faith finds certain helps in what it sees of goodness and beauty in the world, and of unity and adaptation. There are so many indications of the presence of a teleological principle that even external facts would lead us to affirm that the great end of life toward which all the world has been moving could not be itself a failure. Yet faith is often strongest when all reasoning and speculation come to naught. At death all outward supports fail, and the whole visible universe appears to be falling away from around and beneath the individual, and yet faith is never stronger than at the hour of death. In moments of deepest sorrow, also, faith is at its strongest. It seems sometimes as though when all outward things were going well, the soul trusted to them, and only when these things were taken away, and it was thrown back upon itself, did it discover the real power of faith. Perhaps one of the greatest helps to faith is found in the sympathy with noble souls who have themselves cherished such faith. It is interesting to see how often we find faith associated with general nobility of soul. It is the great natures that manifest

faith most strongly, no doubt because faith is an element in the freest and fullest development of life, whereas a distrust of one's environment is unfavorable to the healthiest growth. This is one great source of the power of Jesus. Standing as he does at the central point in the movement of history, all who have honored him have felt the contagion of his mighty faith. In such faith as this there is no weakness. Mere credulity is weak, but faith is heroic. In a world where there is so much evil and suffering, it is the heroism of faith that it can affirm an infinite good above and in the world and working through it. In a world where all life seems to die and pass away, it is the heroism of faith that it affirms immortality. This faith rises about the great mass of outward facts which seem to contradict it, and trusts itself. In it the spiritual lays down the law to the material.

Some have said that courage is born of faith, and others that faith is born of courage. Both statements are significant. That courage is born of faith is true in the sense that in so far as a man has confidence in himself and in his purposes, the more courage he has in carrying through that which he has undertaken to its result. But on the other hand it may be said that the more his courage is based on faith, the less he has; for if he is sure of accomplishing a thing, there is not much courage in undertaking it. Therefore the kind of courage that is born of faith is less needed as faith is stronger. Yet it may be said that faith in the object itself, rather than in its accomplishment, does give greater courage and disregard of danger. On the other hand faith is also born of courage. We recognize this more readily if we substitute the word "boldness" for "courage." Boldness certainly increases with faith, for faith is self-asserting in relation to that which it has recognized as best. Why is it that we admire courage and faith? Foolhardiness we despise, and superficial readiness either to believe or to act we feel to be unworthy. We also think little of a timid or doubting heart. But there is something about confidence and courage that we admire. Just as we feel contempt for the cowardice of the man who gives way, so we honor the man who we see stands for something, at least for himself,

if for nothing better. I suppose it is because both faith and courage spring from a more abundant life, and in turn stimulate it.

There are two elements in the highest religious faith, the recognition of the highest good as supreme *de jure*, and the recognition of it as supreme *de facto*. The first recognizes the divinity of righteousness, the second, the omnipotence of righteousness. The first declares that righteousness ought to be supreme, the second, that it not only ought to be but is supreme. The first is sufficient for a sturdy morality, the second alone affirms that which we call religion. Indeed, this distinction between religion and morality is as good as any that we can make, that whereas morality recognizes the supremacy of the divine goodness *de jure*, religion recognizes it not only *de jure* but *de facto*.

We have already had occasion to notice how science itself rests upon faith, so far as its fundamental principles are concerned.¹ Science believes what it cannot prove. It finds the law of gravitation illustrated in a few worlds, and affirms that it is the controlling force of all worlds. It discovers a few instances of a connection of cause and effect in the past, and affirms that such connection always has been and always will be universal. This is a faith as magnificent as the faith of religion, and as pure. Religion adds to this faith in truth the faith in goodness, and because of its faith in truth and goodness it has also its faith in beauty; because it has its faith in what is and in what ought to be, it also has its faith in the universe as being that which it ought to be. We hold the faith of science because it is necessary to life; we could not live without that trust in the unity of things which is the basis of science. But faith in the religious sense is as essential to the life of the spirit as faith in the scientific sense is to the life of the body. We are told, however, that the faith of science is confirmed by experience, whereas such confirmation of the supremacy of goodness is not found in anything like the same degree. It is true that science finds its faith confirmed by experience to a large extent, and it is also true that although there are still a great many things in the world that cannot yet be reduced to the unity of scientific faith, there are vastly more things that cannot be

¹ Page 374.

brought within the requirements of religious faith. It is more difficult to prove the supremacy of goodness in the universe than to prove the supremacy of law. Yet religious faith has also its confirmations. It holds that "to them that love God all things work together for good,"¹ and everyone who has fairly put this to the test has found it true at least of his own experience.

At the same time we have to recognize that there are many difficulties with which faith must contend. We cannot be surprised at this, for faith would not be faith if there were no difficulties. The surprise is that the difficulties are so great. It is a surprise that is especially apt to meet the young as they enter upon life. It is so easy to talk about temptation, and it seems as though it would be as easy to resist it. It is not until one has had personal experience of it that he realizes that the essential element in temptation is that it *tempts*. So long as our difficulties are difficulties only of the imagination it is easy to be heroic, but when the reality of pain and toil and grief brings with it real difficulties, then we are surprised at finding how great they are. Faith implies a certain degree of optimism, and it is open, therefore, to the same difficulties to which all optimism is open. We affirm the supremacy of good, and we find an actuality of evil. The question is often asked why God did not make spirits perfect at the first. The Christian tradition says that he did, and that the experiment failed; the angels fell, and the Creator was obliged to begin again and build up from the bottom. The tradition illustrates the great lesson which life teaches, that apart from all theories and looking only at the actual relations of things, we find that the highest cannot be created outright, cannot be given outright, but must be won by each individual for himself. And it must be won at a cost.

I know that this is superficial, and that we must go behind it. If God is omnipotent goodness, we have to ask, why has he not made the world a good and happy world? I have already referred to this question in considering the doctrine of omnipotence.² We have found that the thought of omnipotence pushed to this

¹ *Romans*, viii, 28.

² Page 53.

extreme would do away with all other attributes and qualities. We have seen¹ that the "unconditioned" of Spencer is an impossibility, even to his own thought, because the Absolute that he describes must by its very nature produce the precise universe that we have and could not produce any other. Even in the divine nature, even in an ideal relation which we cannot comprehend, we may conjecture that there exists a connection for all finite natures between virtue and effort as absolute as the law of contradiction itself. A virtue *given* may be as truly a contradiction in terms as any that can be conceived; to be good without having won the good may be a contradiction as truly as to be and not to be, in the same sense and at the same moment. Of course this is merely conjectural, but it is the last word that we can say upon the matter. We have two fundamental principles to apply: first, the unconditioned is something the existence of which we cannot even conceive, because such an existence would lead to nothing; and second, if there are conditions, these conditions may be of the character which I have just suggested.

Practically, in actual life, we recognize often the gain in strength and beauty which may come through the limitations of the earthly experience. Something of this finds illustration in the attempts that have been made by the painters in trying to portray a perfect holiness that has not known struggle. When in these pictures we compare the faces of the angels with those of the saints, the angel faces are no doubt fair and sweet, and yet there is in the faces of the saints, however furrowed by age and suffering, a nobler kind of beauty that is lacking in the angel faces. Perhaps we may interpret in a larger sense than was intended that story of the Hindu maiden who was about to choose a husband. You will remember that three gods took the form of her beloved, so that she saw four semblances of him instead of one; but whereas the three gods were of an absolute purity, her human lover was soiled with sweat and dust, and so she knew him by the marks of his earthly infirmities, and we may conceive loved him the better because of them.

The suffering of the lower animals presents a harder problem.

¹ Page 6.

It was the problem which troubled Theodore Parker; he found no difficulty in human suffering. We may indeed reduce the suffering of the lower animals to a minimum in our thought. It is true that whereas human suffering is so concentrated by memory and fear that the whole burden of long periods may be felt at every moment, the burden in the case of the animal is spread out over the whole of life. It is true that whereas wilfulness exaggerates human suffering, there is in the suffering of the lower animal a certain passivity often,—it desires simply to crawl away and hide itself. Still the suffering is there, and we are quite as likely to underrate as to overrate it. The whole field is obscure. In regard to man's future we have our faiths in immortality, but as regards the future of these lower creatures we can neither affirm nor deny. To make a conjecture that may seem bizarre, is it possible that as the life of the world moves slowly upward from the lower to the higher through this terrible struggle for existence, the spiritual element is working in these pains so that a higher inheritance may result? But I can only repeat that at present the whole region is obscure, the whole question as to what animal life really is, and what is its consciousness, and its history. It is very obscure and very tantalizing.

Returning to the world of human life, it is reassuring to recognize that in spite of all its many obscurities, there still are certain luminous points which shed light upon the rest. Spencer tells us that pain is absolute evil.¹ Let me say here, in passing, that it is well to avoid the temptation to speak slightlyingly of a writer who meets us thus at almost every point in our discussion. This statement, however, in regard to pain we cannot accept. For in a world without pain we should find no place for heroism, no place for sympathy in any profound sense, and no place for the development of character, or for helpfulness and the various glad activities of life. These activities imply friction, and yet the slightest friction or difficulty is of the nature of pain. Furthermore, it is through difficulties that life works upward from the lower animal plane to the spiritual plane. The devil is painted

¹ *The Data of Ethics*, Chap. III.

with horns and hoofs, and it may be that this symbolizes the animal nature of sin, the fact that moral evil is from below. It is also suggestive that in the medieval plays the devil figures simply as an instrument and tool. Certainly we can recognize no absolute evil; temptation as well as suffering may be the instruments of the higher life. It is sometimes urged that if the principle of absolute evil is denied, the principle of absolute good must go also. But whereas evil is negative, good is positive, and the positive may abide even if the negative passes away. I say nothing as to the possible existence of evil spirits; we cannot say on any *a priori* grounds that there may not be a whole hierarchy of such spirits. But the principle of absolute evil can have no place in our thought of the universe.

Theoretically most people no doubt would agree with what has been said. It is very easy to recognize in theory the fact that suffering and temptation may be helps to a life which could not be lived without them. The real difficulty comes when we meet the fact of temptation and suffering, whether in our own lives or in the lives of those about us. We who perhaps have solved without difficulty the problem of the suffering of the universe, find our theoretical optimism put to shame by a toothache, to say nothing of severer suffering. Then it is that we ask why suffering should be permitted in a world that is ruled by supreme goodness. The suffering of those who are dear to us involves still greater difficulty. For in bearing his own burden of pain or sorrow a man has some resources which fail him when he tries to bear the burden of another. He may make light of his own sorrow, but not of the sorrows of his friend; he may summon up energy to meet troubles of his own, but he cannot provide in this way for another's trouble. Practically speaking, what disturbs our faith is not the idea of suffering but its reality; it is when we feel the reality of it that we protest. So that the very hardest lesson that we have to learn is that if the battle is to be fought, it must be a real battle. If suffering is to do its work, it must be real suffering. If we are to be made perfect through temptation, the temptation must be that which really tempts.

If victory is to be real, the battle must be not a sham fight but a real battle, involving the possibility of real and absolute defeat.

The real difficulty, then, lies in a lack of proportion. These persons or those, we say, or perhaps we ourselves, have more than a just share of suffering or temptation; and we are very apt to magnify our own share. But how is the just proportion to be determined? If theoretically we grant the necessity of suffering, if practically we grant its reality, how are we to determine the degree in which it shall be shared? The fundamental difficulty in the whole matter, practically considered, is the fact that in our hearts we fail to recognize what is the real end of life. We may recognize it theoretically, but not actually in our hearts. Theoretically we agree that the end of life, so far as it is open to us, is the development of our spiritual nature in the direction of the highest virtue, if I may use an inadequate term for a great fact. Practically, I suppose that most of us feel that the end of life is happiness, and so, if unhappiness comes to us, we feel that our life is failing to fulfil its end, even though the straight and narrow path which leads to the spiritual heights may still be open to us.

One of the most difficult themes, in a discussion in which all the themes bristle with difficulties, is the question, what is the *summum bonum*. Is it happiness, or is it virtue? I suppose we should all say that practically it is both; that the universe would be perfect if happiness could be reached by virtue. But which is higher? Shall we say that happiness is the inevitable concomitant of virtue, or that virtue is the means to the highest happiness? I think it is obvious that from our present point of view virtue must be regarded as the highest good. For although we may admit that the highest happiness can be reached only through virtue, and that virtue thus may be regarded as the means by which to reach the highest happiness, still the true end toward which we are to strive is the highest spiritual life. If we really felt this, if we were really convinced in our hearts that the highest spiritual life is the highest good of which we can at present conceive, the questions that we have been considering might still

remain unsolved theoretically, but practically, for most men, they would be answered. The reason why most of us are so pressed by our difficulties is that we do not realize that virtue is worth all that it costs. If we did realize it, the inspiration of the thought of the spiritual life as we should see it in all its beauty, would give us such strength and earnestness that our difficulties would seem slight in comparison. Furthermore, when we consider happiness and virtue side by side, we see that happiness is not possible for all; but for all normal souls not only is the growth in virtue possible, but it is made more easily possible through these very difficulties which trouble us. Therefore if we fully realized both the power of this ideal and the possibility of drawing nearer to it, we should find the foundations for an optimistic faith greatly broadened and strengthened. A work that is most helpful in this connection is Edward Dowden's *Critical Study of the Mind and Art of Shakspere*, because of the clearness with which the sternest difficulties of life, as they are pictured in the tragedies, are contrasted with the higher life which causes those difficulties to seem of comparatively little account.

I have sometimes used an illustration which I find is given in an essay by Frances Power Cobbe.¹ She speaks of the bewilderment and questioning that would arise in the mind of a person who had never seen a ship and who in passing along the shore should come upon one on the stocks and mistake it for a house. We can imagine his perplexity. On the one hand there would be the evidences of art and skill and contrivance, the evidences that in many respects the comfort and taste of the future occupants had been anticipated and provided for. Yet on the other hand it would appear in many ways so inconvenient and unattractive that he would wonder how an architect or builder, evidently of so much genius and skill, and with so much money at his disposal, could have made such a house as this. In a similar way, if the world is to be considered simply as a house in which we are to dwell comfortably, difficulties at once appear. We confess that there is evidence enough of design, and evidence

¹ *The Peak in Darien*, "The House on the Shore of Eternity."

enough of power and of the preparation of that which may satisfy our highest desires. Yet in spite of all this the world presents so much of inconvenience and of suffering! Certainly if the world is only a house for present dwelling, these difficulties may easily seem great beyond the possibility of explanation. But if the world is not a house but a ship, if the mere dwelling at ease is not the end of life, but the accomplishment of the highest ideals, the development of the highest spiritual life, then we find that the world may be well adapted to its purpose.

We have seen with what difficulties faith has to contend. We have also seen in what way faith may be aided in overcoming these difficulties. It is to be noticed that the evil of life is felt much more, as a rule, by those who consider the evil theoretically than by those who are actually suffering. The faithful souls who pass through suffering and look upon it from within see the real meaning of it and realize the good that it is working out, as those who look upon it sympathetically from the outside do not. Men learn that there is such a thing as patience, and a faith that can transform sorrow, and an aspiration that rejoices at finding in suffering that upon which it feeds. The world, then, is to be regarded as designed not so much to test character—for there is nothing to test until the experience has come—but rather to develop character. In a certain sense, however, it may become a test, for all these things may be misused. It is a great mistake to suppose that suffering in itself has power to save men. To realize this, we have only to remind ourselves how many natures have simply been hardened by it. But there is in it the possibility of salvation; it offers a way by which salvation may be attained.

When we pass to the consideration of the object of faith, the idea toward which it strives, *the divine providence*, we find that two views are held with more or less distinctness: the belief in what is technically defined as special providence, and the belief in that which may be called general providence. The terms are inadequate, but we may use them for convenience. According to the first view every element of life and every event in life

is specially adapted to the special needs of each individual, so that if special suffering comes to a man, or special joy, there is the question why this joy or suffering should have come to this particular individual. According to the other view the laws of nature are invariable, and every spirit alike is subject to them. Therefore when this or that experience comes to an individual, he does not ask why the special event should have happened to him, but sees in it one manifestation of the forces by which all men are surrounded. According to the first view, a man's relation to the world is like a bath that has been specially prepared in accordance with the directions of the physician, with just such qualities to the water, and just such temperature, and so on. According to the other view, the relation is like bathing in the ocean, where there is no preparation for the individual, but the same surf beats upon all alike.

It may be asked, where, if we take this latter view, is the possibility of recognizing any providence at all? Where is there any opportunity for faith? The difference, however, between the two views is largely one of detail. There is opportunity for precisely the same sort of faith in the one case as in the other, the faith in an absolute ordering of events. Only according to the second view we assume that the divine providence has ordained this subjection of man to a system of invariable law as the best method of education for the spiritual life, recognizing that in a world where laws might be suspended, where the action of forces might vary according to every varying need, the soul would lose its strength and vigor. The question in regard to our conception of the divine providence is a question as to the best method of training; is the individual soul best trained under the one system or under the other? An imperfect parallel to this question appears in the question in regard to the education of children, whether private education is better, or education in the larger schools. The illustration is a very poor one, but I use it purposely. For if the world is designed for the training of the spiritual life, then we must see that the question as to which method is better may be a very open one.

What I am insisting upon is that the idea of an overruling providence enters just as much in the one case as in the other. The providential care may show itself in the strength that is inspired in the hearts of those who seek it, as they find themselves exposed to the action of the invariable laws. The father may, as it were, himself bear his child into the ocean, so that as the waves beat upon the child, the father's hand supports him and the father's voice gives him courage.

As we compare the two methods further we have to recognize that whereas the first admits no *a posteriori* proof, the second does admit such proof up to a certain point. Not that this discredits the first method. But supposing that we held this view, we could not expect to be able to "justify the ways of God to men." For in order to understand the relation of outward events to individual character, we should need to have a knowledge of the character and of its relations that we cannot have. As it is, we interpret providence in each case according to the result. We regard the same experience sometimes as a judgment and sometimes as a discipline, according to the person to whom it has come. And as a matter of fact, apart from any theory as to a special or a general providence, that is what we find in the world. "All things work together for good to them that love God," whatever the explanation we may give, whether the current of events is so guided as to bear the lover of God on his way, or whether the lover of God has the power to transmute the environment in which he is placed into that which shall nourish and develop his life. This power of transmutation differs in different individuals as one plant differs from another; given the rosebush, all things work together to produce roses, and given the thistle, all things work together to produce thistles. Or from another point of view, it is like the sailing of ships upon the sea; nothing is more striking to one who sees it for the first time than the passing of ships, one in one direction and another in precisely the opposite direction, and yet both impelled by the same breeze. The second view does admit *a posteriori* proof to some extent, though not absolute proof.

This proof appears in the fact that no suffering has been found so great that souls have not been purified and lifted by it. The difficulty is that so many souls have been hardened by even less suffering, and the question which cannot be determined by any *a posteriori* reasoning is whether in such cases the individual was incapacitated by his nature from drawing out of his experience the possible benefit. What we may say with tolerable confidence is that there is no suffering from which the individual may not, if he will, receive some betterment. At the same time no observer of life can fail to see that there are natures which harden with suffering but blossom into a certain beauty in the sunshine of prosperity.

I suppose that in the largest possible view both theories would flow together. That is, if we recognize absolute omniscience and absolute omnipotence in the sense in which we have used these terms, and if we regard this all-wise omnipotence as establishing absolute laws, then we must conceive of this power as seeing these laws from the first in the whole sweep of their history and results, so that in their very establishment their application to the needs of every individual would have been foreseen and provided for. But this carries us very far into a region where I for one do not like to penetrate. My object has been, not to press either the one view or the other, but only to emphasize what it is that religion has at stake in this question. The difficulty is that individuals are apt to insist upon the inflexibility of law and then leave the matter there, whereas for the complete religious view we need to recognize the fact that religion assumes that the individual is indeed subject to law, but subject to it by the act of divine wisdom and love. It may be helpful to notice that the second view suggests a distinction like that which Paul so emphasizes, between law and grace. The natural law, like the Jewish law, may be regarded as the schoolmaster to bring men to Christ, training men's spirits by the discipline of its invariableness until they can rise into the higher realm of love. But however this may be, without some view of providence the soul cannot rest and religion cannot exist. All that

religion demands is the recognition of an infinite spirit of love into relation with which the finite spirit is brought.

We have seen that practically speaking no finite nature can reach the highest perfection possible to it without the discipline of evil, at least in the form of friction. However hopeless we may be in regard to any answer, I suppose we cannot help asking the question, how is it, then, with the infinite spirit? Is the infinite spirit also made perfect through suffering? This is wholly beyond our knowledge, and we need not be confused if the results that we have reached in regard to the finite spirit seem foreign to the infinite. Yet we may recall a thought which has haunted many profound thinkers. We may remember the sacrifice of Purusha by which the universe was created, and the words of Laò-Tsè, "He veiled his glory and became one with the dust,"¹ and we may call to mind certain doctrines of the Christian church. In other words, in philosophical language, we may recognize that negative element which is the condition of creation. But in regard to this whole realm we can only peer into the mists and the measureless distances and remain silent. Happily the question is practically clear enough and is made still clearer by Christianity. For in Christ and Christianity we find the glorification of suffering. The Christian sees the captain of his salvation made perfect through suffering,² and the cross becomes the symbol of the highest life.

To go back now to the point from which this discussion started, I said that faith is a condition of inspiration. Since all higher life is in greater or less degree the result of inspiration, it follows that faith is essential to the highest life. It is indeed the one important thing in the religious life, the faith in something that is worthy of reverence. Perhaps this may help us to understand those words of Jesus, "the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you."³ For we may suppose that Jesus saw that they had a faith in a better life, even

¹ V. F. Von Strause, *Laò-Tsè's Tàò Tè King*, p. 22. S. Julien, *Le Livre de la Voie*, etc., p. 16.

² *Hebrews*, ii, 10.

³ *Matthew*, xxi, 31.

though they believed themselves to be shut out from it, and that he felt that the sinful man or woman who had faith in the possibility of the better life was nearer to it than the Pharisee who had no real faith in the divinity of goodness and whose morality was merely either a habit or a pretence. We must bear in mind that this is probably not the precise point of the comparison as Jesus intended it; for the Pharisees, as he painted them, were not the morally religious people we are too apt to think them, but rather men whose religiousness was hypocritical, men who were said by him to "devour widows' houses and for a pretence make long prayers."¹ Still we may extend the comparison in the form in which I have stated it, and say that the most imperfect life which keeps its faith in a better life, even though it has lost the hope of reaching it, is really nearer God than the most upright life which has lost this faith.

¹ *Matthew*, xxiii, 14. *Mark*, xii, 40. *Luke*, xx, 47.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE INDIVIDUAL IN RELATION TO SIN AND ATONEMENT.—REPENTANCE.—FORGIVENESS.—REGENERATION.—PRAYER.

WE have considered the great facts of sin and the atonement in their general aspect. We have now to consider the individual in relation to these great facts. We have looked at the environment and have seen how it is adapted for harmony with the development of individual life. We now have to look at the individual and see him adapting himself to a relation in harmony with the environment. It may seem like a Hibernicism to say that the environment may be in harmony with the individual, and yet the individual be out of harmony with the environment, but the explanation of the seeming paradox is to be found in the fact that the individual may be out of harmony with himself. The individual has two selves, the universal element in his nature, and the individual element. The environment is in harmony with the larger self, the universal element, and it is the business of the individual to bring the smaller self into harmony with the larger self and so with the environment.

I will speak first of *repentance*. The word as we find it in the New Testament signifies primarily a change, a transformation, but in common speech it has come to mean regret, so that when we speak of repentance for sin, what we have in mind is not so much the turning from sin as the sorrowing because of it. To this meaning the Catholic adds, through a mistranslation, an element of penance. I mention the three meanings because all are helpful to the complete idea of repentance. All the three elements are involved. The change is the fundamental thing; but this can hardly come except as it is either caused or accompanied by regret, while the test of repentance is the willingness to do penance, the penance of right living.

In its subjective aspect the fact of repentance is most interesting. We have seen¹ that identity can be recognized only in the case of self-conscious beings, in whose thought past, present and future are united. In the case of an impersonal object the past leaves an effect, but the past itself no longer exists; with persons, on the other hand, the past is taken up into the present. Therefore in repentance there is not merely the memory of a deed, but the recognition of responsibility for the deed. The person extends his present into the past and brings over his past into the present. "This experience is mine," he must say to himself, "and mine in such a way that I can blame myself for it." Thus responsibility is brought out most clearly in repentance. But the person may say further, "This experience is truly mine, and yet I disown it. It has no business to be mine, for it was not my true life that accomplished it. It was my self that did the act, but not my true self." Thus repentance emphasizes the distinction between the lower and the higher self, the historical and the permanent self. There is in it both an acceptance and a rejection of the past act. The sin is of the person, it is his own sin, but it is something foreign to his true nature. Thus in the case of the individual as well as in its general aspect, sin is negative. The objective act itself and the ruling motive at the time when the act was performed were indeed positive, but what constituted the sin was the absence of the higher motive and the higher deed which should have been present. At first the thought of the positive act is uppermost in repentance; the other element appears later. "I am sorry that I struck that blow," is the first thought; but then comes the thought, "I ought not to have given way to my passion." Thus the more profound repentance goes back to the negative aspect of the experience.

I said that the sin is recognized by the individual as foreign to his true nature. He finds further that this foreign element is superficial, and that it can be cast out and he himself remain whole and sound. This will appear more plainly if we compare repentance with remorse. Remorse like repentance sees that a

foreign element has come into the life, but unlike repentance it believes that this element has entered so deeply into the life, and has become so large a part of it, that it cannot be removed, so that whereas repentance is full of hope, remorse is hopeless. In repentance the case is like that of a person who suffers from some external trouble which the surgeon's knife may easily remove without touching the source of life itself, but the person who is filled with remorse is like the man who finds that a cancer is feeding upon his very vitals. It is thus that remorse seeks relief sometimes in suicide. Peter goes out and weeps, but he knows that his heart has all along been true and that his sin is one that his sorrow can wash out. Judas abhors not merely his sin but himself; he feels that no way is open by which he may eradicate his sin except as he eradicates himself. Yet however remorse may be regarded from a subjective point of view, viewed from without it should be considered a ground for hope. For the individual who can abhor himself on account of his sin has the faith of which I have only just now spoken, that there is something worthy of the highest reverence, something that is worth living for.

From certain points of view, *forgiveness* seems to be a very light and easy thing. But when one looks at it more closely he realizes the difficulty that is involved. For if you forgive a person, you are supposed to treat him and to feel toward him as though he had not done the wrong, and how is this possible? There is a play of Racine's in which Augustus is made to detect Cinna in leading a conspiracy to take his life. He not only forgives him but shows the reality of his forgiveness by saying, "Let us be friends, Cinna." Here is the difficulty set in the clearest light. Here is a man asking another man who has been preparing against him the sword of the assassin, to be his friend! What sort of friendship could there be between these two?

Three different attitudes are possible in the object of forgiveness, and the nature of the forgiveness in each case varies according to the attitude. In the first case the offender has repented. Here forgiveness ought to be easy, and yet we know that there

are persons whom apparently no amount of repentance leads to forgive those who have wronged them. In the second case the offender has not repented, but is believed to be true at heart. Here there may be forgiveness even before repentance, according as the person who is wronged has power to see the life of the wrong-doer in its completeness. It is the forgiveness which is so often felt by the loving father or mother toward their children, or between friend and friend. For a moment your anger at an unkind word or deed may magnify it so that it hides from you your friend's life as a whole; but presently your love looks around and beyond the act and sees it only as a single incident over against the complete life, and you only sorrow that your friend should thus have yielded to the impulse to do a wrong which is unworthy of his truer self and of which you are sure he will repent presently. The third case, and the case which occasions the chief difficulty, is that in which even the calm judgment of the offended person cannot separate the wrong act from the life of the offender as a whole. If the act was deceitful, he has to recognize the fact that the person who has done it is deceitful; if the person has inflicted an injury upon him he cannot help feeling that this person is cruel. In such circumstances what sort of forgiveness can there be? It would seem at first thought that the most that one could do would be to leave out of the account all personal considerations, and to judge an injury done to one's self exactly as though it had been done to some one else, considering it calmly and condemning it without passion. Such a course undoubtedly requires a certain degree of magnanimity. We see constantly persons who regard some aspect of wrong-doing very comfortably until they themselves become the victims and then suddenly discover that the offender is unworthy of any consideration whatever. At the same time it is possible that a profounder view of life would even here, as in the second case, look beyond the more immediate conditions, with faith in the ultimate goodness of every individual, and that here, too, there would thus be mingled with whatever indignation one might feel an element of sorrow. Forgiveness does not imply any lack of indignation

against evil, but it does imply the absence of personal vindictiveness. It is entirely possible that one's attitude toward wrong-doing in general may be as much too lax as the anger at personal injury is too intense, and that in the case of some minds the sense of personal relation to a wrong may serve to make them see more clearly the real nature of the wrong itself. But it is only the more superficial minds that wait thus to realize an evil until it has touched themselves.

When we come to consider forgiveness in its theological aspect, we find the same difficulties that have met us in the ethical aspect. We not uncommonly hear it said that such a thing as divine forgiveness is impossible, that there is simply sowing and reaping, and men must abide by the results of their own acts. Thus we have a principle like that of "Karma," by which every act has its fruition, whether of good or of evil. In one sense this is true, and yet as thus stated it is likely to convey a false idea. Forgiveness is in some sense or other the remittance of penalty. Now in analyzing the nature of penalty and asking what are its elements, we have found that it involves first of all what may be called the natural result of sin.¹ I use the term "natural" in the absence of a better word, for in a certain sense all the results of sin are natural; I use it with reference to the more external and superficial results of sin as they are found in the nature of the individual who sins. We have many examples of this element of penalty, especially in the relation of human life to the external world. Nature speaking through her various laws says to us, not "Thou must" or "Thou shalt," but only "If thou doest this, thou shalt suffer the penalty." Thus the man who transgresses natural laws by taking insufficient nourishment suffers in one direction, and if he transgresses them in his use of intoxicating liquors, he suffers in another direction, and so on. As yet no ethical element is involved; we have to do simply with laws of nature which exact their own penalty from those who transgress them. But here we have also that which may serve as an illustration of forgiveness, the recuperative power of nature. The individual in transgressing the natural law has incurred its

¹ Page 296.

penalty, but although the law enforces itself irrevocably, it is as though there were at the heart of nature a sort of love by which she attempts to soften and remove the effects of the transgression. There is something marvellous in these restorative processes. Some of the penalties are removed very promptly, as in the speedy healing of cuts or other wounds in a healthy body. In other cases the results may disappear more slowly, and in still others not at all.

I have spoken of these processes as constituting forgiveness, because we see in them the attempt at the removal, or it may be the actual removal, of the penalty of transgression. But these violations of the laws of nature may from a higher point of view become sin. A man's body is his instrument for doing the work which he has been placed in the world to do, and if through intoxication or in other ways he disables his body, he is guilty of sin just as much as the carpenter's apprentice who wilfully abuses the tools with which he is set to work. In considering the natural results of transgression from this higher point of view, weaknesses of will are to be taken into account as well as infirmities of the body, and with the change in the nature of the transgression another element enters into the penalty. Take transgression in the use of intoxicating liquors. It becomes a sin because the man unfits himself for his duty toward his own family and for his share in the general work of society. He becomes a burden and an infliction instead of a help. He sets an obstacle in the way of the development of his own nature. As the natural result of his transgression he becomes a wreck. But here enters the second element in the penalty. So long as he continues to surrender himself to the power of this sin, he is to a certain extent an outcast, even from the noblest affection of his own family. His wife may continue to love him, but her love will be no longer a wifely love but rather that of a sorrowing, pitying mother, and that which changes the form of her love changes the feeling toward him in society to aversion or contempt. Now if the man reforms, there is an attempt on the part of nature to remove the effects of the penalty, and this attempt may or

may not be successful. The wasted body may become in part, perhaps wholly, strong again, the weak will, by its very effort to overcome the temptation, may gather strength, and the man may again become useful; or on the other hand recovery like this may have become impossible, so that the man remains a wreck. But even so, although the physical penalties of his transgression cannot be removed, his reformation has brought about a change in the attitude of his family and of society. He has once more the old love from the heart of his wife and children, and the sympathy and respect of society. He is no longer an outcast. So far as his relation to his household and to society is concerned, he is forgiven.

This illustration may have made clearer why I hesitated to use the term "natural" of any one kind of penalty. For the exclusion of the drunkard from the sympathy of those about him is as natural a result of his transgression as the wrecking of his bodily health, and the return of men's respect for him when he has reformed is also a natural result of such a change. Still the process, especially so far as forgiveness is concerned, depends so largely upon volition that we are justified in placing it in a somewhat different category. There are men of a certain hardness of heart or coldness of purpose who refuse to forgive a fall of this sort. Let a man once have been a drunkard and their sympathies are closed against him forever. They are like the elder son in the parable of the Prodigal Son; the father welcomes the repentant prodigal to his home again with joy, but the elder brother looks coldly on.¹

When we consider the relation of men to God we find the same elements. We have as before the natural element in both the penalty and the forgiveness of the transgression, and also the element of the spiritual relation. Just as between man and man, so also between man and God the spiritual relation cannot be the same while the man continues in his sin that it is after he has repented. It is with God and man as it is with a wise earthly father and his child. When the child does wrong, the father does not fly into a violent rage, nor does he, as soon as the

¹ *Luke*, xv, 11-32.

child repents, give way to a paroxysm of joy; nevertheless the relation in which the father stands toward the child when it is disobedient is necessarily different from the relation that is possible when the child is repentant and loving. For the complete flow of love requires two poles that are in connection with one another; there must be a return as well as an outflow, and the outflow is checked if there is no return. Love may be present, but it is under constraint and cannot manifest itself as it would under other circumstances. In a similar way, although we may believe that the divine love watches and follows the whole of life, and that the divine insight measures not by any momentary act or state but sees the nature and the tendency that are under all, yet even this divine love must manifest itself differently, the relation between it and the life of the individual must be different, when that life is open to receive it, and gives forth its own love in return.

It may be urged that in all this there is nothing that can properly be called forgiveness, but that the process is all natural. But it will be seen that our method of judgment is different; the man is looked upon as weighed rather than measured. For the idea of judgment is too often that of measurement, the counting up of a man's deeds. When I say that here we are considering the man as weighed, I mean that we are thinking of him as judged not for what he has done, but for what he is; whatever fineness of nature, whatever true tendencies there may be underneath the different deeds, these will appear in the weighing. We may even carry the figure a little further and say that since weight is the manifestation of the attraction of any body to the world of which it is a part, so character is the manifestation of the attraction of the individual nature to the absolute realities of the universe. Furthermore, in these higher spiritual relations we have to do with spirit, and however irregular its manifestations may be, we must recognize them as spiritual and voluntary rather than natural. The fact that a father always provides for his children is very different from the fact that the tree or the field to which they look for support always bears fruit. For even

if there is necessity in the case of the father, that necessity passes through the channel of the will, and, as we have seen,¹ there is a power of will by which a man may yield himself more or less perfectly to the fundamental laws of his being and the relations in which he stands. So that the return of the spirit into these higher relations, into the relation of love to a father, into absolute union with God, may rightly be called forgiveness. It is true that as a man soweth so also shall he reap; there is no caprice in the government of the universe. But the absence of caprice does not imply the absence of spiritual activity.

There remains the important question whether a spirit that has sinned can ever make up for its sin, the question whether forgiveness is so absolute that the individual life shall be as well off ultimately as though the sin had not been committed. There are some who maintain that the loss by sin is never made up through all the eternal life of the spirit, that the ground once lost can never be regained. There are others who insist that in forgiveness the soul is taken into a more intimate relation with God and reaches loftier heights than if the sin had never been committed; according to a phrase that often appears in theologies and in hymns, the redeemed have a joy of which the angels know nothing, the joy in the consciousness of sins forgiven. The question is one of those which are interesting to contemplate, but which perhaps we need not attempt to answer dogmatically. Without laying down any absolute principle, we may notice that in many cases a fall does appear to lead to gain. The individual is stung by his own transgression into such a sense of the evil of sin that he recoils from it as he might not have done otherwise, and he may experience an exaltation in the consciousness of freedom and of forgiveness which otherwise he might not have known. It may even happen that only through sin do certain spirits come to recognize fully the reality of God's existence and the power of the moral law; there are those who must be driven against a wall in order to realize its existence and feel the recoil. With this in mind we can understand the lofty utterances in the New Testament in regard to the "joy in heaven

¹ Page 229.

over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine righteous persons, which need no repentance." ¹

Is not all this, however, contrary to the principles of ethics? I think we have already recognized the fact that the universe is not governed ethically, in the strict sense of the term. We have seen that ethics is only an intermediate stage, and that a wise and earnest love is greater than morality. The universe is fundamentally not an ethical but a spiritual universe, governed by spiritual laws, not by ethical laws. We have in it not a system of pedagogy but the outflow and inflow of the spiritual life. It is, if I may use the phrase, not the working but the play of life. The ethical pedant may criticise such statements as these that we have been making, but we may still rejoice that the universe is the manifestation of the spiritual life, and that this life is higher than all the laws that are made merely to render life under certain circumstances easier of fulfilment. And we may be sure that there is in the heart of the individual himself, in the heart even of the sinner, something which responds to this power of the spiritual life more readily than to the laying down of ethical principles. Therefore it seems to me that religious feeling may recognize the fact not only that there is forgiveness in the universe, but that forgiveness may be absolute. The state of the soul that had sinned and been forgiven would be different from what it would have been, had not the sin been committed, but the difference might be only a new quality in the joy in the higher life upon which the soul had entered.

In considering the subject of *regeneration* theologians have often treated it as part of a process in which there are various stages described by certain technical terms. There is the "divine call," resting upon the "election" of the individual soul; then there is the "awakening," in which the individual is aroused from a state of indifference; then follow his "conversion," in which he is turned toward the higher life, and his "justification," in the sense in which Paul uses the term; finally "regeneration" plants the new life in the soul, and is followed by "sanctification,"

¹ *Luke*, xv, 7.

the assumption of the just life which crowns the whole process. I shall not attempt to follow the line of these technical terms, but shall speak of regeneration simply as a great fact or great possibility in human life. I shall perhaps make the whole question more real if I ask whether any of you can recall absolutely and distinctly the case of a person who you knew had been in any sense of the term *converted*, and if so, in what you believe the change in him consisted. Up to a certain point we no doubt can easily recall such examples, using the term "conversion" not in a technical sense and not in a specifically religious sense, but in relation to the life of the individual generally. Thus we have known men who had been intemperate who have reformed. Reformation is familiar to us. But the question goes deeper than reformation, that is, a reformation in external morality. Regeneration involves a change in the heart, a change by which a selfish person becomes loving, or a thoughtless and indifferent person becomes thoughtful. Now we recognize that changes of this sort do take place. There is, for example, a certain ripening in life, as time goes on, which must be granted without any hesitation or discussion. I remember having seen once a criticism upon Dickens's novels in relation to this very point. Writing from a point of view not uncommon in our day, which assumes the invariableness of character, the critic said that it was a great mistake to represent a man so cold and selfish as Mr. Dombey is in his middle life as undergoing the transformation by which he becomes in old age a rather thoughtful and kindly person. But the transformation in Mr. Dombey is of a sort which those who have seen much of the world must often have found. The change may be one of environment, but even so it manifests itself as a change in the individual. Furthermore, the change is often of such a kind that the man who has been indifferent to spiritual things, and has lived a worldly and selfish life, becomes a believer in religion. In such cases, however, the change may be only superficial; the religion of the selfish man may be selfish, and the religion of the worldly man may be and often is worldly. We have to go behind external

changes, and ask whether the heart of the man is changed; has the mean man become generous, and the selfish man loving, and the hard man tender? For myself, although I might find it difficult fairly to defend my position even by examples, so much does the whole question have to do with that which lies below the surface of ordinary experience, I have a faith, or trust, or hope, that such change may take place, and that there often may be in this profound sense a new birth of the human soul.

Such a change of heart is equivalent to a fresh start in life. It may be recognized as the yielding of allegiance to the highest that the individual knows. The question how high this highest is, is of less account than the fact that the individual gives himself to his highest, whatever that may be. Thus it is that we may find conversion and regeneration in any religion that is worthy of the name. For every religion which is in any way worthy offers to its followers something higher than their ordinary life, and when the individual yields himself to this, he yields himself to the highest that he knows. Here we have the explanation of the wonderful fact which to many seems at first so mysterious, and which in some minds raises doubt in regard to the whole question, that under such different forms of faith there may be a like process of conversion. Thus Christendom is broken up into numerous sects, and each sect claims that it has to some extent a monopoly of truth. Yet we find that in all alike the religious experience is exalted; there is a unity among them all in this regard, in spite of the differences in form. And what is true of Christianity is true in some respects of other religions also. I have told elsewhere in a similar connection, but with a different emphasis, the story of the boy who sold the neighbors tickets to his mother's garden in order that they might enter it to see the eclipse.¹ The illustration has its serious and positive aspect. It may often happen that the soul does not lift its eyes to the heavens until it has passed inside the gates of some particular religion or sect. Not that all religions are equal, or that any one can accomplish as much for the spirit as any other.²

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 107.

² Page 335.

Although the process of conversion may be the same in all, although all may have doors which open into the one great temple, that which claims the allegiance of the spirit as highest in one may be higher than the highest in another. Christianity has this great advantage, that it makes the process of conversion easier in causing it to be in some respects more attractive; it offers a fuller spiritual life, which grows out of a more profound insight and a larger knowledge. Furthermore, in Christianity the ideal to which the soul surrenders itself is really an ideal, manifesting itself under the form of a perfect spiritual life, in the person of Jesus. In all these various ways Christianity has a power which is lacking to other religions.

The conversion which manifests itself in newness of life is first of all a transition from selfishness to love. This is a regeneration that must take place at some time, consciously or unconsciously, in every individual. For the infant is the centre of his world, its king. If he continues to live in this relation with the universe, he must become a selfish youth, a selfish man. But he must pass out of this relation, and the transition may be made unconsciously, or it may cost more or less of conscious effort and struggle. It is as though a world that hitherto had turned only about its own axis should finally yield itself to the attracting power of the central sun, and swing out into the circling orbit of its greater course. But, secondly, conversion is a change from caprice to principle. If it were necessary for me to describe in a single phrase the straight and narrow way "that leadeth unto life," I am not sure that I should not make it this,—the acceptance of some principle as the rule of life. A principle is that from which one can start and to which one can return. It does not forbid the play of life. No life is cast-iron; play there must be in it, and chance. But now the dice are loaded, for whereas the man was before indifferent, now he is on the side of the better life. In Christianity this principle is, as I have just said, the ideal that is manifested in the life of Jesus. Finally, conversion is a transition from the material to the spiritual; the soul is brought into conscious relation to the infinite spirit. This is conversion in

its highest form, its culmination. With it there comes the life of faith and obedience, and of joy in the Holy Spirit. These transitions, this process, by which the soul rises from a lower to a higher state, may take place again and again. The religious life is like a stairway in which, as we ascend, each new step may be considered as in a certain sense a conversion or regeneration. Yet at the same time there may be, and perhaps must be, some first or more important step, when the individual life turns its face in the direction in which henceforth it is to move. Whether this step is taken consciously or unconsciously will depend largely upon circumstances. In the family life there comes unquestionably a moment at which the child begins to surrender self, to abdicate his royalty. Yet the child who is well brought up probably is never conscious of this moment; the change takes place naturally as part of a general development. But the question is one in regard to which we may not dogmatize in either direction.

How is conversion to be produced? The difficulty lies in the fact that what we are seeking is not merely reform but regeneration, not merely a change in the outward life but a change of heart. A change of heart implies that a man loves what before he did not love, and hates what he did not hate. A man may change his methods and the outward forms of his life, but one's heart would seem to be beyond one's power to change. The difficulty is so great that Schopenhauer insists that while a man may change his opinion, his intellectual view of things, he can never change his disposition. He illustrates this by saying that a man will laugh over mistakes which he may have committed in the past, but none likes to be reminded of a past act of meanness because he feels that such acts tell against him in the present. I cannot help thinking that Nicodemus may have been dealt with rather unfairly by some of the commentators in taking it for granted that when he asks how a man can be born when he is old, he shows himself so obtuse and dull.¹ It is assumed that Nicodemus is speaking only of the external, bodily birth while Jesus is speaking of the spiritual birth. But it is possible to suppose that Nicodemus also was speaking figuratively, and that he was only urging

¹ *John*, iii, 1-21.

upon Jesus the fundamental difficulty in the case, the difficulty which must always present itself whenever, to use a phrase current just now, "the man needs to be made over and to be made differently."

I recognize thoroughly all the difficulties. As I speak, I remember how I once heard an orthodox preacher insist that the orthodox were really more liberal than the so-called liberals, because it was so common among liberals to deny the possibility of such a change as is implied in regeneration, whereas this possibility was a fundamental element in orthodox belief. Perhaps, therefore, I shall not be suspected of underestimating the difficulties when I say that as we consider the matter more closely, we must see that they are after all more verbal than real. For man is not a unit. He has many various tendencies, and he does not advance evenly all along the line. Thus no man, we may assume, no normal individual life, is wholly selfish; in every man there is, if not some beginning of the higher life, at least the germ of that higher life, the germ of unselfishness, waiting only for the impulse that shall develop it. Therefore the change that takes place in conversion is not to be regarded as an absolute change of nature in the individual life. What is already higher in the life lifts that which is lower, and the germs of that which is higher are stimulated to activity by new influences, while behind all is the mighty spiritual power of God. From this point of view, although we need not be surprised when conversion takes place suddenly, still we should expect that more usually and more naturally the change of front would proceed somewhat slowly, as the powers and tendencies germinated and developed and thus the whole nature ripened. Even when the impulse might have come in some one moment, still the results would usually appear in the processes of this gradual development.

The subject of *prayer* is one which on some accounts I should prefer not to consider in an examination such as we are making. It seems to me not to enter naturally and fittingly into theological discussion. For prayer should be simply the natural expression of the spiritual life at that stage, whatever it may be, at which the

soul finds itself. Whatever the religious standpoint of a man may be, he should be left to himself to express his spiritual life naturally. If his religion does not impel him to pray, then prayer will be for him artificial unless indeed it be the prayer for prayer.

Fundamentally, in a large sense, prayer is communion between the soul and its divinity. Communion implies sympathy, and if sympathy is present, it makes little difference what is actually said or thought. You may meet a man and say to him merely that the day is fine, but if you have said it with sympathy, you have had communion with him. On the other hand you may have talked long with him and on high topics, but if it has been without sympathy, there has been no communion. The sympathy need not find utterance at all. Animals do not talk, and yet they like to be together, and it is pleasant to sit by one's friend, though he and you may speak no word to each other for many minutes. Now if we raise all this to the highest point, it may help to show what communion is like between man and God, and it will be seen that given the communion, the sympathy, the form or subject of one's prayer will matter little; the soul may be trusted to pour itself out in its sense of sympathy and submission. The poor serving-woman who can understand hardly a word of the Latin service has the sense of the divine presence and lays open before it her life with all its needs. When the prayer does seek utterance and takes shape in words, these words will be such as most naturally suggest themselves. Of course there may be some differences in form between the prayer of public worship and that of private devotion, but whatever they are, they should not interfere with naturalness of expression. Whether the prayer of public worship takes the form prescribed by some ritual, or is extempore, will depend upon the preferences of individual minds. The liturgical prayer is more universal, the extempore prayer more particular; liturgical forms tend to develop a general religious sense, the extempore prayer tends rather to call forth intensity of feeling in a few.

If we turn now to the more definite aspects of prayer, we may consider first the element of worship or praise. This element

has been sharply criticised; we offer to God, it is said, what we would not offer to a man. But we must look at prayer from the human rather than from the divine side. Whether God needs such praise is one question, and whether man needs to offer it is quite another question. There are moments of warmth and enthusiasm in which we do not hesitate to express to our friends our praise of them, moments when we cannot restrain ourselves but have to give utterance to our feeling toward them, and this is not flattery, but only the natural outpouring of our love and appreciation. So it is in prayer. It is one of the ways by which man climbs upward, and when in his love and adoration he utters his praise to God, that praise is not meant to influence God; it influences the man himself; it helps to keep before him, to fix in his mind and heart, the object of his devotion. It is interesting to notice that even in Comte's religion of humanity prayer had an important place. Every day had its saint, and the prayer consisted in the repetition of the virtues of the saint and the desire that they might be fulfilled in the life of the worshipper. There was no response from the saint who was thus worshipped, but there was believed to be an inspiring effect upon the worshipper.

The element of petition presents greater difficulties. If God knows all, and does all for the best, may we not trust to his guidance at least as much as we do to the guidance of men? And if "prayer moves the hand that guides the world," what are we that we should grasp at the rein in the hand of the skilful driver? But it may be said in answer, first of all, that prayer changes the conditions; God causes the grain in the field to grow and ripen, but man plants the field and chooses what kind of grain it shall bear. Petition is of three kinds: the prayer for spiritual blessings for ourselves, the prayer for spiritual blessings for others, and the prayer for material blessings for ourselves or others. The first kind of petition, the prayer for spiritual blessings for ourselves, we may recognize as distinctly a condition to the end desired; it is the opening of the heart, the natural method by which the gift may be received. From the point of view of the understanding,

prayer must inevitably be its own answer, for when the heart is ready for good, good must enter as it were by a certain divine necessity. But if we grant the truth of religion, this sort of petition and its fulfilment appear in a higher aspect. The response of spirit to spirit may indeed be as inevitable as any action and reaction in the natural world, but the method is different. Because the response is regular, it is not therefore mechanical. The spiritual acts voluntarily.

The question is somewhat harder when we turn to the petition for spiritual blessings for others. God must know their needs; it is the human spirit, not the divine, which requires to be prompted; and such petition is not obviously a condition of the fulfilment of that which is desired. But here we must do as we have done before,—apply the test of religion itself to our theories, and if our theories do not bear the test, sorrow for them, if possible change them, but at all events resist the temptation to cut our religion to fit our theories. Now our truest spiritual life leads us to pray for others. We may explain this as justified simply by the effect which the intense thought and feeling of one person has upon another. But from the point of view of religion, is there not more? Is it not true that as the mother gives utterance in prayer to her longing for her child's good, her heart is opened, so that the influence which she exerts upon the child becomes not merely that of her own desire and will, but also that of the divine presence itself? The bit of steel that is charged by a magnet becomes powerful to charge other bits of steel. In such petition what we have is not the human will making the divine will follow its desire, but the divine will making the human will its instrument.

In the prayer for material blessings, whether for ourselves or for others, the connection between the petition and the fulfilment is far less obvious. All the tests that have been suggested are very superficial. Thus Tyndall proposed as a prayer-gauge by which the petition for material blessing should be submitted to scientific test, that two wards should be set apart in a hospital, in one of which the patients should be treated by physicians in the usual

way, while in the other ward they should simply be prayed for. But Tyndall here fell into an error common with scientists when dealing with questions of religion or metaphysics. He did not recognize the spiritual nature of prayer, and failed to see that in this experiment that he proposed the conditions would be such that the prayer offered would not be prayer at all. It would not be the expression of personal desire, but the demand that God should display his power. The fact is that there is no test that can be applied. The question is not whether prayer is a good irrigator or fertilizer, but whether it is a real power. If a man believes that it is, then let him pray as he wishes, spontaneously and freely. The sense of the stability of the laws of the universe grows upon us. Yet, as I have said before, the harvest does not depend solely upon natural laws. Furthermore, the power to make the best of things, with all that it involves, is a spiritual power, and he who loves God and communes with him, and submits his will to the divine will, is like the ship that takes advantage of any winds that blow; he is in a position to accept and use whatever comes. Finally, whatever else we recognize, we must not forget that prayer is first of all communion, and that with every true prayer of the individual soul, the heart of the world is lifted nearer to God.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

IMMORTALITY.—THE ARGUMENT FROM REAPPEARANCE: FROM ANALOGY: FROM PHYSICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA: FROM THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.—THE PHILOSOPHICO-TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.—THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT.—THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SENSE OF THE IDEAL: FROM THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD: FROM MAN'S INSTINCTIVE FAITH.—DIFFICULTIES: IMMORTALITY OF ANIMALS: PRE-EXISTENCE: QUESTION OF SELFISHNESS.—NATURE OF THE FUTURE LIFE.—THE ARGUMENT FOR RELIGION OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE.—SIXTH AND FINAL DEFINITION OF RELIGION.

WHENEVER the subject of immortality is considered, the question as to the reality of life after death, it is the habit of our time to ask for proof. Men ask for a demonstration of immortality as they ask for a demonstration of the existence or being of God. This questioning and doubt of the present day are more serious than such doubt has been for the most part in other ages. There has always been more or less of superficial skepticism, but the skepticism of today is based upon larger considerations than in former times, and is more profound and more reverent.

I have already reminded you that religion is not a matter of demonstration but of faith. This principle in its relation to the doctrine of immortality is well stated by John Fiske in his *Destiny of Man*. Science, he shows, has nothing to say against the doctrine of immortality, and scientific results on the whole are favorable to it; yet, although immortality is something in which unquestionably man will always believe, "it must ever remain an affair of religion rather than of science."¹ Of course there is a

¹ *The Destiny of Man*, p. 108.

certain kind of demonstration which we can conceive as possible, or rather a kind of proof that would approach demonstration. If the doors of the future life were left ajar, so that we might look in, or so that the inhabitants might be free to come and visit us, we might have in this an approach to demonstration, although there would still be ample room for questions in regard to optical and other delusions. Many have regarded the resurrection of Jesus as a demonstration of this kind. Others have objected, and with a certain logical and superficial correctness, that the resurrection of Jesus would not prove the doctrine of immortality as applied to other lives; that the very fact that Jesus rose from the dead and entered heaven in the manner that has been recorded would show that his case was exceptional, and that his resurrection might naturally be as exceptional in its result as it had been in its method. But this argument seems to me to have little to do with the real question. For, after all, what men really want to know is not so much whether this or that individual may enter the spiritual world, but whether such a world exists, and if only a single individual were known actually to have died and then to have lived again, and to be living now in some sphere hidden from our mortal vision, nothing more would be needed to quicken the faith of men; if they could be sure that there was this sphere of being, this world of spiritual existence, then they would have at least the hope, if not the confidence, that some door would be opened by which they themselves might enter.¹

The real difficulty in the case, so far as any demonstrative evidence is concerned, is the lack of scientific certainty. One may shrink here from any criticism or test. But evidence that depends upon historical facts must submit to historical investigation; we cannot have in full force at the same time the argument from spiritual insight and the argument from the scientific proof of a material, external fact. Now all the difficulties that have beset the study of the genuineness of the gospels and their apostolic authority meet us here. For example, criticism has made much of the differences in the manner in which the story itself is narrated. Here as elsewhere we find ourselves upon firm ground only

as we study those epistles of Paul which criticism has left intact. In saying this, I do not mean, of course, that we are sure of the absolute truth of what is said; but we are sure of our witness, we know that it is Paul who is writing, and from the letters themselves we have some idea of the sort of man that he was. We find that according to Paul's testimony in regard to himself and the other disciples, both he and they believed in the actual appearance of Jesus to his followers after his death. Of course there is here no demonstration, for it is easy to say that the experiences narrated may have been only delusions. All that we know is that Paul and the others believed them to be real. I suppose one who had no faith in the possibility of immortality would make much of Paul's account of his visions. But to one who does believe in either the reality or the possibility of the immortal life the occurrences which Paul describes may be only what he has expected, and he will find in them, if not a basis for his faith, an illustration and to a greater or less extent a confirmation of it.

The difficulty, however, in regard to such evidence as this, appears in the fact that to so many thoughtful minds the claims of so-called spiritualism at the present time make such slight appeal. If spiritualism were true, there would be little difficulty in the matter, and there are multitudes of people who have been convinced by it. But as soon as one enters to any extent upon the investigation of it, the first thing that he meets is the great fact of fraud. It is admitted by fair and liberal and at the same time earnest believers in spiritualism that many of the most noted mediums fill out by fraud their lack of real power. But this introduces a very great difficulty, for if you know that there is fraud up to a certain point, it is very hard to say where the fraud ceases. Unquestionably the phenomena of mind-reading have much to do with the phenomena of spiritualism, and may be used to explain them to some extent. Perhaps we may admit the possibility that actual spiritual persons may be involved in some of these manifestations. Yet I confess that I feel more confidence when the manifestations occur under somewhat different circumstances. Thus the visions which sometimes greet the dying have, in my

judgment, much more force as evidence than those produced by mediums whose character may not be of the highest order. We might almost expect that now and then when a soul is just on the border line between the two worlds they should both be within its vision at the same time. Here again there is no demonstration, for demonstration would require us to go behind the fact and see for ourselves whether the reality were according to the appearance. What has stood most in the way of spiritualism is the generally low order of its results. There has been very little in them that has brought inspiration to the world, and the picture of spiritual life as revealed by spiritualism does not seem to be on the whole attractive. It is sometimes said in explanation of this that we are brought more easily into relation with the lower order of spirits, although some communications are received from those who profess to be exalted spirits. In my own investigations what little I have seen has given me a greater realization of the amount of fraud practised than I had before. Yet I do not consider that I have myself judged the question, and I do not wish to judge it here. All that I wish to urge here is that for the great mass of men spiritualism cannot at present be relied upon as a proof of immortality.

This first form of the argument for immortality that we have been considering may be called the argument from actual reappearance. The second form of the argument is that from analogy. The classic example of this form of the argument is the life of the butterfly, but it is easy to see that the analogy here is very weak. For the life of the butterfly is still in the material world, and our fundamental question is whether there is a spiritual world into which one may enter, apart from the material world. All such illustrations show merely that immense changes may take place in the life of an individual without destroying his individuality; the analogy goes so far, but no farther. The doctrine of the conservation of force is often brought forward as an argument, but it can hardly be considered helpful. For this doctrine does not teach that a force is preserved under the same form as that in which it has previously existed. It teaches precisely the opposite

of this. The great energies of nature manifest themselves now under one form and now under another. The doctrine of the conservation of force, if we applied it in the manner in which it is applied to the facts that come under the investigation of the scientific world, would lead us to ask whether the force which now manifests itself as spirit might not later show itself under some other form.

In its third form the argument for immortality is based upon the interesting physico-psychological phenomena of clairvoyance, mind-reading, and the like. In regard to these phenomena two questions are to be asked: first, are there any exceptional individuals who possess the power that is manifested in them? and, secondly, is it a power that is possessed at least in germ by all men? The claim is sometimes made that the two must go together, and that the power which one possesses must be to some extent possessed by all, but it seems to me not necessary to assume that all must possess it in such a degree as to affect the results even slightly. That certain individuals, however, possess the power seems to me hardly to admit of doubt, and that it is manifested in a special form by some persons in the hypnotic state is unquestioned, although many experiments have failed and although men who claimed that they possessed the power have been found to be mistaken. It is very difficult here to exclude all possible error. In the attempts to explain the phenomena the most ingenious suggestion is that the person whose thought is communicated to the other may unconsciously frame the words with his vocal organs in such a way that although no sound is heard sufficient force is yet produced to influence slightly the auditory nerve and so the brain of the percipient. So far as the bearing of the phenomena upon the question of immortality is concerned, they seem to me, up to a certain point, very interesting. They do not show that the mind can act without a physical medium, for brain may be said to act upon brain by means of some subtle physical connection. But what they do show is that there may be an activity of the senses independent of the organs through which the senses commonly act, so that we have hearing indepen-

dently of the organs of hearing, and vision that is independent of the eyes and not limited by those objects which ordinarily intercept vision. The liberty is not absolute. But the fact that this partial liberty is possible, that there may be this independence of that part of the physical organization through which communication usually takes place, affords at least a hint of the possibility of a more complete emancipation from the physical organization.

The fourth form of the argument, the psychological argument, rests upon the fundamental psychological fact of the unity of consciousness. I have dwelt at length upon this subject already,¹ and I need not repeat what I have said. We have seen that it is absolutely impossible that the unity of consciousness should be produced by any conglomeration of atoms. However subtle they might be, or however delicate the connection between them, the result would be what might be turned a *crowd* of consciousnesses and not the unity of consciousness, that unity which manifests itself in the use of the pronoun "I." Not that we have here any absolute proof that this unity may survive the dissolution of the body. Lotze, who presents the fact of the unity of consciousness with the greatest distinctness,² himself admits that it is not of the nature of a proof. If we knew that this unity had always existed, had never had a beginning, then we might reasonably assume that it would always continue; but in the thought of most of us this individuality of ours had a beginning, and if so, then its non-composite character does not prove that it may not come to an end. Yet nevertheless the fact has a very strong negative importance. For if the unity of consciousness is not the result of a combination of the molecules that compose the brain, if it cannot by any possibility be the product of them, then we are helped in our thought that it may survive when the physical organization has ceased to exist. This is a result the importance of which has hardly been recognized as yet by physico-psychologists or physiologists. Some of them seem not even to have felt the difficulty. Tyndall says that he does not understand how the

¹ Page 160.

² *Microcosmos*, transl. of Hamilton and Jones, Vol. I, p. 152, f.

flower grows. But this is an entirely different matter. The development of the flower is something that we do not understand, but the unity of consciousness is something which we know could not have resulted from any combination of physical elements. It is not a question here of any mere lack of comprehension. We do comprehend the impossibility of producing this unity by any process of composition.

I have spoken of the unity of consciousness rather than of our consciousness of unity, because the demonstration of the unity of consciousness is far more important than that of the consciousness of unity. For our consciousness of unity may be regarded as merely a postulate of thinking, whereas the unity of consciousness is independent of any consciousness of our own except as our consciousness is one and always one.

The question that may be raised in this connection as to the immortality of the lower animals is one that does not concern us here. I may say, however, in passing, that one or two elements which are among the most important factors in the human thought of immortality appear to be absent in the case of the lower animals. Whether there is in them an approach to absolute self-consciousness, and if so in what degree, we cannot say. But I am inclined to think that any approach of this sort appears most strikingly in those instances in which the animal has come under the influence of man. As I may have reminded you before, the domestic animal borrows much from the human consciousness that would hardly have been gained otherwise.¹ The pride and ambition of the race-horse may indeed involve a certain degree of consciousness, a sense of separation from others. Whether the jealousy of animals in the pairing season has anything to do with such consciousness is open to some doubt; what appears to be jealousy may arise simply from the desire of possession; certainly it is not mere jealousy that leads a dog to fight for his bone. Something that is more obviously, or less doubtfully, of the nature of jealousy, does appear in domestic animals, as when a dog shows what looks like jealousy at the attention paid by his master to another dog. But how much these reflected emotions, caught

from the higher life into the midst of which the animal has been thrown, have to do with the nature of the animal himself, is a doubtful question. As I said at the outset, the matter is one that does not concern us in connection with our present discussion. The question as to the immortality of the lower animals is wholly distinct from the question as to the immortality of man. If the decision in regard to the immortality of man should involve a decision as to that of the lower animals, I do not know why we need to protest. But all that we can say with any definiteness is that the indications of the immortality of man are very much more marked than those of the immortality of the lower animals, and for the reason that whereas the personality of man is developed, that of the lower animals is not.

There is, however, another aspect of the fact of consciousness which does concern us here, namely, the question as to the theory which finds the origin of religious belief, and more especially the origin of the belief in immortality, in the dream. If these beliefs were based on a theory which has proved to be mistaken, why, it may be asked, should the beliefs remain when the theory upon which they rested has been demolished? Of course the reply may be made that the fact that religion and the belief in immortality remain in spite of the decay of this alleged foundation, would imply that the relation between the beliefs and the theory was not so absolute as some have supposed. I do not need to discuss here the relation of this theory to religion in general, but as regards its relation to the doctrine of immortality we have to recognize the fact that belief or knowledge may be obtained purely by accident, and then, when once obtained, may find a stable psychological foundation. In speaking of the origin and growth of Christianity I said that the fact that accidents might have contributed largely toward establishing the leadership of this or that person, did not at all affect his power and right to lead, provided that power was manifested.¹ So here, the fact that it may have been an accident which first brought this great thought of immortality into human consciousness does not imply that there may not have been a special psychological basis upon

which it could rest permanently. The savage did not only believe that the spirit or shade of the departed still lived and visited him in dreams, and that he himself in his dreams left his body and wandered to distant places. He also found that there was within himself something separable, the sense of personality, the sense of the "I," which gathered itself up and separated itself, not merely from surrounding personalities and the physical environment, but also from his own body, so that he could say with a sense both of possession and of identity "my body." It is possible, and I am inclined to think it probable, that this was the basis upon which the thought of immortality first found rest, as the theory of dreams began to give way to other views. At least it complements the theory of dreams, and might easily serve to give additional and permanent strength to the belief which that theory had suggested.

The fifth form of the argument for immortality is the philosophical or teleological argument. I give the two terms, but I am inclined to think that a single term, *philosophico-teleological*, would express my meaning better. I use the word "teleological" in its largest and most fundamental sense. Suppose we assume the Absolute as the foundation of all thought as well as of all being. The Absolute, by that fundamental process which underlies all thinking and all spiritual life, produces from itself individuals. These individuals are individual in the strict sense of the term; they have separated themselves from the world about them and have become conscious *egos*. Now there are two dispositions of these individuals that are conceivable: first, that they should lose their individuality, and sink back again and be absorbed into their original source; and second, that they should continue to develop as individuals, and should return to their source, not mechanically or physically, so to speak, by the mere process of absorption, but through self-surrender and love, in a process which should be endless, always accomplishing itself and yet never finally accomplished. According to the first view, we should have only the first two stages of the great and fundamental logical process, unity and differentiation, and a differentiation

which really amounts to nothing. There would be no third stage of integration, for that is not integration in which the individuals simply fall back again into abstract unity; true integration requires that the differentiated elements shall all be taken up and preserved in a difference which yet shall not be a difference of separation. On the other hand, according to the second view, the theory of immortality, we have a conception of the universe which is complete, a process of perpetual differentiation and integration. This process is without end, because the individual, in the eternal process of his identification with the Absolute, can complete the process only in eternity; his goal is an infinite goal. Yet it is not a process which is worthless until completed. There are such processes. A mechanical process is in large part worthless until the finished result is reached; the unfinished mechanical instrument is practically good for nothing. But it is very different with organic life. Here there is worth at every stage even of its incompleteness. Thus the life of the child is of immense worth even if it never becomes the life of the man, and yet it is incomplete, because there are possible values which it has never attained. In a similar way, in this process of eternal differentiation and integration which is never complete and yet always completing itself, we may say that the joy is in the process rather than in the result. For in the process the individual is entering always more and more into the divine relationship. If the result were attained, so that the individual was absolutely lost in God, then there would be no individual consciousness whatever; the individual would have passed away. In the process the individual is preserved at the same time that he is lost. For it is a process of voluntary self-surrender. He asserts his individuality in the very act of surrendering it. It is *he* who surrenders himself, but he does not remain merely a separate individual, for he *surrenders* himself.

It may be asked whether such a process, or such a result, might not be attained through an eternal sequence of individuals, by which each generation should enter into the results of the generation that had preceded it, and so the advance in the direction of

the divine relation be made through waves, as it were, of human life, rather than through individuals. But whatever other difficulties in the way of this assumption may occur to us, it is enough that we meet this fundamental difficulty, that science makes no provision for an advance of this kind. Not merely certain scientific men but science itself would declare that if anything is certain, it is that there is no such thing as perpetual motion. There is no such thing as motion without friction, and friction by its very existence is destructive of motion. So that if a man comes to any scientific person and tells him that he has discovered a machine which without any influx of fresh power from without will move on forever, the scientific person does not need even to look at the machine, but knows in advance that the man is either a crank or uninstructed. There is this friction in the revolution of the earth. Kant himself, if I am rightly informed, was the first to call attention to the fact that the tides are like a great brake upon the rotation of the earth,—the fact which may help to justify that awe which so many feel in the presence of the ocean, and which certainly enhances our own sense of its sublimity when we think that this is the hand that is laid upon the earth to delay its course.

If we accept this dictum from science, we find that the perpetual development of the human race upon the earth is not conceivable. Any outward “good time coming” of the sort to which men have so long looked forward, must be rather a culmination than the close of a development. That is, it must be merely a highest point from which there will be a slow recession. If there is to be a golden age in the later period of the earth’s history, it must be a golden age of the spiritual life as it finds itself beset, to a degree of which we can hardly conceive, by the elements that are slowly to crowd man out of his place upon the earth. If there is to be a perpetual development, it must be through the individual rather than through the race, and what is true of our world must be true of all worlds, for the principle that is involved is fundamental.

There is a more personal aspect of this philosophico-teleological argument, in the great possibilities that are bound up in the

spiritual nature of every individual. There are two views which one may take of immortality. When we see a nature which seems already nearly perfect and hardly to need the process of death in order to reach that higher spiritual life which we call angelic, we are apt to think at first that the idea of immortality is easy to conceive, for we seem to see the immortal life already begun on earth. But when we consider some poor ignorant, degraded specimen of humanity side by side with that first exalted nature, we find in it no hint of immortality. It would be possible, however, to take quite another view. We might say of the exalted nature that perhaps it had had its fulfilment; it had looked upon the universe and had seen God, and might be content, as we also might be content for it, that it should pass away. But of these other, lower lives, which in spite of present ignorance and degradation still have within themselves the possibility of the divine vision, the germ of the immortal life, we might say that these were the natures of whose future existence we might be most assured. In the first case it is easier for us to conceive of immortality because we see the spirit shining through the flesh; in the second case because the flesh still so overlies the spirit. In the first case the conception rests on intuition, in the second case on reason.

These two aspects of the argument, as related on the one hand to the universe and on the other to the individual complete each other. That which the universe demands in the relation of the creation to the Creator is seen to be demanded also by the nature of the individual.

The sixth form of the argument, the ethical aspect of it, follows naturally upon what has just been said. The individual, it is held, cannot fulfil the law of righteousness within any brief or limited period. Besides this, there is the question whether the universe is at heart just or unjust. This question presents itself in two aspects. First there is the question as to the justice or injustice of exciting hopes that can never be fulfilled or making beginnings that are to lead to nothing further. Then, secondly, there is the matter of equality, the fact that some come into the world so

pressed by outward circumstances that their lives can be only misery, while others are so fortunate that it is their own fault if they are not supremely happy; the fact that some holy individuals because of their very holiness suffer martyrdom, whereas others through their sinfulness not only obtain worldly prosperity, but, so far as one may judge, are not troubled by even the inner pains of conscience which so beset those who are more virtuous than themselves. It has been a favorite argument for immortality that the balance should be restored. The answer has been made that this restoration goes on all the time, that the balance is always being accomplished, that righteousness pays as it goes. But so far as happiness is concerned, I think we must admit that Kant is right, and that virtue does not make a man happy. He may indeed be less miserable than he would be if he did wrong. In exceptional cases, as when he suffers the flames of martyrdom for conscience sake, he may have such a sense of the nearness of immortality as to make him absolutely happy. But where a man who without any exalted religious faith is simply doing right, suffers for his right-doing, we can say only that he is less miserable than he would have been, had he not done right: we cannot go so far as to say that he is happy. I know that the answer may be made to this that the individual who does right in order that he may be happy does not really do right. But we are not putting ourselves now in the place of these individuals and uttering the complaint of the man who does right and suffers. We are looking upon the question from the outside. We are pressing it not for ourselves but on behalf of others, and above all on behalf of the universe itself. We demand poetic justice for the universe, in order that it may be complete; that it may have the crown of beauty as well as of holiness. It is from this point of view that the ethical argument for immortality is to be pressed. It loses weight, we freely admit, when it is urged by the individual on his own behalf; the person to whom it applies has not the right to offer it. But when we leave ourselves out of the account and look upon man and the universe at large, then perhaps we do have a right to urge it.

In its seventh form the argument for immortality is based upon man's sense of the ideal, the fact that he attains to the recognition of the absolute ideal. For these ideas are eternal, and he who sees things *sub specie aeternitatis*, to use one of Spinoza's most striking phrases, is taken up out of the flux and sweep of the things of time. It is possible and even probable that this sweep of change is all that the animal sees, and perhaps all that some men see. But above and beneath it are the things that abide, the absolute truth and goodness and beauty, together with all the forms under which they manifest themselves. The fact that man has the power to recognize these elements may not be an argument for immortality, but at least it enables us better to conceive the possibility of immortality. The spirit which has entered the realm of eternal things to the extent of having looked upon them may with less difficulty be supposed to partake of their eternity. One feels this the more strongly when one recalls how easily the sense of immortality arises in those moments when one is exalted by the ideal relations; thus the lover of music seems often in certain moods to be lifted above the limits of time, and there is a similar experience in all similar exaltation. The individual who has entered this realm is not merely a higher animal, for he has entered where, so far as we can judge, the lower animal cannot enter. There is here another of the indications which make it easier for us to believe in the immortality of man than in that of the lower animals, although as I have already suggested¹ it is in no way necessary to the upward flight of the spirit that the lower life should be pressed downward.

This element which we have just considered reaches its culmination in the consciousness of God. Here is the eighth form of the argument. In the thought of God all the ideas of the reason are blended in absolute unity. The spirit that feels itself rooted in him feels itself independent of earthly things. It is like the water lily, the lotus, rooted beneath the stream. I hardly understand how one who has a real faith in God can have serious doubt in regard to the immortality of the spirit. For from one point of view the only real difficulty is the question as to the

sphere which the spirit is to inhabit after it has been severed from its material environment. But if we recognize a spiritual as well as a physical universe, if we recognize the Infinite Spirit as well as the infinitude of matter, then all difficulty of this kind appears to be solved; there is a sphere in which the spirit may live, apart from the physical environment. Furthermore, if we attain to the consciousness of God, those arguments to which I have already referred, in regard to the demand for justice and completeness in the universe, have a special significance and power. For without God the universe would be only a world of atoms of which little of justice or equality could be expected. Apart from this, however, the fact that the spirit reaches the idea of God is itself an indication of immortality, because in this thought it already severs itself from the mere material world about it, and if we may assume that the thought embodies an absolute reality, then this reality provides an absolute foundation for belief. I do not mean to say that the belief in individual immortality must inevitably follow from the belief in the existence of God. What I am urging is that if we grant the existence of God, then the fact that the individual is conscious of the divine life, and feels that his own life is rooted in it, makes the thought of immortality in one aspect easy if not necessary, while the fact that an infinite sphere is provided in which the spirit may dwell when severed from the material world removes the difficulty of the belief in another aspect.

We see how the belief in immortality is one of the outgrowths of religious faith. We have left far behind that world of dreams of the savage, with its play of the fancy and its suggestion of demonic life. We have reached the fulness of the spiritual life, in which the soul meets the Absolute face to face. It lives in a higher world, the world of ideas, the world of God. The ideal elements of this world may go very far beyond anything that is found in the external world. It is a world which in part the spirit has created, or which it perceives by its own powers of intuition. For the absolute goodness and truth and beauty, as we have all along seen, involve that which we have called the *supernatural*.¹ But since

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 89.

the spirit lives in this world which is above nature, it seems natural that it should be to a certain extent independent of the world of nature. At least we can conceive it possible that as the lower world of change drifts on beneath the spirit, it shall not be swept along with it in its course.

Finally we come to the suggestion that is offered in man's divination of immortality, his instinctive faith in it. Of the two aspects under which this manifests itself historically, the aspect that has been more often emphasized is the universality of the belief. From the earliest period of which we have any knowledge we find evidences of it, and it is doubtful if a race has ever been found in which it did not exist. Individuals have professed that they did not have it, but so far as the history of the race in general is concerned we find it everywhere. It is the second aspect, however, which is the more important, namely, the belief of the higher natures. Wherever the inner life of the spirit has been most developed, there we find, as a rule, the strongest faith in immortality. At least this is true of the past. In our own time there have been some very noble spirits, such as Harriet Martineau and George Eliot, who appear not to have had faith in immortality. But one may easily make too much of individual examples. For in our day questioning and criticism are so common that the natural instincts hardly have free sweep. The element of self-consciousness also has often a repressing effect upon instinctive faith. It works here very much as we see it so frequently in the case of acquired instincts, as when one plays from memory upon an instrument or as when one walks at a great height upon a narrow plank; one's success depends largely upon the extent to which one can avoid thinking about what one is doing. We can easily understand how in the winds of doctrine that are so prevalent nowadays the spirit as it strives to rise may be swept out of its course.

It is interesting to notice the faith in God and even in immortality that we find in writers whose general habit of thought might lead us to expect from them little sympathy with such beliefs. Thus we have seen how Darwin speaks of God as breathing the

breath of life into a few original forms,¹ and in *The Destiny of Man* John Fiske out of the very process of evolution itself grasps the thought of the permanence of the individual.² The religious spirit should recognize the fact that its friends and allies are more numerous than is sometimes thought, and that in the minds of many of the men of science and of the questioning habit there remain the fundamental religious faiths which it is simply not a part of their special work to emphasize or elaborate.

The instinctive faith in immortality which we are here considering is in itself a most striking fact. The more we think of it the more we realize the weakness of any explanation like the theory of the phenomena of dreams, to account for this long-continued faith in man by which

“He thinks he was not made to die.”³

The very thought of eternity would seem to lift man out of the limits of time, especially when we consider the fact that man is the only being upon the earth that is in the strict sense of the word “mortal,” the only being that is conscious of its mortality.⁴ For in spite of occasional stories to the contrary, the lower animals cling instinctively to life, and it is safe to assume that they have no consciousness of the limitations of their lives, but pass each moment as though it were part of an eternal existence, with no thought of any end or separation. I am inclined to think that natures of the sort to which I have just referred, like Harriet Martineau and George Eliot, may have denied a belief in immortality largely because in a similar way they had already entered into an eternal life, so to speak, and therefore were hardly conscious of the coming day. But however this may be, we see how man’s faith in immortality rises out of his recognition of the great fact of death. He has crossed a gulf which the lower life does not recognize. The lower animal has the sense of life, but

¹ *The Origin of Species*, close of Chap. XV.

² *The Destiny of Man*, Chap. XVI.

³ *In Memoriam*, the prologue.

⁴ Page 202.

not the sense of death; man has the sense of death, but he has also the sense of immortality. Here is the final stage in the great process of affirmation, negation, and negation of the negation. This instinct is not merely the form in which belief commonly appears, but it may be in itself an indication of the trustworthiness of belief.

Of course difficulties occur to us. There is the difficulty to which I have already referred, in regard to the life of the lower animals. But, as I said before, the question as to their immortality is wholly independent of the question as to the immortality of man. If the lower animals also are immortal, so much the better. All that can be said is that certain reasons exist for a belief in the immortality of man which do not hold in the case of the lower animals. In the lower animals as in man there is affection, there are elements of consciousness, there is suffering which may demand compensation. But there do not exist in the lower animals that distinct, rounded, self-conscious personality which appears in man, and that faith in love, that instinct by which man's spirit clings to the departed and will not give them up but follows them into some new and higher life. I once heard a sermon in which the preacher insisted that our feeling toward the departed was not properly to be described as love. I do not know what was the practical or spiritual purpose of the sermon; I only know that it chilled the spirits of many among those who listened to it. But if we have any belief in immortality, why should we not call this feeling love which reaches through the veil that separates us from the unseen world? Such love is one of the forms in which the fundamental instinct of immortality manifests itself. Even the lower animal has it to some extent—the dog that knows nothing of the mystery of death and yet will die of sorrow on the grave of his master. However, all that I wish to urge here is that the question as to the immortality of the lower animals does not concern us in relation to our present discussion.

This is also true in regard to the question of pre-existence. Many hold that the doctrine of immortality involves the doctrine

of pre-existence. But pre-existence is something about which we know nothing whatever. For anything that we know to the contrary, we may have existed indefinitely or from eternity. Certainly we existed long before our consciousness could tell us anything in regard to it, and the earlier years of conscious life are wholly passed from memory. Who can say what previous existence may or may not have been ours? Perhaps our spirits have had their growth slowly through all the stages of lower life, and that thus there may be an immortality of the beast as the lower life takes form at last in the higher life of man. But a matter that is so uncertain not merely as regards the fact, but also as regards the relation of that fact to the doctrine of immortality, hardly needs to enter into our consideration. Our present question is not as to the eternity of existence, but whether existence as we find it here is of such a nature as to justify a faith in its immortality.

We must bear in mind always that nothing that has been said *proves* the doctrine of immortality. All that we have been doing is to bring out the elements of the highest religious faith in their relation to this doctrine. Religion is a matter of faith, not of demonstration. Even in the more ordinary subjects of human thought one sees clearly enough how little room there is for demonstration. We cannot prove to a man that Wilberforce had a nobler career than Napoleon, and we ought to see as clearly how powerless demonstration is in relation to the elements which constitute man's higher life.

There are, however, certain other difficulties which are urged from quite another point of view. It is said, for example, that the belief in immortality is narrow and selfish. But we must recognize the fact that one's thought of immortality rests as largely upon the thought of others as upon the thought of one's self. It is our thought of the universe that demands it rather than the thought of our own individual lives. What concerns us most is not what may happen to us individually, but the question whether or no we must give up our dreams of a universe which is governed by love and wisdom, and which is working toward some

great and worthy end. It is the faith in all the higher relations of human existence which points to the faith in immortality. But even if we consider only the individual, the doctrine of immortality when viewed from the proper standpoint is seen not to be a manifestation of littleness or selfishness. It is true that there is a great beauty, almost a sublimity, in the self-forgetfulness and self-abnegation of the spirit which lays down its hope of immortality in obedience to what it believes to be the demands of truth. Men have made many sacrifices to truth, but none, perhaps, that is more profound than this. The words of George Eliot are very touching when she speaks of rejoicing, or trying to rejoice, in the thought of the sunshine that shall be in the world after we are gone, and when she prays in the great utterance of that poem which is now so familiar,

“Oh may I join the choir invisible,”

we cannot but admire the unselfishness that is manifested in such belief. But the question as to the selfishness or unselfishness of the hope of immortality depends almost entirely upon the nature of that hope. The hope of one who is looking forward merely to a paradise of personal joy may not grow out of actual selfishness but certainly is centred in self-love. But in the higher life self is given up. The individual spirit does not think of itself as self-centred but as in relation to the infinite spirit. Its hope is not for a universe in which everything shall conform to its desire and will, but for one in which it shall itself conform always more and more to the divine will.

Perhaps the lowest form of the belief in immortality arises out of the mere habit of living; we are used to living and we hate to have the habit broken up. The true thought of immortality is not this mere clinging to the habit of living, but the recognition of the true end of life, and the glad and full surrender of one's self to it. Granting such recognition and surrender, what if the spirit does pray for an immortality of life in which it shall be bound to the other spirits about it by natural love, and in which it shall

share more and more in the inflow and outflow of the divine life? Shall we call such existence selfish or even self-centred? A child is sick unto death, and the mother shrinks from having any hand but hers minister to it. Shall we call such a mother selfish? She wishes to give up the peace of her nights and the pleasure of her days to this care. Is it selfish? Is there not here the very unselfishness of love? Or when in some perilous assault soldiers rush forward to share the post of danger, is it selfishness or unselfishness? There may be the thought of self, but only in the eagerness to surrender self. Is it selfishness or unselfishness that the spirit longs to be itself the instrument of the eternal love? Or, to speak more especially of the relation of love to its object, is it selfish or unselfish in the spirit that it shrinks from an eternal separation from the object of its love? Is it selfish or unselfish in it that it clings to the thought of living more and more fully in the perfection of the divine love, that it shrinks from passing out of the world of God himself? If this is selfishness, it is certainly a qualified selfishness. To me it seems to be the very opposite of selfishness. In a single word, the relation of the thought of immortality to self depends, as I said before, upon the nature of the immortality that is the object of one's hope. If it is an immortality of love and service and self-surrender, then the longing for it would seem to be free from selfishness.

One of the fundamental difficulties in regard to this whole question at the present day arises from the fact that we set too low an estimate upon the personal. There is even a tendency to look upon it as something to be escaped from, a feeling that the impersonal is higher and worthier. We are reminded that although individuals may pass away, the eternal laws of the universe abide; there is still the movement of the great forces which constitute the physical life, there is still the activity of the great spiritual forces; so long as these endure, what does it matter that the merely personal comes and goes? But when we look more closely we find that personality is the one thing in the universe the permanence of which is of value to us. We may even ask what would become of this infinite, absolute universe itself if

personality should disappear. For there are no laws outside of the human soul, or rather outside of conscious spirit; there are only facts. It is the power of generalization which unites these facts in a single thought and brings them together in a common law, which changes facts to laws. Again, personality is the one thing in our lives which we are not willing to change or to replace. Anything else may come and go, but when your friend goes, his place cannot be filled; his personality has made it sacred. Thus the grief for personal loss is the one grief for which we are not willing to be consoled. Even the things which we cherish, the lock of hair, the bit of ribbon, are things that have become dear to us through the touch of personal association. If we could fully realize the place and value of the personal in our lives, if we could fully appreciate its power and its divinity, we should shrink less from applying the term even to God himself, and we should certainly feel more deeply the power of the spiritual life.

I have spoken thus far of the nature of the faith in immortality. What shall we say of the nature of that future life which we may accept from the hands of faith? We can only say with the apostle, "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."¹ How is it possible for us to conceive the nature of this higher life? Granting the absolute certainty of it, what can we know of it? Or supposing it possible that we should be placed in the midst of it, what could we comprehend? What does the child comprehend of the world in which he is placed, of the lives of his father and mother, of their relations to all the life that circles about them? He sees, and he thinks he understands, but we know that he comprehends little of the underlying reality of it all. Or take some person who has the musical sense but in whom that sense is wholly untrained, and set him in the midst of the world of music and make him listen to some perfect concert. What does he know of it? And what is true in his case and in the case of the child, is true in varying degrees and varying relations of all of us. No spirit comprehends the world about it except by the most imperfect divination. We can trust only to

¹ *1 Corinthians*, ii, 9.

certain absolute principles. From the beginning of our examination the ideas of the reason have been our guides. They have suggested to us the content of the religious life, they have shaped our visions, and it is they alone that can give us any prophecy in regard to the nature of the immortal life. We believe that God is the source of all that exalts us in the earth. The unity after which the thought of philosophy is always striving, the goodness of the universe, its beauty, these all are only the manifestations of God. We are assured that if there be this eternity God fills it, and that what has been the source of joy here is the possible source of ever increasing joy, a joy that is not selfish but the opposite of selfishness.

Various questions will suggest themselves and may be answered after a fashion. There is the question as to the recognition of friends in the coning life, the relation of spirit to spirit. It may help us here to bear in mind what I said just now of the love which clings to the departed as one of the powers by which the faith of the spirit is compelled to "trust the larger hope" and press on, as it were, into the unseen world. Emerson makes little of the personal element that we have been considering.¹ Yet Emerson's loftiest song, the song in which he is moved to a passion that we rarely find in him, and in which the great thought of the infinite realities becomes most clear to him, is that poem which grew out of his personal bereavement.²

There is the question as to universal salvation. Will all spirits reach the fruition that seems possible for them, at least in their ideal of life, or will some either drop out by the way and cease to be, or else continue in an eternity of sin and misery? Who can venture to answer such questions as these except in the familiar words that I have just used.

"And faintly trust the larger hope."³

The difficulty here is one of which Dorner makes much, the antinomy between God's power on the one hand and individual

¹ *Essay on Love.*

² *Threnody.*

³ *In Memoriam*, iv.

freedom on the other. How can the doctrine of universal salvation be affirmed without doing violence to the freedom of the individual? Can God compel a spirit to love him, to choose the good instead of the evil? On the other hand we have to recognize the might of the forces that are pushing in the direction of universal salvation, the omnipotence of God and the divine spirit, and the real nature of man himself, which, however it may strive to satisfy itself with lower things, yet never can be satisfied so long as its highest possibilities are unfulfilled. If we look about us, do we find any in whom the germs of the better life have wholly disappeared? As your eye falls on some company of roughs, you may ask yourself what elements of a higher life are to be found in natures such as theirs. But suddenly a child falls into the water, and while you and I stand full of horror but shrinking back, one of these men plunges in and saves the child, it may be with an oath on his lips at the very moment of self-sacrifice.

In general there is little room here for dogmatism, but great room for faith. It is easy to paint the curtain that hides from us the unseen world and think that the pictures represent it, but the curtain is still there. I do not mean to imply that the play of the imagination by which we attempt to make what is so dimly seen more concrete, may not have its place. We may indeed regret that such pictures cannot be more real. Yet there is the danger that the definite representations of the future life that are sometimes given, however comforting and helpful in certain ways, may exclude or weaken somewhat that thought of the relation to the infinite which after all is among the most helpful elements of the great doctrine. The inspiration which comes from the recognition of this element of mystery is not to be lightly prized, even while we trust our higher faith and while our imagination pictures for us as it can that which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard."

At an earlier stage in the examination that we have been making we considered first the *a priori* and then the *a posteriori* argument for religious faith. We are now concluding what may be

regarded as a third argument, the argument from personal experience. It is found in the religious consciousness itself, in the joy and power of the religious life, in the sense of the divine communion. If one is pressed logically, one must admit that looked at from the outside such an argument rests only upon the individual interpretation of certain phenomena of consciousness, and that there is the possibility of self-deception. Nevertheless we must recognize that it is precisely what the *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments lead us to expect. It comes as a confirmation of them—as a confirmation, too, without which they would lose much of their power. One may be deceived in regard to the external world, one knows that there may be delusions there, and yet one cannot help trusting the testimony of the senses. Here we have the spiritual sense, and thus the experience of religion becomes one of the most important arguments for the truth of religion. The phrase “experience of religion” is often used, if not wrongly, certainly in its least important significance. A person is said to have experienced religion at the moment when his religious life begins, whereas properly and strictly the experience of religion should come with the continuance and development of the religious life itself. A sailor’s “experience” does not come in the moment when he first sets foot on board his ship or first feels the motion of the waves beneath him; such a moment may well be an epoch in his life, but experience is something that can come to him only with the long years of actual service.

With the close of the argument from personal experience we reach our sixth and final definition of religion. As we added to the fourth definition¹ the element of Christianity to obtain the fifth definition,² so now we add the element of the personal experience of the individual soul. RELIGION, then, IS THE FEELING TOWARD A SPIRITUAL PRESENCE MANIFESTING ITSELF IN TRUTH, GOODNESS AND BEAUTY, ESPECIALLY AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS AND AS EXPERIENCED IN EVERY SOUL THAT IS OPEN TO ITS INFLUENCE.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH.—BAPTISM.—COMMUNION.

IT would be interesting to consider at length the development of the authority of the Christian Church. Comparisons are sometimes made between that authority and the authority of science. The world, it is said, respects the authority of science as it does not that of the church. It should be remembered, however, that the authority of the Church is of two kinds: on the one hand it is concerned with religion itself, the spiritual experience of the human soul, and on the other hand it has to do with matters of belief and administration which have grown up about religion. In this second aspect it is either a divided authority or an authority assumed at second hand, and must naturally suffer when set beside the comparatively undivided authority of science. But in its first aspect, in its relation to spiritual experience, it is an authority at first hand and absolute. Whatever may have been the misapprehensions or contradictions in the beliefs about religion, underneath and through them all the Church has nourished the positive thought of the spiritual presence, and so the faith of the absolute religion. The eternal heavens may often have been obscured by the disputes of the theologians, but there has been no time at which the eternal light has not shone through. As regards the three ideas of the reason, the Church has recognized them in varying degree, but in general, by its philosophy, by its methods of organization and of work, and by its services, it has tended to do its part in furnishing to the religious life its content of truth and goodness and beauty.

It remains for me to consider, though very briefly, the two rites which the Church at large has recognized, the one positive, the other negative, communion and baptism. The rite of

baptism represents negatively the cleansing of the spirit and its entrance upon a new career. It seems especially fit and pleasing in the case of infants and of those who are about to join for the first time in the communion service. It is easy to ridicule the baptism of infants on the ground that we are doing for them that which they do not understand. But we do not usually wait to do something for a child until it can understand what we are doing. We do not wait till it is conscious before we adopt it into our hearts, and as the son or daughter rejoices that the love of father and mother met them at their birth, so it may be a help to a man or a woman to think that the Church thus met them and received them upon their entrance into the world.

As regards the communion, the fact that the Church has chosen this method to commemorate its founder is enough. It is first of all a service of commemoration; in how intense a form we do not always remember. It goes back without a break to the tenderest moment in the life of Jesus. It is almost as though we received the cup warm from the hand of the Master himself. One should bear in mind that in all that is essential it is a very simple service, and also that it is a service which has been newly consecrated again and again by the holy men and women, the heroic lives, who in every age have joined in it. Furthermore, it is a symbol both of the profound mysticism which underlies all true religion and especially the Christian religion, and also of the manner in which the daily life of men should be transfigured.

It has been too often associated with artificial interpretations of its meaning. Too often, also, it has been held to apply to an actual attainment of the worshipper rather than to his aspiration and endeavor. But rightly understood it brings the soul into present relation with the highest spiritual realities. It is at once a commemoration of the fullest manifestation of the spiritual life that the world has seen, and also a call to everyone to share in that higher life. We speak sometimes of looking back to Jesus. Is it really a backward look? Or do we look forward to him?

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